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2ABSTRACT
E.G. West raises, but does not adequately address, philosophical issues concerning the
justification for state intervention in education. West's market model is outlined, and likely
objections - based on recent arguments against 'internal markets' in education - are explored.
Chapter 1 outlines West's role for the state in inspecting a 'minimum adequate education for
all'. Chapter 2 examines whether this could overcome the objection that markets won't
satisfy equality of opportunity. Williams', Rawls' and Dworkin's arguments on equality are
found compatible with West's model. The curriculum for West's model is then investigated:
Chapter 3 considers 'education for democracy', and whether compulsion is needed to ensure
the desired qualities for democratic participation emerge, or whether they could emerge freely
in civil society. A reductio ad absurdum argument brings out the illiberal consequence of a
compulsory curriculum, of a 'fitness test' for democratic participation. Chapter 4 explores
'education for autonomy'. John White's argument for a compulsory curriculum for autonomy
could undermine other autonomy-promoting institutions in civil society, it is suggested.
White's argument depends upon Joseph Raz's argument for state promotion of autonomy,
which is explored, raising the 'epistemic argument' for markets. John Gray's argument to this
effect is extended, to suggest that there will be difficulties with any 'fleshing out' of West's
curriculum if it is to be promoted by the state. One way around this, democratic control of
the curriculum, is explored in chapter 5. Difficulties with John White's approach arise
because of logical constraints on improving democracy, raised by consideration of social
choice theory (Arrow's theorem and its corollaries) and public choice theory (logrolling).
Chapter 6 considers the objection to markets that education is a 'public good', using the
arguments of Gerald Grace and Ruth Jonathan. These are put in the context of the game.
theory literature of De Jasay, Taylor, and Axelrod. The 'public goods dilemma' is explored,
to arrive at less pessimistic conclusions about markets in education than the critics of markets
we consider. Finally, chapter 7 briefly relates the issues to the contemporary discussion about
markets, including internal markets and vouchers, in education.
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Chapter 1: Education and the State
Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
Is there a philosophical justification for the state to be involved in education? If so,
what level of state intervention can be justified? I take as the springboard for
exploring these issues, the work of Professor E.G. West. West is one of the foremost
proponents of entrusting education to markets, and hence for a much lesser role for
the state in education. His most recent discussion to this effect pointed out that the
'opting out revolution' in England & Wales, allowing schools to leave Local
Education Authority control, was mild in comparison with what he seeks, namely,
'opting out in the sense of having the family's tax contributions to education returned
to it so that it can once more spend its own funds directly on the purchase of
schooling.' (West 1993 p. 20). Again, after setting out an 'archetypal' model of a
market education system, where '[g]overnment subsidies, whether in the form of
grants to private schools or vouchers to parents, are absent' (West 1991 p. 160), he
chastises educationalists for failing to realise that 'currently proposed voucher systems
... fail to match true market provision of education' (p. 164).
West's most well-known and widely-cited work is his Education and the State (1965,
2nd edition 19701) . Now, to the historian of education, this is a work of some
importance in the contemporary debate about education in Victorian England & Wales.
1 All references are to the 2nd edition.
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Centred on original research, West questioned the accepted wisdom of the role of state
intervention in bringing about near-universal schooling and literacy in England &
Wales. His major insight that before the state there was considerable private provision
of education, and that literacy rates were very high, is now widely accepted, (see e.g.
Johnson 1979, Gardner 1984, Stephens 1987) although precise details in his argument
are disputed'.
However, Education and the State is not just a historical treatise: .indeed,· in the
preface, Arthur Seldon claimed that the 'main part' of the bookwas 'a re-examination
of contemporary educational policy from first principles.' (West 1970 p. x). West
himself agrees that the work 'is not primarily a volume of history', but is 'an
exploration of the social and economic principles of [state] intervention' (p. xx). To
the philosopher of education, his discussion of these issues is not entirely satisfactory.
For he discusses many issues of philosophical import, such as the protection of
minors, equality of opportunity, and education for democracy, but, does not address
the philosophical literature focused on precisely thoseissues". Later work of West's
took the economic and historical arguments furtherl.vbut didn't develop these
philosophical issues. This neglect is excusable in a path-breaking and interdisciplinary
book of this nature; West was not a philosopher and these problems do not detract
2 The debate is reviewed in appendix 1.
3 Philosophy of education as a discipline of course was in its infancy when West was
writing: however, there was still much written by 'pure' philosophers ofrelevance to
his discussion which he did not address; e.g. Williams (1962) on equality of
opportunity and education.
4 See for example, West 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1990,
1991.
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from the development of his historical and economic arguments. However, the
suspicion must be that, had West addressed philosophical concerns, he may well have
arrived at different policy conclusions, and been less sanguine about leaving education
largely outside of state intervention.
This thesis attempts to fill the philosophical lacuna in West's argument. It uses
West's discussion as a springboard to explore these important philosophical issues,
including the central question of the justification for state intervention in education.
My method will be to complement West's historical and economic arguments and
assumptions with a philosophical dimension. Hence, the historical and economic
angles of his work will not be taken any further.
West's arguments are particulary germane to the current political and educational
debate about the role of 'markets' in educational provision. To emphasise this
relevance, my method will be to use the recent literature criticising recent moves
towards markets in England & Wales, .showing how these criticisms will also be
relevant to West's argument. I will also make brief comments in the concluding
chapter about the relevance of his argument, if any, to those concerned with these
current policy issues.
In a thesis of this length there is not space to tackle all the concerns raised by an issue
of such importance, so I propose to narrow the scope of the work in three main,
although related, ways. Firstly, motivated by the contemporary critique of markets
from the 'political left' , I am not interested herein exploring the viability of a more
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'libertarian' position than West sets out. So I will not be examining arguments in
political philosophy which question whether we need a state at all (see for example,
Nozick 1974 part 1); nor arguments emphasising the need for the state to get out of
education altogether (see for example Rothbard 1975 pp. 102-107). My main concern
is exploring the dialogue that could emerge between West and those unsympathetic
to markets from the 'political left', to see if there could be some agreement reached
between them on a minimum role for the state. This approach is in itself justified on
the grounds that it clearly reflects West's own concerns in writing Education and the
Secondly, the springboard for this work is the 'educational model in political
economy' which West sets out, based on, as we shall see, four explicit assumptions.
These four assumptions will, by and large, be taken as given: the aim of the thesis,
is to take West's model and see what follows from this. Related to both of these
issues is the third narrowing of scope, in that the thesis will not attempt to construct
a positive case for markets, in terms of the virtues markets can inculcate", or their
efficiency in economic terms, and so on. However, brief comments along these lines
will be made in several places to complement the discussion, but these must be taken
as setting out the agenda for future research: this thesis fundamentally aims to tackle
the objections laid against markets, rather than attempting a wholesale defence of
5 For example, he himself accepts, as we shall see below, the 'protection of minors'
principle which gives the role for the state in education; the main criticisms which he
considers throughout the book reflect the concerns of the political left, for example,
on equality of opportunity, and education for democracy.
6 For discussion along these lines see Gray (1992) and Novak (1992); Smith ([1776],
1976) is of course also relevant.
them.
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The central question of this thesis is thus: Given West's assumptions, what is the·
minimum justified role for the state in education? In particular, what is the minimum
justified level of state regulation of the curriculum?
The thesis is divided into 7 chapters. This first chapter shortly outlines West's model
and assumptions, with the aim of distinguishing those issues of philosophical import
from issues of empirical, historical and economic importance, as well as examining
the coherence of his argument, relating his conclusions to his assumptions. Of.
fundamental importance to the philosopher of education is that West sees the main
role for the state as setting and policing a 'minimum adequate education for all'; this
provides much of the impetus for the remaining chapters.
Chapter 2 examines whether this requirement could overcome the frequently-cited
objection to markets that they won't satisfy equality of opportunity. Exploration of
recent philosophical writing, by Bernard Williams, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin,
on this issue suggests that perhaps it would, that what these philosophers really mean
by 'equality of opportunity' is something closer to the demand that no-one should fall
beneath a minimumadequate level of living standards. We then take up the challenge
to 'flesh out' the important issue of the curriculum of West's minimum adequate
education. This strand provides the basis for the next three chapters.
Chapter 3 explores whether an 'education for democracy' could provide the basis for
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this curriculum -noting again that it is a common criticism of markets that they will
fail to provide for this. Arriving at doubtful conclusions, chapter 4 explores the
related but not identical 'education for autonomy' as a possible basis for West's
curriculum. This takes us into detailed discussion of Joseph Raz's argument, central
to the examination of West's argument, of whether states are justified in promoting
the autonomy of their citizens. Again, doubtful conclusions are reached, and a
suggestion that there will be difficulties with any 'fleshing out' of West's curriculum,
if it is to be argued that the curriculum has to be promoted by the state. Given this'
impasse, the possibility presents itself that it is misguided for one philosopher of
education to attempt to arrive at the solution to the curriculum issue, but that what is
desirable is that the decision should be reached by 'the people' themselves, through
the democratic process. We turn to explore this possibility in chapter 5, examining
John White's recent argument concerning the need for democratic control of the
curriculum (with implications noted to control of education more generally). We argue
that difficulties with this approach arise because of logical constraints on improving
democracy.
This takes this strand of the argument concerned with the curriculum as far as it will
go in this thesis. However, there is another strand of argument which challenges the
heart of West's market model, concerned with the range of possible state intervention,
including provision, funding and regulation: that is that education is a 'public good';
we find that this is an important focus of West's own discussion, concerned as he is
with the 'externalities' or 'neighbourhood effects' of education. This strand is taken
up in chapter 6, where we examine the arguments of Gerald Grace and Ruth Jonathan
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on this issue, and put them into the broader context of discussion of the 'public goods
dilemma'.
Finally, chapter 7 pulls all the threads of the .argument together, points to tentative
conclusions regarding West's market model, and briefly relates these to the
contemporary discussion about markets in education.
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1.2 West's 'market model'
I now turn to explore West's argument set out in Education and the State concerning
the minimum justified state intervention in education. I first outline his 'market
model', its assumptions, and the conclusions West draws from it, before considering
the issue of what exactly is meant by a 'minimum level' of state involvement. I then
examine if West's conclusions follow from his model, and point to those philosophical
issues which are of concern to us throughout the thesis, as well as to those issues of
empirical or economic importance which we will not be addressing.
In the concluding section of Education and the State, West invites us to conduct a
thought experiment:
'In order to crystallise the arguments of the various parts of this book it will be
helpful first to conduct a discussion on the assumption that we are about to establish
our state intervention for the very first time and under explicit conditions. It is hoped
that such a hypothetical exercise will serve as a peg on which to hang most of the
more important fmdings of earlier chapters.' (West 1970 p. 199).
The model- his 'educational model in political economy', henceforth dubbed 'West's
market model' - that emerges from this thought experiment is the springboard for
discussion in this thesis. It is a model which allows West to clarify what he sees to
be the minimum justified state intervention in education, in a particular idealised
society, but one nonetheless which West feels has implications for actual societies.
7 We will explore what is meant by 'minimum' state involvement below.
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In West's model, there are four explicit assumptions: firstly, that it is agreed that there
is a justification for the state to intervene in education to ensure that all children have
some specified 'minimum adequate education'; although secondly, the state isn't as
yet involved in education at all; thirdly, that there is a low tax regime and hence
families have disposable income which they could use to fund their children's
education; and finally, that families can be classified as belonging to four groups, and
that the largest of these groups does procure educational opportunities (of quality not
specified) for their children, despite the lack of state involvement.
Given these four assumptions, West then argues their implications for a minimum role
for the state in education. The assumptions lead to: (a) the need for the state to set
minimum standards of required educational opportunities"; (b) to set up an
Inspectorate to police these standards; (c) to fund the education of those children
whose families are too poor to provide for them; and (d) to selectively compel
children to partake of educational opportunities who otherwise, without compulsion,
would not have done so. These are his minimum requirements for state intervention
in education in his model society. Moreover, it is implicit in the remarks quoted
above (from West 1970 p. 199) that this minimum state intervention in the model will
8 Note that when he outlines his 'educational model in political economy', West
seems at times to be equating schooling with education, and hence writes about
schooling rather than this more general 'educational opportunity'. Elsewhere in the
book, he makes it clear that this is not his intention, and that the appropriate education
he is describing could be acquired in a variety of ways, in the family, through the
media, religious and community groups, etc., and not just through schooling (pp. 12-
13, chapter 2, and pp. 191-5).
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satisfy potential criticisms of such minimal involvement concerned with equality of
opportunity, and education for democracy, law and order and economic growth (for
these are all addressed in, and 'important findings' brought forward from, the 'earlier
chapters' of West 1970). Finally, West then hopes to show that this model bears
some resemblance to the situation pertaining in England & Wales in the nineteenth
century, and moreover that there are lessons to be learnt from it for the contemporary
debate about the involvement of the state in education.
West thus hoped that his model could demonstrate that a strong case could be made
for market provision of education, and against the extensive state involvement in
England & Wales and the USA. Clearly his argument is important to address,
particularly in the light of the recent debate about market provision in England &
Wales, and for the more general argument about the role of the state in education.
Before moving to establish the coherence of West's model and to locate those
philosophical concerns which need examination, we need to be clear what is meant
by 'minimum' state involvement.
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1.3 Minimum state involvement in education
Now, nowhere in Education and the State does West explicitly claim that it is the
minimum state involvement in education, (compatible with certain other arguments and
his assumptions), which is being sought. However, comments made in several places
suggest that this is in fact what he is looking for. For example, when he discusses the
comparative advantage of selective over universal compulsion, (pp. 206-7), he makes
it clear that he prefers the former because it is all that is needed, and that going for
the latter would be 'over-reaching ourselves' (p. 207); it is clear that he is wary of the
growth of government (see pp. 2, 203 and 207, for example), and hence likely to wish
for as little government intervention in education as is compatible with his other
principles and assumptions; moreover, these suggestions are made explicit in later
writings (see West 1991, 1993).
When we come to examine what could be meant by 'minimum' state involvement, it
seems the classical liberal tradition is concerned with three issues: the size of the
bureaucracy of the state, cost of the state, and the invasiveness, or intrusiveness of the
state (Gray 1992, p. 89; Kukathas 1992 p. 113). We will assume then, that what West
is searching for is minimal state involvement in education in terms related to these
three issues. We are not interested in the context of this thesis in more precise
measures of each of these - so for example, it is of no great concern to us whether the
size of the bureaucracy of the state is measured in terms of personnel employed by it,
or proportion of some measure of national wealth consumed, or produced, by it. But
we are interested in one potential problem. While the size of the bureaucracy and cost
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of the state probably bear some relationship to each other, it is not clear how the
intrusiveness of the state relates to the other two factors. For example, a low-cost,
small-bureaucracy state might be very intrusive, if the great majority of its personnel
were employed on secret police duties. The relationship between the invasiveness of
the state, and other issues of size of the state will be of importance in the discussion
which follows, for this contrived example shows that it is theoretically possible that
a lesser degree of state involvement in terms of costs orsize could lead to a greater
degree of state involvement in terms of invasiveness. So it might not be a
straightforward matter to decide which of two options for state involvement is the
lesser involvement. It could require some quite elaborate, and probably somewhat
arbitrary (if interpersonal comparisons of utility, for example, have to be made)
calculation to decide whether one system involved less state intervention than another.
Some examples of possible difficulties will be highlighted in section 1.6 below.
Finally, before moving onto examine West's assumptions, let us clarify what is meant
. by state involvement in education. States can be involved in three distinct ways:
through regulation, for example of the curriculum, or compulsion of attendance at
educational institutions; through funding, for example by providing vouchers; and
finally, through provision, for example, by providing educational establishments, or
peripatetic teachers. Each of these categories is independent of the others. So even
if a state provides educational opportunities, this does not mean that it would have to
also fund them: it could do this by collecting private conscriptions, contributions, or
9 Although not necessarily - for if a state doubled its employees but paid them all half
their previous wages, then on some measure the state could have doubled in size but
remained at roughly the same cost.
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fees, or a mixture of all three. Similarly, funding does not depend upon provision, nor
does regulation imply funding or provision, and so on. We see examples of the
independence of these three types of state involvement in other areas: for example, the
British state has undertaken to build the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, but will fund this
partly through private investment (provision separate from funding); state regulation
compels car drivers to carry third-party insurance, but there is no state funding or
provision of this (regulation separate from funding or provision); unemployment
benefit from the state is primarily to provide food and clothes for the recipient and
family, but there are no state food or clothing stores, (funding separate from
provision)".
With these brief comments, we return now to West's model, to exarmne the
assumptions on which his model is based.
10 Note that in all these areas the state is involved in some regulation: of investment,
insurance, and of food and clothing stores.
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1.4 West's assumptions
Assumption 1: the protection of minors principle
Chapter 1
The protection of minors principle states that families do not have 'absolute' power
over their children, and that the state can intervene in, inter alia, the education of a
child when it is discovered that 'a child is being deprived of a "reasonable" minimum
of education.' (West 1970 p. 199). Now West himself thinks that this principle will
receive wide agreement, from economists and the genera! public: he notes that even
the most ardent 19th century supporters of laissez faire were prepared to make
exceptions to their 'general principle of freedom of contract', and a 'prominent
example' of these exceptions concerned children (p. 7). Children are especially
defenceless, and hence 'the state had special obligations towards them' (p. 7). This
position, he suggests 'seems to have been readily accepted by liberal economists ever
since' (p.7). He also thinks that the important role of the family will not be seriously
disputed (p. 233)11. So, West holds that individuals, and hence families, 'concede'
(p. 199) to the state the right to intervene in failing families. Within the framework
of this thesis, this assumption will not be questioned".
11 Recent discussion from 'the left' seems to complement that from 'the right' that
there is certainly some recent agreement from across the political spectrum, reinforcing
West's claim, on an important role for the family in society (see for example, Dennis
and Erdos 1992, Halsey 1992, and Davies (ed) 1993).
12 As remarked above, we are not interested here in defending a 'more libertarian'
position than that set out by West, in challenging the notion that there is some role
for the state to protect minors. Nor will we defend the importance given to families.
These issues are, of course, of great interest philosophically, but are beyond the scope
of this thesis to explore.
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Assumption 2: no state involvement in education
Chapter 1
West asks us to think of a society in which 'state education has not so far been
established.' (West 1970 p. 200). That is, we are in an 'original position', able to
decide from this position to what extent we would wish to see the state involved.
Assumption 3: a low tax society
In West's model it follows, he writes, from Assumption 2 that taxation is
'correspondingly' lower than what we are used to in contemporary societies: hence it
could be the case that this lower taxation is due entirely to the fact that the
government is not spending money on education. In this case, we might wonder how
much lower these taxes would be, because it might be felt that, in societies such as
the UK, education isn't a huge proportion of the state's budget, so if this expenditure
was removed, taxes wouldn't be that much lower. How much lower does West need
them to be? Presumably what he needs is for them to be low enough that most (see
below) families have 'more disposable money in their purses' (p. 200) in order to be
able to fund educational opportunities for their children", If the lower taxation was
due to the fact that governments were not involved in other areas of social services
too, than presumably we would see taxes much lower than if government was not just
involved in education; but then families might need to spend more money on other
services - health, unemployment insurance, etc., so they might still not have enough
to pay for their children's education. West's assumption, therefore that the majority
of families would be able to afford to pay for their children's education given this
13 The wording here is carefully chosen: I am not saying that they would be able 'to
fund their children's education', for this would have implications which wouldn't
follow at this stage that the education is adequate.
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lower tax regime raises many difficult economic questions, which West does in part
address in the book (pp. 44-5, 184) and in more detail elsewhere (for example; West
1975a, 1985)14.
Again, for the purposes of this thesis we will not take this discussion further. We can
note that West's position has stimulated some controversy: if economists could show
the implausibility of the assumption then the scope of his model, and hence of this
thesis, might be curtailed". So the majority of parents can afford educational
opportunities: how many parents this would be is the subject of West's fourth
assumption.
Assumption 4: families can be classified into four grOUPS; the majority of families are
procuring educational opportunities for their children
. West's families can be classified into four groups":
group 1: responsible and not poor families;
14 Part of this work addresses the relative costs of state education and private
education, and the amount of money that gets lost through any bureaucratic system,
suggesting that it would not be as difficult as some commentators have suggested for
parents to fund good quality education themselves. At one stage he concedes that
some families might experience cash flow problems when children were young, and
that another function of the government could be to lend money to those families until .
such time that they had higher incomes and lower outgoings (see West 1975a, pp.l-
27); however, he later may have withdrawn from this position too, noting that private
capital markets and/or philanthropy could equally well provide for these areas (see
West 1991).
15 Or if West's 1975a modifications were shown to be plausible, then this would have
additional implications for the role of the state in education, namely. that of loaning
money to families.
16 The labels are mine, not West's.
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group 2: irresponsible and not poor families;
group 3: responsible and poor families;
group 4: irresponsible and poor families;
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where 'responsible' defmes a family which wants to provide educational opportunities
for its children, and by 'not poor' is meant they can afford to do so (West 1970 pp.
202-6). Thus families in group 1 provide educational opportunities for their children,
group 3 doesn't but would like to, and groups 2 and 4 don't primarily because they
are not interested, although group 4 couldn't afford to do so even if the families
within it were motivated enough.
West then assumes that 95% of parents would be in group 1, and that the remaining
5% would be shared between the other three groups (p. 200)17. He makes this
assumption based on his historical analysis of nineteenth century England & Wales,
being what he would, at a minimum, expect of families' educational provision in our
model society without state involvement (p. 200). Note that this assumption is
important to the argument that follows, for if, as West himself acknowledges (in
chapter 14), the figures were reversed - and only say 5% of families provided for their
children's education, then the model would be severely distorted (for reasons which
will become apparent, if they are not already so) and different policy prescriptions
might well be derived.
17 Indeed, West gives more precise figures: out of every 1000 families, he suggests the
following rough classification might prevail: group 1: 950; group 2: 15; group 3: 20;
group 4: 15 (pp. 202-6). However, the figures in groups 2-4 seem to be for illustrative
purposes only, and are not crucial to the argument.
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Four points concern this assumption: Firstly, it is based on West's historical analysis,
which has received much criticism. However, on my reading of the debate", the
discussion concerning the numbers of children attending schooling is disputed only on
the margins: so it may well be that a consensus view could be reached from the
evidence which perhaps lowered the figures somewhat, but didn't effect greatly West's
initial assumption.
Secondly, this assumption is clearly not dependent on the historical evidence. Even if
West was over-optimistic about the quantity or the quality of education in Victorian
England & Wales, his optimism could be applicable to a society which was less
poverty-ridden. Moreover, of course, his model doesn't have to have any basis in.
reality: it could be used to examine whether, even under optimistic predictions about
the provision of educational opportunities without the state, there could still be a role
for the state nevertheless. These conclusions could then inform debate on policy for
societies less well-endowed.
. Thirdly, West claims only that families will fit into one of these four groups, not that
we have any fail-safe way of so classifying any particular family encountered. For
example, if we came across a family which does not send its children to school, we
would not know which group they fitted into. They could be providing their children
with educational opportunities at home, (hence fit into group 1) or they could be using
them for housework or other cheap labour and denying them educational opportunities
even though they could afford to provide these (hence fitting into group 2). Worse,
18 See Appendix 1.
29 Chapter 1
the children could be doing housework and so on, and we could see that the family
was probably too poor to provide educational opportunities, but still not know from
this whether they were in groups 3 or 4, that is, whether if they had the funds, they
would or would not provide educational opportunities for their children.
Fourthly, and crucially, (for it may have seemed that in this assumption, West was
actually smuggling in his conclusions about the viability of education without the
state), West is only claiming that families in group 1 are providing educational
opportunities, not that these opportunities are adequate in the sense of satisfying the
minimum state requirements. We will explore the ramifications of these last two
assumptions shortly.
30 Chapter 1
1.5 West's conclusions
Given these four assumptions, we now turn to the central question raised by West:
what is the minimum justified role for the state in education in his model society, in
terms of regulation, funding and provision, compatible with these four assumptions?
Two concerns are raised: firstly, what role should the state play concerning the
proportion of children who are not receiving educational opportunities at all? Secondly,
should the state intervene in the education of the majority who are receiving
educational opportunities - this intervention would primarily be concerned with
improving the quality of these educational experiences (West 1970 p. 200).
West recognises that his first assumption - the protection of minors principle - means
that there is a role for the state to intervene in education, on both these counts. It
should intervene not only for the minority not being educationally provided for, but
also to ensure that the quality of the education received by the majority is of an
adequate standard. Hence the first justified involvement of the state is to establish the
'minimum adequate education' which must be offered to all children (p. 201). He also
agrees that the minimum standards would need to be policed, so an inspectorate would
need to be established to oversee these standards (p. 201). West notes, almost in
passing, that this minimum could be established in terms of length of time at school
(he suggests eight years, p. 201), or in terms of the quality of the teaching resources
or teachers (suggested by footnote 1, p. 201).
The second justified involvement of the state in education, West notes, could be to
intervene in the markets of education, to ensure that there was better competition
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between educational institutions. Under more fr-ee markets 'there would be every
reason to expect efficiency in schools [or other educational institutions] to continue
rising until they all exceeded and made superfluous the minimum standards originally
specified by the state.' (p. 201). This argument, about the efficiency of markets, will
not be taken further in the context of this thesis.
Thirdly, West agrees that the state would be justified in intervening in the (suggested)
5% of families who do not provide educational opportunities for their children (p.
202), namely groups 2-4 mentioned above. He argues that those in group 3, ex
hypothesis, simply need more money, and then they will give their children adequate
educational opportunities. So the problem of these poor families can simply be met
by 'the provision of direct money grants from the state' (p. 203), through negative
income tax, supplemented by payments for non-taxpayers. These families would use
this money to buy schooling, because, ex hypothesis they are 'responsible'. Families
in groups 2 and 4 need some slightly different treatment. What is needed, West
argues, is selective compulsion for these 'irresponsible' families. By 'selective
compulsion', West draws a parallel with 'the way in which we protect infants from
physical neglect such as malnutrition.' In those cases, the state 'has means to see to
it that no family is without the purchasing power necessary to feed and clothe a child
to a certain standard. The total apparatus of protection is then strenghtened (sic) by
the provision whereby health visitors are allowed periodic access to children in their
own homes. Such persons have the duty to report clear cases of parental neglect to
the Child Care Office. This authority then has it in its power to bring into operation
procedures which in effect amount to compulsion of the parents.' (pp. 204-5). This
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is the type of 'selective compulsion' he envisages for the educationally-irresponsible
parents. In parallel with this compulsion, finance would be needed for those in group
4, who are not only irresponsible but also poor, and this would be most easily met by
the provision of educational vouchers to be spent only in the school or other
educational establishment of their choice.
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1.6 Critique
These are West's prescriptions for the justified minimum state intervention in his
model society, given his four assumptions. Now, three issues are raised concerning the
coherence of the implications West draws from his assumptions. Firstly, we will
discuss the issue of the 'minimum adequate education', and ask if West has given this
sufficient attention; importantly, this raises concern about West's solution for the
majority of families. Secondly, we are concerned with whether West has solved the
problems of what to do with the small minority of families who are not providing
educational opportunities for their children (West's 5%). Thirdly, we are interested in
whether West's solutions do bring about a minimum state involvement in education.
Minimum adequate education
Now, West does not explicitly mention in connection with his model issues which are
of great importance to philosophers of education (and others), which are likely to
feature very highly on their lists of what is needed in a minimum adequate education,
namely, the content of what is taught and learnt in educational settings. We will define
the content of what is taught and learnt in, and the ethos and organisation of, these
educational settings as their curriculum. Hence we note that it is very likely that
educationalists will seek minimum standards in terms of a minimum, or core,
curriculum, which every child should have the opportunity to enjoy.
Now interestingly, West has discussed, although not explicitly, this sense of
curriculum in the earlier chapters of Education and the State, particularly m
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connection with education for democracy (chs. 4 and 6). Given his remarks quoted
earlier (from p. 199) it is also clear that he feels he has addressed the concerns raised
there in his 'market model'. One of the crucial areas we will need to address in the
remainder of this thesis, then, is whether West has adequately dealt with these issues,
or whether discussion of the crucial philosophical questions of the curriculum bring
implications for West's model which he has avoided.
Related to this concern is the fact that West hasn't considered the repercussions of the
minimum standards for group 1, that is the great majority in his model who are
offering educational opportunities for their children - for recall, nowhere has he said
that they are offering adequate educational opportunities. If this is taken into account,
then we see that his group 1 could be divided into 5 sub-groups, each with different
implications for the involvement of the state. In fact, group 1 turns out to be a
microcosm of the society at large! Group 1a would be that proportion of group 1 who
satisfy the inspectorate that they are providing adequate educational opportunities for
their children. Groups 1b, 1c 1d and Ie are found not to be. Groups 1b and 1d, on
discovering this, are motivated to do something about it, group 1b is able to do so, but
group 1d is not wealthy enough to provide improved educational opportunities.
Finally, groups 1c and Ie are not motivated to offer improved educational
opportunities for their children, they consider that what they have so far provided was
adequate in their own terms and decide not to do any more, even though they have
seen the inspectors' reports; however group 1c does have enough funds to improve the
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educational opportunities, whereas group Ie does not". Questions arise about each
of these subgroups, which West simply ignores. In effect, what West considered to be
the solution for all of his group 1 turns out only to be the solution for groups la and
lb.
In other words, his solution is inadequate, and the solution he proposes for groups 2-4
are in fact transferable across to some proportion of his group I too. Crucially, we
have no estimate of what proportion of group 1 this will be. This will depend a great
deal on what the curriculum for the 'minimum adequate education' turns out to be -
if this curriculum is demanding, then it might be found that groups la and lb were
in the minority, with repercussions as noted above for the strength of West's
conclusions. We will return to this discussion in the concluding chapter to this thesis,
when we are clearer on what the minimum adequate education should be.
Solving the problems of groups 2-4
A small problem concerns how West's solutions for groups 2-4 can be brought into
effect, because of the problem with identifying to which group a particular family
belongs. Distinguishing families in groups 3 and 4 (families who are poor and not
providing educational opportunities for their children) from families in group 2 (not
poor but irresponsibler", could be accurately accomplished using a 'means-test' - but
19 That is, groups la and lb relate to West's group 1; group lc is the 'irresponsible
and not poor' equivalent of group 2; group Id is the 'responsible and poor' equivalent
of group 3; and group Ie the 'irresponsible and poor' equivalent of group 4.
20 With parallel implications for distinguishing finding those families in the new
groups ld and Ie from those in group lc.
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this is likely to be intrusive (with implications for the 'minimum state involvement')
and encourage the 'poverty trap' (Kendall and Louw 1989 p. 234); so West is likely
to favour the alternative of allowing the state to ask established charities to ascertain
those who are needy". But then, having located those families who are too poor to
provide adequate educational opportunities, (that is groups 3, 4, ld and Ie), how do
we sort out those who are in groups 3 or ld (the responsible families), from those in
groups 4 or Ie (the irresponsible ones)? - for West argues that both need different
solutions. Clearly, the means-test, or the charity investigation, examines wealth only,
not responsibility. If a family was found to be too poor to provide adequate
educational opportunities, and is then given funds, either through negative income tax,
or a cash handout, as West indicates is the solution for group 3 (and hence group ld),
then this money will also go to those who are in group 4 (and group Ie), for it is hard
to see how to decide which family is in which group! This difficulty is likely to be
an argument against cash-handouts to anyone, and in favour of educational vouchers
(which West has suggested arethe solution for group 4) to all families found to be too
poor to provide adequate educational opportunities. So it seems West's conclusions.
need to be thus modified. Given these vouchers, then, it is now straightforward to
apply West's selective compulsion to those with vouchers who still don't bother to
make adequate educational arrangements for their children (i.e to groups 4 and Ie)..
Still one problem remains for West's group 2 and the revised group lc. Families in
these groups are wealthy enough to provide adequate educational opportunities for
their children but are not doing so. According to West the solution for them is that
21 It is perhaps an omission in his work that he doesn't discuss this issue.
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they should be (selectively) compelled to provide educational opportunities for their
children, without receiving any additional funds to help them do so. But just because
they are not poor, doesn't mean that they will be able to find the additional funds
without causing some hardship. For example, they could be relatively well-off, but
the parents insist on spending all their disposable income on luxuries; if they are
compelled to provide educational opportunities for their children, they might pay for
these but of another essential part of their budget, rather than the discretionary part,
for example cutting back on the children's food or clothes. Or they might simply be
relatively well-off but bad at managing their budgets, so if compelled to find funds
for educational opportunities, fall into debt, or again cut-back on other essentials. So
the solution for groups 2 and Ic could cause some hardship, which might undermine
the desirability of West's solution. In the spirit of West's approach, we would
presumably seek specific action for this specific problem. For example, it might lead
us to decide that further state intervention would be needed for these families to
ensure that they not only spent some of their money on their children's education, but
also didn't skimp on other necessary items of expenditure for their children. Again,
this raises issues about the intrusiveness of the state, issues which we will take up
below when we consider the issue of selective versus universal compulsion.
Is funding enough for the poor, or is there an argument for provision too?
West's solutions for the families in groups 3 and 4, as we have seen, was to provide
state funding for these families to purchase educational opportunities, but not state
provision. This, as we discuss below, is because West sees this as a lesser state
involvement. But could there be any reasons why provision rather than, or in addition
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to, funding might be necessary for those in groups 3 and 4?22 One reason could be
if in the areas in which these groups live, there is not an adequate supply of
educational institutions offering educational opportunities which satisfy the minimum
requirements. Now West feels able to make the assumption that there would be such
suppliers in all areas, however poor, from his historical analysis. Moreover, recent
empirical evidence of what can accompany an 'opening up' of the educational supply-
side in poor inner-city areas does lend some support to West's assumption (see e.g
Clipboard No.B, Summer 1992?3. However, again it is an empirical assumption that
this would be the case, and one which we cannot simply assume here - particularly
as we don't know at this stage how demanding the minimum curriculum requirements
are going to be. So if it was discovered that, in certain, probably very poor, areas,
there would not be an adequate supply of educational opportunities of the required
standard, then this would clearly be a case for the state to intervene in provision.
Minimum degree of state involvement
Finally, we wish to consider the very important issue of whether West's solutions are
in fact consistent with finding the minimum degree of state involvement in education.
At several places it seems questions are raised about this: we consider the issues of
inspections, of whether funding is always lesser state intervention than provision, and
similarly, whether selective, compulsion is always a lesser intervention than universal
compulsion.
22 This argument might also be applicable to families in group 1 who are too poor to
provide adequate educational opportunities.
23 Clipboard is the publication of the Center for Educational Innovation, The
Manhattan Institute, 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017.
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a Inspection
Suppose that the state's minimum curriculum requirements had not ruled out
educational opportunities being undertaken in a variety of educational establishments,
not just schools, but including the home, the playground, churches, etc. The
Inspectorate is then faced with the task of ascertaining whether for individual children
this minimum is being reached. Now if a child is going to a school, then it might be
a fairly easy task to inspect the school and decide if the minimum requirements were
being satisfied there. But if a child is having the educational experiences in a variety
of places, it becomes much more difficult to ensure that they are being met; but
crucially the inspectorate's job could become much more intrusive, which has
implications for what we consider to be the minimum degree of state involvement -
for domestic inspections are likely to be considered more intrusive than school
inspections. Of course, this may well be felt to be a price worth paying - but it would
certainly have to come into any calculation of the size of the state as mentioned above.
It would seem that in order to take this matter further, we would need empirical work
on what people in a particular society do feel about such issues, whether they would
consider several random inspections in the home and on family outings to be more
intrusive than being compelled to provide educational opportunities in a particular,
more easily inspected environment. It seems likely that for some people, these family-
based inspections would seem more intrusive, in which case they might prefer to use
educational opportunities provided by schools and other easily-inspected educational
institutions; those who feel the opposite way would presumably opt for family-based
inspections. But it seems that this is a contingent matter, which we can't take any
further here, but which might turn out to have different implications for the type of
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state involvement than that assumed by West.
Chapter 1
b Is funding always a lesser intervention than provision?
West argues that the minimum degree of involvement needed for groups 3 and 4, i.c.
those too poor to provide educational opportunities for their children, would be for the
state to provide funding for these children, but not provision". Now, can we be so
confident that funding would always be a lesser state intervention than provision?
Consider first the issue of cost (one of the three parameters for amount of state
involvement) of the state intervention first. It appears to be West's assumption that
giving cash or (as we have modified it) vouchers to families would be the cheapest -
and hence require less state involvement - than for the state to be involved in
provision of educational opportunities itself. But note that state provision doesn't have
to imply state funding. So if the state decided that provision was necessary, then it
could raise finance privately. Hence state provision of this sort might be found to be
cheaper than state funding. Moreover, even if state provision was to imply financing,
then it is still plausible that provision with funding could be cheaper than funding
alone, through vouchers or cash. For example, if it was decided that the minimum
educational requirements could be provided by quickly trained teaching assistants in
the home, with small groups of children, say, for a couple of hours a day, and if there
was a ready supply of such people unemployed and otherwise taking state benefits,
then it might well be the case that it would be cheaper to deploy such people to
teaching the poor, rather than provide the poor with vouchers (or money), with which
24 We have seen this also applies to our modified groups ld and Ie.
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to buy private, possibly more expensive, services. Or if vouchers or a negative
income tax proved to be expensive to administer through the state bureaucracy,
perhaps because civil servants' labour was very expensive, then it could be the case
that directly funding educational facilitators might be cheaper. The point of these
examples is to show that what would be the minimum level of state involvement (in
terms of cost) would again be an empirical matter to decide, and West rushes too
quickly (as he seems to) in assuming that vouchers or cash would be the cheapest, and
hence the lesser state involvement.
In terms of the size (with implications for costs, of course) of the state, West offers
two other reasons why state.provision of schools would be less desirable than giving
state vouchers or cash to families. Firstly, he suggests that providing schooling will
lead to a massive expansion of the service: 'to judge from 19th century experience
those who are just above the poverty level will begin to request entry into it and ...
the service will very quickly fall into the hands of a majority which does not need it.'
(West 1970 p. 203). However, this objection would also seem to be applicable to a
voucher system, and brings in well-known issues connected with 'the poverty trap',
so would seem to be a reason against state involvement in education in terms of
funding or provision, rather than an argument just against state provision.
West argues also that there also will be other bureaucratic pressures set up within the
body administering these educational institutions, which might have harmful effects
leading into a massive growth of thesize of the government (p. 203). Again, there
would need to be some bureaucracy set up to administer the voucher system, and
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again, this could be open to similar harmful effects of bureaucracies: so again this
would seem to be an argument against state involvement in general, rather than state'
provision of schooling.
This means that we can't conclude a priori from these considerations, what is likely
to be the minimum state involvement in education for these groups. It could be simply
funding and selective compulsion, as West argues, (together with the curriculum
regulations as mentioned before) but it might also be provision instead of, or as well
as, funding and regulation, depending on the outcome to the empirical questions
raised.
c selective versus universal compulsion
Similar questions can be raised about the issues of selective versus universal
compulsion. Again West's assumption is that selective compulsion is the lesser
requirement in terms of state intervention. But in terms of costs and size of the state
first, it seems an open question which of these would be the cheaper and less
demanding in terms of policing. With universal compulsion, the policing would need
to be brought into force when families in groups lc, Ie, 2 and 4 offended - which
would also be the case if there was selective compulsion. (It could of course be the
case that universal compulsion had some effects on those in groups l a, lb and 3,
perhaps out of perversity, objecting to be compelled to do what they would be doing
anyway, so there could be some extra policing costs brought in here). But what about
the invasiveness of the state? Again West is clearly assuming that universal
compulsion is a greater intervention in terms of intrusiveness than selective
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compulsion. But consider the groups who would have provided adequate educational
opportunities for their children, who would perhaps be those whom it might be
thought would suffer most from the universal compulsion. They might not mind at
all that the law now says they must provide opportunities, they might be able to totally
ignore the law in this respect, even though they are in fact obeying it. Of course the
opposite could be true, but we don't know this a priori.
Perhaps the greatest worry is that, if there was universal compulsion, there might be
some disincentives for families who would otherwise have provided these
opportunities for their children to defer their responsibilities to the state, undermining
the institution of the family in the process. This is an important philosophical issue
which is addressed in chapter 4.
What about the families who wouldn't otherwisehave provided adequate educational
opportunities for their children: would selective or universal compulsion be the most
intrusive? One possible scenario is that, after a few generations of universal
compulsion, the compulsion becomes so deeply ingrained in peoples' lives that they
accept it as 'the way things are', and hence the law becomes unobtrusive. So if the
question simply is not raised about whether to send a child to school, or otherwise
provide educational opportunities, then there might be felt to be little intrusion in the
lives of these families. On the other hand, if there was selective compulsion, then
these families might feel that the state was being much more intrusive: for now these
families would see that the state was 'on their backs', differentiating them from
neighbouring families who were more responsible. Again, we can say that a final
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answer to these questions would require empirical research, and cannot be pursued
further here.
This brings us to the end of our discussion of West's model, and the implications of
his assumptions. We now summarise our conclusions and layout the agenda for the
thesis.
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1.7 Summary and conclusions
Having examined West's 'market model', we can now say that, as it stands, West's
model isn't entirely coherent, in that his conclusions do not follow from his
assumptions. Or at least we cannot say that they do without further examination of
some crucial issues. So we have various outcomes which are compatible with West's
model. One possible outcome would be that offered by West (with the important
modifications of a reclassification of his largest group of families, group 1, and the
'voucher' solution for all the poor, not simply the 'irresponsible' poor). That is,
consistent with his model and assumptions, the minimum state involvement requires
funding for those who are too poor to provide adequate educational opportunities,
funding and selective compulsion for those who are poor and irresponsible, and
selective compulsion for those who are just irresponsible. But at the other extreme,
also consistent with West's model and the discussion so far would be the following
outcome: a national curriculum (since it is conceivable that the Inspectorate could find
national deficiencies, or that the minimum adequate education would need to be
nationally imposed); universal compulsion (if this was decided to be less intrusive than
selective compulsion); educational opportunities confined largely to schools (if it was
decided that the concomitant inspections would be less intrusive than home-
inspections); universal funding (if it was decided that means-testing was too great an
intrusion on peoples' privacy, and charity assessments were ineffective); universal
educational provision (if it was found that vouchers were too expensive to administer,
or if there were national areas of weakness which could not be met privately). Note
I am only saying that the above discussion has not ruled out this particular
combination, not that it is implied by the discussion. And of course, most positions
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in between these two extremes would also be possible under West's assumptions. In
other words, without further work, we cannot say that West's minimal model is in fact
the one implied by his four assumptions.
Now, many of these issues are empirical, and many have been addressed by West in
later work. However, in my position qua philosopher, I am not able to adjudicate in
these debates, only to point out as above inconsistencies within West's own argument.
However, as we have noted, there are important philosophical issues raised. Firstly,
we are interested in pursuing the philosophical question of whether a 'minimum
adequate education' would satisfy those who seek equality of educational opportunity -
an issue examined by West. On the face of it, it would seem unlikely that it would
satisfy them, for just because everyone has an adequate education does not mean that
provision would not be unequal. This issue is taken up in the next chapter, chapter 2.
Secondly, there is the crucialissue of the curriculum of West's 'minimum adequate
education', in terms of both the content of this, and the issue of who should decide
this content. Now contemporary discussions of a core, or minimum curriculum for all
are often predicated on the notions of what purposes the curriculum must serve. West
himself mentions education for democracy, education for law and order, and education
for economic growth as being important functions which education is supposed to
serve, and which hence might be expected to have implications for his curriculum.
We will explore the first of these in detail in chapter 3, and make some brief
comments concerning the others in chapter 4. A related notion of education for
autonomy, which West does not consider, is discussed in chapter 4. Indeed, a relevant
criticism of West's model could well be that it is the responsibility of the state to
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promote the autonomy of its citizens, and that all citizens will fail to obtain their
'education for autonomy' in West's market model. In that chapter we will also be able
to explore the important philosophical issue raised earlier of whether state compulsion
could lead to the undermining of other important institutions in society, in particular,
the family.
Moreover, as we have noted, another issue raised by the curriculum, and ignored by
West, is that of who should decide on its content - this issue will be taken up in
chapter 5, where an argument for democratic control of the curriculum, and hence
against leaving this to markets, will be examined.
Finally, it is observed that most of West's discussion of objections to his model is in
terms of the 'externalities' or 'neighbourhood effects' of education. We note that
there has been recent philosophical discussion of this issue, focused on whether
education is a 'public good', and the implications this has for the role of the state.
This discussion is addressed in chapter 6.
West's model, then, will be used in this thesis as a springboard to discuss the
contemporary philosophical debate about the role of markets in educational provision.
We will examine whether this discussion can resolve any of the indeterminacy which
has been the outcome of this preliminary discussion of West's position, and whether
we are able to arrive at any more substantial conclusions about the role Jof the state
in education.
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Chapter 2: Equality of Opportunity and West's (Market Model'
2.1 Introduction
The first philosophical issue raised by our examination of West's market model
concerns equality of opportunity. Now, in chapter 1, we argued that West conceded
the need for a state-enforced 'minium adequate education for all'. Given that West has
examined 'equality of opportunity' in Education and the State, and that he believes
he has taken into account this, and other, objections when proposing his model (West
1970 p. 199), then we assume that he believes either his model will satisfy demands
for equality of opportunity, or that these demands were incoherent or not relevant.
This chapter reviews his arguments to see which of these conclusions is plausible. We
outline West's own discussion of equality of opportunity, then examine his market
model in the light of the discussions of three relevant philosophers, Bernard Williams,
John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin - chosen as representing an important line of recent
liberal thinking on issues concerning equality. So, of concern throughout this chapter
is whether West's market model is compatible with the arguments of these
philosophers.
How are these theories likely to produce difficulties for West's model? West posited
a 'minimum adequate education for all' regulated by the state; but it is neutral as
regards any other inequalities: inequalities are irrelevant to his model, as long as all
have the opportunity to achieve this minimum education. But prima facie this seems
to go against our intuitions concerning equality of opportunity: equality means being
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equal in some literal or mathematical sense. But educational opportunities will not be
equal in this sense within West's model, so it would seem that it would not satisfy
what is desired from equality of opportunity.
These intuitions about markets and equality are reflected in the current debate about
markets in education. For example, Ball criticises moves towards markets, noting that
'inequality is not only inevitable but necessary in the market in order to provide
differential rewards which will stimulate competition and produce incentives.' (Ball
1990a pp. 2-3). Levitas bemoans that market provision 'would, of course, lead to far
greater inequalities of opportunities within the education system.' (Levitas 1986 p. 84
emphasis added). Ranson notes that '[u]nder the guise of neutrality, the institution of
the market actively confirms and reinforces the pre-existing social order of wealth and
privilege.' (Ranson 1990 p. 15). Jonathan argues that, if educational provision is left
to the market, there will be 'a further twist to the spiral of cumulative advantage and
disadvantage which results when the state is rolled back to enable "free and fair"
competition between individuals or groups who have quite different starting points in
the social race.' (Jonathan 1989 p. 323).
So the issue of equality of opportunity is of concern in the current debate, and likely
to be used as a powerful argument against West's model. We tum now to West's
own discussion of equality of opportunity.
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2.2 West on Equality of Opportunity
Chapter 2
West thinks that 'equality of opportunity' is 'as elusive a philosophical idea as it is
a practical target.' (West 1970 p. 50). He considers both philosophical and practical
problems, which we shall tum to below. But first, West attempts something of a
definition of equality of opportunity. He notes that it is felt to be a problem that a
child from a wealthy family has greater educational opportunities than one from a
poorer family; this leads to the demand for 'some artificial governmental machinery
to see to it that the children of the poor do not get such relatively unfavourable
treatment compared with the others. We have to organise their lives in a similar way
to organising a race in which each competitor starts level at the starting line.' (pp. 52-
3). Equality of opportunity, according to West, says that the children of the poor must
not get unfavourable treatment compared with others (p. 51). This would seem to be
a reasonable first attempt at defining what might be meant by equality of opportunity -
although we will want to refine it later. Now he thinks that even this notion is very
difficult to sustain. First we tum to the practical problems raised'.
West thinks there will be practical problems with deciding which environmental
factors will hinder children's education. He points out that poorer families may
actually be offering their children greater educational opportunities than richer
1 In his argument he uses the technique of first supposing that children do not differ
in innate ability (p. 53), seeing what follows from that, then returning to assume that
they do. His main point in using the technique is to show that 'where there is
inequality of potential (ability) there is bound to be inequality of result' (p. 58). This
seems rather obvious and it would only be an issue if we were sure that equality of
opportunity must lead to equality of results, which he does not conclude and which
we do not assume here.
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families, if the former spend more leisure time with them reading, etc. (p. 53 footnote
1). Thus it may be independent of wealth whether a child benefits from an
educational environment. He asks 'on what basis do we sort out those children who
have not had the extra educational stimulus incidental to richer middle-class homes?
More difficult still, how do we detect those homes, whatever their social class, which
give better educational environments than others?' (p. 53). This cannot be a valid
objection for West: for in his 'market model' he pointed to the desirability of an
inspectorate which could discover these sorts of educational opportunities in the home,
etc. (This was implied by his broad definition of education to cover opportunities
found elsewhere than in schools). So this practical problem, ex hypothesis, is not
significant for our purposes here.
A second practical problem is that the demand for 'equality of opportunity' is likely
to be related to a demand for equality in the distribution of income, (p. 55), and that
a system of heavily progressive taxation, would perhaps undermine the incentive to
work hard, and hence undermine economic growth (p. 55). This leads him to argue
that there will be a general acceptance of inequality in wealth: 'income differences
have to be expected if only as a necessary expedient in an imperfect world.' (p. 55).
Given this then it seems odd to him that we should then strive to ensure that
inequalities of wealth do not prejudice educational chances: 'we are in danger of
contradicting ourselves if, having allowed some people the freedom to earn more than
others, we are at the same time striving for the day when most rich men's sons are
forced to school with children of the not-so-rich according to some system of
conscription.' (p. 55). Why are we in danger of contradiction here? His argument
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seems to be that: the demand for equality of opportunity implies, or is at least related
to, the demand for equality in the distribution of income. But the latter has negative
effects and would not be sought; hence we should not seek equality of opportunity
either.
However, this argument fails because, it could be that what is sought is not equal
incomes, but less inequality of income, and that the level of progressive taxation
needed for that could be compatible with some, even quite good, economic growth.
So the argument he has constructed is a 'straw man', and he has not challenged the
demand for less inequality of wealth, hence cannot conclude that more equality of
opportunity is undesirable.
Next we turn to the philosophical arguments. West indicates two relevant areas of
philosophical concern. First he asks: 'Is [equality of opportunity] demanded because
it is a thing of justice, something that is an inalienable right of each child?' (p. 53).
In which case, he suggests the full logic of this position is that equality of opportunity
will have to spread further than national boundaries, and that if we accept it we should
be prepared to give equality of opportunity to, for example, 'Chinese children',
'immigrant West Indians ... from an illiterate plantation background', and 'children
who are ... handicapped by ... physical misfortunes' (p. 54). He doesn't say anything
more on this matter, but does of course raise issues which are crucial to our
philosophical discussion here. We shall explore Rawls' theory below which explicitly
links equality of opportunity to considerations of justice, to see if West's questions can
have an answer.
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The second philosophical issue raised, again in passing, is that the demand for equality
of opportunity is likely to lead to conflict with the demand for liberty, for example,
if 'rich people' are not allowed to buy 'extra education' for their children (p. 57 and
p. 69). Again, this is an issue to which we turn below, when discussing Rawls, where
we shall see that this conflict is easily conceded and resolved.
Thus West has raised issues which are of importance, but has not successfully
addressed them. In order to pursue this further, we now explore philosophical
arguments by those in favour of equality of opportunity, asking to what extent these
arguments are compatible with West's 'minimum adequate education for all'.
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2.3 Williams on Equality of Opportunity
Williams discusses equality of opportunity and relates it to educational provision in
his seminal paper 'The Idea of Equality' (1962). Here, we consider four issues.
Firstly, we consider the context of Williams' discussion and outline his definition;
secondly, after exploring the coherence of Williams' definition, we modify it slightly;
thirdly, we outline an implication of Williams' ideas for the family, and suggest how
West's notion of 'an adequate minimum education for all' could provide a suitable
way around the problem encountered; finally, we show how West's model seems to
satisfy William's definition of equality of opportunity, except for one difficulty, that
of 'positional goods'.
Context and Definition
Firstly Williams notes that discussion of equality of opportunity is explicitly designed
to cater for the assumption that human beings are not equal (Williams 1962 p. 120),
and 'the question arises of the distribution of, or access to, certain goods to which
their inequalities are relevant.' (p. 120). He defines equality of opportunity in the
following way: 'a system of allocation will fall short of equality of opportunity if the
allocation of the good in question in fact works out unequally or disproportionately
between different sections of society, if the unsuccessful sections are under a
disadvantage which could be removed by further reform or social action.' (p. 127).
Equality of opportunity is thus the opportunity for 'everyone in society' (p. 124) to
secure the goods in question. Importantly for the discussion here, Williams
distinguishes three types of goods in this respect: firstly, those goods that are either
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desired by everyone, or large numbers of people for themselves or their children, or
would be so desired if they knew about them; secondly, those goods which people
'earn or achieve' (p. 124); thirdly, those scarce goods which are either by their nature
limited (e.g. positions at the top of the hierarchy in an hierarchical society), or are
contingently limited, that is which have no intrinsic limit but certain qualifications of
access are required for entry, or those which are fortuitously limited, that is there are
not enough of them to go around (pp. 124-5? For the purposes of our critique, we
consider how education fits into each of these categories. It might be thought that in
the first category would come West's 'minimum adequate education', something
which would be desired by large numbers of people for their children, or would be so
desired if they thought it was attainable. But then what of the second category, goods
'which people may be said to earn or achieve'? (p. 124). West's education might be
thought to fit into that category too, because education always must be achieved, it
can never be simply received'. So it seems the distinction between these two
categories in terms of education is not very useful. What seems crucial to Williams'
argument is that they are distinguished from the third category, that is, those goods
which are limited. But on further examination, it would seem that all educational
goods also would fit into this category! While no educational good 'by its very
2 It is not entirely clear whether Williams wants equality of opportunity to refer only
to these 'limited' goods, his third category: for he writes 'the notion of equality of
opportunity might be said to be the notion that a limited good shall in fact be allocated
on grounds which do not a priori exclude any section ... ' (p. 125 emphasis added).
But in his later definition he doesn't mention that it is only limited goods which are
the subject of equality of opportunity. We assume his later definition and that the
quoted passage was just considering limited goods as an example, not defining
equality of opportunity only in terms of them.
3 See Wilson (1991) p. 28.
56 Chapter 2
nature', seems to be limited, Williams' first subdivision, all educational goods would
seem to fit into the 'contingently' or 'fortuitously' limited category. This is the case
whether we are speaking in terms of educational goods as being access to educational
institutions, or access to the learning experience itself. For example, even basic
numeracy or literacy seems to fit into the category of a good to which 'there are
certain conditions of access .,. which in fact not everyone satisfies, but there is no
intrinsic limit to the numbers who might gain access to it by satisfying the conditions'
(p. 124). For to achieve basic numeracy one needs certain intellectual and motivational
qualities which it is clear that not everyone satisfies: the congenitally mentally
handicapped are one group, for example. Suppose we exclude such people, (treating
them as reasonable exceptions to the general rule) and concentrate our attention on
people without congenital handicaps, or similar problems. Then we might be able to
say that there are some levels of educational attainment which all can achieve.
The problem then is that we don't know where to set this level of attainment, that is
what level of education is in Williams' first and second groups, and what level in his
third. If we were to set it as a result of empirical surveys, then we might be tempted
to set it at a very low level indeed, because we would discover large proportions of
the population who were illiterate and innumerate. But this would be to make an
unwarranted assumption that, given different environmental circumstances, these
people could not have achieved much more. But at present it doesn't seem that there
is an uncontroversial body of theory which says that a certain level of educational
level of attainment is achievable by all, (and hence in Williams' first and/or second
category) or contingently limited (hence in his third). This could have repercussions
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for West's minimum adequate education, and for the definition of equality of
opportunity, which we will consider below".
Using his definition of equality of opportunity, Williams notes, as an example, that
the old selective education system in England & Wales could not be considered a
system ofequality of opportunity: 'It is a known fact that the system of selection for
grammar schools by the '11+' examination favours children in direct proportion to
their social class. We have every reason to suppose that these results are the product,
in good part, of environmental factors; and we further know that imaginative social
reform, both of the primary educational system and of living conditions; would
favourably effect those environmental factors. In these circumstances, this system of
educational selection falls short of equality of opportunity.' (p. 127).
Having outlined Williams' definition, and shown how education fits into the categories
of goods which Williams is describing, let us now tum to a critique of his definition.
Williams' definition: a critique
It seems Williams' definition misses out two situations where we might want to say
equality of opportunity has been violated, but which under the definition would not
seem to be included; there is a third situation which others have objected to, although
it is not clear whether Williams would too. Firstly, suppose you are a child of middle-
4 We note that the fortuitously limited category could apply to educational goods in
any category. Indeed - a thought which we will not take further - it could be a
definition of equality of educational opportunity that educational goods (of whatever
type) should not be fortuitously limited.
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class" parents, but your parents don't actually give you the educational opportunities
common to other middle-class families; for example, they don't buy you books for
presents, don't take you to the theatre or galleries, and make no attempt to place you
in a good school, nor supervise your homework from school, and so on. Surely you
too could be said to be a victim of inequality of opportunity? But under Williams'
definition, you apparently would not be, because it focuses only on 'sections" of
society, rather than individuals. So I propose one modification to Williams' definition
to modify 'sections' to 'individuals'. But doing this then immediately calls for a
further modification: in his definition, Williams revised claim would now be that there
is inequality of opportunity 'if the unsuccessful individuals are under a disadvantage
which could be removed by further reform or social action.' (p. 127, emphasis added).
Here I assume by reform he means legal reform, and by social action he means action
organised by groups of individuals, not necessarily from outside of the group
concerned (so the 'social action' which could lead to a disadvantaged group improving
its position could be self-help from within the group itself). But in our example of the
individual in a particular family, clearly anyone individual in the family could decide
to improve its condition itself unilaterally, for example, by stopping drinking or
gambling less, so that there is money for educational opportunities, or time at home
to supervise homework, etc. It seems this sort of self-help has been neglected and
should also be included in the possibilities for improvement.
5 I am avoiding defining this, assuming that it could be done in terms of variables
such as occupation, income and educational background of parents.
6 Again, Williams has not defined this, but I am assuming he means, clear from the
context of his example, social class.
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Secondly, Williams' revised definition is that there is inequality of opportunity 'if the
unsuccessful individuals are under a disadvantage which could be removed ... ' (p. 127,
emphasis added). But suppose that after a great many attempts at legal reform, social
action and self-help, it was shown that some educationally disadvantaged group's
position had not been improved. For example, it could be that legal reform on behalf
of an underclass, for example, was always high-jacked by the middle or working
classes for their own benefit, and social action on behalf of any group failed because
the underclass would not organise themselves as a group, nor respond to efforts from
outside, nor were they sufficiently motivated for self-help. We surely would want to
say that there was still inequality of opportunity in this situation, even though by
Williams' definition it would not fit. So I propose also to take this into account: My
final suggestion is thus that, in the spirit of what Williams seems to have intended, a
definition of equality of opportunity would be as follows: 'a system of allocation will
fall short of equality of opportunity if the allocation of the good in question in fact
works out unequally between different individuals, if the unsuccessful individuals are
under a disadvantage which could in principle be removed by further reform, social
action or individual endeavour'.
Thirdly, we noted that there is some level of educational achievement which is open
to all (excluding some exceptional cases) and above that level only those who have
particular abilities or qualities can attain them, that is, above a certain level, education
becomes a contingently limited good. Now suppose the 'minimum adequate' level of
education is set above this level. Does it make any sense to say that everyone has
equality of opportunity to achieve this level? By Williams' definition it seems we
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would say yes, for there is nothing to rule it out. However, Wilson would object to
this. He argues that it makes no sense to say that we have equality of opportunity to
do something unless we 'logically can learn X, and ... have the power or ability to
learn X' (Wilson 1991 p. 29). Burwood, in reply to Wilson, seems to concur with
this part of his discussion at least: 'If I have a broken leg, it follows that I cannot be
said to have the opportunity to walk up Snowdon because I do not have the ability'
(Burwood 1992 p. 257).
Does this affect our discussion, and Williams' definition? Supposing we had
established what curriculum would satisfy West's 'minimum adequate education'.
Then this difficulty would arise if we knew with a high probability that the level of
this curriculum had been set at too high a level, so that it was, in effect, in Williams'
category of a contingently limited good. But given the present state of theory and
empirical evidence in the human sciences, it seems highly unlikely that we would be
able to make such an assertion. In our ignorance, then, it would seem that this
particular criticism of Wilson is not of relevance to the discussion. If our theory and
empirical evidence became more advanced, we might well want to consider whether
it makes any sense to have equality of opportunity for something that not everyone
can achieve. Indeed, such evidence would probably be weighed in the balance when
deciding what the minimum adequate educational level should be. At present we don't
know what everyone is capable of, so reserve judgement on the issue.
Equality of opportunity, the family and West's market model
So let us stay with the revised definition of equality of opportunity above, and explore
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how West's model can relate to this. One way of exploring this is to consider one
implication of Williams' defmition, taken up by John Rawls, to show how West's
model might point to a solution to the difficulty which Williams himself avoids
confronting. For as Rawls has explicitly pointed out, one implication of Williams'
position is that his equality of opportunity, because it 'requires us to view persons
independently from the influences of their social position' (Rawls 1972 p. 511), makes
us aware how 'the family will lead to unequal chances between individuals'. So,
Rawls asks, should the family be abolishedr" Interestingly, Williams notes a related
possibility in passing, when he says that 'the individuals whose opportunities are to
. be equal should be abstracted from ... social and family background.' (Williams 1962
p. 128). But then he moves much further away into an abstruse fantasy world of
genetic engineering. However, his remarks in that context must presumably be taken
also to apply to the more mundane position of abolishing, or alleviating the affects of
the family: for he says that the objections for doing so must be moral ones, (p. 128),
which are outside of the scope of his enquiry. Here presumably he means
considerations of other values, such as liberty in particular, hence confrrming what
West suggested was important about equality, that it could be one value amongst
several worth striving for, but not necessarily the most important at all times (West
1970 pp. 57 and 69).
However, what is interesting here, is that it seems that West's market model may
provide another, perhaps preferable, way around the problem of what to do about the
family in the context of equality of opportunity, For West's 'adequate minimum
7 We will consider Rawls' way out of this position in the next section.
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education for all' would seem to provide a way in which the influence of the family
could be mitigated, without undermining its primacy. For if the state ensured that all
families did enable their children to receive this minimum adequate education, then
it seems that equality of opportunity could be accommodated, provided that, of course,
West's notions were found to be compatible with Williams' notion of equality of
opportunity, and also that the state regulation in this way did not undermine the family
too much. We turn to this first issue now; the second issue will reemerge in chapter
4.
West's minimum adequate education and Williams' equality of opportunity
Now, prima facie, it would seem that there would be no problems with the 'minimum
adequate education' satisfying Williams' notion of equality of opportunity. We can say
that, if what is considered to be desirable from education is the ability to pass, say,
the 11+ examination, then this could be the criterion for the 'adequate minimum
education for all'. As long as the inspectorate were ensuring that this minimum
standard was being provided by the combination of all educational settings which a
child was experiencing, West's market model could be said to have passed the test of
equality of opportunity. There is equality of opportunity to obtain the 'minimum
adequate education'. Importantly, it would not be an objection to equality of
opportunity that educational opportunities were unequal in any other respect. This is
illustrated with reference to an example of Williams' concerning health. He objects
to a difference in the treatment of the 'rich ill and the poor ill' (Williams 1962 p.
122), because the 'proper ground of distribution of medical care is ill health' and so
those whose needs are the same should receive the same treatment. But is it really the
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inequality of treatment that is of concern to Williams? Surely it wouldn't make any
difference on the grounds Williams has given us if the richer person was treated in
plush surroundings, with many luxuries, by very eminent highly paid consultants,
while the poorer person was treated in a large ward, without any luxuries, by less
eminent and hence cheaper medical practitioners, provided that both treatments were
adequate.
Is this obscuring the issue by bringing in irrelevant dimensions? What Williams could
be arguing is that what is relevant is the medical treatment itself, not these peripheral
parts. But again, why would it matter if the medical team treating the rich person
gave a superior service, as long as both treatments were adequate? It seems that
Williams couldn't object to the difference in their treatment, at least not from the
, principles he has stated here. So what, I suggest, Williams is actually concerned with
is that the irrational situation is where 'those whose needs are the same not receiving
adequate treatment.' The notion of 'equal treatment' is a luxury not afforded by his
argument.
Similarly, at first it would seem as though we could translate this example and
discussion mutatis mutandis into an educational context. Williams objection to the 11+
system which he describes is not that the poorer person's education is not equal to the
richer person's, but that it is not adequate to pass .the 11+. For exactly parallel
discussion to that above could point out the differences between two schools, but at
the same time agree that both were adequate to pass the required exam. For example,
the schooling of Smith (Williams' richer child) could take place in a plush old manor
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in the home counties, with a richly carpeted library, and small classes with well-paid
Oxbridge graduates. The school of Jones (the poorer child) could be in an inner city
compound, with a carpetless library, and larger classes taken by education graduates
from one of the new Universities. But the only objection in Williams' terms to the
latter would be if it wasn't adequately preparing children for the 11+. The fact that
the educational resources were unequal would be irrelevant.
However, the situation isn't quite as straightforward as that. Difficulties begin to
emerge when we start to consider Williams' third type of good, the limited goods.
Consider our graduates from various of West's market educational settings and
establishments. They all have had the opportunity at least to obtain their 'minimum
adequate education's. Now when these graduates apply for work or further
educational opportunities in jobs or educational establishments where there is no
competition, that is, for those goods that are not intrinsically or fortuitously limited,
then there is no problem. All can get that which they seek, so equality of opportunity
prevails". But what happens when they apply for positions which are intrinsically or
fortuitously limited? Consider two applicants, you and I, both of whom have had an
adequate education, but competing for this sort of limited good: both of us can't get
the post. In this situation, it might well be that we have not equality of opportunity
to obtain that position: it may be the case, say, that you will get the position just
S Note that we can define our 'minimum adequate education' broadly enough to ensure
that it does cover such qualities as motivation, perseverance, and so on, so that it
couldn't be objected that people didn't have these kinds of opportunities.
9 With the small caveat noted above that reserves judgement on this issue if it should
be proven that some individuals were not capable of achieving the minimum level.
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because you went to the better school from which people are normally drawn for that
post, even though mine gave an adequate education. It will be inequality of
opportunity in Williams' definition, because of course, my educational situation could
in theory have been improved to the level of your's. This is the familiar 'positional
goods' problem, which does then seem to bring in a problem of compatibility between
West's market model and Williams' definition of equality of opportunity. We need'
to explore this issue, to see if it does present a serious problem for West's model.
Education as a positional good
The positional goods problem is that 'advance in society is possible only by moving
to a higher plane among one's fellows ... what each of us can achieve, all cannot'
(Hirsch 1977 pp. 4-5). Or as Miliband puts it: 'improved... performance by one
person makes a "loser" of someone else' (Miliband 1991 p. 10). Now of course, the
'winners' and 'losers' aspect of this competition can be over-emphasised. For a loser
can become a winner later on: most famously, the failed bus conductor becomes prime
minister. But the problem of positional goods is that there still seems a prima facie
element of unfairness to the whole thing. More to the point here, it does seem that,
because of the competition for these particular sorts of positional goods, West's
market model would fail equality of opportunity, as defined by Williams. Is this
enough to damn it? If we thought so, then we would be in danger of following the
Roman emperor who, in a contest between two singers heard the first, didn't like his
song, so awarded the prize to the second (Tullock 1976 p. 10). Surely, if we are
interested in assessing market models relative to other alternatives then we are
interested in seeing if these alternatives could fare any better, including in this aspect
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of equality of opportunity. So, are there theoretical or empirical perspectives which
will enable us to think that West's market model, rather than more extensive state
intervention, would make the problem of positionality worse? So suppose the model
was as he wanted it to be, with state involvement in regulating the minimum
standards, (with allowance for regulation of the curriculum) and state funding of those
too poor to provide for themselves. Could a system with more state funding,
regulation and provision be better placed to deal with this problem than the market
model? In what follows we will make some brief comments about what is a very
important issue, in the hope of showing that the issue of positional goods does not
present a knock-down argument against markets in education as some have supposed.
Firstly, the two recent arguments relating education, markets and positional goods,
from Jonathan (1990) and Miliband (1991) have not been convincing. Jonathan argues
that when children face 'intensified competition', parents, as a 'category of
individuals', have their children's welfare threatened by the actions of others: 'the
outcome [from education] has currency only in relation to the outcomes of individuals
across that society' (Jonathan 1990 p. 122). That is, Jonathan wants to make the case
that this positional nature of education means that individual decisions will have
. 'damaging consequences in general for the society which [the education system]
serves' (p. 123 emphasis added). She doesn't argue this in detail, but simply notes
that: 'In a game structured like a prisoner's dilemma, trustees, [ie parents] far from
having free choices, have no responsible option but to make individualistic,
competitive moves even though these must entail a worse outcome for some of the
young - and may arguably entail a worse outcome for all of them - than would have
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resulted from a less competitive framework for decision.' (p. 124). Elsewhere I have
argued that the latter accusation - that there would be 'a worse outcome for all' -
cannot be shown using the prisoner's dilemma as Jonathan suggests (Tooley 1992a pp.
123-5). But of course the issue of concern to us here is whether or not positional
competition in markets leads to greater unfairness to particular individuals, an issue
which Jonathan does not address. Similarly, although Miliband accepted the opposite
position to Jonathan - that any dangers of markets in this respect cannot be shown 'by
resort to the famous 'prisoner's dilemma"(Miliband 1991 p. 10), and indeed, that
positional competition can lead to a raising of overall standards (p. 10), again he does
not address the issue with which we are concerned. So could there be an argument
constructed to show that markets in education (along the lines of West's market
model) would be worse for positionality than greater state intervention?
In order for such an argument to succeed, it would have to overcome the perspective
of Gray who argues that it is precisely greater state intervention, rather than markets,
which will exacerbate the problem of positional goods. He argues that '[t]here is much
to support the conjecture that the positionality of many of the goods that Hirsch
mentions derives from the politicized and collectivist mode of their provision, so that
their positionality would be increased, not diminished, by any further move to
collectivism of the sort that Hirsch commends.' (Gray 1983 p. 176). He gives
example of experiences from the 20th century, which Hirsch 'inexplicably' ignores,
showing that 'it is in socialist orders that goods such as education, housing, and access
to favoured occupations acquire a degree of positionality beyond any possessed in
societies containing a powerful market sector.' (p. 176).
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Now Gray's argument is both empirical and theoretical; but we do not need to
examine the details; for we can conduct a simple thought-experiment to show that any
imaginable state intervention would come up against the problem of positionality;
hence this is not a problem unique to West's market model:
We assume that the state is involved in education a much greater way than that
envisaged by West. Let us also assume that this state system, as with West's, ensures
an adequate minimum education for all. Finally, let us assume that the state can
actively intervene to eliminate those fortuitously limited goods, so that the problem
of positionality remains at its starkest with the allocation of contingently limited
goods. Now we could have the situation where there is a two-tier system, of private
schools as well as the state schools. If this was permitted, then even if the state
school system provided a uniform education, these private schools would be free to
offer much more diversity of standards, and it is likely that elite schools would emerge
under that system. So the problem of positionality would be present there, and it is not
clear that West's market model would be any worse".
Now, this could be combatted by either banning private schools, or by putting ceilings
on what these private schools would achieve - all of which would have repercussions
for liberty, which might not be considered desirable. But most crucially, it would
10 Indeed, it is possible, depending on the type of intervention that existed, that the
system proposed would be far worse, because it is likely only the much wealthier will
be able to afford these better schools, on top of their taxes for state schools; in a
private-only system, no-one is paying much taxation for education, and hence less
wealthy people would have more disposable income and could perhaps also afford to
send children to the more expensive schools.
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seem that doing so would not solve the problem of positionality. For suppose a
second situation, where we have only state schools (with parallel arguments for the
case where 'ceilings' are placed on private schools). Suppose first that some schools
within this system are 'better' than others - not necessarily because of a state decision
to be like that, but in the absence of a decision which rules it out - where 'better'
means producing graduates who are more able to satisfy selectors allocating
contingently limited goods. We don't even have to assume that these schools have
more resources devoted too them - which would be a fairly easy area in which the
state could move to equalise: the schools could simply have more motivated staff, .
more able leaders, more motivated children, more connections with the elite world, or
any number of similar factors which make the school 'better' in the sense defined.
Clearly the problem of positionality remains, however children are selected or
allocated to these schools. If the allocation was at random, then this still might seem
unfair if those children who have more talent or motivation are denied a place at the
better schools; if it was selection through geographical location, then this is likely to
favour those of a certain, probably wealthy class; if selection through academic or
other achievement, or motivation discovered through personality tests, then it could
still be argued that all of these qualities had been unfairly influenced by earlier
environmental factors. It does not seem as though the problem of positionality is
solved as long as it is accepted that some schools are going to be better than others.
What about the case where we could assume that the state ensured (by some
mechanism - which might of course be impossible to achieve) that all schools were
comprehensively the same, with none recognised to be 'better' than others. But, as
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long as there are still contingently limited goods to allocate, the problem of
positionality still will not go away. For if all schools are uniform, then this raises the
importance of the family (or any other child-raising voluntary institution outside the
control of the state). If schools were equal, and there was still competition for
positional goods, then to some families it would matter very much to provide their
children with extra educational opportunities outside of schooling. Children of these
families would presumably have the edge when applying for positional goods.
Again, the state could, at least in theory, intervene to equalise educational
opportunities in a more general way, so that there was educational compensation for
those who were from less privileged backgrounds. But again, as long as there remain :
valued positional goods, and as long as it is possible to contribute more educational
opportunities, then some families still would see it as their role to give still more
educational opportunities to their children. Of course, the state could intervene here
too, and forbid this sort of activity. And that takes us to the limit of this thought
experiment, into the arguments that Williams avoids, but which, as West noted, bring
in issues of liberty, and which Rawls suggested would lead to the abolition of the
family as we know it. What this thought experiment is supposed to illustrate is that,
as long as the family (or other child-raising voluntary institution outside the control
of the state) remains, positionality will remain a problem. Whatever degree of state
intervention is proposed in education, provided it falls short of abolition or similar
interference in the family, will not prevent the problem of positionality. So West's
market model does not uniquely suffer from this problem.
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Thus, (i) the arguments presented in the recent debate about the problem of
positionality do not give a convincing argument against markets and for greater state
intervention; (ii) there are empirical and theoretical arguments which give the
opposing view, which we would need to explore for a more thorough view on the
issue; and (iii) the problem of positional goods would seem to remain a problem even
in an imaginary world of greater state intervention providing equal educational
experiences, as long as the family (or any other voluntary child-rearing institution
outside of the control of the state) remains.
As far as this discussion goes, we will not take this issue any further: we do not have
to contemplate the abolition of the family, because, recall, we are going along with
West's assumptions, and one of these concerns an important role for the family.
Moreover, Williams has raised the issue of conflicting values, in particular of liberty,
and we shall see in a moment that Rawls would balk at overriding individual liberty
in the way necessary to avoid the problem of positionality".
Conclusion: Williams, West and a minimum adequate education
We have explored Williams' definition and justification of equality of opportunity, and
with some small caveats, noted that West's market model incorporating the 'minimum
adequate education for all' satisfies Williams' arguments. The most important caveat
concerned positional goods: however, West's model.was shown to suffer from this
11 As some consolation, perhaps it must be added that unequal opportunity for
positional goods is not necessarily a bad thing for those who experience it. An
incentive to compete even harder can come from seeing what a disadvantage one has
had, and fighting not to let that come in the way of one's achievement.
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problem only as any other more extensive state intervention system would suffer.
Hence we can conclude that West's model has satisfied, as much as is possible,
Williams' equality of opportunity.
But does Williams' argument capture what is important about equality of opportunity?
Does later, more sophisticated, work add crucial elements which Williams overlooked,
and which could not be satisfied by West's market model? We turn now to Rawls to
see how West's model would fare under his scrutiny.
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2.4 Rawls on Equality of Opportunity
Chapter 2
Rawls' A Theory ofJustice is one of the most influential works in moral and political
philosophy in the latter half of this century. For our purposes, Rawls' work is
important for it addresses in detail the notion of equality of opportunity, developing
Williams' argument. In this section we explore whether West's 'minimum adequate
education for all' can also satisfy Rawls' discussion". In order to do this, we will
first set out where equality of opportunity fits into Rawls' scheme. Secondly, we
explore Rawls' definition of equality of opportunity and relate this to Williams'
definition. Thirdly, we explore Rawls' way around the perceived 'problem' of the
influence of the family, showing how the principle of equality of opportunity is
tempered by other principles within his overall theory of justice. Fourthly, we note
how Rawls' solution is very similar to West's 'minimum adequate education for all',
with the crucial difference that Rawls' solution is constrained by his 'difference
principle'; this is not compatible with what West intended at all, and hence presents
an area where we could find objections to West's model. However, fifthly, we note
some difficulties with Rawls' 'difference principle', ask what his arguments for it are,
and note some difficulties with these arguments. This brings us to, sixthly, ask what
it was Rawls sought from the difference principle, and we suggest that it is for a
society with a 'safety-net', a minimum standard below which no-one is allowed to fall.
Finally, we relate this to West's argument for a 'minimum adequate education for
12 Note this section does not attempt a thorough explication or critique of Rawls'
theory of justice. It focuses on this narrow question of whether Rawls' conception of
equality of opportunity is compatible with West's 'minimum adequate education for
all' .
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Equality of Opportunity and Rawls' Principles of Justice
Chapter 2
Rawls' social contract argument, as is well-known, uses the tools of the 'veil of
ignorance' and the 'original position'. In this original position, individuals, stripped
of the positions in which they would find themselves in society, are able to rationally
decide the principles which, if operating, would ensure a fair society (Rawls 1972 p.
17). Thus 'we have to ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given
the contractual situation. This connects the theory of justice with the theory of
rational choice.' (p. 17). What these individuals from behind the veil of ignorance
come up with are two principles of justice, together with a number of caveats. The
second of these principles - the 'difference' principle - concerns equality of
opportunity:
'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ... and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.' (p. 302).
There are two important caveats to Rawls' principles. Firstly, that if any inequalities
of opportunity are to be permitted, then 'an inequality of opportunity must enhance
the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity.' (p. 303). Secondly, there is the
13 Recall that we haven't yet discussed what the content of the minimum adequate
curriculum could be - we shall be exploring these issues in later chapters.
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'general conception' that: 'All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income
and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favored.' (p. 303).
We will return to these principles and these caveats below. But first let us be clear
exactly what Rawls means by 'fair equality of opportunity', and how this relates to
Williams' notion.
Rawls' definition of fair equality of opportunity'
Rawls definition is contrasted to the classical liberal notion of 'les carrieres ouvertes
aux talents'; this he suggests is unfair, for although it allows equal legal rights of
access to 'all advantaged social positions', it also allows the 'cumulative effect of
prior distributions of natural assets - that is, talents and abilities' to 'improperly
influence' access to social positions. These factors are 'arbitrary from a moral point
of view' (p. 72). So Rawls' 'fair equality of opportunity' is defined to mean not only
that there is in this formal sense 'careers open to all', but that, more meaningfully, 'all
should have a fair chance to attain them'. (p. 73). This means that 'those who are at
the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should
have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social
system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born' (p. 73).
This 'fair equality of opportunity' can be obtained in part by ensuring equality of
educational opportunity: 'Chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not
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depend upon one's class position, and so the school system, whether public or private,
should be designed to even out class barriers' (p. 73, emphasis added).
Now there are great similarities between Rawls' and Williams' definitions".
However, an important qualification, as Rawls several times points out, is that his
definition of equality of opportunity cannot be taken in isolation, but must be seen in
the context of his theory of justice as a whole, and in particular, his 'difference
principle' and the caveat noted above about equality in social primary goods.
So we cannot assume that, just because West's 'minimum adequate education' was
compatible with Williams' argument, it would satisfy Rawls too. One way to explore
potential differences is to examine how Rawls tempers what he takes to be the logic
of Williams' position - which, as we noted, Rawls suggests would lead to the need for
the abolition of the family. We noted how West's 'minimum adequate education for
all' itself helped to avoid the logic of Williams' argument. Rawls' solution is
different: it is firmly embedded in his difference principle.
Equality of opportunity and the family: towards a minimum adequate education for
all?
Rawls notes that: 'the principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out,
at least as long as the institution of the family exists ... Even the willingness to make
an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon
happy family and social circumstances.' (p. 74). However, he thinks he can avoid the
14 This isn't surprising as Rawls cites Williams favourably in several places.
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implication that the family 'should be abolished', an implication which he notes he
would draw from Williams' position on equality of opportunity (p. 512): He argues
that: 'Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of equal opportunity
inclines in this direction. But within the context of the theory of justice as a whole,
there is much less urgency to take this course.' (p. 512). What emerges most crucially
in the theory of justice is the difference principle, which 'redefines the grounds for
social inequalities as conceived in the system of liberal equality' (p. 512). Moreover,
there are the principles of fraternity and redress which, if working properly, will make
people more able to accept 'the natural distribution of assets and the contingencies of
social circumstances' (p. 512), in particular, the advantages that belonging to some
families can bring.
So what impact would Rawls' difference principle have when we come to consider
the implications for equality of opportunity in education? Rawls notes that the
difference principle'gives some weight to the considerations singled out by the
principle of redress.... undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities
of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow
compensated for'. (p. 100) So at first sight it seems one implication of this principle
would be that 'greater resources might be spent on the education of the less rather
than the more intelligent, [in], say the earlier years of school.' (p. 101). However,
again, we can see that this principle must be 'weighed in balance' (p. 101) with the
other principles. The difference principle would only favour this solution if it could
be shown that this would be likely to 'improve the long-term expectations of the least
favored' (p. 101). But if some other solution showed more likelihood of achieving
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that, even, for example, if more attention was given 'to the better endowed' (p. 101),
then this would also be permissible. The crucial issue is that the difference principle
should be satisfied.
Finally, the principle of fraternity also has implications for education. This is related
to the difference principle'i'; however, another aspect of fraternity concerns the
'essential primary good of self-respect' (p. 107). Recall that one of Rawls' caveats to
the difference principle noted above was that these essential primary goods should be
distributed equally (unless, again, an unequal distribution was in the interests of the
least-favoured). So the need for this essential primary good implies that 'the confident
sense of their own worth should be sought for the least favored and this limits the
forms of hierarchy and the degrees of inequality that justice permits. Thus, for
example, resources for education are not to be allotted solely or necessarily mainly
according to their return as estimated in productive trained abilities, but also according
to their worth in enriching the personal and social life of citizens, including here the
less favored.' (p. 107). Similarly, he claims that 'the value of education should not
be assessed only in terms of economic efficiency and social welfare. Equally if not
more important is the role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of
his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual
a secure sense of his own worth.' (p. 101).
15 'The difference principle .., does seem to correspond to a natural meaning of
fraternity: namely to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is
to the benefit of others who are less well off.' (p. 105). 'The other aspects of fraternity
should not be forgotten, but the difference principle expresses its fundamental meaning
from the standpoint of social justice.' (p. 106).
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So here we have the notion that fair equality of opportunity, modified in distinct ways
by the difference principle, the principles of redress and of fraternity, leads to the need
for an education for all, adequate to ensure the essential primary good of self-respect,
and that this appears to be a non-negotiable minimum for alL On top of that
minimum, there could be inequalities in educational opportunities, provided that for
Rawls, the difference principle is satisfied. So these considerations bring out
similarities to West's 'minimum adequate education for all' solution. There are two
differences: one is that Rawls has specified some content to the minimum adequate
education (it should ensure self-respect and be geared in some ways towards each
person enjoying the cultural affairs of the society): this may well be acceptable to
West, as we shall explore in the ensuing chapters. However, there is a crucial
dissimilarity between West's model and Rawls', namely the difference principle,
which in no way seems to be implied by West's modeL For within West's model,
there are likely to be severe inequalities, which could only be justified in Rawls'
system if they could be shown to be of benefit to the least favoured - and that wasn't
part of West's assumptions". So: how crucial is the difference principle to Rawls,
and how seriously would not satisfying it be a damaging blow to West's market
model?
Rawls' arguments for his difference principle
Rawls offers two arguments for his difference principle: an intuitive argument and a
rational choice argument. His intuitive argument is not very satisfactory. Having
16 There is nothing in his assumptions to rule it out, but nothing to suggestthat it was
anything that he could have had in mind, particularly as it would only seem to be
possible with much greater state intervention, which West would abhor.
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established that 'the parties [in the original position] start with a principle establishing
equal liberty for all, including equality of opportunity, as well as an equal distribution
of income and wealth' (p. 151), Rawls then agrees that a person in the original
position is likely to concede various inequalities if he or she notes that these
inequalities 'succeed in eliciting more productive efforts' (p. 151). But '[i]n order to
make the principle regarding inequalities determinate, one looks at the system from
the standpoint of the least advantaged representative man. Inequalities are permissible
when they maximize, or at least all contribute to, the long-term expectations of the
least fortunate group in society.' (p. 151). But where has this come from? It doesn't
seem to follow from anything that has been said before; nor is it self-evidently
obvious either: I present an alternative conception of when inequalities could be
permissible below.
His second argument, from rational choice, is as follows: he offers us an analogy with
a player in a game of chance. He says that someone is likely to choose his two
principles of justice from the original position in a way analogous to how a gambler
would use the 'maximin' rule > which tells us 'to adopt the alternative the worst
outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others' (p. 153).
Now, Rawls recognises that 'the maximin rule is not, in general, a suitable guide for
choices under uncertainty.' (p. 153)17. But it is rational to use the maximin rule, he
17 Why it is not suitable for many 'choices under uncertainty' can be seen with this
example: imagine a rational gambler asked to choose between these four societies
(example adapting Letwin 1983 p. 23):
1) All incomes £7,500
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says, when all three of the following conditions prevail (p. 155): Firstly, when there
is no reliable knowledge of the probabilities of each of the outcomes. Secondly, when
'the person choosing has a conception of the good such that he cares very little, if
anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be
sure of by following the maximin rule.' (p. 154). Finally, when the alternatives that
are rejected involve 'grave risk.' (p. 154).
By analogy, Rawls suggests that these three conditions will also lead to the adoption
of his principles of justice from behind the veil of ignorance. Concerning the first
condition, Rawls notes that the original position has been defined so that 'the veil of
ignorance excludes all but the vaguest notion of likelihoods' (p. 155). Restrictions on
the knowledge of those in the original position are in general justified because the
parties must be ignorant of facts about themselves, for the good reason that this
outlaws bargaining (p. 139). It is not clear why this applies to having knowledge of
the probabilities of different societies emerging. The suspicion is that his 'veil of
ignorance' has been defined 'so that we get the desired solution' (p. 141). This does
seem a little arbitrary - in the 20th century, statistical techniques are well developed,
so although it may have been excusable for a classical social contractarian to assume
2) half incomes are £5,000, half £10,000.
3) 1% incomes are £3,000, the rest £7,545.
4) 1% incomes are £100,000, the rest £6,566.
Each has the same 'expected value' as a lottery, namely £7500. So a rational gambler
would regard equality - i.e. position 1 - as no better and no worse than the very
substantial inequalities in the other cases. So maximin would not feature on the agenda
of the rational gambler. (Maximin would select equality, because that has its worst
outcome - £7500 - superior to the worst outcome of all the others - namely £5000,
£3000 and £6566).
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that likelihoods would be difficult to calculate, it is less of an excuse for Rawls.
Concerning the second condition, Rawls notes that there are arguments from his two
principles of justice" which illustrate its importance: 'if we can maintain that these
principles provide a workable theory of social justice, and that they are compatible
with reasonable demands of efficiency, then this conception guarantees a satisfactory
minimum. There may be, on reflection, little reason for trying to do better.' (p. 156
emphasis added). We shall come back to the crucial comments highlighted concerning
the guarantee of a 'satisfactory minimum' shortly. But what has this got to do with
the second condition, that we aren't interested in maximising or at least extending our
income etc., which is one reason why we would choose the maximin rule? If we are
assured of a satisfactory minimum for all, why does this preclude striving for
something much better? Why would I not strive for more for myself if I was free of
guilt about others who were less fortunate? Rawls argues that there isa persuasive
consideration to do with 'the priority of liberty': 'For this priority implies that the
persons in the original position have no desire to try for greater gains at the expense
of the equal liberties. The minimum assured by the two principles in lexical order is
not one that the parties wish to jeopardize for the sake of greater economic and social
advantages.' (p. 156). So Rawls is arguing that, because of the desire for equal
liberties, we would not seek economic and social inequalities. But why do economic
and social inequalities rule out, or at least mitigate against, equal liberties? For we
have already noted that Rawls accepts that inequalities are desirable in a society if
18 The second principle is the difference principle. The first is: 'Each person is to have
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar system of liberty for alL' (p. 302).
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they lead to greater opportunities for the least advantaged. So these inequalities of
themselves can't be the cause of the undermining ofliberty, otherwise they would be
outlawed, by lexical priority, in Rawls theory. It does not seem as though Rawls has
a substantial argument for the second condition required to use the maximin rule, so
again he seems to be in grave difficulties.
Finally, 'the third [condition] holds if we can assume that other conceptions of justice
may lead to institutions that the parties would find intolerable.' (p. 156). He gives as
an example that 'it has sometimes been held that under some conditions the utility
principle ... justified, if not slavery or serfdom, at any rate serious infractions of
liberty for the sake of greater social benefits.' (p. 156). This is a very bold claim. For
what it says is that we would choose his two principles under a maximin rule,
because, to satisfy this third condition, all other alternatives could lead to undesirable
situations. But how can he be so sure of this? For example, if the utility principle (in
whatever form) is otherwise satisfactory but leads to these 'serious infractions of
liberty' then it would seem possible that the principle could be suitably modified to
ensure that these infringements of liberty didn't occur.
We won't take this matter any further here, for we note that, whether of not this third
condition raises difficulties, the second condition seems fatally flawed and the first
arbitrarily selected. As Rawls says, all three conditions are needed in order to
recommend the use of the maximin rule, so we are left without the need for such a
rule in this situation. Analogously, then, it would appear we are left without a rational
choice argument for his two principles of justice to be selected from the original
position.
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Guaranteeing a satisfactory minimum: from the difference principle to the safety-net
This seems quite devastating for Rawls. Can anything be salvaged? Why did Rawls
want his two principles, and in particular the second? The crucial aim was contained
in the remarks highlighted earlier, concerning the 'guaranteed satisfactory minimum'.
For Rawls argues that one of the reasons why his principles are so important is
because they do guarantee a satisfactory minimum standard for alL Now, firstly, it
is hard to see how Rawls could argue that principles of justice alone could guarantee
a satisfactory minimum standard. For we are in a position of ignorance about the
society. We don't know anything about our place in society, our class position, social
status, wealth, natural talents, conception of the good, and so on (p. 137), nor do we
know our society's 'economic or political situation, or the level of civilisation and
culture it has been able to achieve.' (p. 137). So it could be that our society is one in
which there is no-one, for example, with any entrepreneurial, scientific or
technological talent, etc. Or it could be a society with no productive resources, or no
opportunities for trading with other nations. In other words, our society could be very
poor, and although we might find it the case that we are all equally free and the
inequalities are arranged so that they do benefit the poorest of all, we might find it
that no-one has the satisfactory minimum standard. Perhaps this isn't a significant
objection to Rawls - for of course, his principles of justice could imply a guaranteed
satisfactory minimum, with the caveat 'capital formation of the society permitting'.
But is it true that even with this caveat an adequate minimum could be guaranteed?
A simple example will illustrate some diffIculties. In order to say whether there was
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an adequate minimum for all, we would have to know what the minimum level of
income was: let us assume it is discovered to be £15,000. Suppose we have the
following three individuals in our society, A, B and C, with incomes, £15,000,
£15,000, and £2,000 respectively. Let us assume everything else about the society
satisfies Rawls' two principles of justice throughout. Suppose then that A is permitted
within these principles of justice to increase her earnings, say by opening a small
business, because this will benefit C, the least-advantaged, say by employing him.
Suppose the new incomes are A: £20,000; B: £15,000; C: £10,000. We have done
everything within Rawls' two principles of justice, and in particular the difference
principle. But notice, crucially, that C is still living beneath the minimum adequate
level. The difference principle has not guaranteed the minimum level for all!
This confusion between (a tendency towards) equality and ensuring that everyone has
ali adequate minimum is well illustrated in Kymlicka's discussion of Rawls. He
considers three possible societies, two with extremes of inequality, and the third with
fairly close incomes (in unspecified units):
1) 10, 8, 1
2) 7, 6, 2
3) 5, 4, 4
He then argues: 'If you do not know how likely it is that you will be in the best or
worst position, the rational choice according to Rawls is the third scheme. ... The
problem with the first two schemes is that there is some chance, unknown in size, that
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your life will be completely unsatisfactory.' (Kymlicka 1990 p. 66).
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But if this is
true of the first two schemes, then it is as true of the third, because nowhere has it
been specified what a minimum, or adequate income would be. Using Kymlicka's
numbers, if this figure was 10, then only the first highly unequal scheme would give
anyone a life which was not 'completely unsatisfactory'. So that would be the rational
society to choose, because then you would have at least some chance of surviving.
If the figure was 1000, then you'd be indifferent between all of the societies - they
would all be as equally as bad. If the figure, however, was 1, then in none of the
societies is there a chance of life being 'completely unsatisfactory'. Kymlicka has
confused the notion of relative inequality, with that of living in absolute poverty and
inadequacy.
Rawls wanted his two principles of justice to guarantee this minimum: but not only
are the principles not justified by his argument from rational choice theory, they do
not even guarantee this minimum standard. But there is another feasible way of
guaranteeing this minimum from behind the veil of ignorance: that is, by deciding that
this is what we would choose to have of society - a society, capital (human and
material) permitting, which has a safety-net, a minimum below which no-one could
falL
Choosing such a conception of a society is perfectly possible from behind Rawls' veil
of ignorance, for the restrictions on knowledge imposed by Rawls do not include
'general facts about human society.' People behind the veil of ignorance do
'understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the
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basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are
presumed to know whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice. '
(Rawls 1972 p. 137). Now one such 'general fact' which I would have thought it
crucial for anyone to know about human society, would be that it is possible for
human societies, especially once they have reached certain levels of capital formation,
to have a 'safety net' below which no-one can falL This would seem to fit into a
general fact about political affairs, about economic theory (which would show that
such a state of affairs was possible) about social organization (it is one possible form
of social organization) and even about human psychology (people might feel more
secure knowing there was a safety-net below which they couldn't fall, and hence strive
to achieve this). We couldn't know that our particular society would have a safety-net
- this would be ruled out by Rawls' proscription noted above, but we could know that
it was a possible social institution.
Conclusions: Rawls, West and a minimum adequate education for all
So let me bring the threads of this argument together. West's minimum adequate
education, curriculum content permitting (to be explored in the next chapters), satisfied
what Rawls sought from equality of opportunity, except that Rawls' equality of
opportunity was embedded in his difference principle, which would not be satisfied
by West's model- for West did not assume that the only inequalities acceptable would
be those which raised the level of the least advantaged. However, once the
justification for the difference principle was examined, we saw that Rawls needed it
to assure that an adequate minimum standard was maintained. It failed to do that: but
Rawls could have simply posited a 'principle of justice' which explicitly stated that
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there was to be this minimum safety-net. But now we can return to West's argument.
For, although he hasn't discussed other areas of welfare, it is at least compatible with
what he is saying about education that he would favour a similar minimum safety net
in terms of other areas. For it wouldn't be much good for a child to have a minimum
education if he or she didn't also have minimum food, or clothing or shelter. It seems
perfectly compatible with the protection of minors principle enunciated in the first
chapter.
So we can conclude from this section is that West's 'minimum adequate education for
all' satisfies Rawls' position on equality of opportunity, with the proviso that instead
of seeking the difference principle, we substituted what Rawls was seeking from it,
namely a society with an adequate guaranteed minimum, or safety-net. Hence West's
model seems to have fulfilled the requirements set by Rawls as well as by Williams
for equality of opportunity to be satisfied. However, perhaps it might be felt that the
test set by Rawls was too easy to satisfy, and that what those who object to markets
would find particularly galling about West's model is not that it wouldn't satisfy
equality of opportunity, but that it wouldn't satisfy equality in some much stronger
sense. Indeed, there has been much criticism from the 'political left' that Rawls has
neglected important issues. One such writer is Ronald Dworkin, who has argued not
for equality of opportunity, precisely because it is in some sense 'fraudulent' (Dworkin
1985 p. 207), but for 'equality of resources'. We tum to his argument now to see if
his criticisms could be used decisively against West's market model.
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2.5 Why Dworkin cares about equality
Dworkin's complex four-part work (1981a, 1981b, 1988, 1987) sets out his theory of
'equality of resources' and demonstrates why this is preferable to 'equality of welfare'.
His argument again involves a thought experiment and an 'original position', though,
unlike Rawls', without 'a veil of ignorance'. The 'original position' is colourfully
translated by Dworkin into a shipwreck on a desert island: 'Suppose a number of
shipwreck survivors are washed up on a desert island which has abundant resources
and no native population, and any likely rescue is many years away. These immigrants
accept the principle that no one is antecedently entitled to any of these resources.'
(Dworkin 1981b p. 285). How are the resources of the island. to be fairly divided
between the new islanders? An auction is held, allowing the market to operate in a
situation. of equality amongst the islanders, each of them having been allocated the
same number of an otherwise worthless object, say, clam shells. In this way, the
resources are distributed to individuals on the island, in a way that satisfies what
Dworkin calls the 'envy test': 'No division of resources is an equal division if, once
the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer someone else's bundle of
.resources to his own bundle.' (p. 285). That is, equality of resources prevails if no-one
feels envious of another's bundle of goods. But of course, there are differences in
talents and handicaps of the islanders, and so an ingenious mechanism of compulsory
insurance is also. built into the process, to compensate for disadvantage in the
islanders' talents and handicaps.
Now, it turns out that detailed examination of his argument need not concern us
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here'", for we are only concerned to see if West's notion of 'adequacy' will satisfy
Dworkin's notion of equality. But Dworkin explicitly states in these works that it is
not his intention to answer why equality is desirable: he is concerned only with
'defining a suitable conception of equality of resources, and not in defending it, except
as such definition provides a defense.' (l981b p. 283fo. So the whole tone of his
work, as Narveson points out, is an hypothetical one: if we want equality, then
equality of resources is the way to go about achieving it (Narveson 1983 p. 1). But
in order to assess whether his theory does provide a challenge to the interpretation of
'equality of opportunity' as 'adequacy', it is the premise of why we want equality,
rather than the details of how this can be worked out in equality of resources, which
we need to examine.
Elsewhere, fortunately, Dworkin has written two articles ostensibly setting out to
explain why equality is desirable (1983, 1985). We will examine both these
arguments, starting with the second".
Dworkin's second defence of equality comes under the helpful title of 'Why Liberals
19 For detailed criticism, see Narveson 1983 and Kymlicka 1990.
20 It does not seem as though his definition in particular does, or whether indeed
definition in general can, provide such a defence.
21 Both were originally published in 1983, the first as a journal reply to criticism that
he had neglected this fundamental question, the other appeared in the New York
Review of Books. At the end of the journal article is the unusual editorial comment
that '[tjhe constructive portions of this Comment are provisional in nature and should
not be taken to represent the author's final judgement on these matters.' (Dworkin
1983 p. 40); his second essay, however, was republished in 1985 as a chapter of his
A Matter ofPrinciple, which suggests that the arguments in that were less provisional
and had stood the test of time.
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Should Care about Equality' (1985). Surprisingly then, nowhere does he explicitly say
why this should be the case. However, he does give interesting arguments which
imply what is being sought. Crucially, Dworkin denies that equality implies anything
like 'equality of result', that is 'that citizens must each have the same wealth at every
moment of their lives.' (Dworkin 1985 p. 206). But what it does require is that
people should begin life on an equal footing, or, failing that, that their 'market
allocations must be corrected in order to bring [them] closer to the share of resources
they would have had but for these various differences of initial advantage, luck, and
inherent capacity.' (p. 207). Treating people as equals requires a complex calculation
be made along the following lines: Divide the total resources available to all between
the number of people; let us call this amount x units. Each individual cannot now
take from the resources on balance more than x units. This is Dworkin's equality of
resources.
We note that the 'on balance' is important: for if individuals have contributed much
to the community, then Dworkin says they are entitled to take more out (p. 206). That
is, the following is consistent with Dworkin's argument: Someone who has contributed
nothing to the overall resources of the community at all is entitled only to x units".
Suppose someone else has contributed a great deal, say 5x units. Then on balance she
is still entitled to x units of resources for herself. But she has already contributed 5x,
so to make her balance the same as the previous person, she is entitled to 6x units".
22 Where x is as above, the total resources available to the community divided by the
number of people in the community.
23 Provided of course that both started on an equal footing, or redistribution was made
along those lines.
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This has the interesting implication that economic inequalities - even extreme ones -
can still be present even with Dworkin's equality of resources. But what is frustrating
about this discussion is that we are still no nearer to knowing why it is equal shares
to begin witlr" which Dworkin seeks.
However, although no explicit comments, there are, thankfully, hints as to what the
problem with inequality is. These reveal exactly what we suspected in Williams and
Rawls above, that it is not inequality as such that he is particularly worried about: For
example, he worries that in the United States: 'A substantial minority of Americans
are chronically unemployed or earn wages below any realistic 'poverty line' or are
handicapped in various ways or burdened with special needs' (p. 208); or '[t]he
children of the poor must not be stinted of education or otherwise locked into
positions at the bottom of society.' (p. 211) But here his problem is not that this
minority earns less than others, that there is inequality, but that they live in poverty,
that they don't have enough. He virtually admits as much in his conclusion when he
says: 'We need not accept the gloomy predictions of the New Right economists that
our future will be jeopardized if we try to provide everyone with the means to lead
a life with choice and value' (p. 212 emphasis added).
So he has jumped from trying to show that what is important is that everyone has an
adequate life, enough choice and value, to that everyone should be equal. This is
clearly too big a jump. As Frankfurt writes, criticising Dworkin on this point: 'To
show of poverty that it is compellingly undesirable does nothing whatsoever to show
24 Or redistribution to that effect.
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the same of inequality. For what makes someone poor in the morally relevant sense -
in which poverty is understood as a condition from which we naturally recoil- is not
that his economic assets are simply of lesser magnitude than those of others'
(Frankfurt 1988 p. 147).
Bearing this in mind, we can now return to our example above, of the two people, one
with x resources, the other with 6x, and show, exactly as we showed with Rawls, that
Dworkin's concern with equality is a distraction, and that what he should really be
concerned with is the notion of adequacy. For Dworkin is happy with the outcome that
one person has only x units, providing only that these x units are an equal portion of
the society's wealth. But if, in order to have an adequate minimum standard of living,
a person needed 5x of resources, then the person with x units would be living in
precisely the poverty which Dworkin has been already quoted as condemning! The
wretched individual will take cold comfort from the realisation that, although living
in poverty, at least he has an equal portion of the society's wealth. So again we can
say that, not only is Dworkin's argument not concerned with literal equality, but that
this equality is of absolutely no use in ensuring that everyone does have what he
seeks, a life of choice and value. Again, we note that what would satisfy Dworkin
would be a notion of 'minimum adequacy' below which no-one would be allowed to
fall.
Let us turn to Dworkin's other defence of equality. Here he notes that there seem to
be two questions in fact raised by the question of why equality is important: Firstly,
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if we accept his 'abstract egalitarian thesis" then the question is: which
interpretation or conception of equality is best? (Dworkin 1983 p. 25). Secondly, we
can ask what reasons are there for accepting the 'abstract egalitarian thesis' at all?
Dworkin argues that 'most of the practical debate about equality - even debate
provoked by people who hold positions they think are anti-egalitarian - is actually
debate about the first question' (p. 25). At first glance, as Dworkin has framed it, this
does seems reasonable. For as he points out, a whole range of political philosophical
beliefs can be accommodated in the abstract egalitarian thesis, from libertarian to
utilitarian (p. 24). But the crucial point for our deliberations is, why does the abstract
egalitarian thesis imply equality at all? For our deliberations so far have suggested that
compatible with accepting his egalitarian thesis is to argue that equality is best
abandoned in favour of a notion of 'adequacy'. As it stands, Dworkin seems to have
slanted his question, to make it possible only to accept his thesis and arrive at some
interpretation of equality".
Bearing this in mind, we are able to follow his argument on his first question, ('which
interpretation of equality is best?'), to arrive at very similar conclusions to those noted
above. Now, Dworkin builds up a complicated machinery to arrive at why his equality
25 'From the standpoint of politics, the interests of the members of the community
matter, and matter equally' (Dworkin 1983 p. 24).
26 For example, note how Dworkin argues that the best way of defending the
egalitarian thesis is to show how implausible it would be to deny any of its
components - and he does this by 'asking about the reasons you might have for
rejecting equality itself (p. 32 emphasis added). But the abstract egalitarian thesis as
Dworkin frames it has nothing necessarily to do with equality in this apparently
broader sense, only to do with equality of respect for each individual from political
institutions.
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of resources is the best interpretation of the abstract egalitarian thesis. He does this
by arguing that because there are many possible 'highest-order interests', (for example,
the utilitarian view of maximising happiness), any attempt at interpretation of his
'abstract egalitarian thesis' must ask 'what different goals politics should take up for
people in virtue of the fact that they have the highest-order interests they do, on the
assumption that these higher-order interests matter and matter equally.' (p. 29). There
is a crucial caveat to this, (his 'endorsement constraint') that '[w]e must not propose,
as a fixed social goal for any person, some goal that he himself could not endorse as
a fixed derivative goal for himself, that is, as a goal he must pursue throughout this
life just in virtue of his highest-order interest.' (p. 29?7.
This 'endorsement constraint' then rules out equality of welfare, as shown in his first
paper, (1981a): for he argues there that 'any plausible version of welfarism will
propose some social goal, on behalf of each citizen, that many citizens must
themselves reject even as a derivative goal.' (Dworkin 1983 p. 29). Similarly, he
argues here that libertarianism, understood as a conception of equality, will also suffer
under the endorsement constraint: 'For no one could accept, as a fixed goal for
himself, that he have as much of any particular kind of freedom as possible, even at
the cost of other resources he might have had instead, once he understands that this
might weaken his position to lead the life that is in fact the most valuable for him to
27 This was arrived at by considering the paternalistic implications of not having such
a constraint.
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lead.' (p. 30?8. Next Dworkin argues that his equality of resources does satisfy this
endorsement constraint: 'Equality of resources proposes, as the derivative goal politics
takes from individual interests, the provision of resources according to the most
abstract possible account of what resources are, so that the resources an individual
actually has available to him, in virtue of the political goal, depend on his decisions
and projects from time to time. Now one can state any goal about the command he
is to have over resources that is better suited to his highest-order transparent"
interest, his interest in leading a life that is in fact a valuable life.' (p. 30).
The problem with this argument is that our argument above (where we suggested that
Dworkin's equality of resources could not of itself guarantee a life of choice and
value) precisely challenges Dworkin's claim that equality of resources could be wel1-
suited to a person's 'interest in leading a life that is in fact a valuable life': for
equality of resources could lead, as our example showed, to living in absolute poverty,
which would clearly not be leading 'a valuable life'. Now Dworkin recognises that
there could be other, even better, arguments for other conceptions of equality which
will also satisfy his concerns (p. 30). Crucially, we can see that our notion of
'adequacy' does satisfy his concerns, and in particular, does satisfy his 'endorsement
constraint': for no individual would object to having as 'a fixed social goal' that of
28 This doesn't seem entirely true, for it would seem possible for some fanatical
'freedom-at-all-costs' person to want such a fixed goal for himself, and would not
want any substitute life-style. But we will ignore this complication for now.
29 Here 'transparent' is contrasted with 'opaque' (p. 27): a transparent interest in
leading a good life means that it matters to a person whether his or her life is in fact
good; an opaque interest in leading a good life means that it matters whether he or she
thinks his or her life is a good life.
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having an adequate level of resources on which to live and develop.
Chapter 2
Hence, we can argue that both Dworkin's explicit discussion of the importance of
equality leads us back to the acceptability of our previous notion of 'adequacy'. Now,
without going into the depth in which we have done with Williams and Rawls, we can
assume that similar arguments could be made to show the compatibility of West's
'minimum adequate education for all' with Dworkin's position when translated into
arguments concerning education - for the key point remains the same: he does not
seek equality in any literal sense, only that everyone has a level of adequacy.
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2.6 Conclusions: for 'equality of educational opportunity' read 'an adequate
education for all'
This chapter has examined the objection to West's market model that it wouldn't
satisfy 'equality of opportunity'. Building on the discussion of chapter 1, we
examined West's notion of 'a minimum adequate education for all' (which he
conceded would be needed in his market model) to see whether it could be compatible
with the notion of 'equality of opportunity'. To this end, we examined the arguments
of three philosophers concerned with this issue, philosophers chosen as representing
critical points in recent discussion from the 'political left' on equality. Discussion of
Bernard Williams' argument showed his notion of equality of opportunity to be
compatible with West's minimum adequate education for all, with the small caveat
that the 'positionality' of education would pose a problem - but only as much a
problem as under any education system whatsoever, including a heavily state-
interventionist one. Similarly, Rawls' argument for equality of opportunity was also
compatible with West's notion, except that the 'difference principle' put constraints
on inequalities which were outside those allowed by West. However, when examined,
the difference principle didn't actually do what Rawls sought from it, and in fact,
positing instead the notion of an adequate minimum safety-net - compatible with
West's position - would be far more satisfactory to Rawls' theory. Finally, we
examined the argument of Dworkin, and again found the reasons for his seeking
equality not only compatible with the notion of adequacy, but in fact not met by his
favoured 'equality of resources'. Again we concluded that Dworkin's argument
suitably modified would also then be compatible with West's notion of a 'minimum
adequate education for all'.
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All this discussion has been abstract in one very important sense: we have been
arguing in tenus of West's 'minimum adequate education for all', but have not yet
specified what is included in this 'adequate' education. Now that we have found his
notion to be philosophically acceptable, we must try to 'flesh out' what might be in
the curriculum for this education. Clearly, one approach to doing this would be to
address other objections to West's market model outlined in chapter one, namely that
markets won't provide an 'education for democracy', nor will they provide the related
notion of an 'education for autonomy'. In the next two chapters we look at both of
these notions to see if they can provide the basis of the curriculum for West's
'minimum adequate education'.
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Chapter 3: Education for Democracy and the Curriculum for West's
'Minimum Adequate Education'
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, we saw that West's 'minimum adequate education for all' could satisfy
critics of markets concerned with equality of opportunity, provided that we
supplemented that discussion with some consideration of the minimum curriculum
content. Now, as was noted in chapter 1, a likely objection to West's market model
is that it won't bring about a 'politically literate' citizenry; hence education within his
model would need to be regulated to ensure this. Thus, the first possibility we
examine is that West's 'minimum adequate education' could be fleshed out as an
'education for democracy".
We note, too, criticisms that markets will fail to provide 'education for democracy'
have been at the forefront in the recent debate about market in education. For
example, Keep notes the expectation that schools, unlike private sector businesses,
must 'pursue social goals, such as the ... fostering of notions of citizenship'. (Keep
1992 p. 114). Green notes that in a democracy, 'everyone must have a right or
entitlement to certain fundamental benefits that education can confer and which a
participatory democracy needs in its citizens, if it is to function as such.' This, he
1 In chapter 4 we will consider the related - but distinct - notion of education for
autonomy. The relatedness of these issues makes the argument in this chapter similar
in structure to the argument there.
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writes, is possible 'only through a comprehensive - that is all-embracing - system and
that the comprehensive principle must extend to ... the curricula that it is designed to
deliver.' (Green 1991 p. 59).
This chapter begins by outlining West's own discussion of education for democracy,
and explores what he sees, implicitly at least, as the difficulties with incorporating this
into his notion of an 'minimum adequate education for all'. We outline what
protagonists of education for democracy see as desirable for a curriculum adequate for
participation in democracy. The question is then raised of whether this curriculum
should be made compulsory by the state': we arrive at contingent objections to
allowing the state to promote a compulsory education for democracy, and contingent
suggestions that it might not be necessary for the state to do so. However, seeking any
non-contingent reasons why the state should, or should not, be involved in the
promotion of educatiorr for democracy, we follow an argument which explores
justifications for democracy. We conclude by examining whether education for
democracy is likely to be an acceptable 'fleshing out' of the curriculum for West's
'minimum adequate education for all'.
2 Or indeed, whether the state should be involved in promoting the curriculum in any
way, short of making it compulsory: for even state promotion distorts the choices of
people, as will be discussed below when we consider Raz and coercion, chapter 4.
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3.2 West on education for democracy
Chapter 3
West discusses education for democracy in terms of his general 'neighbourhood effect'
argument'. He points to education for democracy as a frequently cited 'positive'
neighbourhood effect (West 1970 p. 40). He considers two principle elements of an
educational curriculum 'to make democracy work', literacy (p. 41) and 'political
literacy' (p. 46). The latter includes" 'the task of acquainting the ordinary electorate
with the rules and spirit of their constitution' (p. 46); this is elaborated on slightly
further when he speaks of the electorate becoming 'fully articulate in political
matters', including 'the ability to read if not always understand a party manifesto, to
be able to lobby, [and] to accept the need for some taxation' (p.46).
This concludes West's brief discussion of the sort of curriculum which he would argue
would make up a curriculum for education for democracy. Now: should this be
included as part of his 'minimum adequate education for all', and hence part of the
curriculum inspected by the state? West seems to balk at this suggestion - for at least
it is not explicitly mentioned in this context. His argument against including it would
presumably be that the appropriate knowledge and skills for democracy would not
necessarily be best obtained in schools, and that other institutions exist which could
better serve these ends: 'So long as healthy opposition to an existing government is
allowed, one can always rely to some extent at least on the organised pressure of
3 Discussion of 'neighbourhood effects', or 'externalities' in general is postponed until
chapter 6.
4 It also includes 'the provision of avenues for political leadership.' (p. 46). This
aspect, relating to equality of opportunity and positionality has already been discussed
in chapter 2, and will not be further pursued here.
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minority parties and groups such as trade unions, trade associations, etc., to educate
in this sense' (p. 46). He also notes that James Mill 'contended that a free press was
all that was necessary for a healthy and stable democracy. Political education in a
liberal society, he thought, could best come from widely dispersed groups airing their
views in journals, books and newspapers.' (p. 47). Similarly, he quotes John Stuart
Mill pointing to the widespread reading of newspapers, long before the state was
involved in education. He suggests that 'the existence of such rapidly improving
means of communication' probably influenced John Stuart Mill in advocating 'a
system of compulsory education as distinct from compulsory schooling' (p. 47).
Moreover, the 'enormous multiplication, improvement and cheapening of means of
instructional media such as television, radio, paperback literature, weekly journals,
correspondence courses, as well as newspapers' (pp. 47-8), West suggests, would
make it even more likely that Mill could have concluded that knowledge of politics
and economics would be better 'provided by a variety of sources than by a single
system of state schools' (p. 48).
However, West could not, with consistency, argue in this way: For, as we noted in
chapter 1, West is adamant that education is not synonymous with schooling, and that
a person's minimum adequate education could easily be obtained outside of formal
schooling. So it would certainly seem consistent with West's discussion to argue that
his 'curriculum for democracy' could be included as part of the inspected 'minimum
adequate education for all', with simply the added caveat that this curriculum could
be obtained by students reading newspapers, watching television, and so on.
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It is consistent with the discussion so far, but West didn't argue for it. This could be
simply because he overlooked it, concerned as he was predominantly with issues other
than the curriculum. Or could there be other objections to including education for
democracy as part of the state inspected compulsory curriculum? To create a
framework in which to explore these issues, we turn to recent discussion of the need
for education for participation in democracy.
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3.3 Education for participation in democracy
Chapter 3
In this section we put West's discussion into the broader context of philosophical
writings about education for democracy. Now, there has been a long philosophical
tradition advocating the need for education for participation in a democracy. Aristotle,
David Hume, John Locke and John Stuart Mill all wrote of the need for citizens to
have not only 'knowledge through political action but also "factual" knowledge in
order to participate in a democracy', (Parry 1978 pp. 37-8). More recently Bernard
Crick and Alex Porter, and Amy Gutmann are among those taking up this cause,
offering detailed proposals regarding the curriculum content needed by citizens to
participate in democracy.
What is meant by 'participation' in these contexts? The writers considered point to
many widely different types of institutions in which democratic participation can take
place, from national elections to small committee deliberations; moreover; democratic
participation could involve many and varied activities, including rational deliberation
and discussion, lobbying and campaigning. However, looking for common features in
all these forms of democratic participation, it has been suggested that arriving at
decisions through the act of voting is of central importance (Riker 1982 p. 5). In this
chapter (and in chapter 5) we will take voting as a necessary, although not sufficient,
5 Two plausible positions on the need for education for democracy present themselves.
It could be argued that, even in an imperfect democracy such as that in the UK,
citizens need an improved education for participation. Alternatively, it could be argued
that this need would only be felt in an improved democracy, for the imperfections in
our current democracy rule out any benefits that might be obtained from improved
educational opportunities. Whichever of these two positions is adopted, however, the
argument that follows is applicable: however, the two positions will become relevant
in the discussion in chapter 5.
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condition of democratic participation, and assume that this would also satisfy these
writers. This is not to undermine the importance of the other processes, but only to
emphasise that none of the processes would be considered democratic if there was not
some provision for participants to cast their vote at the end of the processes, in order
to make their decisions known.
Now, Crick and Porter explore the curriculum content for 'education for democracy'
as follows: a 'politically literate person would possess, among other things, a
knowledge of those concepts minimally necessary to construct simple conceptual and
analytical frameworks' (Crick and Porter, 1978 p. 47); they spell this out as requiring,
inter alia, the development of oral and written language skills, an understanding of
number and statistics, the scientific interpretation of data, and ethical understanding
(p. 255). Gutmann similarly puts forward suggestions for the curriculum content
needed for participation in democracy: she includes reading, writing and arithmetic,
developing 'capacities for criticism, rational argument and decision-making... how to
think logically, to argue coherently and fairly, and to consider the relevant alternatives
before coming to conclusions' (Gutmann 1987 p. 50). Finally, there are the detailed
curriculum proposals of Q'Hear and White (1991 pp. 19-22), which include knowledge
and understanding of maths and sciences, practical competencies, experience of the
arts, understanding of the social community, as well as prescriptions about the
organisation and ethos of the school; all of this will enable the individual to be a
participant in the democratic community.
What can we say about such a curriculum? Firstly, we can note there are prima facie
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similarities between these several proposals. Secondly, we see that the list of
educational requirements for participation in a democracy appears rather long:
certainly there is more detail than that discussed by West. In order to make informed
decisions in a democracy, many cognitive skills, dispositions, and knowledge content
is required. One reservation immediately occurs about this: with education for
democracy being so demanding, it seems likely that the majority of citizens are
unlikely to become acquainted with more than a small subset of it (Gutmann 1987 p.
287). Perhaps this could be challenged by pointing out that even if the education is
so demanding, the majority would still be in a better position to participate if they
took in only part of the curriculum; a grounding in these issues for all would be better
than nothing, and improve the quality of our democracy. A problem with this is that
it is a common experience that one's views on a subject change, the more in-depth
knowledge is acquired. Take a topical theme such as the environment. Perhaps the
minimum level of education for participation in democracy would inform children
about the hole in the ozone layer and how government action on pollution could solve
this problem; those with this minimum level of education might then vote for a party
which supported, say, strong government pollution controls on industry. Someone with
a little more information might discover that the hole is over Antarctica, and hence
question how the industrial pollution of the 'North' could have caused it; they might
then discover that some experts suggest instead it is caused by volcanic activity in the
'South', which would obviously have different voting implications. Or a more in-
depth education might lead one to see disagreeable effects of strong government action
to reduce pollution, and hence to question whether or not there might be other, and
better, ways of combating pollution",
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My point is that a little information is not necessarily any better than none.
Understanding of issues is what is required for informed political decision-making, not
a passing acquaintance with a few bare facts. So it seems likely that when people
write of the need for citizens to be educated for participation in democracy, then it is
the rather demanding education that they do - or should - have in mind. Moreover,
if West is genuinely concerned with the abilities of individuals to participate in
democracy, then prima facie it would seem that he, too, would have to endorse the
more extensive requirements for the curriculum.
Now, the argument of the three (sets of) authors quoted above proceeds somewhat as
follows: not only is an education adequate for participation necessary, but furthermore,
it is necessary to ensure that all receive it. Hence, education for democracy should be
part of the compulsory curriculum promoted by states. Does this follow? Does
someone who believes in education for democracy for all, have also to believe that it
should be made compulsory by the state?
6 For example, current European legislation leads to the perverse effect of outlawing
the lean-burn engine, which is considerably cleaner than an engine fitted with a
catalytic convertor. Indeed, catalytic convertors make things worse at average
European morning temperatures, although they are quite effective at average
temperatures in California, where they were tested. For details on 'market solutions'
to environmental problems see Anderson and Leal 1991.
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3.4 State versus non-state education for democracy: Contingent arguments
In order to argue that the state should be involved in the promotion of a compulsory
education for democracy, we would need to be committed to the following
propositions:
1 that some, or all, of the state's citizens need an 'education for democracy' to
be able to effectively participate in democracy, (over and above that which
they or their relatives are able to provide);
2 a state-promoted compulsory education for democracy is needed to ensure that
all 'receive' the required education for democracy; this is because (a) those
who need an 'education for democracy' cannot either expect to receive it
through the institutions of civil society"; or, (b) that state intervention in this
regard will better promote their ability to participate in democracy than these
other institutions.
The second proposition trivially implies a third:
3 that state intervention in this regard is efficacious; i.e. that certain types of
state intervention in education can be expected to have the effect of improving
democracy, by effectively promoting the ability of citizens to participate in
democracy, better than if the state was not involved.
7 Used throughout this thesis to refer to voluntary non-state institutions, e.g. families,
the media, religious organisations, communities, political parties, and so on.
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Now the first of these propositions could only be examined empirically or historically,
and we cannot go into this now", The second proposition also contains a large
empirical element, which again we cannot resolve now. But it is worth pointing out,
as West does, that, without the state being involved in the promotion of education for
democracy, there are numerous other ways in which citizens can and do have access
to 'education for democracy': through lectures, sermons, newspapers, television, films,
articles in magazines, pamphlets, comics, books, etc. One objection to settling for this
might be that the crucial issue is that all should receive a curriculum for democracy,
and this can't be guaranteed without the state. However, this assumes a simple
correlation between a (state) compulsory curriculum and all children 'receiving' all
of the curriculum". But clearly, there are many reasons why every child might not
'receive' (let alone understand) the compulsory curriculum, or why any particular child
might not 'receive' (let alone understand) all of the compulsory curriculum. For
example, there are factors at the student level, (some, but not all, connected with
schooling) such as absenteeism, daydreaming in lessons, comprehension problems,
motivation problems, etc. Then there are factors at the teacher or school level, bearing
on how much of the prescribed curriculum actually gets taught by teachers: for
teachers might misinterpret curriculum statements, or deliberately distort them to teach
what they want to teach. So, there are at least five variables which are likely to affect
both the percentage of children who receive all of the state compulsory curriculum,
8 But some comments are made in chapter 6, last section.
9 This issue is of considerable importance: this discussion will be referred to in
chapters 4 and 6.
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and the percentage of the state compulsory curriculum received by each child, namely
the proportion of prescription of the curriculum, the degree to which the prescribed
curriculum is actually implemented, the attendance of children, their ability, and their
attention and motivation.
So, it is clear that with a compulsory curriculum, there is a strong likelihood that not
all will receive it, and that not all of those who receive it will receive all of it. But
this brings us then to the question: will voluntary, non-state efforts to propagate an
education for democracy lead to a greater or lesser proportion of people 'receiving'
what was required for participation in democracy? And would there be a greater or
lesser proportion of the 'curriculum' being understood by each person? For example,
if reformers, anxious to ensure that all received an education for democracy,
concentrated their energies on other media, such as television, newspapers, radio,
films", publishing, preaching, etc, as well as aiming to persuade schools and students
to partake of these opportunities, rather than relying on a compulsory curriculum for
schools, would this reach more or less people, and would each person take in more
or less of the 'curriculum'?'! Clearly factors relating to motivation, interest,
10 Medved points out how Hollywood film makers have been influenced by recent
campaigns. The Environmental Media Association (EMA) brought experts to talk
about environmental problems to directors, writers, producers, agents and stars; these
have had an immense impact both on television and on box office hits (Medved 1992
p. 338). Similar successful lobbying programmes have ranged from concern with
alcoholism (The Harvard Alcohol Project), to the need for wearing seat belts in cars
(Entertainment Industry Council).
11 This relates to West's point that, where there is a 'healthy opposition' to
government, then there will be great pressure from other political parties, trade unions,
and other pressure groups to make the citizenry aware of important issues (West 1970
p.46).
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accessibility, and so on would be raised here.
Chapter 3
So my position is that, if education for democracy is thought desirable, it is too easily
assumed that the state will solve the problem and markets and other non-state
provision can't. The issues raised concern empirical questions and hence are
contingent questions which we cannot answer herel 2•
Returning to the third proposition, and the second half of proposition two, again it is
likely that any opposition to this will be for contingent reasons only. For example, if
we lived in a state which called itself a democracy, but fell far short of what we
consider a democracy should be, then we might be very dubious - indeed fearful -
about the efficacy of the state to bring in a satisfactory programme.
But do we have to leave our propositions here, with only contingent objections to
them? That is, do we have to be content with an open verdict on the possibility of a
state-compulsory curriculum for democracy fleshing out West's 'minimum adequate
education for all'? There are two possible routes to finding non-contingent objections
to these propositions to be considered here", namely an argument from the problem
of collective action, and a reductio ad absurdum argument that assumes that states
should be involved in promoting education for democracy, and sees what follows from
it.
12 But we will come to two non-contingent points below.
13 A third route could seek a more general argument against extending the jurisdiction
of the state. We will not consider this general argument here.
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3.5 State versus non-state education for democracy: non-contingent arguments
Problems of collective action
West has accepted that 'education for democracy' can be considered a positive
'neighbourhood effect' or externality, of education. However, this brings in the
problem of collective action, or the 'public goods dilemma'. For there is a tradition
in political theory that suggests that desirable externalities will be underprovided
unless governments intervene, either because, however desirable these externalities are
to the community at large, they will not be desired by individuals, or because of the
difficulties of coordination. Translated into the promotion of education for democracy,
the argument would be that the following propositions would hold:
4 reliance on the altruism and/or self-interest" of citizens would not lead to the
desired outcome of the promotion of education for democracy for all;
5 even if individuals were altruistic and/or self-interested enough, they would be
subject to the limitations of collective action problems in coordinating action
for educational opportunities for democracy without the state; we need the
state to solve these collective action problems for us.
Arguments against these propositions will not be discussed until chapter 6, where we
suggest that the problem of collective action may not be as powerful as certain
14 Self-interest would come about from wishing to promote the desirable
'neighbourhood effects' of a 'politically literate' citizenry, or through the needs of
media editors to maintain audiences, or the needs of opposition politicians to alert
people to failings of government, etc.
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theorists have suggested, and hence that there may well be a non-contingent argument
against accepting proposition 3 above.
Reductio ad absurdum
A second way at arriving at a non-contingent objection to proposition 3 is attempted
by again assuming the first two propositions, and seeing what follows from this - with
the hope of fmding a contradiction between this and proposition 3. That is, we
assume:
1 that some, or all, of the state's citizens need an 'education for democracy' to
be able to effectively participate in democracy;
2 a state-promoted compulsory education for democracy is needed to ensure that
all 'receive' the required education for democracy;
and see where this argument leads. My question is: what will happen to those who
fail to obtain the necessary skills, knowledge and dispositions? Should they be
allowed to vote, or otherwise participate, in the democracy?
It might be felt that such a consideration is ruled out-of-court immediately by
definitions of democracy. However, definitions of democracy aren't as
straightforwardly opposed to this consideration as might be supposed. For example,
we could follow Lively in defining democracy, paying close attention to the word's
etymology, as the rule ('kratos') ofthe people ('demos') (Lively 1975 chapter 2). Both
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'rule' and 'the people' need explication: we find that Graham has refined the
definition of 'the people' to include those affected by decisions made, and who
possess some characteristics entitling them to decide issues affecting them (Graham,
K. 1987 p. 15). But, crucially, this is framed in such a way as to leave open the
possibility that one of the characteristics entitling membership of the 'demos' could
well be 'competence'. So the definition of democracy need not rule out the discussion
that follows.
One consideration which might be worth pondering before proceeding is to consider
what states do when other conditions that are deemed necessary for some act are not
fulfilled. Certain driving skills are deemed necessary for driving on public roads, so
states institute a compulsory driving license; states deem it necessary that teachers (in
state schools) have a qualification in education, and forbid anyone without these
qualifications from practising. This is so, even though it might be considered unfair
that some people have not enough opportunity to obtain any of these licenses or
qualifications. Is there a similar argument for bringing in licensing with regard to
political participation?
Firstly, let us observe, that many, or even all, of these suggestions of curriculum
content are the types of knowledge and skills that are amenable to assessment". So
IS There will be difficulties in weighing up the different priorities of validity and
reliability in the assessments. Presumably written papers would be supplemented by
oral and practical assessments. Assessment of participation itself could be conducted
at some 'lower levels of government', for example in the school. Walzer (1980 p. 169)
has implied that a model for education for democracy might be a training in law:
hence a model for the assessment might be that of admission to the legal profession.
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for convenience, we could dub the collection of all these different assessments, of
reading, writing, arithmetic, logic and statistics, democratic performance, and so on,
a 'Political Proficiency Certificate', or Pf'C, Now we have a shorthand way of saying
that a person shows evidence of having completed an education that O'Hear and
White, Crick and Porter, Gutmann, and so on, would deem adequate for participation
in a democracy, namely that a person has passed the PPC16• So my question
becomes: what should happen to those in a democracy who fail to obtain (at least) a
A person's failure to obtain a PPC means, by definition, that this person's knowledge
and skills are not adequate for participation. That is, given a required political
decision, a PPC failure would not be able to make a rational and informed judgement.
For example, (using the curriculum descriptions of Crick and Porter, and Gutmann),
a PPC failure would not be able to do some or all of the following: understand and
interpret arguments for and against particular policies; understand or interpret
government statistics; he or she would not have suitably developed capacities for
logical criticism, nor be aware of the different bases of ethical understanding, and so
on.
16 There may well be other skills, knowledge and so on which were not amenable to
assessment but which were still deemed important for political participation. In which
case, the PPC would be a necessary but not sufficient condition for a person to be
qualified to participate.
17 It could be decided that there should be a variable level PPC with passes at lower
levels acceptable for participation in certain democratic decisions, and only at higher
levels in all decision-making.
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If PPC failures were permitted to participate (by voting, for example) in a democracy,
how would this be perceived by those who are qualified to participate? To put this
more concretely, suppose there were two groups of voters", X, those who had passed
their PPC, and Y, those who had failed it. Suppose the political decisions to be made
are about something that will seriously affect me. It is likely that I will want the
decision to be made by group X, not group Y, nor even by a majority of groups X and
Y. Of course, I would concede that it might still be the case that those in group X
(persons who had obtained their PPC) would not use the skills, knowledge, etc, in
order to make political decisions - perhaps because of laziness, or lack of time, or
because of priorities other than becoming informed about voting issues; or it could be
the case that those in group X would nonetheless ignore the results of their
deliberations when making political decisions, perhaps because these outcomes
conflicted with their own personal interest, and so on. I might also feel that, for some
decisions, the 'uneducated' group Y could easily be swayed by propaganda - perhaps
organised by myself - which would lead them to my opinion on the issue in question.
Nevertheless, even given all these possibilities, ceteris paribus, I still think it would
be likely that I, as a PPC holder, would rather see a decision which was of importance
to me made by the more qualified group. For surely we can agree with Dahl that 'if
you believe that there are significant differences in competence with respect to some
subject, the more important the decision is to you the more you should, and
presumably will, try to have the decision made by the most competent authority.'
(Dahl 1970 p. 31).
18 Voting, recall, is a necessary although not sufficient condition for participation in
democracy.
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So the upshot of all this is that following from our propositions 1 and 2 is:
3* the democracy should employ 'fitness tests' to determine membership of the
voting 'demos'.
Crucially, notice that the same conclusion is not likely to be arrived at by those who
favour education for democracy, but do not wish to see the state promote it: for their
inhibitions about using the state for this promotion, whether contingent or principled,
are likely to carry over to the issue of not wanting the state to be involved in anything
like regulating and promoting a PPC. So we need both of the propositions 1 and 2 in
order to arrive at this conclusion.
This conclusion jars with the accepted wisdom about democracy. In a moment we
will consider whether there are any countervailing arguments which would seriously
undermine the case for a PPC. But first we note some interesting parallels with the
question asked here, and that asked by LaFollette concerning licensing of parents.
LaFollette's argument is that activities which are (a) potentially dangerous and (b)
which require certain demonstrable competencies for their safe performance give a
prima facie case for regulation by government (LaFollette 1980 p. 183). His argument
applies these criteria to parenting: for parenting is potentially very harmful to children,
and parenting clearly requires competence. My argument here seems to fit the criteria
mentioned by LaFollette: voting requires competence (by assumption of the education
for democracy protagonists); it is also clearly hazardous: for example, voting in the
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1979 election in the UK brought about a Thatcher government which at least some
would argue had a dangerous impact on people in this country and overseas - one of
many examples could be Argentina. Moreover, as we have observed there do seem to
be relatively reliable methods of ascertaining whether people have achieved the
requisite levels of competence. So, according to LaFollette, there would be a prima
facie argument for licensing voters, by instituting competency 3testing for democratic
participation". The parallels here are interesting because they show that these
'illiberal' ideas do in fact fit into mainstream discussion in academic political
philosophy, and are not outlandish 'straw man' ideas which no-one could possibly
subscribe to, dreamt up simply for the purposes of the argument here".
So are there any ways around this conclusion? The obvious way out would be to argue
that although the definition of democracy might suggest the need for fitness tests for
participation, justifications for democracy would rule these our".
Now, what of the justifications for democracy? Can these override the demand for
a PPC? In the next section we will consider some of the justifications for democracy
19 LaFollette explores possible objections to this conclusion with regard to parenting,
some of which parallel the objections I explore below with regard to democratic
participation.
20 LaFollette's article was in the prestigious Philosophy and Public Affairs journal.
Moreover, the published reply, (Frisch 1981), and other citations of the paper, have
each concentrated on showing the limitations of the argument in regards to the
practicalities, which LaFollette (1981) correctly dismisses. The argument as to
whether there is something 'illiberal' about providing the state with such power is not
mentioned.
21 See Longstaff 1989 for this crucial distinction.
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which I suggest are likely to appeal to the political 'left', to see if any of these rule
out the requirement of a PPC. We will then return to our reductio ad absurdum
argument, in particular to see how it affects our proposition 3 above.
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3.6 Justifications for Democracy and fitness tests for participation
Chapter 3
To summarise the discussion thus far: we are trying to adjudicate between those who
would wish to see education for democracy made compulsory from those who might
be in favour of education for democracy but would balk at state compulsion of this -
this would seem to be West's position. I suggested that a logical implication of
seeking state-promoted education for democracy is to be in favour of 'fitness tests' for
democracy". Now, is anything in the justification of democracy which can rule out
such competency tests?
Justifications for democracy", broadly speaking, can either be of a consequentialist
or a deontological type. The latter justifications have the feature that 'the conclusion
is meant to follow from the mere conjunction of a definition of democracy and a
general moral principle' (Nathan 1971' p. 107). These give grounds for democracy
'based upon some principle or principles whose truth is evident or universally
accepted' (Cohen 1971 p. 1). Consequentialist justifications, on the other hand,
require some statement concerning facts to support the justification. These facts could
be about the better performance of governments under democracy, or of individual
citizens themselves. The justification consists 'in showing that certain states of affairs,
desirable in themselves or relatively desirable, are [democracy's] probable
consequences.' (Cohen 1971 p. 1). Clearly, there is some overlap between these two
22 This is a logical implication. It might be objected that, even if it was logically
implied, this doesn't mean that states would actually go that far. That is irrelevant -
the aim here is to challenge those who believe in state-promoted education for
democracy, by showing a logical corollary of their belief.
23 These will also feature very prominently in chapter 5, where we discuss how
markets might be able to satisfy them.
122 Chapter 3
categories, for the desirable consequences of democracy could be considered to be
either of a non-moral kind, for example, the promotion of individuals' or the general
interest, or of a moral kind, for example, the pursuing of the common good, or
safeguarding of individual liberty, or political equality (Graham, K. 1987 p. 20).
The most frequently expressed deontological justification for democracy (at least from
the political 'left', which as we noted in chapter 1 is our main concern in this thesis)
is the argument from political equality. Individuals have some intrinsic qualities
which give rise to the desire for all to have equal participation, in some manner to be
discussed, in political matters. Common consequentialist justifications for democracy
(again, at least from the 'left') concern, first, the educative importance ofdemocracy;
that is, that if individuals are enabled, in some greater or lesser respect, to participate
in government, then this has an educative effect on them (Lively 1975 p. 132).
Secondly, there are justifications concerning either the way in which democracy
promotes individuals', or the general, interest. Finally, democracy could be seen to
have the consequence of promoting liberty. We will briefly examine each of these
justifications for democracy in turn, to see if they can override the need for a PPC.
First, political equality.
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Overriding a PPC? the argument from political equality
What is claimed in the justification of political equality as a basis for democracy?
One argument is that given by Cohen. He argues that the principle of political equality
can justify democracy in the following three steps:
1 equals should be treated equally;
2 all people are equal in one fundamental way;
3 that this way is 'precisely that necessary to justify democracy in the body
politic.' (Cohen 1971 p. 3).
Now, clearly the first principle alone, that 'equals should be treated equally' is not
enough to justify democracy, since this principle 'needs to be supplemented by
argument showing that the members of that community '" are indeed equal in the
necessary relevant sense' (p. 2). Step 2 tries to do this. The significant equality is that
'beneath all the undeniable differences among men there is in every human being an
element, or aspect, or essential quality which justifies our treating him as the equal of
every other in the largest sphere of human life.' (p. 12). It is Kant's notion of human
dignity: 'Dignity here connotes not pride or manner, but the intrinsic worthiness of
every human being, without regard to his intelligence, skills, talents, rank, property,
or beliefs.' (p. 12). Now he suggests that an argument cannot be constructed for this
equality, and if it is not accepted by someone, then the argument would fail for that
person. This doesn't matter for our purposes, for we want to assume the argument, and
see whether or not it can rule out the need for a Pf'C,
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Cohen moves his argument from his step 2 to step 3 in two main ways. The first uses
a 'position of ignorance' in an imaginary society from which position he claims, 'there
is a strong presumption in favor of democracy... So far as we know, the members of
[the society] are equal; at least they are equals in being members of [the society].
Regarding the right to a voice in the affairs of [the society] we have no rational way
to justify any preference among them.' (p. 5). This argument doesn't seem very
convincing. If we were in a position of ignorance about our society and what position
we would hold in it, and if we were entrusted to determine the institutions of that
society, it seems at least a plausible alternative position that we would be concerned
that important decisions were made by members of that society who were competent .
to make them. We might insert caveats to the effect that it is desirable that there
should be opportunities for all to become competent in the due respects, and that all
those who are competent should be granted political equality, irrespective of whatever
other sub-communities they happened to fall into (thus perhaps ending political
discrimination against children), but not allowing the incompetent. to participate.
Against this, Cohen says that 'we are likely to act on the presumption that where
important and relevant.inequalities cannot be shown, the members of a community are
entitled to equal treatment with regard to the right to participate in common affairs.'
(p. 6). But the discussion of thePPC above suggested that competence is not likely
to be an inequality that 'cannot be shown'. Cohen's first argument does not succeed.
Cohen's second way of arguing from his step 2 to step 3 explores more fully the
notion of dignity. He argues that possession of universal dignity gives every person
an equal concern and an equal standing in the political community. We'll focus on
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the first of these. He writes: 'Precisely because these needs are universal every man
has an equal concern in the effort to meet them. Every man has an equal concern in
the establishment of justice, in the protection of liberty, and the promotion of the
general welfare, because these goals are crucial to the pursuit of all his other ends, and
hence crucial to the conduct of his own life.' (pp. 16-7). This seems to have a strong
empirical element which I think could be questioned. If I am a thief I am not as
concerned with the establishment of justice as is a law-abiding person; some people
are more concerned with liberty than others; some are more concerned than others
about general welfare. He concedes that there might be differences in education but
notes that: '[h]owever great these differences may be they are relatively unimportant
when compared with the interests shared equally by all' (p. 17). ,I don't see that this
implies that relative educational levels are not important. For example, let us take one
interest 'shared equally by all' - to live in a relatively unpolluted environment. A
decision is to be taken about controlling local pollution. If I know a lot about the
causes of the pollution, and you are ignorant about them, then clearly it will be in
both our interests if my voice is heard rather than yours. For example, if there was
a vote on clearing up a particular factory's emissions, which I knew (correctly) could
likely best be combated by particular measures, whereas you had no idea about the
pollution or the appropriate measures, then it seems absurd, on the grounds of our
common interests in a clean environment, to give both our votes equal weight.
Crucially, I find it hard to see how this has any impact on the issue of human dignity.
How does the possession of human dignity by all (which we are assuming ex
hypothesis) lead us to want to override the issue of competence in a democracy? For
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example, when we considered pollution above, is it more in line with respecting
someone's dignity if we allow them to make a decision about which they are not
competent to make, or if we ensure that only those who are competent to make the
decision do so? John Stuart Mill suggests that: 'No one but a fool, and only a fool of
a particular description feels offended by the acknowledgement that there are others
whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of consideration
than his. To have no voice in what are partly his own concerns is a thing which
nobody willingly submits to; but when what is partly his concern is also partly
another's, and he feels the other to understand the subject better than himself, that the
other's opinion should be counted for more than his own accords with his
expectations, and with the course of things which in all other affairs of life he is
accustomed to acquiesce in. It is only necessary that this superior influence should
be assigned to grounds which he can comprehend, and of which he is able to perceive
the justice.' (Mill [1861] 1972 pp. 307-8).
If this line is taken, then the justification for democracy on the grounds of political
equality - at least as given by Cohen - would not rule out the need for a PPC. And
I suggest that the argument given by Cohen contains the crucial features of any
argument about political equality, that we all have a certain quality or capacity by
virtue of being human which needs to be respected (see Graham, K. 1987 pp. 39 and
54).
We now tum to consequentialist arguments to see if they can be used to rule out a
rrc.
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Overriding a PPC? the educative function of democracy
Chapter 3
Democracy is justified by some because of its important 'educative function'.
Historically this argument has been associated with John Stuart Mill. We find Mill
([1861] 1972, chapter 8) deliberating about the issue of extending the franchise in the
United Kingdom. At first it seems as if he is arguing against anything resembling a
Pf'C: it would not be expedient to limit the franchise on grounds of education of the
intelligence and of the sentiments, he writes, because voting is in itself an educative
experience: the 'exercise of political franchises by manual labourers' is 'a potent
instrument of mental improvement.' (p. 300)24. So it seems as if he would be against
any notion of competency testing. However, qualificationsf soon emerge to modify
this position. The first is that he regards 'it as wholly inadmissible that any person
should participate in the suffrage without being able to read, write and ...perform the
common operations of arithmetic' (p. 303). So basic literacy and numeracy are to be
tested before the franchise can be extended: 'No one but those in whom an apriori
theory has silenced common sense will maintain that power over others, over the
whole community, should be imparted to people who have not acquired the
commonest and most essential requisites for taking care of themselves; for pursuing
intelligently their own interests, and those of the persons most nearly allied to them'
(p.303).
But why stop at literacy and numeracy? Fundamentally, Mill stops at prescribing
24 He suggests that American people, everyone of them a person of 'cultivate
intelligence', lend support to this thesis.
25 literally!
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other curriculum content for contingent reasons only: he accepts that his argument
could be extended further to other types of knowledge necessary to the suffrage:
'some knowledge of the conformation of the earth, its natural and political division,
the elements of general history, and of the history and institutions of their own
country.' (p. 304). But crucially: 'these kinds of knowledge, however indispensable
to all intelligent use of the suffrage, are not ... accessible to the whole people; nor
does there exist any trustworthy machinery for ascertaining whether they have been
acquired or not.' (p. 304).
So if it were possible to have a minimum adequate education for all, say, and national
competency testing, then he would be in favour of restricting the franchise: 'If there
existed such a thing as a really national education or a trustworthy system of general
examination, education might be tested directly.' (p. 308). As these things weren't
available to him, he proposed tests of employment, etc. However, he would have to
accept that, provided we could show the practical feasibility of our PPC and minimum
education for all, he would accept it as a logical extension of his argument in favour
of literacy and numeracy tests!
So the earliest exponent of an educative democracy is most clearly in favour of the
equivalent of a PPc. It is interesting to see how Mill has been interpreted more
recently, in particular how he has been used by a modern exponent of 'participatory
theory', Carole Pateman.
Pateman claims J.S. Mill as one of her three theorists of 'participatory democracy'.
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Mill, she says, 'fills out' Rousseau's theory so that it can fit into participation into a
modern political system. Now she notes that Mill thought that participation should
occur at a local level first, to prepare people for participation at higher levels (Pateman
1970 pp. 30-1). But she argues that he didn't follow his principles of educative
democracy far enough and proposes an alternative solution to his system of plural
votes": instead of weighting votes in this way, Pateman argues that it would have
been preferable for 'the maximum amount of opportunity [to] be given to the
labouring classes to participate at a local level so they would develop the necessary
qualities and skills to enable them to assess the activities of representatives and hold
them accountable.' (p. 32). More practice at democracy is what is needed for those
less qualified to participate, so that they can become better able to participate at the
national level.
Now, is Pateman's alternative solution a better extension of Mill's ideas, and hence
our way out of the need for a PPC? Actually it is hard to see how it is different in
this crucial respect: for what Pateman is agreeing with is the proposition that some -
in Mill's situation, 'labourers' - do not have an education adequate for participation
in democracy. So therefore they should be allowed only to participate at a local level
of democracy. After a suitable time at this participation, then they should be allowed
to proceed to the higher levels of government participation. But then she herself is
26 For Mill also proposed that peoples' votes should be weighted according to their
'political intelligence' (Mill [1861] 1972 p. 306). He didn't want anybody to have no
voice at all - provided they passed their basic literacy and numeracy tests, but then
people should be grouped according to their abilities and the higher abilities given
more voice (pp. 307-8). Interestingly, notice that Pateman doesn't mention Mill's
initial literacy and numeracy tests.
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proposing a test - satisfaction of time in participation at the local level. Only when
people have passed that test should they be allowed to participate in higher-level
politics, she says. It seems only a very minor extension to this to ask that the test
should not only be of time-serving, (which seems a bit arbitrary), but also to ensure
that the relevant skills, knowledge etc, had also be learnt through local participation.
If the participation at the local level is supposed to be educative, authorities would,
it seems, be justified in asking whether or not the individuals. were achieving the
appropriate education as their participation increased, and before graduation to the
higher levels of participation were permitted.
I suggest, then, that Pateman's argument doesn't seem to be able to override the
outcomes of Mill's deliberations on these matters. The justification for democracy on
the grounds that it fulfils an educative function can be used to reinforce, rather than
undermine, the notion that a PPC is needed.
Overriding a PPC? the promotion of individuals' interests
Graham asks: why are human beings important? Because 'each individual human
being has interests which they can express and which they have a right to pursue'
(Graham, K. 1987 p. 21).. It is because of this factor that we are led to the need for
democracy, because 'only the individual can know where the shoe pinches' (p. 21).
Graham notes some general difficulties with this. Firstly, and informally, the notion
that a person's interests can be established by observing their expressed preferences
is brought into question by the fact that people can and do change their minds. 'If I
hold conflicting views at different times about where my interests lie, then at least
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sometimes I must be wrong' (p. 22). Moreover, we often, as observers, foresee that
someone is making a decision, a choice of career or partner, Which is not likely to be
in their best interest. More theoretically, we can challenge the interests argument in
a Kantian way: 'preferences or desires are themselves a species of judgement ...
therefore amenable to criticism in the light of what is reasonable, and that in
consequence it is perfectly possible for someone to make mistakes in their preferences'
(p. 22). But even so, it might still be countered that, although not infallible,
individuals probably have 'a better knowledge than some unknown and remote person
in a position of great power over them. In any case, it might reasonably be felt that
only they themselves can safely be relied upon to pursue their interests' (p. 23). It is
these sorts of considerations which lead to the demand for democracy for the
satisfaction of interests, rather than some other imposed decision.
However, we can note that none of this would seem to contain arguments against a
PPC. For if it is an important question how it can be known that individuals really
'know where the shoe pincheth', then it would seem that a PPC would be a useful
mechanism in this regard. In making political decisions, sometimes I might question
my own ability to make the appropriate decision. If I knew that I had passed the test
which was deemed a necessary condition for being able to make such decisions, then
I would feel better qualified to make those decisions. Looked at from the point of
view of 'the state', it would seem that with a PPC, then there is a clear way of
recognizing that people genuinely do have the expertise that is claimed for them by
the interests argument. In both cases, then, a PPC would seem to be consistent with
the justification for democracy.
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Overriding a PPC? the promotion of the general interest
Similar comments about individuals' interests would seem to apply even more strongly
here. The argument that democracy best promotes the general interest is an especially
fraught area. The crude claim is that, whereas the 'rule of the few will produce
government in the interests of the few, the rule of the many will produce government
in the general interest' (Lively 1975 p. 112). Now, does this 'general interest' emerge
(a) spontaneously by the mere act of voters expressing their own personal or sectional
interests? or (b) by individuals choosing to consider the general interest when voting
in a democratic process? I suggest that (a) - an 'invisible hand' process - is unlikely
to be the reason adopted by the political 'left'. For democratic control is explicitly
contrasted with the selfish control that individuals can exercise through markets (see
e.g. Jonathan 1990, Ball 1990a).
So (b) is the likely position that the political left would adopt. However, the
isomorphism between the majority vote and the promotion of the general interest
would then seem to be reinforced rather than undermined if it were known that those
voting had competence in relevant knowledge and skills to the issues being voted on.
It is clearly 'in the general interest' if those who are able to make decisions which
affect 'the general interest' are suitably assessed, by means of a PPC, to ensure that
they are competent to make such decisions. So this justification for democracy doesn't
seem to be inconsistent with the need for a PPC either.
Overriding a PPC? the promotion of liberty
The final justification for democracy considered here is that democracy promotes (or
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best promotes) liberty. So the instigation of a PPC would seem to have the opposite
effect, of countering certain peoples' liberties, to vote for instance, so would be
undesirable and ruled out. Now it is well-known that there are two interpretations of
liberty - the 'negative' and 'positive' views (see Berlin 1969). The 'negative' view
says that freedom in civil liberties is of paramount importance, that is, 'freedom of
speech, assembly and association, liberty of thought and conscience' (Graham, K.
1987 p. 38). The role of the state is to ensure that these liberties are protected from
intervention by other humans or agencies, and that is all. The 'positive' view,
however, sees this as a very restricted form of liberty, and notes that there are many
social and physical conditions which people need in order to live and to thrive as
autonomous agents; moreover, it is the role of governments to ensure that these
conditions are met, as well as the protection of negative liberties. Graham argues for
an integration of the positive/negative liberty dichotomy: He defines liberty as 'the
absence of constraints, of whatever kind, on rational action' (p. 47).
Now, those arguing from the political left are not usually concerned with, indeed, are
antipathetic to, the notion of liberty conceived in the purely 'negative' sense (see for
example White 1990, Raz 1986). They are much more likely to argue for the
'positive' view, or some variation on this. The positive view of liberty requires that
certain material conditions are necessary for a person to have freedom to follow his
or her chosen projects. But, 'generally speaking, the provision of these means of life
is a relatively complicated business in our society, calling on the effort and co-
operation of large numbers of people.' (Graham, K. 1987 p. 49). So for freedom, in
this view, a person needs the organisation of society to be such as to provide him or
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her with the material basis of freedom. Put in terms of education, a person will need
society to provide everyone with, at least, a curriculum for autonomy, to enable all to
choose projects and follow them through to fruition (see Raz 1986, White 1990) - this
is further discussed in chapter 4.
Now, if, as proponents of this position also argue (see chapter 5), this curriculum is
to be decided upon through the democratic process, are there any dangers with so
doing? One obvious danger is that democratic control of the curriculum could lead to
any curriculum whatsoever. We cannot say, a priori, that it would lead to a
curriculum for the promotion ofautonomy. But if there were improvements to voters'
intellectual and dispositional. qualities, and safeguards to ensure that those voting on
important issues actually had these qualities, then this danger could be alleviated. In
other words, it would seem favourable to this justification for democracy if a well-
designed PPC was instituted. Conversely, provided that there were safeguards in
place to ensure that all had 'equal' opportunity to obtain their PPC, and that the
examinations were fair and free from bias, then this would not seem to undermine
each individual's positive liberty. So again, this doesn't seem to be a useful argument
against a Pf'C,
Having shown that each of the considered justifications for democracy seem at least
consistent with the need for a PPC, we are in a position to return to our 'reductio ad
absurdum' argument, to see what conclusions can be drawn relating education for
democracy, markets and the state.
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3.7 Education for Democracy, markets and the state
In this chapter we examined a possible argument against West's market model that it
wouldn't supply education for democracy for all. Consideration of West's brief
discussion concerning education for democracy made us particularly interested in
adjudicating between the claims of those who wanted to see education for democracy
made compulsory by the state, and those who were happier leaving this to non-state
mechanisms. West fitted into the latter category.
We stated two propositions which spelled out the need for the state promotion of
education for democracy:
1 that some, or all, of the state's citizens need an 'education for democracy' to
be able to effectively participate in democracy, (over and above that which
they or their relatives are able to provide);
2 a state-promoted compulsory education for democracy is needed to ensure that
all 'receive' the required education for democracy;
The second proposition trivially implied proposition three:
3 that state intervention in this regard is efficacious;
We then noted that there were likely to be many contingent objections to proposition
3 (and also the second half of proposition 2); however, we sought non-contingent
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objections to it, which would enable us to arrive at more positive conclusions in the
context of this philosophical work. One argument was postponed until chapter 6,
relating to the problem of collective action (or the 'public goods dilemma'). The
second argument took the first two propositions, and showed that together they also
implied the conclusion:
3* the democracy should employ 'fitness tests' to determine membership of the
voting 'demos'.
We then argued that none of the justifications for democracy seem to be inconsistent
with this conclusion; hence we can assume that, at least given those justifications
which the 'left' would be amenable to, there doesn't seem to be anything to rule it
out. But now we see that propositions 3 and 3* can be interpreted as being in
contradiction. For we spelled out the notion of 'efficacious' in terms of 'improving
democracy, by promoting the ability of citizens to participate in democracy'. But in
whatever way we had spelled out the notion, I suggest that if state intervention in the
curriculum for democracy leads to the logical implication of needing 'fitness tests' for
democratic participation (proposition 3*), then this will contradict the notion that state
intervention is efficacious (proposition 3): fitness tests, for many, will be seen as
'illiberal', and will be seen to be doing precisely the opposite to 'improving
democracy' .
If this position is accepted, this argument points to another non-contingent argument
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against state education for democracy, because we have arrived at what will be (for
some at least) a contradiction between proposition 3 and proposition 3*; hence we will
need to reject one of propositions 1 and 2.
Should we reject that education is needed for participation in a democracy,
(proposition 1) or that it should be made compulsory by the state (proposition 2)? We
will look at both these possibilities shortly. However, before doing so, we note that
some might not accept that there is any contradiction in the argument: they will be,
if not happy with, then at least willing to accept, the notion of fitness tests for
participation, arguing that these have no implications for discussion of improvements
to democracy - in the same way that many were happy to accept the conclusion of
LaFallotte's in relation to licensing parents. Even if fitness tests for democratic
participation seemed 'illiberal', they do not appear to be 'undemocratic', at least not
within the justifications considered here. Hence another possible conclusion to this
discussion is that a state-promoted education for democracy is needed and desirable
and that there is no contradiction between 3 and 3*; hence an education for democracy
could be the basis for fleshing out West's minimum 'adequate education for all'.
Crucially, this conclusion, however, could only be held by someone willing to endorse
some form of competency-testing for democratic participation. If someone was not
willing to accept that, then they would be, according to my argument, guilty of
inconsistency.
Now, for those who don't accept this position, who accept the contradiction noted
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above, which of the first two propositions should we reject? One challenge" to the
first proposition would be to argue that people can make the necessary political
judgements in a democracy without specific education. There seem to be at least two
ways in which this could be argued. One way would be to take a recognizably
'Schumpeterian' position on democracy. Here it is assumed that voting 'permits the
rejection of candidates or officials who have offended so many voters that they cannot
win an election', but nothing more is expected of it (Riker 1982 p. 242). This position
suggests that the whole point of elections is to simply ensure a smooth transition of
power, and to ensure that governments can be rejected if they commit political
excesses. Citizens of the democracy don't have to make informed political judgements,
but only be able to recognize if a government is not delivering the goods. This
interpretation of democracy will be discussed further in chapter 5 when we examine
democratic control of education and improvements to democracy. There it will be
shown to be a reasonable course to take. Moreover, someone following this way out
of the argument will still not have found any fleshing out of West's 'minimum
adequate education for all'.
A second way of arguing against the first proposition would be to argue that people
have some capacity without a specific sort of education to make political judgements.
This would then rule out the need for education for participation in democracy. This
is the position of Ronald Beiner, whose argument is not ultimately successful, I
suggest, in showing what it set out to achieve; it is explored in Appendix 2.
27 Apart from the empirical challenge noted earlier.
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Alternatively, we can reject the second proposition, that education for democracy
needs to be state-imposed. A person who sought this way out would then look for
improvements in democracy, recognise that better education for democracy was
desirable, but not seek to impose this through the state on children, instead seeking to
bring it about through the kind of voluntary mechanisms mentioned earlier. A person
following this argument would again not have found any fleshing out of West's
'minimum adequate education for all'.
So, the argument here is that, only if it is argued that there is not a contradiction
between 3 and 3*, are we any closer to deciding what should be the curriculum content
for West's minimum adequate education for alL If the contradiction is accepted, then
we would have to conclude that education for democracy would not provide a fleshing
out of the curriculum for West's minimum adequate education for alL Hence, in this
case, then we would still need some further discussion of what the minimum level of
curriculum would be - to which we shall now turn. A related suggestion put forward
for a minimum adequate education for all is that of an education for autonomy (White
1990, Q'Hear and White 1991). Now clearly this is related to the issue of education
for democracy, but is much broader. For the arguments, as we shall see, are that
education for autonomy is needed not simply for democratic participation, but in order
to live the 'good life' at alL It is to this issue of education for autonomy that we turn
now.
Chapter 4 Education for Autonomy and the Curriculum for West's
'Minimum Adequate Education'
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 we saw that West's notion of a 'minimum adequate education for all'
could overcome the criticism that his market model wouldn't satisfy equality of
opportunity. We then turned to the job of examining what the curriculum content of
that education might be. Thinking of the curriculum in terms of 'education for
democracy' was problematic, in that there seemed to be illiberal consequences of it -
and these illiberal consequences we found hard to rebut even after considering several
justifications for democracy. However, we noted earlier there is a related notion which
we might find could serve as the basis for a minimum adequate education for all,
namely 'education for autonomy'.
The chapter begins by examining the argument of John White, who has been the chief
protagonist in England & Wales for the need for a national curriculum for the
promotion of autonomy for alL We arrive at certain difficulties with using his
arguments for a state-promoted compulsory curriculum for the promotion of autonomy.
The suspicion is that White's or any other, national curriculum might actually
undermine, rather than promote, autonomy. However, the discussion of this is by no
means conclusive, and in order to strengthen the argument, we proceed by examining
the foundation of White's claims, the justification for state involvement in the
promotion of autonomy. It transpires that White's argument owes much to Joseph Raz,
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whose arguments take up the remainder of the chapter. Raz's study (1986) argues that
personal autonomy is so important that the state is justified in coercing citizens to
promote it. We examine first his negative arguments against those who seek a minimal
role for the state, (hence who would be against state promotion of autonomy), and find
these arguments not wholly convincing. We then move on to address Raz's arguments
in support of state promotion of autonomy, giving flesh to them in the context of a
state-promoted curriculum for autonomy. Again, we find Raz's position not convincing
- in particular because of the epistemic argument concerning markets.
Hence this chapter concludes that the argument from education for autonomy, as with
the argument from education for democracy, does not supply us with an adequate
'fleshing out' of the curriculum for West's 'minimum adequate education for all'.
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4.2 White on a compulsory curriculum for autonomy
Chapter 4
John White has been at the forefront of the philosophical debate about the introduction
of a national curriculum in England & Wales for two decades. The compulsory
curriculum he advocates is that which is necessary for the promotion of autonomy.
White argues that for an individual to become autonomous, 'one needs to have
acquired various capacities, dispositions, and types of understanding. If a government
is committed to the promotion of autonomy for everyone, its aim must be that
everyone should be educated to enable them to exercise it.' (White 1990 p. 23). This
is his justification for government intervention in a specific compulsory curriculum.
White's philosophical argument is taken further in a policy-oriented publication for
the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), co-authored with Philip O'Hear
(O'Hear and White 1991). There, the details of the curriculum proposals for autonomy
are worked out in more detail.
In the context of this thesis, there is not space to explore White's notion of
autonomy'. We are concerned with the implications of accepting the proposition that
1 Very briefly, White notes that in our society, or similar societies, with 'a liberal
democracy built around an advanced industrial economy' (White 1990 p. 21), then
personal autonomy is important in the way that it wouldn't necessarily be in a
traditional society. Personal autonomy is related to the concept of 'positive freedom':
'negative liberty is desirable not in itself, but as a requirement of positive liberty - that
is, of one's leading a life which one has autonomously chosen to lead.' (p. 22).
He gives more shape to the concept as follows: 'One is more autonomous the more
one's life is not determined by factors outside of one's own choices' (p. 75);
'Autonomous individuals live self-determined lives. They choose their major ends and
decide what relative weight to give to each... people choose what job they will do,
where they will live, whether they get married, how to spend their free time, whether
to give to charity, what clothes to wear, etc.' (p. 82). He doesn't want this to be
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the state should be involved in the promotion of autonomy. Hence we take White's
position on autonomy as given, and ask what follows from this in terms of state
involvement.
White on state promotion of autonomy
White 2 argues that the state has a role in three areas in the promotion of autonomy,
the third' of which is most germane for our present purposes: 'in order to become
autonomous one needs to have acquired various capacities, dispositions, and types of
understanding. If a government" is committed to the promotion of autonomy for
everyone, its aim must be that everyone should be educated to enable them to exercise
it.' (White 1990 p. 23). This is the argument I want to challenge. If it is agreed that
autonomy is valuable, even an aim of education, must we also agree that government
is justified in intervening to ensure that it is promoted for everyone?
stretched to the extreme however: he is not recommending that we be 'radical
choosers' attaching excessive weight to negative liberty. Instead he insists that we
choose within the cultural context of our upbringing, 'shaped from birth onwards by
...parents and other teachers' (p. 82).
Education for autonomy requires the knowledge and understanding of issues to do
with religion and society, and science (p. 23); dispositions of character such as
'independence of mind, resoluteness and courage', in order to 'withstand possible
manipulation or coercion by others' (p. 23); and attitudes towards other people.
2 Following Raz (1986) as we shall see below.
3 The first area is to enable citizens who have acquired their autonomy can exercise
it; secondly, the state can help ensure that there are a range of options for people to
choose from (p. 23).
4 Note that White - and as we shall see, Raz - uses 'government' and 'the state'
interchangeably.
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In this section, I raise two main reservations, which cast doubt upon the enterprise of
state involvement in this area. These are the issues of, firstly, whether a state-
controlled curriculum for autonomy will have a detrimental impact on the autonomy
of schools and teachers, and hence, of students; and second, whether other autonomy-
promoting institutions of civil society will be undermined by this 'curriculum for
autonomy'.
a will a state controlled curriculum undermine the autonomy of schools,
teachers, and hence students?
White is at pains to stress that his curriculum proposals, unlike the current National
Curriculum in England & Wales will not restrict the autonomy of schools too much:
in the policy-oriented IPPR pamphlet he writes, with O'Hear, that their curriculum
'will give considerable powers back to the schools' (O'Hear and White 1991 p. 11).
However, whatever they might want to be the case, will power be devolved to schools
in practice? One problem arises when controversy occurs in democracies.
Firstly, we can say that the elements of an 'education for autonomy' are likely to be
controversial: for example, White and O'Hear's curriculum depends upon the
development of personal qualities. But have they adequately located all those, and
only those, qualities necessary for autonomy? For example, is their 'temperance' a
necessary condition for an autonomous person? Or should we forgo the label of
autonomous if we fail to reach 'contemplative reflectiveness ... on our existential
characteristics as self-conscious creatures aware of our mortality'? (O'Hear and White
1991 p. 13). This is further reinforced when one considers the critical reaction which
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White's recent work has received (see for example Carbone 1993 or Purpel 1992; or
compare White 1990 pp. 95-98 with Callan 1988), and also the critical debate around
the notion of autonomy as an educational ideal (see in particular Dearden's 1975
reductio ad absurdum of the concept). There is no need here to engage in the
controversy, only to point out that the controversy about the nature of autonomy, and
of education for autonomy, exists.
Secondly, it is this kind of controversy which is likely to have an undesirable impact
in a democracy. Because of the problem of political uncertainty, those who win
political power have it guaranteed only for a short time, creating an incentive to
insulate policies from future democratic controL This creates incentives to avoid
discretionary aspects of laws: 'The best way for groups to protect their achievements
from the uncertainties of future politics, therefore, is through formalization: the formal
reduction or elimination of discretion, and the formal insulation of any remaining
discretion from future political influence;' (Chubb and Moe 1990 pp. 42-3). Put in
terms of a compulsory curriculum, these pressures are likely to lead to committees
going for a highly prescribed curriculum, precisely the detailed prescription that White
and O'Hear say they will avoid.
The need for compromise is also relevant here. The committees set up to formulate
a national curriculum for autonomy are likely to consist of people from varying
political backgrounds. But compromises are 'agreements among contending, often
mutually suspicious, sides that can easily come apart over time if they are informal
and subject to discretion.' (Chubb and Moe 1990 p. 44). Opposing groups can insure
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against these dangers by putting 'everything in writing, down to the last detail, and
make it legally enforceable - to formalize the agreement.' (p. 44). Chubb and Moe
give an example of a 9-page federal government statute for aid to disadvantaged
students generating 174 pages of statutory amendments. Similarly, Lady Thatcher
herself bemoaned the excessive detail that emerged from the committees she set up
(Thatcher 1993 pp. 593-597). This explosion of detailed prescription is, I suggest,
exactly what would happen to White and O'Hear's proposed leaner national
curriculum, exactly as happened with the current National Curriculum. The explosion
of detailed prescription leads to undermining of teacher autonomy, which is likely to
lead to negative lessons for students, for 'children learn by example and are more
likely to acquire a taste for the autonomous life from people who themselves embody
it than from the hemmed-in functionaries within an authoritarian system.' (White 1990
p. 132).
b will a curriculum for autonomy undermine other autonomy-promoting
institutions of civil society?
The second reservation worth exploring is, whether, by prescribing a compulsory
'curriculum for autonomy', other autonomy-promoting agencies in society will be
undermined. For White argues that 'the content of education embraces more than the
timetabled curriculum. At its broadest, it includes what children learn from their
parents and the media.' (White 1990 p. 142). Much of the 'education for autonomy',
he suggests, could be, and is likely to be, learnt out of school - in the 'home, at school
and in the community' (O'Hear and White 1991 p. 11). Now in the rarefied
atmosphere of the academic book, White went on to argue that 'there needs to be state
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regulation not only of timetabled activities, but also of educational vehicles such as
these' (White 1990 p. 142). However, these suggestions are dropped from. the IPPR
pamphlet. But this means that a great deal is being crammed into the school
curriculum that it seemed White, in his earlier work at least, didn't really believe
should be there.
However, if legislation insists that the education for autonomy has to take place in
schools, then two things follow. First, students might not get a very good 'education
for autonomy' if it is transposed from the other institutions of civil society to schools,
because schools might not be conducive places in which to obtain it: classrooms might
be too large, for example, or teachers not suitable people to talk over issues with; or
compulsory curriculum subjects or themes might alienate students. But secondly, and
most significantly, not only might children be receiving an inferior 'education for
autonomy' than that obtained in the other institutions of civil society, these other
institutions might themselves become undermined. For example, if many of the
personal qualities listed are assumed to be the school's responsibility, children might
consult or confide in their parents less. Or parents might feel that it is not their role
to instill these qualities in their children, because it is by law the school's role. Or
educational experts might warn parents thattheir 'common sense' parenting methods
were not good enough, and so it was best to leave such education to schools. Similar
comments could apply to the other autonomy-promoting institutions of civil society.
S The latter two comments are not at all far-fetched - they have both happened in the
case of reading and sex education.
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We could consider this further in the more abstract context of West's market modeL
Suppose in that society as outlined in chapter 1, it was decided that the state had a
legitimate role in the promotion of autonomy through education. The government
would do its analysis of what an education for autonomy should be, and conduct
inspections to determine whether there are some people not getting this,education for
autonomy. It would then intervene to provide the education for autonomy on behalf
of these people. Would this action, purportedly on the grounds of the promotion of
autonomy, have any effect on the autonomy, either in these people, or of people in the
wider community?
Clearly, those now receiving this education at the behest of the state are freed from
one restriction on their autonomy - the lack of such an education - but have come
under another tutelage which also restricts their autonomy - they are dependent on the
state for something important to their autonomy. Clearly, as a short term expedient,
they might initially prefer this loss of autonomy over ignorance, or might come to
prefer it as they become more autonomous. But this brings in a bigger problem: they,
and people in general, might begin to take this state provision for granted. Instead of
seeing the education of themselves and their children as a requirement of their own
autonomy, individuals might begin to see it as part of the responsibility of the state
towards them. These children begin to take education for granted, and expect things
to be given to them from the community, rather than that there should be reciprocal
giving. It could be the beginning of a 'culture of dependency'.
This might not be of such concern if the state successfully did the job of promoting
149 Chapter 4
autonomy through its educational system. But if its methods were not efficacious, or
if it swayed from its commitment, then the situation could arise where individuals had
lost either their sense of responsibility to educate their children or themselves, or the
ability to do this, and where, crucially, the state itself was also failing in its duty. For
example, it could be that the state's preferred option of education through schooling
was not particularly efficacious in promoting autonomy, in that these schools became
parasites on the community, taking resources but giving nothing in return. Or, as noted
earlier, this schooling could also be a cause of the undermining of families and of
communities. Schools could 'separate parents and children from vital interaction with
each other and from true curiosity about each other's lives'; they could 'stifle family
originality by appropriating the critical time needed for any sound idea of family to
develop - then ... blame the family for its failure to be a family' (Gatto 1990 p. 74).
So the state's preferred approach could have this negative autonomy-undermining
outcome.
Moreover, some parents might rather like the idea of not having to exercise their
autonomy in the giving of thought and resources to procure educational opportunities
for their children. With the sure knowledge that the state will intervene to ensure that
their children don't suffer, such individuals, instead of providing educational
opportunities, can spend their money and energy on luxuries, and await the arrival of
their 'education for autonomy' coupons. So where people were previously
autonomous, the intervention of the state could make them less autonomous. In turn
this could lead to a vicious cycle of more and more people claiming benefit, higher.
and higher taxes, and less wealth creation leading to less autonomy for everyone.
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Moreover, the altruism and autonomy of the community at large might be affected.
Previously, in West's model society, it could well have been that when lack of
educational opportunities for autonomy were noted, individuals within the community
banded together to provide these opportunities for those families who fell on hard
times, until times got better. Now that the state swoops in whenever lack of
educational opportunities are detected, and now that they pay their taxes, people in the
community are less inclined to help.
Returning from our discussion of West's abstract model, the upshot of all this is that
there seem to be difficulties with White's proposals. Paradoxically, the proposed
'education for autonomy', because of its controversial nature, couldhave the effect of
firmly curtailing the autonomy of teachers, schools, and hence, of students. Moreover,
focusing all the attention on schools as places for the promotion of autonomy might
actually serve to undermine autonomy, by undermining other institutions that already
serve it, or that could be strengthened to better promote it.
These arguments raise doubts, but I am not suggesting they are compelling. A
compulsory curriculum for autonomy might not, in fact, be a very good way of
promoting autonomy, hence the proposed curriculum for autonomy might not be a
suitable vehicle to flesh out West's 'adequate minimum education for all'. But these
are doubts, nothing more substantial. Perhaps we could find more substantial support
for or against White's curriculum for autonomy by examining arguments as to why
the state should be involved in promoting autonomy in the first place? Indeed, if
these arguments are powerful, then in themselves they might provide an argument
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against the limitations on the state in West's market model.
Chapter 4
Justification for state promotion of autonomy
So what are the arguments that White uses for justifying the state promoting autonomy
in this way? White has only a brief argument on this issue. He argues against the
notion of a neutral state, 'in refusing preference to some ideals of life over others, [the
state] overlooks the fact that it is tacitly presupposing the value of personal autonomy.
... Why, after all, should it be thought desirable to avoid entanglement in different
conceptions of the good? Why should one try to ensure that one conception is not
favoured over another? The root anxiety here seems to be that non-neutrality brings
with it the danger of imposing one way of life rather than another. But this is only
an anxiety for someone who is already wedded to the view that individuals should
freely determine their own way of life, i.e. for someone who already places a high
value on autonomy.'(White 1990 p. 22). This argument has several difficulties.
Firstly, the anxiety that White mentions, of imposing one way of life, is only one of
the anxieties of liberals about state intervention in these matters (we will come to the
others in the sequel). Secondly, however, one can still be convinced in the high value
of autonomy and yet not want the state to impose one way of life through coercion.
This is Nozick's position, and as we shall see below, it transpires that Raz too has
some sympathy with this. So White's arguments are not enough to counter uneasiness
about the state promoting autonomy.
Now although White's argument on the justification for the state involvement in the
promotion of autonomy is brief, it transpires that his work is explicitly influenced by
152 Chapter 4
Raz (1986); and turning to this work, we find that a considerable part of it is devoted
to defending why the state should be involved in the promotion of autonomy. So in
that work can we find a substantial argument to this effect, which will ground White's
argument for a compulsory curriculum for autonomyr"
Raz's (1986) work can be interpreted as offering both a positive case for state
promotion of autonomy, and also a negative case challenging those who would argue
that the state should not be involved in this way. The negative case involves two
arguments: Firstly, there are the arguments against individualistic rights, aimed at
overriding liberal scruples about the state coercing citizens, and permitting it to create,
using coercion if necessary, the conditions for autonomy (Raz 1986 part III).
Secondly, there are the negative arguments against a minimal or neutral state. These
concern the anti-perfectionist doctrines of the neutral state and the exclusion of ideals.
Undermining these arguments leaves room for the perfectionist doctrines that Raz
wants to promote (part II). The positive case for the state promotion of autonomy
uses a combination of Raz's 'principle of autonomy', his 'harm principle' (part V),
and the arguments for the authority of the state (part I).
6 Note the great importance of Raz's work for classical liberal thinkers: the
philosopher, John Gray, for example, seems to have been weaned off classical liberal
ideas in part at least because of Raz's work. Gray writes: 'Raz's critique is of the
utmost importance, partly because ... it encompasses a restatement of liberalism in
which its dependency on individualism is removed. Raz argues, so far as I can see
demonstratively, that no political morality can be rights-based, ... that egalitarian and
libertarian political principles have no claim on reason.... A liberal state, according
to Raz, cannot be a state that is neutral about the good life, if only because liberal
freedoms take their value from their contribution to the good life.' (Times Literary
Supplement July 3 1992 p. 15; see also Gray 1989 p. 233 where he praises Raz's
'masterly study'). These remarks suggest that for any classical liberal exploration,
detailed attention must be paid to Raz's arguments.
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In the context of this thesis, clearly the positive case is the most important: however,
the negative arguments aimed at demolishing the case for a minimalist state could
easily be translated as arguments challenging West's market modeL As we noted, such
a challenge could completely undermine the assumptions on which his model is based,
and undermine it, moreover, from a perspective which some classical liberals have had
sympathy with. So these arguments need also to be, albeit briefly, considered.
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4.3 Raz on the state promotion of autonomy: negative arguments
Raz against moral individualism
Chapter 4
Raz's first argument aims to undermine 'moral individualism' in order to allow for the
promotion of 'collective goods' to be a legitimate concern of the state. The notion
of 'moral individualism' which he uses holds that there are inviolable human rights
which governments cannot infringe. Hence, any measures by the state to promote the
conditions of autonomy, as Raz requires, would be more or less bound to impinge
upon these rights, through inter alia the coercive measures of the state. Raz wants to
avoid giving his opponents the objection of appealing to these rights against coercion:
'It is wrong to identify autonomy with a right against coercion, for example, and to
hold that right (i.e. the right against coercion) as defeating, because of the importance
of personal autonomy, all, or almost all, other considerations ... The provision of many
collective goods is constitutive of the very possibility of autonomy and it cannot be
relegated to a subordinate role, compared with some alleged right against coercion, in
the name of autonomy' (Raz 1986 p. 207f.
So Raz wants to undermine individualistic right-based theories. With these
undermined, then 'the confrontational view of morality which pitches a person's own
interests and goals as ... occasionally in conflict with his obligations to others' (p. 216)
is thrown out. Hence 'collective goods' can 'provide the source both of personal goals
and obligations to others.' (p. 216).
7 Note that Gray (1992) favourably quotes this passage when he lays out his ideas for
social democracy and the 'enabling welfare state'.
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First, some definitions. Raz means by a 'collective good' a special type of public
good: 'A good is a public good in a certain society if and only if the distribution of
its benefits in that society is not subject to voluntary control by anyone other than
each potential beneficiary controlling his share of the benefits.' (p. 198). Some public
goods are such contingently: 'Water supply in a certain town may be a public good
if the water pipe network does not allow for the switching-off of individual
households. But ... it is possible to change the supply system to enable control over
distribution.' (p. 198). However, 'collective goods' are defined as inherent public
goods (p. 199), goods which are public goods in any conceivable society. Now, are
there any inherent public goods? Raz thinks there are: 'General beneficial features of
a society are inherently public goods.' (p. 199). For example, collective goods include
a tolerant society, an educated society, or a society infused with respect for human
beings. Finally, he defines an 'intrinsically valuable good' as one which is 'valuable
independently of the value of its actual or probable consequences; and not on account
of any consequences it can be used to produce or to the production of which it can
contribute causally.' (p. 200).
Raz's argument is that:
1 Individualistic moral theory holds that no collective goods have intrinsic value
(p. 198).
2 If having an autonomous life is an ultimate value, then having a sufficient
range of acceptable options is of intrinsic value (p. 205).
3 The existence of many options depends upon certain social conditions (p. 205).
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4 Some of the social conditions which constitute such options are collective
goods (p. 206).
5 These collective goods are intrinsically valuable (p. 206).
Hence Raz argues that 5 and 1 together show that individualistic moral theory is
contradicted.
However, if we go back to step 1, we find a weak link in the argument. Who says that
'individualistic moral theory holds that no collective goods have intrinsic value'? Raz
says so. This is his definition of an individualistic moral theory: 'A moral theory will
be said to be individualistic if it is a humanistic morality which does not recognize
any intrinsic value in any collective good.... collective goods have instrumental value
only.' (p. 198). He invites us (twice, p. 198 and p. 18) to consult Lukes for a broader
discussion of individualism; if we do that, then we begin to question why Raz has
focused on such a narrow defmition. For example, we find Lukes noting that'
American individualism 'was the route to perfection - a spontaneous social order of
self-determined, self-reliant and fully-developed individuals.' (Lukes 1973 p. 29).
That is, in one interpretation, individualism was valuable in part because it led to the
collective good of social order. Moreover, this isn't the only interpretation along these
lines: Graham defines individualism as involving the notion that 'the value of
collective goods must ultimately be explained by their value in the lives of individuals,
and not for instance in the activities of states, nations or corporations.' (Graham, G.
1987 p. 482 emphasis added). He elaborates: 'If the proper explanation shows
[collective goods] to have a constitutive and not merely an instrumental role in those
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lives, this need do nothing to disturb the fundamental reference to individuals.' (p.
482).
Kymlicka argues in a similar way. In adjudicating between communitarianism and
liberalism he notes that the former seem to have a very limited view of what the latter
see as the role of the individual. Liberalism is not, he argues, wedded to the thesis
that community does not have value in itself. It is concerned with how to achieve
what is valuable, and neither denies nor asserts that what Raz would call collective
goods are valuable in themselves (Kymlicka 1988 p. 193).
Finally, on the same theme, Buchanan suggests that there is simply no incompatibility
between what he calls the 'liberal political thesis' - which is fundamentally a thesis
of moral individualism (Buchanan 1989 p. 854) - and the communitarian thesis that
community is a fundamental human good (p. 857). He suggests the idea that this is
so rests on a misunderstanding of the liberal thesis: he agrees that it is silent about the :
role of community, and is framed in terms of the importance of individual rights. But
its silence about community does not imply that it denies that community is 'a
fundamental human good'. For this notion can be interpreted either psychologically
('that human beings strongly desire community') or normatively ('community is an
important objective good for human beings. '). But as the liberal thesis is not a
psychological theory, 'there is no reason why it should assert or deny the
psychological importance of community' (p. 857). Analogously, 'since it is only a
thesis about the proper role of government, why should it include a comprehensive
catalog of objective human goods?' (p. 857). Furthermore, Buchanan argues that the
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individual rights of moral individualism 'provide valuable protections for the
flourishing of community.' (p. 858). Indeed, he is able to advance a
'nonindividualistic justification' for these individual rights: He notes that historically,
totalitarianism has probably been 'the greatest single threat to communities'. It
opposes communities because they can potentially liberate individuals' dependence
upon the state. Consequently, totalitarian regimes have mercilessly undermined
traditional communities including families and religious organisations. In contrast, 'we
should regard the priority on individual civil and political rights usually associated
with liberalism as the protector of community, even if the liberal political thesis is
itself silent as to the importance of community in the good life.' (p. 858). For
Buchanan, the debate between communitarians and liberals is about strategies, rather
than the value of community: 'strategies rooted in different estimates of the relevant
risks.' (p. 860). The moral individualist liberal is a pessimistic (or realistically
cautious) communitarian, rather than a 'recklessly utopian' one.
In short, there are considerable voices ranged against Raz which would deny him the
first step of his argument. For Raz is only able to demolish a certain interpretation of
moral individualism, and other interpretations survive his argument very well.
But in any case, notice the crucial assumption that is creeping into his writing here":
for he seems to be arguing that not only are collective goods valuable - and we have
argued that many moral individualists would also agree with this - but that this means
8 The assumption is apparent because Raz uses the terminology of 'public goods': see
chapter 6 below.
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that the state needs to intervene in order to provide these collective goods. This part
of his argument we will explore - and raise doubts concerning its efficacy - in chapter
6, when we consider the 'public goods dilemma'. But for the purposes of the argument
here, we can say that Raz has not succeeded in undermining the case in general
against moral individualism.
Raz against anti-perfectionism
Raz's second set of arguments challenge theories that the state shouldn't be involved
in any 'perfectionist' doctrines: the exclusion of ideals argument holds that
'governments should be blind to the truth or falsity of moral ideals or of conceptions
of the good' (Raz 1986 p. 108); the neutrality argument is that 'governments must so
conduct themselves that their actions will neither improve nor hinder the chances
individuals have of living in accord with their conception of the good.' (p. 108). Raz
concludes that he has dismissed both these arguments against perfectionism; I suggest
that this is not the case, but that in fact he has left open the door to two possible
neutral states, and only shown that in an ideal democracy, coercion is acceptable.
Again, the arguments are important for us to address, for if they held they would
severely challenge the fairly minimal state involvement of West's market model.
a Raz against neutrality
Raz examines three interpretations of Political Neutrality:
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'1 No political action may be undertaken or justified on the ground that it
promotes an ideal of the good nor on the ground that it enables individuals to pursue
an ideal of the good.
2 No political action may be undertaken if it makes a difference to the likelihood
that a person will endorse one conception of the good or another, or to his chances of
realizing his conception of the good, unless other actions are undertaken which cancel
out such effects. [The principle of narrow political neutrality]
3 One of the main goals of governmental authority, which is lexically prior to
any other, it to ensure for all persons an equal ability to pursue in their lives and
promote in their societies any ideal of the good of their choosing.' [The principle of
comprehensive political neutrality] (pp. 114-5).
Raz claims that the first of these is Nozick's position. Now Nozick himself questions,
as Raz observes, whether the proposed minimal state is itself nonneutral with regard
to its citizens: 'After all, it enforces contracts, prohibitions on aggression, on theft, and
so on' (Nozick 1974 p. 272). But Nozick argues that this does not contradict its
neutrality, illustrating this using an example of rape:
'Not every enforcement of a prohibition which differentially benefits people makes the
state nonneutral. Suppose some men are potential rapists of women, while no women
are potential rapists of men or of each other. Would a prohibition against rape be
nonneutral? It would, by hypothesis, differentially benefit people; but for potential
rapists to complain that the prohibition was nonneutral between the sexes, and
therefore sexist, would be absurd. There is an independent reason for prohibiting rape
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... That a prohibition thus independently justifiable works out to affect different
persons differently is no reason to condemn it as nonneutral, provided it was instituted
or continues for (something like) the reasons which justify it, and not in order to yield
differential benefits.' (Nozick 1974 pp. 272-3).
That is, Nozick's argument is that provided the state's reason for action is not
specifically to favour one party or hinder another, but that it acts for an independently
justifiable reason, then it is a neutral state. Raz dismisses this: in two sentences he
concludes that 'Nozick's State is not neutral, and his principle (principle 1 above) is
not a principle of neutrality' (Raz 1986 p. 116). In full, his dismissal reads:
'on the assumption, surely acceptable to Nozick as to most people, that the prospect
of profit is a valid reason for most commercial activities it follows that selling arms
to one of the combatants for profit does not jeopardize one's neutrality. One is not
free to deny that when one's action actually helps one of the parties then the profit is
not a valid reason, for that is to abandon the case' (p. 116)9.
I suggest that Raz's example does not show what it is intended to show. For what Raz
is assuming is not so much that a government or commercial company is selling arms
to one side, but that it is not selling arms to the other side. For it would be perfectly
possible for the company or government to be selling arms to both sides in the
9 Note how Raz here seems to be conflating the neutrality of people, and the neutral
state. Nozick is arguing about the neutral state, but this is lost when Raz writes that
'Nozick's case rests on the view that so long as one is not acting for the reason that
one's action will favour one of the parties or hinder the other .... then one's neutrality
is intact.' (p. 116 emphasis added).
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combat, in which case we could, appealing to Nozick's principle, point to the
'independently valid reason' of profit-making, and argue that it is behaving neutrally.
However, if it is only selling arms to one side, then, provided of course both sides
have available sufficient hard-currency funds, credit ratings, and so on, then
presumably the company or country must not be selling arms to the other side for
reasons which have nothing to do with profit - for, ceteris paribus, profit is lost by
not selling to both sides. Hence there must be political reasons why the company or
country is not selling to one side, which would of course make its actions nonneutraL
As soon as the company or country started to discriminate between buyers on grounds
other than profit, then it would cease to be neutral, unless another valid independent
reason could be found (for example, exports to the country were too risky,
geographical factors, or currency problems, etc.).
Razs example is not very good, and I am not so sure that Nozick's thesis can be so
easily dismissed as being non-neutral. Anyway, Raz does consider it again, under the
guise of having an 'anti-perfectionist bias', an examination we turn to in a moment.
Having dismissed the first definition of political neutrality, Raz then moves on to
examine the second and third. But although he does rebut the third, the principle of
Strict (Comprehensive) Political Neutrality, nowhere does he ever succeed in rebutting
the second, the principle of narrow neutrality. Let us follow his argument through to
show this.
Raz begins by setting out two arguments to challenge the notion that there can be
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even an approximation to political neutrality. His first argument is as follows:
neutrality 'is concerned only with the degree to which the parties are helped or
hindered. It is silent concerning acts which neither help nor hinder.' (p. 120). So some
argue that although 'one is morally responsible (i.e. accountable) for what one does,
one is not morally responsible for what one does not do' (p. 120). Raz rejects this
distinction. Not helping and hindering must be brought into the argument about moral
neutrality. But immediately we must be suspicious that this argument will have
anything to do with the ostensible subject of his chapter, political neutrality, because
again we notice that he has slipped into the language of 'one' rather than speaking of
'governments' 10. His example to illustrate this point confirms these suspicions:
Uruguay had no relations with either Somalia or Ethiopia, two warring parties. But if
one country is short of a militarily useful commodity, which Uruguay could have
supplied equally to both, then he argues that '[i]f by not helping it Uruguay is
hindering it', then we must conclude that Uruguay is not behaving in a neutral way,
unless it starts providing the commodity to the country suffering from the shortage (p.
121). But again, this warfare example obscures what it is supposed to illuminate, by
making assumptions about the legitimate activities of states. Let us unpick why this
is the case.
Suppose Somalia, say, is short of the militarily useful commodity x, Ethiopia is not,
and Uruguay has x in abundance. In normal commercial contracts, Somalia will seek
x commercially, and if it has sufficient foreign exchange, then it will buy it from
10 Perhaps he has already done the groundwork for this in Part I on the authority of
the states? We will turn to this in a moment.
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commercial suppliers in Uruguay, or anywhere else. So in Raz's argument we have
the situation where for some reason Somalia is not buying x from Uruguay - but we
are not told why. There seem to be two broad reasons why it might not be doing so.
Firstly, this could be because the government of Uruguay refuses to allow its
commercial suppliers to sell x to Somalia for political reasons; in which case clearly
it is not being neutral. No-one would surely dispute this. Secondly, however, it could
be the case that Somalia doesn't have foreign exchange, doesn't have the information
that Uruguay has x, or for whatever other reason is not seeking x from commercial
suppliers in Uruguay. Raz suggests still that then the government of Uruguay is
behaving in a non-neutral fashion, simply by virtue of the fact that it isn't going out
and seeking to provide Somalia with what it needs. But this assumes that the state of
Uruguay has the resources to go and seek out potential recipients of x, to ship it to
them whether or notthere is to be payment, and, crucially, the political authority to
do so. The latteris most significant, because Raz's whole discussion is concerned with
deciding about the neutrality of states. In such an argument it is seriously begging the
question to assume that states do have such authority. For this reason alone, Raz's
example fails to convince. We can't conclude, as Raz would want us to do, from this
example that political neutrality is 'possible in some cases, but it may be impossible
in others.' (p. 121).
His second argument against neutrality is: 'whether or not a person acts neutrally
depends on the base line relative to which his behaviour is judged, and that there are
always different base lines leading to conflicting judgements and no rational grounds
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to prefer one to the others.' (p. 121)11. His example to illustrate this shows, he says,
something quite radical: 'In it two standards of neutrality conflict.' (p. 122). The two
'conflicting' standards are the afore-mentioned comprehensive and narrow
neutrality 12. Let us not worry too much about why in this example the two standards
of comprehensive and narrow neutrality conflict - for there is no obvious reason why
these principles should not conflict. What we are surely seeking to do is to adjudicate
between these two conceptions of neutrality, and decide which is more adequate. And
it turns out that he agrees that actions are possible which allow us to be narrowly
neutral, but not comprehensively neutral (pp. 122, 123). I find no problem with that.
Now comes the difficult part of the argument, where we are brought back 'to the
choice between the narrow and the comprehensive principles of neutrality' (p. 123).
He argues that the 'conflict in which the state is supposed to be neutral is about the
ability of people to choose and successfully pursue conceptions of the good (and these
include ideals of the good society or world). It is therefore a comprehensive conflict.
There is nothing outside it which can be useful for it but is not specifically necessary
for it. The whole of life, so to speak, is involved in the pursuit of the good life. Can
one be narrowly neutral in a comprehensive conflict?' (pp. 123-4).
His next paragraph begins 'Furthermore', so the assumption must be that he assumes
11 My emphasis, again stressing the personal nature of Raz's comments which fit
oddly into a discussion purportedly on political neutrality.
12 His example: the Reds are fighting the Blues. 'We have no commercial or other
relations with the Blues, but we supply the Reds with essential food which helps them
maintain their war effort.' (p. 121). The question is whether, to remain neutral, should
we continue to supply the Reds with food? If we don't then we are hindering the Reds
more than the Blues, if we do then we are helping them more than their opponents.
166 Chapter 4
that the answer to his rhetorical question is 'no'. But why are we led to this
conclusion? One problem seems to be that he has used the word 'comprehensive' in
two different ways - firstly to refer to a type of political neutrality, secondly to
describe the full-blooded conflict. But if instead we used, say, the word 'all-
encompassing' to describe the conflict, then his question becomes: 'Can one be
narrowly neutral in an all-encompassing conflict?', and the apparently obvious
contradiction disappears. Now, can one? And more germanely for our purposes, can
the state? I can't see anything in the definition of the narrow conception of neutrality
which rules this out at all. Indeed the definition of narrow neutrality was specifically
in terms of choosing conceptions of the good, so it would seem very possible to be
narrowly neutral in a conflict about these issues.
The argument continues: 'within the range of duties which the State owes its citizens
failure to help is hindrance.' (p. 124). How does he arrive at this? He gives two
examples in this case - that of owing a client a duty to increase the value of his
portfolio, failing to do so positively harming his interests; and that of a surgeon who,
in failing to help the recovery of a patient, hinders that recovery. (p. 124). But are
we able to translate these examples to the actions or inactions of the state? For
crucially it would be assuming that the state has the political authority to intervene in
such cases. This is surely an illegitimate assumption when it is the limits of the state
which we are seeking to find? The question is begged about what exactly are the
'range of duties' which the state does owe its citizens.
So the argument does not seem persuasive. But notice how he concludes with: 'So
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much for clarifying the doctrine of neutrality. In evaluating its credentials our prime
example will again be Rawls' theory.' (p. 124). But he has already told us that
Rawls' theory is one relating to comprehensive neutrality (p. 117). So it seems that
principle 2, of narrow neutrality, is not to be further challenged. So we are left with
Raz's agreement that '[e]galitarian supporters of the neutrality principle such as Rawls
endorse a variant on the principle of comprehensive neutrality. Libertarian supporters
of neutral political concern gravitate towards the narrow principle.' (p. 124). We seem
to be left with no further argument against these libertarians! Raz has contradicted
only the principle of comprehensive neutrality, and left the principles of neutrality .
likely to appeal to libertarians not persuasively challenged.
b Raz against the exclusion of ideals
Raz's second argument against anti-perfectionism challenges the 'exclusion of ideals'.
The main thrust of this argument" addresses Nozick's interpretation of the Kantian
imperative. Raz asks whether people have 'a right that other members of the
community contribute to the life of the community'? (p. 148). If people do have
'moral duties to contribute to other persons and to promote certain ideals, then they
are not being treated as means by being made to live up to them.' (p. 148). Against
this is Nozick's concern that 'because the state acts through coercion ... it has to
abjure perfectionism' (p. 148).
13 In the first part of the chapter, Raz dismisses 'political welfarism' - the doctrine
that governments are 'required to promote the goals that people have, without
discrimination based on their moral merit.' (p. 136). We won't go into this argument
here, as he notes that Nozick's theory is 'immune' to these criticisms (p. 145), and it
is Nozick's theory which is likely to be more substantial to his case.
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The details of the argument need not concern us here'", for Raz concludes only that
there are gaps in Nozick's theory, not that it is hopelessly misguided (p. 147). But
most significantly, we find that certain of Raz's comments do seem to lend more
support to Nozick's thesis then Raz is prepared to allow.
For Raz argues that if one holds personal autonomy to be of great value, as he does,
then coercion does 'deserve the special importance attributed to it in much of liberal
political thought' (p. 156). He doesn't, however, want to go as far as Nozick, pointing
out countervailing tendencies which must also be taken into account. On the one hand,
'[c]oercion diminishes a person's options.... loss of options through coercion is
deemed to be a greater loss of autonomy than a similar' loss brought about by other
means.' (p. 377); moreover, '[a]ll coercion invades autonomy by subjecting the will
of the coerced. Coercive threats which create a choice dictated by personal needs, and
most serious cases of coercion by the state are of this kind, also invade autonomy by
offending against that aspect which concerns the quality of options.' (p. 155). On the
other hand, however, 'harsh natural conditions can reduce the degree of autonomy of
a person to a bare minimum just as effectively as systematic coercive intervention.'
(p. 156); hence 'it is easy to exaggerate the evils of coercion, in comparison with
other evils or misfortunes which may fall to people in their life.' (p. 156). Raz
suggests that the liberal, concerned with peoples' autonomy, will seek to limit
coercion and also by the same token, 'to secure natural and social conditions which
enable individuals to develop an autonomous life'. However, in pursuing these goals
'the liberal may be willing to use coercion.' (p. 156).
14 For brief details, see appendix 3.
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Three important issues are raised by Raz's discussion. Firstly, Raz contends that
'[s]upporting valuable forms of life is a social rather than an individual matter....
perfectionist ideals require public action for their viability. Anti-perfectionism in
practice would lead not merely to a political stand-off from support for valuable
conceptions of the good. It would undermine the chances of survival of many
cherished aspects of our culture.' (p. 162). Hence the need for coercion to ensure that
these valuable things do survive. But why does Raz assume that coercion by the state
will be needed for this? He seems to be ignoring the possibility of there being a
vibrant 'civil society', of culture thriving independently of the state, and avoiding the
need for coercion. This issue, related to the 'public goods dilemma' is taken up in
chapter 6, where it is suggested that Raz is being too pessimistic about this alternative.
Secondly, we can't let Raz get away with his insistence that even though the state
needs to act in this perfectionist way, it can achieve much without coercion: 'Much
of it could be encouraging and facilitating action of the desired kind, or discouraging
undesired modes of behaviour. Conferring honours on creative and performing artists,
giving grants or loans to people who start community centres, taxing one kind of
leisure activity, e.g., hunting, more heavily than others, are all cases in which political
action in pursuit of conceptions of the good falls short of the threatening popular
images of imprisoning people who follow their religion,' etc. (p. 161'emphasis added).
But each of these methods described by Raz involves the state using funds taken in
taxes from some people and given to others; it is rather odd that Raz describes this
as being state activity which does not involve coercion - particularly as failure to
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comply with tax laws does carry the threat of imprisonment'", Moreover, there is
more at stake in this type of coercion than simply taking of money from one party to
subsidise another. Waldron argues, discussing the example of a tax on hunting, that
'[t]he imposition of the tax then is necessarily manipulative, for it influences a
person's decision by distorting that individual's understanding of the merits of the
choice.' (Waldron 1989 p. 1146)16.
1 suggest that taxation is a significant form of coercion which does pose problems for
Raz17, and which, if addressed seriously, could lead him to be less unsympathetic to
Nozick's position.
15 See emphasis in quote above.
16 This has implications for the state promotion of a curriculum, even if it balked at
actually making it compulsory - for this too would distort the 'individual's
understanding of the merits of the choice'.
17 Mason attempts to support Raz's position that taxation and subsidy do not really
involve coercion: 'although taxation and subsidy, for example, involve interfering with
the way people lead their lives, not all forms of them also prevent people from
exercising their autonomy.' If I am taxed, then '1 may no longer be able to smoke
twenty cigarettes a day and go to the opera every three months .... However, if 1 am
still able to smoke ten a day and go to the opera as frequently as I did before, even
thought an option is no longer available to me, 1 have not been prevented from
exercising my autonomy' (Mason 1990 p. 442). But this avoids the problem that some
peoples' autonomy have been reduced because they have been coerced into paying
subsidies to others, and by having their options weighted, as noted above. Mason
argues that this is not the case: for example, taxation of fox-hunting would be
satisfactory, provided the government informed people of the reasons for so doing,
and, perhaps initiated debate about them: 'An increase in the cost of foxhunting may
force some who enjoy this pastime to enter into rational debate about its merits when
no other social pressure would do so, in the hope of changing state policy.' (p. 443).
But why should they have to do this? One is suspicious that Mason is happy to see
this because he against foxhunting. Supposing a rather conservative government
introduced a state-subsidy of foxhunting? Would he then be so pleased that at least
this would initiate debate about its pros and cons?
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Thirdly, and most significantly, Raz observes that 'there is a significant difference
between coercion by an ideal liberal state and coercion from most other sources.
Since individuals are guaranteed adequate rights of political participation in the liberal
state and since such a state is guided by a public morality expressing concern for
individual autonomy, its coercive measures do not express an insult to the autonomy
of individuals. It is common knowledge that they are motivated not by lack of respect
for individual autonomy but by concern for it.' (Raz 1986 pp. 156-7 my emphasis).
This is of crucial importance. Raz's arguments, it transpires, have concerned an ideal
state. But in a less-than-ideal state, liberals will presumably be concerned to limit
state coercion. For in real liberal states it is arguable that people do not have adequate
rights of political participation, and the public morality isn't as Raz glowingly
describes. So even if we accept Raz's conclusions about coercion, we are left with
the idea that, in real situations, he arguably could agree with Nozick about practical
outcomes. Coercion should be limited. Coercion in real states does have the.effect of,
in Raz's words, treating the individual as 'a non-autonomous agent, an animal, a baby,
or an imbecile.' (p. 156).
These considerations of Raz against anti-perfectionism do not have the strong
conclusions that he would wish us to draw from them. We are left without persuasive
argument against two possible types of neutral states. Moreover, we are left with
question marks hanging over Nozick's argument, but in any case, an admission by Raz
that in real circumstances coercion by the state is undesirable - a position which will
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not leave him in much practical disagreement with Nozick. So, together with the
failure of his case against individualistic rights, it seems Raz has not demolished the
arguments against a perfectionist state. We turn now to his positive arguments for the
state promotion of autonomy, to see if his case there is more successfuL
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4.4 Raz on the state promotion of autonomy
Raz's argument for the state promotion of autonomy has three elements: the principle
of autonomy, the harm principle, and the normal justification thesis. Taken together,
these elements constitute Raz's defence of the state's use of coercion in the promotion
of the personal autonomy of its citizens.
The principle of autonomy is defined as 'the principle requiring people to secure the
conditions of autonomy for all people' (Raz 1986 p. 408, emphasis added). This is
arrived at with an argument about the 'ultimate value' of the autonomous life, and the
'intrinsic value' of the conditions needed for autonomy; as with White's argument, the
details need not concern us here, for we are seeing what follows if we accept Raz's
position. So, '[s]ince autonomy is morally valuable there is reason for everyone to
make himself and everyone else autonomous' (p.407). To this end, individuals have
three 'autonomy-based duties' towards other persons: to refrain from coercing others
(p. 407); to 'help in creating the inner capacities required for the conduct of an
autonomous life'; and finally to create 'an adequate range of options' for people to
choose from (p. 408). It is in the second and third sets that the duty to provide
educational opportunities for others arises.
These duties are duties that people have towards other people, e.g. as parents,
neighbours, or members of a community. On its own the principle of autonomy does
not give us duties that states have towards their citizens. So in order to arrive at
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Raz's position that 'Iglovernments" are subject to autonomy-based duties to provide
the conditions of autonomy for people who lack them' (p. 415, emphasis added), and
that they are permitted to use coercion to do this, we need two extensions or
supplements to his autonomy principle.
Raz's harm principle provides one supplement to the principle. He takes Mill's harm
principle that 'the only justification for coercively interfering with a person is to
prevent him from harming others' (p. 412), and extends it to include the prevention
of harm to the person him or herself. He then defines harm rather broadly: 'one
harms another when one's action makes the other person worse off than he was, or
is entitled to be, in a way which affects his future well-being.' (p. 414). Clearly much
depends upon how 'well-being' is interpreted here: Raz wants it to be interpreted
broadly to include acts of omissions as well as commissions: 'failing to improve the
situation of another' (p. 416) is harming someone. A more thorough examination than
we have space for is likely to find difficulties with Raz's approach here. However,
let us accept his position to focus on its implications. Clearly, the harm principle does
not go the whole way to justifying the intervention of the state in the promotion of
autonomy. For Raz concludes his discussion: 'if the government has a duty to promote
the autonomy of people, the harm principle allows it to use coercion both in order to
stop people from actions which would diminish people's autonomy and in order to
force them to take actions which are required to improve peoples' options and
opportunities.' (p. 416 my emphasis).
18 As we noted earlier, Raz uses the terms 'the state', 'government', and also 'the
law', interchangeably (Raz 1986 p. 70).
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So this is still hypothetical: if the government has this duty, then the harm principle
justifies coercion. We still need a supplement to the principle of autonomy to show
that states do have this duty. We find this in his normal justification thesis, a thesis
justifying authority in general, including political authority. The thesis asserts that the
'main argument for the legitimacy of any authority is that in subjecting himself to it
a person is more likely to act successfully for the reasons which apply to him than if
he does not subject himself to its authority.' (p. 71). Importantly, political authority
can only be justified if it satisfies this thesis. The test is: 'does following the
authority's instructions improve conformity with reason?' (p. 74).
Let us try to do what was beyond the scope ofRaz's argument, and examine the case
of education for autonomy. In other words, let us supplement Raz's principle of
autonomy with the machinery of the normal justification thesis, to show how this
would justify states intervening in education to promote the autonomy of citizens.
Now the normal justification thesis allows us to make the following assertion: state
action in education for the promotion of autonomy is justified only if it can be shown
that a person is better able to comply with the duties to promote the autonomy of
others by obeying the relevant laws, rather than by simply following his or her duty
in this respect. That is, if people pay their taxes, follow the state's commands on
compulsory schooling, and so on, they are better able to assist in providing
educational opportunities for the promotion of their own and other peoples' autonomy,
than if they are involved more directly in educational matters, by, for example,
voluntarily contributing resources to education or by offering their services to the
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community. If this is accepted, then Raz's principle of autonomy can be extended in
the desired way to support White's argument that the state should be involved in the
promotion of autonomy through education.
Now, in order to accept the extension of Raz's principle of autonomy extended to
justify state intervention in education for the promotion of autonomy, we would have
to be committed to these propositions":
1 that some, or all, of the state's citizens need help in promoting their personal
autonomy, over and above that which they or their relatives are able to
provide;
2 (a) that those who need such help cannot either expect to receive it through the
institutions of civil society, that is through non-state institutions such as
religious organisations, communities, etc; or, (b) that state intervention in this
regard will better promote the autonomy of all citizens than these other
institutions.
The first proposition is framed in such a way as to accept that, of course, all children
need some help in being initiated into the requirements for autonomy; the condition
stresses that, however, some cannot obtain it in their own families without outside
assistance. As in chapter 3, we note that both of these propositions have a large
empirical element, upon which we cannot adjudicate here. The second proposition
19 Recall the analogous propositions in chapter 3.
implies:
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3 that state intervention in this regard is efficacious; i.e. that certain types of
state intervention in education can be expected to have the effect of promoting
the autonomy of citizens, better than if the state was not involved.
These are propositions which would need to apply to any society in order for Raz's
argument for the state promotion of autonomy to be satisfied. Now, just as in the
earlier discussion of coercion, we note that Raz would seem to accept that there might
be contingent reasons why the third proposition might not hold in anything but an
ideal liberal society. For Raz argues that there are 'pragmatic considerations which can
normally be expected to favour erring on the side of caution where governmental
action ... is concerned.' (Raz 1986 p. 411); Or: 'Some governments can be entrusted
with the running of schools which it would be wrong to entrust to another' (p. 427).
Or again: 'Since power is corruptible, fallible and inefficient it should not be trusted.
... The impotence of politics to do good, the unreliability of governments, is the basis
of the freedom of the individual' (p. 428). That is, we can say that Raz would not
necessarily accept proposition 3 above. Neither, it seems, would White: he warns:
'It does not follow ... that the wisest policy in any liberal democracy is to put the aims
of education under government control. For actual governments may not be motivated
by the desire to help everyone to become autonomous .... Whether or not aims should
be left to government cannot be laid down by a formula. Everything depends on local
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considerations.... Where a government is likely to misuse its power, to mouth
autonomy for all, for instance, but in reality to encourage autonomy for a few and
structure the educational system so that the many become their servants, then the
move would be unwise.' (White, J. 1988 p. 230).
This is of great importance: I argue that, for contingent reasons, it seems that Raz (and
White) could agree that some states, or some types of state intervention, would not be
efficacious at promoting the autonomy of citizens, or not as efficacious as action
without the state. That is, he could agree that his argument for the state promotion of
autonomy through education might not apply in general (for his argument, I have
argued, implies propositions 1-3, and 3 he would not in general accept). Let us call
this Raz's contingent objection. What I seek to question in the next section is whether
it is simply for contingent reasons that we might reject proposition 3 above, or
whether there could be other reasons for so doing. We shall explore two possible
routes.
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4.5 Challenging Raz's 'contingent objection'
Raz and the prisoner's dilemma
Chapter 4
In building up his argument for the normal justification thesis, and its applicability to
the argument for political authority, Raz notes that 'the case for having any political
authority rests to a large extent on its ability to solve co-ordination problems and
extricate the population from Prisoner's Dilemma type situations.' (Raz 1986 p.
56?0. He elaborates on this, pointing out that: 'Direct individual action in an attempt
to follow right reason is likely to be self-defeating', so individuals should, following
an 'indirect strategy' give authority to the state. Moreover, the 'authority is in a better
position to achieve ... what the individual has reason to but is in no position to
achieve.' (p. 75).
For the prisoner's dilemma argument to hold in the case of state promotion of
autonomy through education, Raz would need either, or both, of the following two
propositions to be true":
4 reliance on the altruism and/or self-interest of citizens would not lead to the
desired outcome of the promotion of autonomy for all through education;
(Self-interest would come about from wishing to promote the desirable
'neighbourhood effects' of an educated citizenry; altruism from wanting to
help others to develop educationally);
20 This supported his 'dependence thesis' which ill turn supported his normal
justification thesis.
21 Again, see the analogous propositions in chapter 3.
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5 even if individuals were altruistic and/or self-interested enough, they would be
subject to the limitations of collective action problems in coordinating action
for educational opportunities for autonomy without the state; we need the state
to solve these collective action problems for us.
Now although Raz repeatedly mentions how important game-theoretic ideas are for
the justification of the authority of states, nowhere does he explicitly examine any of
the vast literature on them. He attaches himself, without argument, to the Hobbesian
and Humean line, that the only way we can extricate ourselves from problems of
social coordination is through state intervention. The easy assumption of this position
is simply no longer tenable, for recent wor~ shows that the problems of
coordination for the provision of public goods are simply not as bleak as Raz has
intimated. We shall take these matters further in chapter 6, where we suggest that
there are strong arguments undermining Raz's 'contingent objection'.
22 Much completed before Raz wrote The Morality of Freedom.
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The Epistemic Argument
The second challenge to Raz's 'contingent objection' relates to epistemic concerns.
Now we find Raz using epistemic concerns in support of political authority, arguing
that political authorities are 'wiser and therefore better able to establish how the
individual should act' than individuals themselves; moreover, that the knowledge of
political authorities is 'less likely to be tainted by bias, weakness or impetuosity, less
likely to be diverted from right reason by temptations or pressures' (Raz 1986 p. 75)
than the knowledge of individuals. However, his 'contingent objection' would lead to
agreement that under some circumstances this might not be the case, but for
contingent reasons only. The question in this section is whether there are non-
contingent reasons why the knowledge of political authorities regarding the promotion
of autonomy through education might not be efficacious. The issue is whether
decision-making about education for autonomy is really best conducted at the level of
governments, or whether the requirements of education mean that lower levels of
decision-making about it are more suitable.
To create a framework in which to explore this issue, we tum to the epistemic defence
of 'the moral foundations of markets' recently given by John Gray (1992). His
argument about markets in general will be summarised before we ask how this relates
to education and the curriculum for autonomy in particular.
Gray on the Epistemic argument for Markets
Gray has two chief concerns. The first is to demonstrate that market systems have
moral foundations connected with the promotion of autonomy. Secondly, he aims to
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show that the classical liberal, or libertarian, argument for markets is inadequate, and
that the justification for their moral foundations also points to 'an enabling welfare
state' .
Gray argues that markets are important because they enable individuals 'to live
autonomously in a form of life containing valuable options furnished by a common
stock of inherently public goods.' (Gray 1992 p. 2). The importance of markets is that
they enable people 'to act autonomously in their own personal knowledge - knowledge
that is typically tacit and practical in form.' (p. 3).
This epistemic argument has a long vintage, and as been frequently used to explain
the failures of socialist central planning by recourse to insurmountable limitations on
human knowledge. Ludwig von Mises put forward his 'calculation argument', that
it is a calculational impossibility to simulate market pricing in a planned economy.
Without market pricing of assets, relative scarcities are unknowable. Hayek developed
this argument to show that the importance of markets lies in their ability to economize
on the scarce resource of human knowledge, dispersed through all of society,
'knowledge that by its very nature cannot be collected by a central planning board.'
(Gray 1992 pp. 6-7). For Hayek, 'the most important role of the market is that of a
device for the transmission and utilisation of unarticulated, and sometimes
inarticulable, tacit and local knowledge.' (p. 8).
Hence, the problems of central planning are not just about incentives, as argued by
some on 'the left'. However, both the incentives and the knowledge arguments are
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important for the discussion of autonomy:
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'The incentive argument invokes the fact that planning institutions obstruct the
individual in acting upon his projects and purposes, while the epistemic argument
notes that they prevent him from using and benefitting from his own knowledge. In
both cases, the planning institutions constrain or diminish the autonomy of the
individuals, partly by compelling him to act on purposes that are not his own, partly
by depriving him of the opportunity to engage in projects animated by his own
knowledge.' (p. 14).
Hence Gray's ethical defence is of the market as 'an enabling device for the protection
and enhancement of human autonomy' (p. 19). The market promotes autonomy
through the right of exir", not voice. Instead of the constraints of collective
decision-making, markets 'are by their nature sensitive to differences among people,
and hostile to the Procrustean conformism of the central plan.' (p. 23).
The market system also inculcates and demands certain virtues of people: 'In
predatory Soviet-style systems, the virtues that are at a premium are the Hobbesian
ones, appropriate to his hypothetical state of nature, of force and fraud, coercion and
deception. By contrast, the virtues elicited in market economies are those of the
autonomous person - the person ... who is self-possessed, who has a distinct self-
identity or individuality, who is authentic and self-directed, and whose life is to some
significant degree a matter of self-creation.' (pp. 24-5).
23 For a definition of this, see chapter 6.
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Now it is certainly not the claim that markets are unique in promoting autonomy.
Many other voluntary associations such as families, churches, and so on, are also
involved in this. But without market institutions, people will not have autonomy in
a crucially important aspect of their lives - 'the economic dimension in which they act
as consumers and producers.' (p. 28).
The novelty of Gray's position, then, is that it has taken autonomy as a fundamental
value, and found a moral justification for the market in terms of this value. But thus
far, we have only found justification for the market in the economic sphere. Where
does education fit into the argument? In particular, could decisions about the
curriculum for the promotion of autonomy also lie in the market sphere?
Gray considers some aspects of educational provision, when he addresses the notion
of the 'enabling welfare state'. In this discussion, Gray accepts Raz's conclusion that
the 'provision of many collective goods is constitutive of the very possibility of
autonomy and it cannot be relegated to a subordinate role, compared with some
alleged right against coercion, in the name of autonomy.' (Raz 1986 p. 207, quoted
Gray 1992 p. 22). Moreover, Gray also accepts that for the promotion of autonomy,
and other basic human needs, an 'enabling welfare state' is necessary, to provide
goods where civil society, including the market, fail to do so (Gray 1992 p. 37). He
argues, closely following Raz, that 'the argument which justifies free markets as
enabling devices for autonomous choices also, and inexorably, justifies the institution
of an enabling welfare state, where this is among the conditions of autonomous choice
and action' (p. 30). That is, he accepts Raz's arguments against a system of negative
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rights, and allows that the provision of autonomy-enhancing (or indeed, any other
basic need-enhancing) goods take priority over the classical liberal's alleged right
against coercion.
However, although Gray's 'enabling welfare state' sounds fairly interventionist, it is
not altogether clear to what extent educational opportunities will need state
intervention, and in particular, whether decisions concerning an education for
autonomy will need intervention. Gray's argument concerning education is clear as
far as it goes. Education is a basic need, essential to the promotion of autonomy.
Hence, there is a 'welfare benefit to education' (p. 65). But this doesn't mean within
his system that governments necessarily have to step in and provide education. For
Gray adds the caveat that the state should only intervene in welfare when and where
resources and opportunities 'are not provided, or are under-provided, by the
institutions of civil society - by the spontaneously formed groupings of family,
neighbourhood and community, by private self-provision and by charitable agencies.'
(p. 58). In an earlier work, Gray suggested that, in the context of a much lower tax
regime, the great majority of individuals, families and communities will be able and
willing to provide education needed for their citizens. For the small minority that is
not so disposed, then the government should step in, by funding vouchers for
individuals to use in private schools. These schools could be regulated with some
minor controls over the curriculum, (Gray 1989 pp. 53ff)24. However, these ideas,
he stresses, are contingent and that what he is at pains to establish is 'the principle of
24 Notice, of course, the similarities between this and West's market model -
presumably Gray was influenced by West here.
186 Chapter 4
education as a valid welfare claim rather than the institutional means for guaranteeing
it (which will greatly vary according to circumstances)' (Gray 1992 pp. 65-6). So it
might seem that he accepts the 'contingent objection' outlined earlier given by Raz.
However, his discussion of the epistemic justification for markets raises the interesting
question of whether this argument also applies to the provision and regulation of
education. In particular could it apply to the regulation of the curriculum?
Now Gray is decidedly brief on the curriculum for an education for autonomy - he
mentions literacy and numeracy (Gray 1992 p. 65), and English Literature,
Mathematics and Science (Gray 1989 p. 55). There is nothing like the detailed
prescriptions put forward by White (White 1990, O'Hear and White 1991). Has this
difference emerged simply because education is White's speciality, and that had Gray
given it more thought, he too would have come out with similar prescriptions? Or is
there more to it than that? I suggest that the epistemic argument has a role here, which
we will explore now.
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4.6 The Epistemic Argument and the Curriculum
Can we extend the epistemic argument for markets to show how decisions about
curriculum are better left to markets rather than central planners? Two issues are of
concern here: firstly, the knowledge of the curriculum planners, and secondly, the
related concern about levels of decision-making. The context of our discussion is, of
course, discussion of 'education for autonomy': but we will see that it may have wider
purchase.
Knowledge of curriculum planners
Now White is aware of the difficulties faced by central curriculum planners: he writes
that they would need to 'work out a coherent and defensible set of overall aims;
examine what sub-aims, or intermediate aims, these might generate on logical,
psychological and other grounds; bear in mind the wide variety of ways by which
aims might be realized; and try to work out criteria delimiting the role of central
government, from that of local government, governing bodies and schools... all of
which would be a long and massive undertaking, requiring the collaboration of
professionals, civil servants, politicians and others in some kind of semi-independent
but politically accountable national educational council.' (White 1990 p. 13, emphasis
added). The central challenge posed by the epistemic challenge is: is all this too 'long
and massive' an undertaking? Let us illustrate the sorts of problems that might arise
in the curriculum central planning process.
a the make-up of the committees
First problem: who would be on the many committees and sub-committees? For the
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choice of those people could largely determine the result of the deliberations. Will
they be people who largely agree on political issues, or will there be a balance of
political colour, and hence great difficulties in reaching agreement? As noted above,
if compromises need to be made, then this is likely to lead to excessively detailed
legislation, which in itself would be undermining of autonomy, exactly the opposite
of what is sought by promoters of a curriculum for autonomy.
b 'tacit' knowledge
Next problem: can the knowledge needed by the central planners be articulated? For
there is a long tradition in political philosophy which queries whether much
knowledge about society is of this articulated form, or whether it is knowledge that
is 'tacit', discovered only through practices and traditions (see for example, Hayek
1960, Oakeshott 1962, Polanyi 1958). A brief look at a couple of the criteria which
'any adequate national curriculum must satisfy' (O'Hear and White 1991 p. 5) will
illustrate the sorts of problems I have in mind.
Firstly, White and O'Hear say that a national curriculum 'must have a clear and
defensible set of general aims, linked to the personal, civic and economic expectations
of the national community.' What does it mean for a 'national community' to have
expectations of its citizens?" How can we discover what these expectations are?
Can they be articulated for use in the committee room? Secondly, a national
curriculum 'must be directed towards promoting success rather than identifying and
25 Notwithstanding difficulties defining its geographical boundaries: compare White
1990 p. 145 with O'Hear and White 1991 p. 10, also see White 1990 pp. 170-1.
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reinforcing failure.' Isn't the ability to do this a practice which depends on the feel
of the teacher in the classroom, rather than the articulations of central planners? And
so on. Each of their criteria seems to present problems over articulation of what takes
place in the teacher-pupil relationship, or with pupils in schools".
c the 'Renaissance Person' problem
Even if the knowledge, or some part of it, can be articulated within separate
disciplines, will the experts from these different fields be able to communicate with
each other, and understand each other in order to create a coherent curriculum? For
the great expansion of knowledge means that there can no longer bea 'Renaissance
Person', familiar with all fields. 'The more civilised we become', says Hayek, 'the
26 It is interesting to note in this context how White seems off-the-mark when he
argues that the 1988 National Curriculum was devised much too quickly, with far too
little thought given to the aims and content of the curriculum. The government
'showed that devising a national curriculum is simplicity itself. You pick ten
foundation subjects to fill most of the school timetable, highlight three as of particular
importance and arrange for tests at different ages. I could have worked out the
national curriculum years ago. Anyone could.' (White 1990 p. 13). The implication
here is that not enough articulated, rational planning in committee rooms took place,
hence there was not enough planning at alL On the contrary, I suggest that the
process of devising the current National Curriculum took place over many centuries,
up to about 1904. Aldrich has noted how the 1988 National Curriculum is virtually
a copy of the curriculum directives of 1904 (Aldrich 1992 p. 67). But prior to that,
without any state intervention in the curriculum, (except for the abortive attempt at
'payment by results' in the 1860s), a curriculum had evolved through centuries of
'social experimentation' (Watson 1909). Through a process of 'natural selection' and
'adaptation', the curriculum evolved out of the education of the gentleman, tempered
with the ethos of discipline from the grammar schools and an orientation to the world
of work. The committees of 1904 simply formalised this unarticulated 'knowledge'
contained within the traditions of society. But of course, they didn't - and couldn't -
formalise everything. Much was taken for granted about the way schools were at the
time, including the details of ethos and organisation. The 1988 committees simply
latched onto those traditions. Of course, it is questionable whether they were relevant
84 years later. However, the point is that knowledge does not have to be articulated
to be useful and used.
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more relatively ignorant must each individual be of the facts on which the working
of his civilisation depends. The very division of knowledge increases the necessary
ignorance of the individual of most of this knowledge.' (Hayek 1960 p. 26). This has
profound implications for any central curriculum planners, who will be largely
ignorant of all but one of the disciplines brought to bear on the planning, such as
economics, history, curriculum subjects, philosophy, psychology, politics, etc. (In fact,
their specialised knowledge will, of course, be limited to a small subset of one of
these disciplines). How will these people on committees communicate with each
other, and weigh up their different claims?
d reaching decisions
How will the committees reach their decisions? Is it assumed that they will achieve
consensus? Presumably not, so will majority voting carry the day on something so
important? What voting system will they use? How do they know that this does not
have malfunctions, which will render the outcome of their deliberations void of any
meaning? We will encounter the problems of voting later (chapter 5). The general
result there is that all voting systems have the possibility of severe malfunctions. This
may lead to the committee members all preferring some option which doesn't get
chosen, or of the eventual choice being an arbitrary one.
e getting it right
Now, remembering that the outcome of the national curriculum committees' work is
legislation to be implemented in all educational settings, affecting all of the nation's
children, and hence the nation itself for the next few generations: what confidence can
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we have that the planners will get it right? Suppose the committee is made up of very
wise members, say with a 0.9 probability of getting anyone particular decision
correct. Suppose they have to make decisions about 10 major and statistically
independent issues. Then, the probability of being right on the whole package is
(9/10)10, just 0.3487. That is, this very wise committee deciding on ten important
issues has only a probability of about one third of getting everything right. That is, it
is very likely to get at least one of the important decisions wrong. A wrong decision
will then be made law and forced to be implemented in all schools. This probability
of course, sharply increases when we consider less wise committees. For example, if
on each issue, the probability of getting things right is 0.75, then on ten independent
issues, the probability of getting everything right is (3/4)10 or 0.056, which is a very
tiny probability indeed.
f unintended consequences
Even if it is assumed that the central-planners can put forward a plausible articulation,
and even if this could be comprehensible across different disciplines, can we be sure
that the policy will not have unintended consequences that may undermine the policy?
A genuine example worth considering in this context is that a recent government
survey found standards in reading falling, and suggested the connection between this
and the state-imposed crowding of the primary curriculum with more science, history
and geography (Cato and Whetton 1991). So the desire for a broad and balanced
primary curriculum may have led to a decline in reading standards. Again, as
previously noted, the emphasis on a curriculum that promotes autonomy could well
lead to the undermining of other institutions that currently serve autonomy.
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The general point is that given the complexity of our social system, we just cannot be
sure how different aspects inter-relate, and how changes in one area will affect other
areas and institutions. It might be thought that if there are effective, fast and accurate
feedback mechanisms, then counterproductive policies can be quickly discovered, and
altered. But this then brings in the appropriate levels of decision-making about
education. For crucially, the level at which decisions are made is related to how
quickly changes can be implemented.
Levels of decision-making
What level of decision-making is appropriate to the curriculum? White, and any other
advocate of a compulsory core curriculum, claims that decisions about the curriculum
should be made at the national level. The locus of decision-making, he argues, should
be moved from the sphere of schools to central government. The assumption seems
to be that this will not only bring the benefits of national control, but also that there
are no costs in changing the locus of control. However, it is crucial to my argument
that decision-making by government is not costless in this way. When decisions are
moved between different levels of decision-making, it is not simply the case that a
different set of people now make the decisions - the nature of the decision itself can
change (Sowell 1980 p.l?). In the context of control of the curriculum, the significant
issues concern the ease of reversibility of the decision; the possibility of incremental
changes; and the ease of fine-tuning of the decision.
a ease of reversibility
We tum again to the example mentioned earlier of the crowding of the curriculum
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leading to a decline in reading standards. If an individual school had experimented
with the broadening of its curriculum in this way, then upon discovery of a decline
in reading standards, the solution would be obvious and quickly initiated. The
headteacher or governors could reverse the previous decision and the next year's
intake could then have a more appropriate curriculum. In fact, it is easier than that,
because the individual school would not need to await the results of standardised tests
administered at the convenience of the central planners: teachers working with pupils
would be able to give immediate feedback of problems encountered, and the decision
could be reversed well before a whole cohort of pupils had gone through the year.
With the experiment conducted at the national level, however, things become
extraordinarily complicated, expensive and slow to change. For the curriculum is now
on the statute book, brought there by lengthy and slow procedures, and only possible
to be changed via similarly lengthy and slow procedures". Moreover, in this
example, the feedback mechanism was fairly easily initiated and interpreted. But it
is more likely that for feedback about other effects of a national curriculum for the
promotion of autonomy, the mechanisms will be very hard to put in place, and the
time taken between discovering problems and being able to institute a solution will
be inordinately 10ng28•
27 In England & Wales we have already witnessed the time it has taken to change the
Attainment Targets and schemes of work in mathematics and science - and perhaps
what is most interesting about these changes is how cosmetic they are.
28 It will not be until the year 2000 that the current National Curriculum will be fully
in place, that is, before the first group of pupils has been taught solely under its
regime. But this means that by this time, eleven generations ofpupils will have been
submitted to the curriculum for some part of their school-life. They will have been
compelled to follow it, even though an evaluation of its effectiveness could not
properly have been made (Kelly 1990 p.ix).
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Even this underestimates the complexity of the problem of feedback. For we have
assumed that feedback on the effectiveness of the compulsory curriculum could be
obtained by, for example, results in reading tests. Bureaucratic control, of course,
needs tangible results such as this by which to monitor whether national goals are
being met, and whether the structure of the curriculum needs to be changed. But it
is difficult, both in principle and in practice, to suggest what objective and quantifiable
measures could be used to ascertain whether effective education is taking place,
particularly an education for something as intangible as autonomy. The central
planners will need to have some feedback, and hence they are likely to come up with
measures which do not really reflect what is important about this education. They are
likely to dwell on things that can be easily quantified, such as test scores, and truancy
rates, rather than on more nebulous aspects of the educational experience. This is not
true, of course, of decision-makers at school leveL They are continually interacting
with pupils and aware of the multiplicity of their educational experiences. They are
in a much better position to evaluate any changes, even if they are not able to
articulate this evaluation to the degree required by state educational administrators.
b incremental changes and innovation
Secondly, the change in locus of decision-making also changes the ease with which
incremental changes can be made; this in turn effects the ease with which innovation
can be introduced. Decisions that are reversible are also flexible, allowing for
innovations to be introduced and tried out, and perhaps rejected or more widely
disseminated. Government-made decisions are much more likely not to foster
innovations in this way. Consider again the reading standards example. If a school
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discovers this decline, then it could as noted above, quickly reverse the previous
decision, and eliminate say, science, from the first years of schooling. However, it
doesn't have to do that, it could also make incremental changes - by raising the level
of time devoted to science, but not by as much as before. Or it could introduce the
innovation of a longer teaching week, allowing more time for science and reading.
But importantly, these changes could be introduced in a spirit of 'we'll try this and
see what happens.' If it's not successful, if reading standards continue to decline, or
if children or parents or staff object to the longer hours, then the decisions can again
be adjusted until the outcome is as desired. Governments cannot make incremental
changes and innovations in this way. Even if the necessary feedback mechanisms
could be brought into place, it would be politically inexpedient for democratic
governments to persist in introducing incremental changes.
The ability to make innovations is of importance when considering the needs of the
economy, as well as of individuals and society. For a state-prescribed curriculum is
likely to be in place for decades before significant changes can be made to its content.
In our fast-changing world, it seems rather arrogant to suppose that ideas today of
what is technologically, socially and personally appropriate in a curriculum, would be
relevant early in the next century, particularly in terms of the promotion of autonomy.
c fine-tuning
Finally, another facet of decision-making relationships of relevance to the curriculum
relates to the ease with which decisions can be 'fine-tuned' to the particular problem
at hand. Teachers in schools have continual feedback from their students, and are thus
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able to assess the effectiveness of the curriculum for individuals, and gauge work
accordingly. The central planners are clearly not able to fine-tune the curriculum to
suit the needs of individuals in this way.
One way around this would be to leave the broad framework of the curriculum to the
central planners, and allow teachers discretion in the classroom. This is certainly how
White envisages that his curriculum will overcome the types of problems discussed
in this section - 'it is essential for teaching to be adapted to the needs and strengths
of the leamer a teacher ... knows the particular circumstances in which leaming
takes place Effective teaching requires the freedom to make specific planning
decisions in response to such factors. The national framework should support teachers
in such planning, not constrain them unduly.' (O'Hear and White 1991 p. 10). I have
already argued why national curricula are likely to be highly prescriptive, and not
leave areas of the curriculum to the teachers' discretion.
What 'fine-tuning' could take place in a curriculum not nationally imposed, in our
reading standards example? Clearly, teachers could encourage those who are able to
read to cover areas of science, while allowing those who are not to spend time in
mastery of reading. The solution is simple, but the inflexibility of a national
curriculum is likely to mitigate against it. Centrally-imposed decisions are likely to
be 'package deals' rather than individualised. The suggestion her is that the latter is
more appropriate to the relationship between teacher and pupil.
The considerations of this section then lead us further to question whether the
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appropriate level of decision-making for the curriculum is the national one. If the
curriculum needs to be flexible, fostering innovation and allowing for incremental
changes and 'fine-tuning' to cater for the needs of individuals, then national decision-
making, I have argued, is inappropriate.
The upshot of all this is that there are severe epistemic problems facing the central
. curriculum planners, analogous to the problems facing any other central planning.
Each unique individual holds different knowledge and skills, and different educational
requirements; information concerning this distribution of knowledge and skills could
never be known by any central planning authority. Moreover, even if it could, the
national level of decision-making is inappropriate for the curriculum because of the
need to match up the individual's unique requirements and the curriculum provided.
The epistemic argument for markets can be adapted to show that there are analogous
problems faced by the state in trying to create and impose a curriculum for autonomy.
Conclusions: Rejecting Raz's contingent objection
We return now to consider how this discussion bears on Raz's argument for the state
promotion of autonomy. We argued earlier that if Raz's principle of autonomy, his
harm principle, and his normal justification thesis were adapted to justify state
intervention for the promotion of autonomy, then this would lead to accepting
propositions 1-3 above. However, we suggested that Raz might concede that
proposition 3 did not in general apply, and hence that his argument for the state
promotion of autonomy might not be applicable in general. Crucially, his non-
acceptance of proposition 3 would be for contingent reasons only, and would not
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change his principled support for state promotion of autonomy through education. We
sought to examine this contingent rejection of proposition 3, which we termed Raz's
'contingent objection'. We noted that there could be two ways to undermine this
objection. Firstly, the 'prisoner's dilemma' and other problems of collective action,
crucial to Raz's argument, seemed likely to pose difficulties for his position. These
were related to educational provision through propositions 4 and 5, and will be
explored in chapter 6. Secondly, the 'epistemic argument' in support of markets raised
serious, non-contingent reasons why state intervention in the curriculum for the
promotion of autonomy might not be efficacious, hence why Raz's 'contingent
objection' might not be acceptable. In other words, the discussion so far leads us to
conclude that Raz's 'contingent objection' might not be upheld. Hence we Can say that
there seem to be non-contingent grounds for questioning our proposition 3, and hence
for not accepting Raz's argument for the state promotion of autonomy through a
curriculum for autonomy. Moreover, because White's argument depended upon Raz's,
the foundations on which that argument rests are also brought into question.
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4.7 Conclusions: Against state promotion of education for autonomy
This chapter had as its first aim the examination of one possible curriculum proposal
for the fleshing out of West's 'minimum adequate education for all', namely an
'education for autonomy'. John White's argument in favour of such a state-promoted
curriculum was explored. It was suggested that such a curriculum could have
undesirable consequences. Firstly, it could lead to the undermining of other autonomy-
promoting institutions of civil society. Secondly, whatever the intentions of the
curriculum designers, it could lead to severe restrictions on the autonomy of
educationalists, and hence, again to undermine the autonomy of pupils. Neither of
these arguments were particularly compelling, and so we turned to the justification for
the state to be involved in the promotion of autonomy, to see if a stronger case could
be made using this justification.
White's arguments were found to depend upon those given by Joseph Raz, and hence
these were explored in some detail. It transpired that none of Raz's arguments against
those who would seek to curtail state intervention in ways relevant to our discussion
were found to be convincing. He left open the possibility of there being an argument
for some sort of neutral state, pointed out that coercion by actual (rather than ideal)
states might not be at all desirable, and failed to address the coercive impact of
taxation and legislation. When we turned to Raz's positive arguments in defence of
state promotion of autonomy, we suggested that when applied to education, we would
need propositions 1-3 to be satisfied in order to accept his position:
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1 that some, or all, of the state's citizens need help in promoting their personal
autonomy, over and above that which they or their relatives are able to
provide;
2 (a) that those who need such help cannot either expect to receive it through the
institutions of civil society, that is through non-state institutions such as
religious organisations, communities, etc; or, (b) that state intervention in this
regard will better promote the autonomy of all citizens than these other
institutions.
3 that state intervention in this regard is efficacious; i.e. that certain types of
state intervention in education can be expected to have the effect of promoting
the autonomy of citizens, better than if the state was not involved..
Apart from many empirical concerns which we were unable to address, we suggested
that Raz himself (and also White) might have difficulty accepting proposition 3, but
only for contingent reasons to do with the shortcomings of particular governments. We
labelled this Raz's 'contingent objection'. In itself, this would be a powerful argument
against allowing many, if not all, actual governments to be involved in the regulation
of the curriculum. However, we asked if there could be any non-contingent reasons
why the state intervention for the promotion of autonomy might not be efficacious.
We suggested two possibilities: one concerns the prisoner's dilemma and other
problems of collective action, which we put to one side until chapter 6. The other
concerns the epistemic argument for markets. We explored this, outlining Gray's
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epistemic defence of markets, and showing how similar reasoning could apply to the
problems of the central curriculum planners. Hence, we suggested this was a powerful
objection to proposition 3, and hence a powerful objection to the state promotion of
a curriculum for autonomy.
So where does this leave us with West's market model, and in particular, its
curriculum? We weren't in general able to overrule in our discussion of education for
democracy (chapter 3) objections to the state being involved in the promotion of that
curriculum". Now we arrive at the same position for the curriculum for autonomy.
As noted in chapter 1, these two curricula are taken to embody what would be the
main thrust of the 'political left's critique of our market model concerning the
curriculum. So does this mean that we are not able to justify the fleshing out of the
curriculum in West's market model? We could first note that there are other possible
models for the curriculum, induding such projects as education for law and order,
education for economic growth, and so on, which we suggest are more likely to be the
province of the 'political right' and hence outside of the scope of this thesis. But even
so, could national curricula along these lines fare any better?
The suggestion here is that they could not, and for precisely the reasons we have
already examined. For although the epistemic argument of the last section was framed
in terms of education for autonomy, the same considerations could be used to argue
against a national curriculum on any grounds. There would always be the same sorts
of epistemic problems raised in terms of the knowledge requirements of the
29 There was, recall, one important exception to this.
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curriculum planners, and the appropriate levels of decision-making about the
curriculum". The epistemic argument is a powerful argument not just against central
economic planning, as Gray and Hayek have used it, but also against central planning
of any sort for the curriculum.
So the conclusions of this chapter are that it seems unlikely to be viable to flesh out
a curriculum to be promoted by the state for West's 'minimum adequate education' for
all'. Note that this doesn't mean that we can't have some very plausible ideas on what
we would like the curriculum of a liberal education to be, only that it is unjustified
to suppose that this could or should seek for these to be made compulsory by the
state. In other words, the argument is that decisions about the curriculum should be
taken away from governments altogether, and that in West's market model, the market
can lead the curriculum too. This conclusion will feel very uncomfortable to those
who seek centralised control of the curriculum, but further examination of the issues
raised is beyond the scope of this thesis, as we are only exploring possible objections
to the market model, not mounting a defence on its behalf". But one powerful
objection might be apparent, and has already been raised in chapter 1. That is, that
however many problems, epistemic and otherwise, which are raised by the notion of
a state-promoted curriculum, democratic control of the curriculum has an importance
30 For example, how could the required committee of experts possibly know how the
economic needs of society in the next century could be translated into educational
needs, especially given the pace of technological change? Can we know what sort of
compulsory curriculum will alleviate the problems of lawlessness? And so on.
31 Some issues will be raised in chapter 6, when we examine whether the curricula for
autonomy and democracy could arise through individuals pursuing their own ends.
For further discussion of the market alternative, see Tooley 1993a.
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and value which would outweigh any of these admitted disadvantages. For the sake
of democracy, control of the curriculum should not be left to the vagaries of markets,
but should be made accountable to the people through the democratic process. It is
to this important objection to which we turn next in chapter 5, before returning to the
unresolved 'public goods' issues raised by our discussion of Raz in chapter 6.
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5.1 Introduction
We have examined two possible ways of fleshing out the curriculum for West's
'minimum adequate education for all', and found neither hold convincing arguments
for allowing the state to intervene in this way. But rather than concede that this
would imply leaving the curriculum to markets, opponents of markets could argue that
whatever disadvantages there were with state-controlled curricula, the importance of
democracy is such that we must seek democratic control of the curriculum. Indeed,
such is the value of democracy, and such are the important links between education
and democracy, it would be argued, we must seek democratic control of all aspects
of education, including funding, provision, as well as regulation of matters including
the curriculum - thus overriding all aspects of West's market model, as interpreted in
chapter 1.
In support of this, we note that in the recent debate in the UK about allowing markets
into educational provision, the argument for democratic control of education has
featured very strongly. Three related strands of objection can be found in this critique.
The first takes the value of democratic control as self-evident and views anything that
undermines this as correspondingly deleterious. For example, Green notes that '[fjree-
market systems are also fundamentally undemocratic' (Green 1991 p. 65) - the
implication being that this is an argument against them. The Hillcole Group suggest
that under market reforms '[d]emocracy itself is what is being hunted to extinction.'
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(Hillcole Group 1991 p. 21). A second strand points to issues that society needs from
education, or from a common education system, suggesting that if there is not
democratic control of education, these will not be met. For example, Ball notes that
under the shift to market provision 'it will become extremely difficult to hold to any
social or educational principles in the delivery of schooling.' (Ball 1990a p. 19). Pat
White argues that allowing parental choice through market mechanisms will 'tend to
sharpen the differences between people at the expense of attention to society's internal
cohesiveness and the need to develop common bonds between its citizens.' (White,
P 1988 p. 197).
Thirdly, and most commonly, the issue of accountability is raised. Ranson argues that
decisions about education 'cannot be determined by individuals acting in isolation
from each other. Thus education is a good which should be the subject of public,
collective, choice which is accountable to the public as a whole (Ranson 1990 p. 16).
Whitty argues that the market 'constitutes an attack on the very notion that collective
action is a legitimate way of struggling for social justice.' (Whitty 1989 p. 339).
Levitas notes that the 'neo-liberals' assume that 'greater accountability will always be
achieved by limiting the role of government and increasing the role of the market ...
The key question of accountability to whom, is never directly addressed, but some
proposals seem likely to lead to limits on existing democratic rights.' (Levitas 1986
p. 83). Ball notes that with markets '[a]ccountability is thus narrowed from the
effectiveness of a local education system overseen by the LEA, [local education
authority] and managed to serve a whole community, to a set of single customer-
producer relations.' (Ball 1990a p.19). The market raises the question of whether
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schools are 'solely responsible to their individual parent consumers' or have 'another
different responsibility to their community.' (Ball 1990b p. 10).
So do these objections hold? Is the need for democratic control of education -
funding, provision and regulation - likely to be a powerful objection to West's market
model? In the next section we will explore one argument for democratic control of
education in more detail.
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5.2 Democratic control of education: an argument from political equality
John White's argument for democratic control of the curriculum' has a long vintage,
going back to his 1973 Towards a Compulsory Curriculum. In this section we use his
writings from a variety of sources, as well as that of 0 'Hear and White (1991), the
pamphlet published by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) already
discussed in chapter 4.
Democratic control is the major focus of White's curriculum proposals. He argues
that, without democratic control, one group of people, professional educationalists, will
have control of an area which is of crucial importance to, and hence should be
controlled by, all. O'Hear and White's formulation begins:
'The main argument for shifting from professional to political control of the broad
framework of the curriculum is that questions about the aims and content of the
curriculum are intimately connected with views about the kind of society we wish to
live in. They are as much political questions as issues of taxation policy or defence.'
(O'Hear and White 1991 p. 10).
Now, in an earlier work, it was clarified that there is not a necessary connection
between something having political implications, and the need for political control
(White 1981 p. 257). White agreed with the observation that 'a political theory may
incorporate in itself the view that the agenda of matters deserving of government
1 We can extend his arguments to look at control of education more generally,
including funding and provision, as we shall see.
208 Chapter 5
control should be limited.' (Dearden 1980 p. 153). So just because the curriculum is
'intimately connected' with a picture of the good society, it doesn't necessarily follow
that decisions about the curriculum must be made by the body politic. What is needed
is 'a review of the various contingent factors at a particular historical time' (White
1981 p. 257), to ascertain whether or not political control is a good idea. Now what
seems to have emerged in White's writings is that the contingent factor is democracy:
in a democracy, issues of political equality are paramount. The argument of O'Hear
and White thus continues:
'Every citizen in a democracy should have an equal right to participate in the control
or exercise of political power in these and other areas.... the citizenry as a whole, not
the teachers, should decide the overall shape of school curricula.' (O'Hear and White
1991 p. 10).
Does this emphasis on democracy give a strong reason for political control of the
curriculum? We will look at two possible interpretations': firstly is White (and
O'Hear and White) arguing that in our present 'democracy' or in a similar society,
democratic control is desirable? Or is the argument that it is desirable only in an
improved" democracy? We will consider both cases. But first, let us be clear what
is meant by the principle of political equality.
2 Recall, these interpretations were first noted in chapter 3.
3 With improvements to be specified.
The principle ofpolitical equality
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White's formulation of the principle of political equality is that every citizen should
be able to have an equal voice in political participation. What does he mean by this?
It would seem that he could have in mind at least the first, and possibly two or more
of the following three criteria (adapting Dahl 1982 p. 6):
1 Voting Equality: (a) the expressed preferences of each citizen are equally
weighted in determining the final solution of a collective, binding decision; (b)
each citizen has adequate opportunities to make an informed and considered
judgment on these matters; (c) the demos should include all adults subject to
its laws.'
2 Participation Equality: (a) each citizen has adequate opportunities for
participation in other aspects of the democratic process, including putting
matters on the agenda; (b) each citizen has adequate opportunities to make an
informed and considered judgment on these matters.
3 Final control over the agenda: the citizens have exclusive authority to
determine what matters are to be decided on using the above two criteria, and
which can be delegated to other authorities to make decisions using
nondemocratic processes - except that the citizens are not permitted to alienate
their final control".
4 This last criteria means that, for reasons of economy or efficiency, the citizenry can
decide to delegate matters to particular experts or sub-committees to make
recommendations or decisions.
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We can see these three criteria as dependent on two distinct factors: firstly there are
the mechanisms of democracy, the voting procedures, franchising arrangements, etc.
Secondly, there are the dispositional and intellectual qualities of the citizens
themselves. That is, for example, voting equality requires the opportunity for all to
participate, their competence to participate, their desire to do so - all dispositional and
intellectual qualities. But it also, and this is an aspect that is often missed by
philosophers, requires that there be appropriate mechanisms in place to allow equality
of voting as an outcome. We have already looked at the intellectual and dispositional
qualities in chapter 3; in this section we mainly focus on the mechanisms of
democracy.
In what follows I focus on the first of these conditions - voting equality - only. That
is, I assume that, as 1 did in chapter 3, although there are many widely different types
of institutions in which participation can take place, a common feature of all forms
of democratic participation is the arriving at decisions through the act of voting (Riker
1982 p. 5). Democratic participation could require much more than that, for example,
rational deliberation and discussion, lobbying and campaigning. However, casting a
vote at the conclusion of this process, whether on the small committee, or in a
national election, is a necessary, although certainly not sufficient, condition for
democratic participation. That is, my suggestion is, that if political equality is being
sought, then the first of these conditions will need to be satisfied,
Now, would White (et al) be seeking democratic control of the curriculum under any
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democracy, for example, that in the UK.?5 I doubt whether that would be the case -
for, because of the imperfections of the democracy in the UK, it is hardly the case that
everyone has, or even has the potential to have, an 'equal voice' in deciding the
curriculum, or other educational matters.
To see this, we can briefly examine a recent example of how a decisions was made
around an educational issues, the decision to impose a national curriculum. The first
National Curriculum came onto the statute books in 1988. However, since the mid-
seventies there had been a debate about the benefits of a national curriculum.
Politically this is always said to have commenced with the 1976 Ruskin College
speech of Labour primeminister James (now Lord) Callaghan; the philosophical
arguments can usefully be traced back to White (1973). Ball (1990c) shows how the
educational bureaucracy (the DES, now DFE6) sought a national curriculum from the
mid-seventies, and sought to bring it about whichever party was in power: Ball
suggests it was likely to have succeeded in this aim. So already it can be seen that it
was on the political agenda whichever way people voted in the ensuing elections.
Now, in the period between elections, various groups were actively campaigning for
or against a national curriculum. These included the 'right'- and 'left'-wing think-
tanks, the teacher's unions, and individual writers, etc. Note that these were all
special interest groups, usually of educational professionals, consulting other
5 The UK is usually described as a democracy, and we will use that term loosely, as
is the custom, to describe states which have elections for government officials, and
other standard criteria (see Dah11982 pp. 10-11).
6 Department of Education and Science, now the Department for Education.
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educational professionals about curriculum matters. As the 1987 election approached,
party manifestos were drawn up. Political parties liaised with their professional
educationalists, and produced educational policies for the manifestos. The ordinary
voter will have played no part in formulating these. In the case of the 1987 elections,
the details on the curriculum in full covered half a paragraph. This seems hardly
adequate for individuals to base their decisions on about such an important matter.
Next, the 'first-past-the-post' voting system does not in general produce a government
elected by a majority of those voting, let alone of the electorate. So this would serve
to undermine political equality, if it is understood that there is some relationship with
this and majority voting (see below). Moreover, each voter could only vote once and
for one party. So each voter will have voted on a variety of issues in the General
Election, and will have been forced to conflate their vote on the curriculum with that
on other issues. So some who approved one party's stand on the curriculum, might
still have voted against that party, because they disapproved of other issues on the
manifesto. The converse would also hold. So we have the situation in our democracy
where decisions about the curriculum are likely to inform the decisions of only a very
small minority of voters.
The process gets even further away from the democratic ideal, as the elected prime
minister then selects a cabinet, and it is this cabinet that effectively sets the political
agenda, with only a small amount of modification of that agenda by the Houses of
Parliament. Moreover, if we follow the passage of the national curriculum legislation
through the political process, we see how, increasingly, professional educationalists
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impinge upon the process at all levels: they influenced the formulation of legislation -
via the DFE, and lobbying of Parliament - and it was these professional educational
bodies whom were entrusted with 'fleshing out' proposals, and carrying policies into
schools. In the case of the 1988 Education Reform Act, various committees were set
up to look at the curriculum proposals in each subject, and two new 'quangos'? were
set up, the National Curriculum Council, and the Secondary Examinations and
Assessment Council, to oversee the arrangements in curriculum and testing. These
bodies further farmed out work to, inter alia, the National Foundation for Educational
Research. All of these bodies are made up of educational professionals.
All of these factors undermine the notion that, in our democracy, there is political
equality for citizens to participate in decisions concerning the curriculum. Moreover,
this argument can be translated mutatis mutandis to an argument about democratic
control of any other factors concerning schooling, including funding and provision of
schools. The same processes would be at work in decisions made about any aspect of
control of education.
I suggest that White would probably agree that there are these imperfections in our
democracy, and that the difference between 'political' control and 'professional'
control is very slight in terms of the formulation of the policy, and hence hardly an
important justification for state control of the curriculum'. In both cases the same
7 Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations.
8 Of course, with our definition of political equality above, it would be possible, using
the third clause, for the 'demos' to decide to allocate responsibility for educational
matters to the educationalists: but it is clearly not the case that the citizenry has in fact
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sorts of institutions are at work creating and modifying the outcome. In 'political'
control the role of the individual voter is simply to choose the party which chooses
the executive which liaises with the 'professional' bodies to decide the curriculum.
The voter also gets to ratify or reject this decision, amongst a myriad other decisions,
by voting for or against the government at the next election. However, although
democratic control of the curriculum remains a chimera as things stand, White would
argue that therefore this is an argument for improvements to the democratic process,
to bring it more in line with voting equality.
A more democratic society?
Firstly, could governments have behaved more democratically under our existing
system, leading to a closer approximation to political equality of control over
education? Again let us focus on the National Curriculum as an example.
Yes, it does seem that there would be potential for improving the consultation process
through which the government introduced the curriculum. Instead of only sending out
consultation documents to schools, and largely ignoring the albeit carefully coded and
quantified results, the consultation process could have been extended to all interested
parties, and the results of this could have had some binding force. The results then
would have had to have been aggregated using some procedure, which would make
this resemble a rather complicated referendum on the issue of the curriculum. Or,
there could have been referenda on the selection of the members of the committees,
decided to do this.
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and further referenda to decide whether or not there was to be a consultation process,
whether it was to be binding, or whether the committees were to be delegated to make
their own decisions on these issues. So in principle, there don't seem, thus far, any
reasons why there couldn't have been these piecemeal improvements in our current
democracy". Now crucially, what all of the suggested changes hinge upon is a
dependence upon voting procedures: consultation and voting on proposals, referenda
and counting of votes, aggregating comments about curricular matters, etc. We shall
turn to possible improvements to voting below.
Secondly, could there be wholesale, rather than piecemeal, improvements to the
democratic process? In this respect, a major recent focus from the 'political left' is on
voting reform (see Labour Party 1993)10. So both of the suggested improvements
to our democracy, piecemeal and wholesale, eventually depend upon improvements to
voting.
The conclusions of this section then, is that although democratic control of educational
matters under our present system has not been of a desirable kind - and certainly not
in keeping with political equality, or removing professional control of the curriculum -
it seems plausible that the democratic procedures could be improved in order to
9 Whether these could have emerged in practice is another matter: witness the
reluctance of Parliament to have a referendum on ratifying the Maastricht treaty when
it is known that 75% of the British public want one - The Times 2nd April 1993;
However, let us sidestep this practical difficulty for now.
10 Other areas of concern are to do with education for democracy, (already discussed)
and devolution of power to local and regional governments, themselves with improved
voting procedures.
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alleviate this problem; a plausibility which we will explore in a moment.
A similar result - that democratic control is desirable only in an improved democracy,
in particular one with improved voting systems - can be obtained by examining any
of the other grounds frequently given for democratic control of education, namely, the
argument from the educative impact of democracy, from the promotion of the general
interest and, from the promotion of positive liberty. Parallel discussion on these other
justifications can be found in appendix 4.
We turn, then, to this crucial issue of improvements to voting systems, to see how
these conclusions stand.
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5.3 Improving Democracy by Improving Voting Systems
Democratic control of education is sought, but this doesn't seem to be of much value
in the kind of democracy as found in the UK. In particular, it doesn't seem to be of
much value in promoting political equality. In part, this is a problem with voting
systems. In an improved democracy, however, in particular, one with improved voting
systems, democratic control would seem more desirable. So: can democracy be
improved? In particular, can voting systems be improved so as to bring about the
desirability of democratic control of education?
Let us be clear-what improvements we are seeking: we want voting systems which
ensure voting equality, (a necessary but not sufficient condition for political equality).
Moreover, from appendix 4, taking into account other justifications for democracy, we
also want people to more be able to participate, through referenda and more carefully
pinpointed voting; and we want voting systems which can amalgamate individual
preferences into the 'general interest' or the 'common good'.
It might seem odd for philosophers to have to ask the question of whether voting
systems can be improved so as to ensure voting equality. Philosophers normally
consider only what is desirable in democracy, not whether it is possible. But clearly,
if something is not mathematically or logically possible, then we have to take this into
account in our philosophical discussions. As Runciman suggests: 'it is feasibility
which constitutes the crucial criterion by which a political argument may be settled;
and it is such arguments which, if established, very often requires the abandonment
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of a prescriptive political position.' (Runciman 1962 pp. 39-40). Runciman notes that
one of the works which it is essential that political theorists consider is that of
Kenneth Arrow: 'What sort of a theory of the General Will or of the Common Good
it is worth trying to construct in the face of Arrow's conclusions cannot be settled on
the basis of Arrow's conclusions alone; but no such theory ... is worth attempting at
all which does not carefully take account of them.' (p. 43). In this chapter, then, we
follow Runciman's advice on this issue. Now, Arrow's theorem has been used by
several commentators to raise questions about what is logically possible from
democracy. We will turn to this in a moment But to set the scene, let us examine
the result which inspired it, the 'paradox of voting'. This paradox as usually presented
is somewhat contrived", so I present it in a completely contrived setting, to avoid
any pretence. However, in appendix 5, I look at some more realistic examples which
illustrate in very general terms the kinds of problems that can arise from voting.
Moreover, Arrow's theorem generalises the 'paradox', as we shall see.
Contrived Example
Present for mum: the 'paradox of voting'
Three children, James, Rachel and Simon, want to pool their money to buy a birthday
present for their mum. They talk about what they want to buy, and whittle it down
to three options, flowers, chocolates or perfume. As they discuss this, each becomes
aware of their own preferences for the presents:
11 The usual illustration is of a three voter society with options for three -
conservative, liberal and socialist - candidates.
James:
Rachel:
Simon:
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flowers, chocolates, perfume
chocolates, perfume, flowers
perfume, flowers, chocolates
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Being slightly precocious, they decide to vote on the options, before going shopping.
First they vote on flowers versus chocolates. James and Simon prefer the flowers,
Rachel prefers the chocolates, so she is outvoted by her brothers, and flowers goes
through. They then vote on flowers versus perfume. This time Rachel and Simon
agree on perfume, against James on flowers, so perfume wins. Hence they decide to
go out and buy perfume as present for mum. This is James' least favoured option,
but, disgruntled; he goes along with it anyway.
Any problems with this? Yes. We have seen that flowers beat chocolates, and
perfume beats flowers. But we haven't seen what the preference is between
chocolates and perfume. If this vote is conducted, we find that chocolates win! So
chocolates were preferred to perfume. But this is confusing. We have chocolates were
preferred to perfume; perfume preferred to flowers; and flowers preferred to
chocolates. In fact this is a cycle of preferences, with no one option being preferred
over any other. Choose one, and there is at least one other preferred to it. The choice
has to be made, and perfume is as good or as bad as any other choice. But notice
that the choice of perfume does mean that Simon got his way, and James not at all.
It may not seem surprising that we can contrive examples like this. But as can be
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seen in appendix 5, there are examples of real political situations where it is suggested
exactly the same thing is likely to have happened. Moreover, it is estimated that these
cycles of preferences occur, with a large number of voters, about 10% of the time
with three options, increasing to 25% of the time with 5 options, and nearly 40% with
7 options (Riker 1982 p. 122). That is, in an national election, say, cycles of
preferences might occur in up to a quarter of all cases: in a quarter of all elections,
it didn't really matter who was chosen for election, it could have been any party.
In fact it is even worse than that. For the presence of cycles means that the voters
have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences in order to achieve a more
desired outcome. Go back to the siblings above. We noticed that James had the least
favoured of his options chosen. Now suppose he had become aware before they voted,
from their discussion and his knowledge of his brother and sister, what their
preferences were12• Knowing a little about voting systems he realises that if he
misrepresents his preferences, he can avoid the consequence of having his least desired
option, perfume, bought for his mum. That is, if the voting preferences become as
follows:
Insincere James:
Rachel:
Simon:
chocolates, flowers, perfume
chocolates, perfume, flowers
perfume, flowers, chocolates
Now in the first vote between flowers and chocolates, insincere James sides with
12 The analogy in political systems is awareness through opinion polls, canvassing, etc.
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Rachel, and chocolates win. Then, in the vote between chocolates and perfume,
(everyone voting sincerely) now chocolates win! So James, by lying about his
preferences, has achieved his second choice, as opposed to his last choice. Again we
see in appendix 5 how this could have changed the results of real political elections.
These results are worth bringing forward here. What they show is that in two very
important recent elections, the results, using plausible assumptions, didn't actually
reflect the preferences of the voters concerned, but reflected more the vagaries of the
voting systems used. The first example is of the election of Boris Yeltsin to the
presidency of the Russian Federation in 1990, which had important repercussions for
Russia, plausibly led to the breakup of the Soviet Union, the deposing of Gorbachev,
the civil war in· Yugoslavia, and so on. We found a plausible 'paradox of voting',
with Yeltsin being preferred to Vlasov, who was in turn preferred to Polozkov, who
was in turn preferred to Yeltsin! That is, there was no winner. Choose any candidate,
and he could have been beaten by another.
Similarly, with the Eastbourne by-election of October 1990 in the UK, which again
plausibly led to the downfall of another powerful leader, Margaret Thatcher. The
example again shows, using feasible assumptions about real voters' preferences, that
a cycle of preferences could have occurred. The Liberal candidate was chosen, but
it could equally have been any of the other candidates, including the Conservative!
Let us be completely clear what these examples are saying. That the vagaries of these
voting systems in each case brought about outcomes which, I suggest, offend our
intuitions about the criteria which a voting system should satisfy. There seems to be
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offence against political equality, for example. More simply, it seems unfair that if,
for example, there is a cycle of preferences, that one party should be elected rather
than another, and so on, particularly if the outcome of the process is not transparent
to us. One's natural reaction to this is, I suggest, to think: these are particular
problems with particular voting systems; so again what we need is improved voting
systems'". However, it has been suggested that social choice theory, in particular,
Arrow's Theorem, shows that any voting system will fall foul of similar results. Let's
explore this now.
Arrow's Theorem
The principle result of Social Choice Theory, Arrow's theorem, can be applied" to
13 Thoughts in the UK normally turn to some sort of proportional representation
system.
14 Social choice theory has a much broader frame of reference than just voting: Arrow
wrote about 'social welfare functions' in general. The objects which are ordered in
this general case are not candidates in an election, or policies in a referendum, but
what Arrow called 'social states'. He defined these as 'a complete description of the
amount of each type of commodity in the hands of each individual, the amount of
labor to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each productive resource
invested in each type of productive activity, and the amounts of various types of
collective activity such as municipal services, diplomacy and its continuation by other
means, and the erection of statues to famous men' (Arrow 1963 p. 17). Clearly, the
sort of individual who has knowledge of every possible social state and can rank them
in order of preference is an unlikely abstraction. Thus the application of Arrow's
Theorem to a social welfare function in general could be - and has been - questioned.
However, when it comes to applying the theory to voting systems, this same problem
seems less likely to arise. For the 'social states' that people are then required to order
in national elections, would be the candidates, (who could be seen as proxies for the
complete social states that their being elected would result in). This information is
more likely to be known by many individuals. Moreover, as we move 'down' to
smaller exercises of democracy, e.g. committees, where the individuals presumably
have uniform knowledge of the alternative 'social states', Arrow's conditions are even
more likely to have plausible interpretations. So we will assume that Arrow's theorem
does have a plausible interpretation in terms of voting. This consideration also
incidentally undermines the argument that the market is also a form of social welfare
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voting systems, from small committees to national elections. Arrow's theorem
generalises and develops the 'paradox of voting'. His theorem states, when translated
in terms of voting, that no voting system with three or more voters and three or more
options can simultaneously satisfy five conditions which it seems prima facie
reasonable to insist that a fair and meaningful voting procedure should satisfy.
These conditions, as reformulated in the 2nd edition of Social Choice and Individual
Values (1963) are as follows:
Condition 1 (Unrestricted Domain):
'All logically possible orderings of the alternative social states are admissible' (Arrow
1963 p. 96);
Condition 2 (Unanimity, or Pareto Optimality):
'If every individual prefers x to y, then so does society' (p. 96);
Condition 3 (Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives):
'The choice between x and y is determined solely by the preferences of the members
of the community as between x and y' (p. 28);
Condition 4 (Non-dictatorship):
The social welfare function is not to be dictatorial' (p. 30);
function, subject to the same limitations. It might be, but only on the larger scale of
the grand 'social states' - and no-one is likely to have that sort of knowledge of the
market.
Condition 5 (Social Logicality):
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The social welfare function produces a connected'" and transitive" ordering for
each set of individual orderings; (p. 19, p. 23);
These five conditions all relate to the social welfare function"; finally, on the
domain of the function, it is also assumed that 'Individual Logicality' pertains, that
is that individuals are able to order their preferences transitively, and that their
preferences should be connected.
Arrow's theorem then shows that these five conditions are mutually incompatible (p.
97). That is, translated in terms of voting, no voting system can simultaneously satisfy
these five conditions. That is, if things are as Arrow says they are, no voting system
can be said to be fair. Now it might not be completely obvious why all five of these
conditions need to be satisfied by any voting system, particularly condition 3: later we
will explore all the conditions further. Before doing so, and in order to see what is
at stake, we will turn to how the theorem has been applied to democratic theory. One
particularly devastating and widely-influential critique of democracy, directly relevant
to our discussion of the desired improvements of democracy, has been put forward by
William Riker (1982), to which we turn first. We then examine, briefly, the argument
of Nathan (1971) which suggests that the quest for political equality also comes up
15 That is, for any two alternatives, either x is preferred to y, or y to x, or the
individual is indifferent between x and y.
16 That is if x is preferred to y, and y to z, then x is preferred to z.
17 Translated in terms of voting systems, the social welfare function is the voting
system, and the domain of the function is the set of individual voters.
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against the limitations of Arrow's theorem.
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5.4 Riker and Nathan on the Limitations ofDemocratic Control
We are looking at the desirability of democratic control of education. We noted that
it only seemed desirable if there were improvements to democracy, and in particular,
as a necessary part of this, improvements to voting systems. We observed certain
difficulties with some voting systems, and introduced Arrow's Theorem, which
claimed, when translated, that any voting system will come up against such problems.
We haven't yet examined Arrow's Theorem in any detail - but we need to see what
is at stake. In this section, we see how his theorem has been used by Riker and
Nathan - arguments which we can interpret as undermining the claims made for the
advantages of democratic control of education, as we shall see.
Riker's Argument
Riker begins by defining two interpretations of voting, the liberal and the populist, and
then argues that since voting is a necessary condition for democracy, these define two
interpretations of democracy itself (Riker 1982 p. 9).
The liberal view is that 'the function of voting is to control officials, and no more.'
That is, popular elections of officials, for limited tenure, are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for democracy. Popular elections ensure participation and
equality, while limited tenure ensures liberty. Opposed to this view is the populist
interpretation, that liberty through participation can only be obtained by 'embodying
the will of the people in the action of officials' (p.ll). The way to discover the
general will is 'to compute it by consulting the citizens'. Thus the contrast between
the rival interpretations is that, 'the populist view of voting, the opinions of the
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majority must be right and must be respected, because the will of the people is the
liberty of the people. In the liberal interpretation... the outcome of voting is just a
decision and has no special moral character' (p. 14).
Now Riker uses social choice theory to argue that the liberal interpretation of voting
is the only coherent one. He argues this in two steps. Firstly, social choice theory
shows that there exists a wide variety of aggregation procedures by which the
preferences of citizens can be incorporated into the social decision. None of these is
an accurate reflection of the wishes of the people, simply because many of the
procedures give different results from the same input. It might be thought that there
were adequate criteria for fairness, and hence we could choose one particular method
as the best. In fact, each of the conditions of Arrow's theorem, he says, seems to be
a requirement for fairness, and Arrow's theorem proves that not all of them can be
simultaneously satisfied. Hence we are left with no adequate way of choosing between
voting procedures which give different results. In fact, it is slightly worse than that,
since 'even if some method produces a reasonably justifiable amalgamation, we do not
know it' (p. 235). This is because in most methods in common use, there is not
enough information collected on preference orders to show how the outcome might
have differed using another aggregation procedure. So we may have a clear 'winner',
but not be able to say that under a different procedure the outcome would be the
same.
Suppose, however, that citizens do decide that particular methods in particular
circumstances are suitable, in a sense defining the outcomes of these methods as fair.
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Then still we know - because of corollaries to Arrow's theorem - that all outcomes
in a democracy can be manipulated - we shall see examples of this in a moment. So
even if the procedure is fair in this sense, still the outcomes of that procedure will
have dubious value.
The second step is to observe that since the essence of populism is that 'governments
ought to carry out the will of the people', then since we can never know what the
people actually want, because all aggregation procedures are flawed, then populism
is untenable.
Riker argues that the liberal interpretation, however, survives 'although in a curious
and convoluted way' (p. 241). Liberalism holds that 'voting permits the rejection of
candidates or officials who have offended so many voters that they cannot win an
election' (p. 242). The kind of democracy that is possible, given the constraints of
social choice theory, is 'an intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse, popular
veto' (p. 244), close to Judge Learned Hand's 'counting heads is better than breaking
heads' maxim.
Modification ofRiker's argument
In order to make Riker's argument directly applicable to the case under scrutiny -
democratic control of education - a couple of minor modifications are required. His
'liberal' and 'populist' interpretations of democracy seem excessively polarised, and
moreover do not seem amenable to applications of democracy outside of periodic
elections in the nation state. For a start, the 'populist' definition is deliberately
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couched in the terminology of Rousseau, involving the notion of the 'general will'.
At one point Riker seems to be suggesting th~t all populists are in fact followers of
Rousseau (p. 11). But there is a long tradition of philosophical critique of Rousseau
by theorists who could nevertheless not be considered supporters of Riker's liberal
interpretation.
Why indeed does Riker need to lumber himself with this extreme polarisation? On
close inspection it seems that Riker is really seeking to differentiate his 'liberal'
interpretation of democracy from any of the others that might be offered. He wants
. to exclude those interpretations of democracy which espouse the importance of
political equality, or some notion of the importance of the participation process in
educating citizens, or those interpretations which connect the outcome of the voting
decision arrived at through the democratic process with what the people really wanted.
So what Riker really intended was to make a distinction between his 'liberal' and
non-liberal interpretations of voting. As a modification to Riker's argument, it is this
distinction that will be used here, that is, accepting his 'liberal' interpretation, and
taking the second category to include every interpretation of democracy not covered
by it.
There is one further slight modification needed: the results of social choice theory are
applicable to voting in any institution, from small committee to national elections.
Riker's liberal interpretation does not as it stands reflect this. Hence, here we re-define
the liberal interpretation of voting as being the view that the function of voting is to
arrive at a decision whenever consensus cannot be reached (or indeed to discover if
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consensus has been reached), and no more. This decision could include controlling
officials, to equate it with Riker's liberal interpretation, but it could also include
individuals themselves participating in the decision-making of, for example, a local
housing trust, or union. The non-liberal interpretation then is any other interpretation
of voting, again in small and large-scale democratic institutions.
Given these modifications, Riker's can be translated to our concern with democratic
control of education. Our concern has been with improvements to democracy which
(a) ensure voting equality; (b) enable more sensitive voting to take place, through
referenda and/or carefully pinpointed voting; (c). ensure that voting outcomes
amalgamate individual preferences into the 'general interest' or the 'common good'.
The last, (c), is easiest to deal with: Riker's argument says that improvements to
democracy which try to make the aggregation process reflect the preferences of
individuals cannot do this fairly - if by 'fairly' we mean being consistent with all of
the conditions of Arrow's theorem (see below). But (b) is also similarly challenged:
for again, changes to democracy which allowed carefully-framed referendum questions
to be posed would not be considered as 'improvements to democracy' if the
amalgamation processes used to combine individuals' preferences were not considered
to be fair. Improvements along the lines of (a) are harder to put into Riker's
argument; but an analogous argument has been constructed by Nathan showing
precisely that political equality is logically impossible given the assumptions of social
choice theory.
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Nathan on the impossibility ofpolitical equality
Nathan argues, using social choice theory, that political equality is not possible
because of the limitations of voting procedures. He considers the formal conditions
required in order for political equality to be achieved: 'If the approval of a set of
voters is a necessary and sufficient condition for the promulgation of a law, and the
voting rule is such that each voter has an equal chance of finding himself in
agreement with the result which the voting rule registers, then we can say that the
voters have positive and equal amounts of political power.' (Nathan 1971 p. 108). For
this condition to be satisfied, the following need to hold: '(a) no individual is deprived
of the chance that this will happen just because his opinions are what they are; (b) no
individual is deprived of the chance that this will happen just because he is who he
is.' (p. 109).
Now, for (a) to be satisfied, we would need the voting system to satisfy Arrow's
condition 1 (Unrestricted Domain), for 'all logically possible orderings' of preferences
to be admissible; if this wasn't the case, then an individual might be deprived of the
chance of being in agreement with the outcome of the voting process. It must clearly
satisfy condition 2 (Unanimity, or Pareto Optimality); moreover, it must satisfy
condition 3 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives), since without this 'voters with
certain options may be able to increase their influence by reporting a preference
different from that which they actually hold.' (p. 110).
For (b) to be satisfied, Arrow's condition 5 (Logicality) needs to hold, otherwise the
presence of cycles means that the person who sets the agenda can determine the
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outcome, hence leading to political inequality. Finally, the voting system must not
violate a Non-dictatorship condition, viz. 'There is necessarily no individual such that
his preference ordering of any pair of individuals always reappears in the social
ordering yielded by the function, regardless of the preferences of the other individuals'
(pp. 99-100).
So Nathan's argument suggests that satisfying political equality comes up against the
logical constraints of Arrow's Theorem. That is, returning to our argument from Riker,
Arrow's Theorem and its corollaries suggest that democratic control of education will
neither be able to achieve voting equality, nor ensure the fair amalgamation of
preferences into a social choice, and hence not satisfy the need for more carefully
pinpointed voting.
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5.5 Questioning the Conditions ofArrow's Theorem
Chapter 5
The arguments of Riker and Nathan outlined above would seem to have a devastating
impact on desires to see improvements to democracy, and hence for our desire for
democratic control of education. The arguments, of course, depend upon the feasibility
of the application of Arrow's five conditions to voting systems, and in particular on
the fact that they reflect our intuitions about what would make a voting system fair.
We need to turn to examine these conditions to see if this holds.
Now Arrow thought that his conditions revealed value judgements about the
construction of the social welfare function, (Arrow 1963 pp. 30-31); Indeed he argues
that they can be-interpreted as value judgements of a society's 'choice of constitution'
(p. 105). Hence, as value judgements they can 'be called into question' (p. 31). He
also accepted that some of these conditions were less self-evidently conditions of
fairness than others, and hence in need of justification. Other philosophers and
economists have engaged in the debate to see if some of the conditions could be
relaxed or circumvented, and hence leave open the possibility of the existence of a
social welfare function in general, or a fair voting system in particular". We briefly
consider each of his conditions.
18 Some examples of this extensive literature are Sen (1970), Brown, D.J. (1975),
MacKay (1980) and Buchanan (1954) on the Logicality condition; Slutsky (1977) and
Plott (1976) on the Unrestricted Domain condition; and MacKay (1980), Bergson
(1954) and Hansson (1973) examining the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
condition.
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Unrestricted Scope
The justification for this condition is based on freedom of choice (Mueller 1989 p.
392). Each individual should be free to put candidates in any order in his or her order
of preferences. However, this leads to the creation of 'cycles of preferences', so can
it be avoided?
One way is to suggest that not every possible preference profile is logically coherent,
and hence in practice some profiles will not be held by anybody. This is certainly true
from time to time. For example, a parliament is considering how to deal with rapists,
and three alternatives are offered: (a) physically torture them, (b) mentally torture
them, and (c) condone them. Then the preference profile 'b c a' is probably incoherent
and might not be held by any representative. Unfortunately, all this example shows
is that in particular instances, unrestricted scope is unnecessary and hence in those
instances, Arrow's theorem is irrelevant. However, in the great majority of voting
situations, all preference profiles are coherent, and hence unrestricted scope must be
allowed. For example, in the Eastbourne by-election example of appendix 5, it was
rational to hold each of the preferences outlined.
Mueller (1989 p. 392) suggests two other ways of avoiding the Unrestricted Scope
condition: either impose restrictions on the types of preferences voters are allowed to
have, or allow only those with certain preference orders to be part of the 'demos'.
For Duncan Black showed that if preferences can be illustrated graphically as a series
of 'single-peaked' curves, then a cycle can be avoided (Riker 1982 p. 124). That is,
it is needed for voters to agree that one of the alternatives is not the worst. For
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example, two voters could be in complete disagreement about choices x, y, z, putting
them in the following orders: x y z; z y x. But at least they are agreed that x and z
are at opposite ends of the spectrum, and that y is in the middle.
Could it be reasonable to insist that voters are allowed only these types of profiles?
It is a very strict criterion. Issues must all be of a one dimensional type, that is the
number of guns, the amount of butter, the number of state hospital beds. All voters
must be able to arrange these choices in a 'single-peaked' way, 'no guns' always at
the opposite end of the spectrum from 'a very large number of guns'. Furthermore,
voters could only simultaneously be asked to decide between different issues - the
number of guns and of beds - if these issues were recognised by everyone as being
on the same political dimension. These seem to be impossibly strict requirements (for
further discussion see McLean 1987 pp. 118-122).
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
This is the most controversial of all Arrow's conditions. This condition requires that
social orderings of a given set of alternatives depend only on the set of the
individuals' preference orderings of those alternatives. This has two important
implications:
(1) the social choice does not depend on intensities of preferences.
(2) the social choice does not depend on preference orderings of alternatives not in the
particular set under consideration.
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The first prohibition (1) will not be considered in detail here. Basically, standard
objections to interpersonal comparisons leads to the conclusion that, while it might be
desirable if intensities of preference could be taken into account, there is no obvious
non-arbitrary method by which it could be done (MacKay 1980 chapter 3).
The second prohibition (2) is more relevant here. This does not prohibit a voter from
forming his or her ordering of preferences based on 'irrelevant' alternatives. For
example, I would have been permitted to order Mrs (now Lady) Thatcher ahead of her
opponents because I preferred the colour of her eyes, or because I did not want to see
Mr Kinnock elected as primeminister: I would have been permitted to do this even
though colour of eyes have nothing to do with politics and Mr Kinnock was not on
the electoral list in the Finchley constituency. What the Independence condition does
rule out is for the aggregation procedure to take into account these sorts of issues, the
obvious one being other candidates not on the voting list.
How is it possible for the aggregation procedure to do this? One example in appendix
6 shows how it can happen. Now Arrow suggested that these types of situations as
described in the appendix should be ruled out because 'to assume otherwise would be
to make the result of the election dependent on the obviously accidental circumstance
of whether a candidate died before or after the date of polling' (Arrow 1963 p. 26).
In fact, a much stronger case can be made than that. For in the second example given
in appendix 6, the situation is that, if one candidate withdraws from an election, it is
possible that the outcome of the voting process can be totally reversed. In the example
given, with four candidates, a, b, c, and d, the first vote gave c as the winner,
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followed by b, a and, in last place, d. If d withdraws from the contest, ('for whatever
reason'), then the outcome is completely reversed, with a the winner, followed by b
and c! Crucially, this type of situation makes it possible for manipulation of the
voting procedure to emerge. For example, candidate a could try to persuade d to
withdraw. Conversely, c could try to persuade d to stand! It is because of this danger
that the Independence condition is important And it is not just in rare odd examples
like this that the situation arises: Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have
proved, in corollaries to Arrow's theorem, that satisfying the Independence condition
is logically equivalent to being immune to manipulation in this way (Mueller 1989 p.
395).
So Dummett (1984 pp. 52-6), Barry and Hardin (1982 p. 226), and Nathan (1984) are
all misguided in suggesting that this condition can be disregarded. None of them
acknowledge the importance of the condition in avoiding strategic manipulation of this
kind.
Individual Logicality
Is it demanding too much that individual's political preferences be transitive and
connected? The usual counterexample to transitivity concerns a person's sensitivity to
amounts of sugar in a cup of coffee (MacKay 1980 p. 50). A parallel political
example might concern preferences over taxation rates. Suppose I am indifferent
between zero taxation and 1% taxation, between 1% and 2%, and so on up to still
being indifferent between 49% and 50% taxation. But clearly I would not be
indifferent between zero taxation and 50% taxation. This is a tempting example of
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non-transitivity of political preference. However, the problem is more subtle than that
There seem to be two distinct ways in which I could be indifferent between 1% and
2% taxation, (or between one and two grains of sugar in my coffee). I could be
indifferent between them because, although I can tell them apart, their 'detectable
differences' do not matter to me. Or, I could be indifferent between them simply
because I cannot tell them apart. It is the latter type of indifference that seems to be
at work in both the examples above. That is, it is not really indifference itself which
is not transitive, but the underlying discrimination of what the differences are. As soon
as the perceptual discrimination is present, then the plausibility of the examples
disappears. For example, all I was saying was that 1% of my income is so small that
I wouldn't notice the difference between having it taken away in tax or not. But if,
with some level of taxation, my outgoings exactly match my net income, then, with
taxation only 1% higher, I would have to do without some item that I had budgeted
for. That is, I could discriminate between 1% difference in taxation because it would
mean going without, say, a newspaper each day. At the point where I can discriminate,
the difference becomes apparent and important.
The suggestion is, then, that individual transitivity of political preferences is a realistic
requirement, provided that people can discriminate between different political
outcomes. (Exactly parallel arguments apply to the requirement of connectedness).
Social Logicality
If it is desirable that individuals should have transitive and connected political
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preferences, can the same be said of society as a whole? Arrow's reasons for requiring
social transitivity are twofold:
(1) That a social decision needs to be made, and without transitivity, cyclical
outcomes such as the 'paradox of voting' can result, (Arrow 1963 p. 118)
(2) That a social decision be independent of the particular 'voting path' taken to reach
it (p. 120).
The need for (l) seems clear enough. If we are policy makers and we discover that
society prefers x to y, y to z and z to x, then we do not have clear guidance as to
what to do. (Observe that doing nothing in these situations is not the alternative:
cyclical outcomes are not the same as social indifference).
Although it has been shown by social choice theorists that (1) does not actually
require transitivity, the alternatives proposed lead to comparable results to Arrow's
theorem: instead of the non-dictatorship condition being violated, power is given
instead to an oligarchy or to a 'collegium' with veto power. (Riker 1982 p. 132).
Secondly, Path independence (2) is necessary to ensure that 'the preferences of the
participants (rather than the form of or the manipulation of the social choice
mechanism) determine the outcome' (Riker 1982 p. 132). If this was not the case, then
those with the power to control the agenda will be able to choose the path which
favours them. Again, this requirement doesn't require the full force of transitivity, but
again, the alternatives are no help in avoiding the thrust of Arrow's theorem.
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So, transitivity itself does seems to be an important requirement. Is it overstating the
case to say that it is a requirement for fairness however? Mueller argues that it is a
common practice for small communities to flip a coin, or draw lots, to resolve issues
of conflict. If all who engaged in this random device accepted it as fair, then wouldn't
the process indeed be fair? The point is not that society would decide all issues in this
way, but only those which didn't obviously have a clear conclusion. In this case, then
' ... the Arrow problem is solved' (Mueller 1989 p. 392). Is it so simple however?
What Mueller neglects is, again, that this brings in the problem of manipulation. If an
alternative which my group does not favour is about to be chosen, then it is in our
interest to introduce other alternatives which could bring a cycle. Or it is in our
interests to misrepresent our preferences, to the same effect, or to control the agenda.
Riker has devoted a small book to showing examples of how manipulation of this sort
is likely to have, or has occurred, in American politics (Riker 1986). Moreover, in an
important corollary to Arrow's theorem, McKelvey (1976) has shown that 'individual
preferences are such as to produce the potential for a cycle with sincere voting under
majority rule, then an individual who can control the agenda of pairwise votes can
lead the committee to any outcome in the agenda space he chooses.' (Mueller 1989
p. 88). Once again we are back with the problem of one of Arrow's conditions, this
time transitivity, being necessary to prevent manipulation.
Each of Arrow's conditions discussed thus far does seem to be a requirement which
we are likely to demand from any voting system, as Riker pointed out The situation
seems quite devastating to those who seek improvements to voting systems, for the
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only two conditions yet to be examined, unanimity and nondictatorship, have been
seen to be the most intuitively acceptable. For example, Vickrey writes: 'functions that
violate either the unanimity or the nondictatorship postulates are of relatively little
interest: they hardly deserve the name of social welfare functions at all' (Vickrey 1960
p.513). Mueller agrees: 'Relaxing unanimity and nondictatorship hardly seem worth
discussing if the ideals of individualism and citizen sovereignty are to be maintained'
(Mueller 1989 p. 388). Barry and Hardin write of the non-dictatorship condition:
'This condition presumably requires no justification' (Barry and Hardin 1982 p. 216).
Finally, Riker writes in similar vein: 'the moral significance of this condition is
obvious' (Riker 1982 p. 118)19.
If we do accept these conclusions, then they point to Riker's and Nathan's arguments
being quite strongly vindicated. Hence, this would seem to undermine the demand for
democratic control of education - in terms of control of funding, provision and
regulation (including regulation of the curriculum). If we accept Riker's argument,
then we are agreeing that democracy can't deliver political equality, nor can it enable
votes to reflect the amalgamation of interests, nor would it make much sense for
individuals to become better informed about issues to be voted on - all because voting
is inevitably flawed in the ways pointed out.
Many will feel uncomfortable with this conclusion. In particular, it might be felt that
there may be difficulties applying abstract social choice theory to real situations.
19 I myself wonder about the non-dictatorship condition. My doubts are expressed in
appendix 7. They are controversial, and need airing in the academic literature before
I could feel confident that they are of any significance.
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Moreover, it has been noted, after all, that each of Arrow's conditions has been
questioned, and perhaps the comments given earlier do not adequately summarise the
strength of the objections to the conditions. Perhaps the objection to democratic
control of education using Arrow's theorem wouldn't be sustained under a more
thorough mathematical or conceptual treatment? Again, let us assume that some fault
could be found. Let us suppose that the case against, say the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives condition could be sustained, overcoming the difficulties with
this approach outlined earlier". Would this then undermine Riker's revised argument
above, and leave the way open for arguments stressing the desirability of democratic
control of education? The argument, unfortunately, is still not so easily made. For
what we would be saying is that there is a voting system which satisfies (say) four out
of five of Arrow's conditions", and that voting system could be fair and satisfy what
we seek from democratic control of education. But one problem is: do we know what
such a voting system is? All we would be assuming is that it is logically possible to
have one, not that we have found it. Worse still, it is highly unlikely that such a
voting system will not satisfy other characteristics which are also sought from voting
systems, in particular, the need for comprehensibility. For as soon as voting systems
are designed which make any genuflections towards satisfying Arrow's conditions",
20 Or perhaps my case against the Non-Dictatorship condition could be maintained.
Alternatively, we could take a second way out and reject the whole social choice
theory approach, perhaps objecting to the notion of knowledge of 'social states', even
in the revised form noted in footnote 14 above.
21 Or if we were pursuing the second option, of rejecting Arrow's approach altogether,
then we would point out that there is a voting system which doesn't fall into any of
the more blatant inconsistencies of voting systems - some examples of which have
been given already (for more details see Riker 1982 and 1986).
22 Or to overcoming other of the inconsistencies exhibited by voting systems.
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they become inordinately complicated (see for example Dummett 1984, Mueller
1989)23. A system so hard to understand might be highly undesirable in a
democracy, alienating people from the system, and of course, itself far more open to
abuse and manipulation from outside".
We have here a dilemma. If we want our voting system to be more democratic, able
to satisfy voting equality, or to enable people to vote in frequent referenda, or to
satisfy the general will, then we will need, because of Arrow's theorem", a very
complicated voting system. This is likely to have the effect of alienating voters, who
do not understand that it is fair, who, moreover, feel that they are not being given
political equality, or a chance for participation, because they cannot comprehend how
the system works. There is always likely to be the suspicion - perhaps justified - that
the system has been manipulated from outside. Hence a system that is more
democratic (in terms of, say, promoting political equality) is highly likely to be
perceived by the people as not being so! But on the other hand, if we have a simpler
voting system, then we will run up against the problems of Arrow's theorem", and
hence violate voting equality, etc. We will return to this dilemma shortly.
However, before doing so, it is worth noting a related set of theoretical objections to
23 It is said that the Danish voting system is only understood by 34 people - and even
that system does not satisfy even four out of five of the conditions of Arrow's
theorem!
24 We are here talking about manipulation in the sense of officials rigging results, etc.
25 Or to overcome the inconsistencies in voting systems noted earlier.
26 Or against inconsistencies within voting systems.
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democratic control which could be used in an analogous way to argue against
democratic control of education, namely those of public choice theory. Particular
objections in this area could concern 'rent-seeking:" and 'logrolling'. We will look
briefly at the last of these, but bear in mind that related criticisms could come from
consideration of the first also.
27 Rent is monopoly income generated by governments through, inter alia, licensing;
rent-seeking is thus activity by interest groups seeking opportunities to acquire, or to
create, this income. Public choice theorists generally think it is deleterious to the
economy: 'it seeks to destroy opportunities for voluntary exchange or production, and
uses up resources in the process.' (Hughes 1993 p. 44).
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5.6 Logrolling and Democratic Control of Education
Logrolling occurs in voting when a particular minority with a strong preference for
a particular policy, X, say, enlists the support of those without particularly strong
preferences on X in order to get it passed; in return that particular minority gives its
support on other issues, W, Y, Z, say, on which it doesn't feel so strongly, to help
others with strong preferences for these issues to get them passed: it is a question of
'I'll scratch your back, if you'll scratch mine.' This process happens frequently in
'democracies' such as the UK and the USA, when policies get selected to be included
in party manifestos - with various factions with strong feelings about some issues
agreeing to other issues they don't like very much, if others subsequently agree to the
inclusion of their ideas. It happens when issues are taken to Parliament and to
committees. It affects which issues are promised around election time (Tullock 1976).
Now, I want to suggest that there seems to be a prima facie case, firstly, that
logrolling undermines the principle of political equality. For the argument of O'Hear
and White (1991) said that the importance of political equality was because it allowed
all citizens to have an equal say in deciding, in their case, the curriculum (relevant to
deciding on other educational matters), rather than only professional educationalists.
However, the intuitive idea about logrolling is that it occurs precisely when a minority
interest group (for example, professional educationalists) persuades another group to
vote against its preferences, in return for favours elsewhere; so the intuitive idea is
that this might well violate O'Hear and White's intuitions about political equality.
This isn't just White and O'Hear's position of course: for example, Honderich argues
that one of the important features justifying democracy is precisely that minorities in
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the society should not be able to force decisions upon government (Honderich 1980
pp. 148-9). Moreover, it would also seem to be the case that logrolling also
undermines the other justifications for improvements to voting systems outlined
earlier: because logrolling brings out the possibilities for manipulation, through
causing cycles, hence undermining the fairness (in Arrow's sense) of the voting
systems. For logrolling 'entails strategic voting, sometimes on a heroic scale. People
form logrolling coalitions by offering to vote against propositions they actually favour.
Those excluded then try to form alternative coalitions by offering to vote against
propositions they favour. Those now excluded try to get back into a winning coalition
by offering yet other strategic votes. The process is almost bound to produce cycles
even if members' true preferences are not cyclical' (McLean 1987 p. 185). Moreover,
how could it be argued that the general interest was being promoted if it was only a
minority group's interests that were being promoted? In detail, we will see if the
intuition regarding political equality can be formalised.
Suppose there is a minority subgroup G of an electorate A. G strongly supports
proposal X over proposal Y; a majority subgroup H of the electorate A mildly prefers
Y to X. So if the proposal X was put to the electorate as it stands, it will fail,
because H casts more votes than G. However, allow logrolling to take place, and, let
us say, X is passed. (How does this occur? - It could occur if G was able to persuade
some part of the majority H to vote with it, in return for G voting with this other
group some other time) Does this offend political equality?
First of all, if X was passed without logrolling, could we say that this offends political
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equality? The position would then be that a minority is able to have its preferences
override the majority's preference. Clearly this offends majority rule, and hence
political equality considered in terms of equal weight given to each voter". Now if
logrolling takes place, the minority G persuade a subgroup of H to vote with it, to
carry the proposal. Call this subgroup F. They could do this by straightforward
bribing, as in Tullock's examples (1988 chapter 1), or by promising to vote on issues
which concern members of H. Crucially note that this subgroup F still prefers Y to
X. That is, there is still a majority in favour of Y over X29• So we can say that a
minority opinion has ruled over the majority, and hence that political equality is
offended.
If this argument was not to further undermine the desire for democratic control of
education, then the crucial question is whether logrolling could be eliminated in an
improved democracy. In order to see this, let us look at Tullock's account, where he
28 Note that Downs defends majority rule on the grounds of political equality: 'The
basic premise behind simple majority rule is that every voter should have equal weight
with every other voter. Hence, if disagreement occurs, it is better for more voters to
tell fewer what to do than vice versa. The only practical arrangement to accomplish
this is simple majority rule. Any rule requiring more than a simple majority for
passage of an act allows a minority to prevent action by the majority, thus giving the
vote of each member of the minority more weight than the vote of each member of
the majority. For example, if a majority of two-thirds is required for passage, then
opposition by 34 percent of the voters can prevent the other 66 percent from carrying
out their desires. In effect, the opinion of each member of the 34 percent minority is
weighted the same as the opinion of 1.94 members of the 66 percent majority.'
(Downs 1988 p. 20). The figures he has used are that 34x1.94 = 66. Whereas with
majority rule, of course, the cut-off figure is 50%, whereby each voter has equal
weights at that point.
29 Of course some might want to argue that F now actually prefers X to Y. This would
be by equating their preferences with their voting. However, if this option was taken
then we would always have to say that strategic voting was sincere, which is a path
we do not want to go down.
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points out the conditions under which logrolling can occur. He notes that it cannot
occur if there is a standard referendum on a simple issue: 'The voter cannot trade his
vote on one issue for votes on others because he and his acquaintances represent too
small a part of the total electorate for this to be worth the effort involved. Further,
the use of the secret ballot makes it impossible to tell whether voting promises are
carried out.' (Tullock 1988 p. 9). In a simple referendum, then, it certainly seems
unlikely that groups of, for example, educationalists, could go around asking voters
to vote for their proposals, and in return they would vote for, say, mineworkers on
matters that interest them. (It is not impossible, but unlikely, for the reason given).
However, Tullock notes that logrolling can occur in two cases: firstly 'where a rather
small body of voters vote openly on each measure; this is normally to be found in
representative assemblies, but it may also be found in very small 'direct democracy'
units.' (p. 9). Here trading of votes is easy to arrange and observe. Secondly, what
he calls 'implicit' logrolling can take place 'when large bodies of voters are called on
to decide complex issues, such as which party shall rule, or a complex set of issues
presented as a unit for a referendum vote.' (p. 9). In this 'implicit' logrolling, exactly
analogous processes to the formal trading of votes goes on within the group which
sets the agenda for the referendum or election.
Which of these types of decisions are likely to occur in our improved democracies?
Consider, first, a much improved democracy, where voting satisfies four out of five
of the conditions of Arrow's theorem". It could be that in this improved democracy,
30 Note that here we are considering only the technical requirements of democracy,
which are of course necessary but not sufficient conditions for political equality to be
met - for citizens would also need time, volition, education etc. before we could say
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decisions about education (which we shall continue to focus on) are taken by elected
representatives, or they could be conducted in a form of direct democracy through
referenda. It transpires that each of these cases brings in difficulties of logrolling,
even in this improved democracy. We will consider three cases: (1) a representative
democracy with directly accountable representatives; (2) ditto without directly
accountable representatives; and (3) a direct democracy.
1 representative democracy with directly accountable representatives
Here, political equality would be satisfied if there was a simple yes-no vote, conducted
by a secret ballot of the constituents. This is Tullock's position, which we won't
question here. But wait: who decides on the question to be asked? For if there was
to be equal participation by the voters in the constituency, then the problem of
logrolling is likely to emerge. If it was decided by the representative, then he or she
might be accused of overriding political equality. If it was decided by the body of
representatives, then again logrolling is likely to emerge. Whichever way, political
equality is likely to be offended.
2 representative democracy without directly accountable representatives
Next suppose that the representative body is not directly accountable to its constituents
as above. They are now representatives in the sense that they can make decisions on
their own volition, bearing in mind their constituents' views but not tied to them.
Issues now come up in the representative assembly about education (the curriculum,
or fmancing, or provision). Now if every one of these representatives was
that political equality was met.
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(approximately equally) interested in education, then no logrolling would take place.
However, as soon as some of these representatives are more interested than others,
then it is very likely that logrolling will occur. That is, some of the representatives
will be asked to vote for others on issues concerning education which they wouldn't
otherwise have voted for, provided that they in turn are given support for other issues
which concern them. Note that now the representatives who are most likely to want
to influence decisions about education are those who are influenced by lobbying from
the educationalists, or others with a political stake in education. In other words, as
soon as logrolling is introduced, this is likely to lead to a skewing of political
authority, over educational matters, to the educationalists, precisely what White sought
to avoid!
3 direct democracy
In an improved direct democracy with referenda, again we can say, following Tullock,
that if the referendum questions were of the 'simple yes-no' type, and there was a
secret ballot, then it is unlikely that logrolling could occur, and political equality could
be ensured, if the voting systems satisfied all the conditions as above. But again we
can say that decisions about education are not likely to be of this simple type. For
example, there could be a simple question: 'do you want a National Curriculum?'.
This would fit in with the above requirement and would avoid logrolling. But as soon
as there were moves towards fleshing this out, then the issues are likely to be more
complex - for example, what combination of subjects, what is to be included within
these subjects? etc. - and it is then that logrolling could emerge, in setting the agenda
for what the complex questions were going to be.
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My argument is, then, that logrolling undermines political equality in precisely the
way that White thought that democratic control could support it. If logrolling cannot
be avoided, then democratic control of education is always likely to mean
governments and parties kowtowing to the minority group with a particular interest
in education. In other words, democratic control of education, with implicit or explicit
logrolling, is likely to mean something very similar to professional control of
education!
Now of course, it could be argued that logrolling in all three of these cases could be
avoided, if there were (a) tight enough constraints on representatives acting against the
wishes of their constituents; and/or (b) prohibition of vote-trading for logrolling (or
restrictions on lobbying of representatives). These would seem rather draconian
measures, which crucially would increase the complexity of the voting system.
Nonetheless some might want to see them introduced, if what was at stake was the
principle of political equality. But this brings us back to the issue of complexity of
voting systems mentioned earlier - and the related dilemma, to which we return.
5.7 Democracy versus Markets
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It is time to take stock, draw these issues together, and to return to our earlier
dilemma. How did we arrive at the dilemma? We argued first that, a serious objection
to West's market model was that it would not allow for democratic control of
education: and whatever the problems with the state being involved in the curriculum
(or funding or provision of education), democratic control was of high enough value
to override these difficulties, Next we argued that, if democratic control of education
was to achieve what was sought from it", we needed an improved democracy.
Improvements to voting systems were a necessary (although not sufficient) condition
for improvements to democracy. But social choice theory (Arrow's theorem and its
corollaries) and public choice theory (e.g. logrolling) cast doubt upon whether these
desired improvements are logically possible. That is, changes in voting systems will
not make democracy more able to deliver political equality, nor facilitate a
participatory democracy, and so on. But more importantly, even if they were logically
possible (if, that is, we could override one or more of the conditions of Arrow's
theorem, or overcome the problems of logrolling), the desirable characteristics sought
from democracy could only be achieved if voting systems were highly complicated.
So in order to be more democratic, voting systems would have to be such that people
would likely be alienated from them, and suspicious of them. Hence our dilemma: that
a system that was more democratic was likely to be perceived by the majority as
being less so. Hence, we could conclude that democratic control of education
(curriculum, funding or provision) would be marked by this dilemma, and hence
31 That is, political equality, or the educative effect of democratic participation, or the
promotion of the individual, or general interest, or the promotion of liberty.
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West's market model solution - which doesn't allow for democratic control - would
not seem so undesirable.
Is there a resolution of this dilemma, which would enable us to avoid endorsing
West's market model in this way? Those in favour of improving democracy, I suggest,
would argue one obvious way forward, that we must seek a compromise solution.
Democracy is valued, but let us not push it to the limits and arrive at a system which,
although eminently democratic", very few understand. Let us instead have as
democratic a system as possible, which also satisfies the demands of comprehensibility
and accessibility. So we might seek the simplest voting system practicable with
satisfying as many as possible of the conditions of Arrow's theorem", and which
didn't allow much logrolling. But: with this pragmatic compromise we would know
that what we valued about democracy - whether it was political equality, or the way
it could promote the general interest, or its educative effect, or the promotion of
positive liberty - would not be fully achieved.
This would be rather like Honderich's pragmatic position on the justification for
democracy. He argues that in a democracy there should be 'approximate' political
equality: 'democracy gives to each of almost all adults the possibility of one vote in
the choice of a government, and the possibility of some part, not wholly out of line
with the parts of others, in the influencing of government.' (Honderich 1980 p. 147).
He continues: 'we do not require that each citizen can exercise the same influence, but
32 In terms of political equality, etc. as outlined above.
33 Or which suffered less of the inconsistencies of voting systems.
254
only what might be called a tolerably similar one.' (p. 147).
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Now Honderich agrees that this is 'distressingly vague'; I suggest that the viability of
this compromise could be brought into question. For if political equality is sought, can
we be satisfied if some peoples' voices do carry more weight than others? Surely the
only 'tolerably similar' political voice would be an equal voice? This may be a matter
of (political) taste, and perhaps it might be thought that here I am setting up a 'straw
man' all the better to aid my argument. So let me assume that this pragmatic
compromise would be acceptable to those who seek political equality, or that parallel
compromise solutions would satisfy any of those seeking other justifications for
democracy. Proponents of democracy would then acknowledge the difficulties with
achieving political equality (or whatever else they seek) within the limitations of a
comprehensible voting system, so accept some 'tolerable' approximation to it34• Can
the argument for democratic control of education thus succeed, in a tolerably
pragmatic way? Not quite. In fact, this brings me to the crux of my argument.
What has been conveyed throughout this chapter is that a democratic system - any
democratic system - is inherently flawed. It is not just that particular systems, such
as those in the UK, USA, etc., are flawed, and that we should strive for improvements
to these. We have now seen that there are difficulties with any democracy. But at
the beginning of this chapter, we had some stark contrasts between democratic control
of education and the market alternative: markets were inherently flawed and imperfect,
34 A further objection to this compromise solution might be that we might not ever
know when our voting systems were getting to be closer approximations - again we
leave this to one side, and see what follows from accepting the compromise solution.
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leaving education to them would be disastrous; we needed democratic control to bring
some order and rationality to the education system. We now see that democracy too
is flawed and imperfect So when we re-read the statements from earlier -
'Democracy itself is what is being hunted to extinction' and so on - these seem less
shocking. At first sight, it appeared that the democrats were advocating replacing an
imperfect system - markets - with something on a different plane altogether -
Democracy. Democratic control was valuable because there were higher order values
which we couldn't leave to the vagaries of markets. But now we are confronted with
this question: can we afford to leave these higher order values to the vagaries of
democracy?
Given that we are talking about two imperfect systems, can't we afford to look more
dispassionately at what each can offer? One argument against markets might be that
there are certain justifIcations for democracy, which markets couldn't satisfy. But do
these justifications for democracy really need democratic control to satisfy them
(imperfectly), or can an equivalently approximate satisfaction of them be obtained
without democratic control of education?
Take political equality first, and return to West's market model. Could what is behind
the desire for political equality be achieved just as acceptably in this model? White
(1990) sought political equality to avoid the situation where professional
educationalists were making all the decisions about (in his case) the curriculum. He
wanted ordinary people, parents, children (perhaps), business people, etc., also to be
involved in making these decisions. It seems highly unlikely that democratic control
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could achieve this, for all the reasons given above: committed interest groups are
likely to decide the curriculum, not the people as a whole. But, what about our
market model? Can't this also fulfil what White desired from 'political equality'? In
the market model who would be 'in control', for example, of the curriculum? I
suggest that it could be all of the groups that White would want included. The
professional educationalists and curriculum visionaries would set their curricular
agendas, propagating them through institutions of higher learning, curriculum
publishers, etc. Parents and children would 'shop around', choosing which of these
they approved of - and the market mechanisms would allow those that parents and
children favoured to be more' successful than those they rejected. Media personnel
and publishers would be offering their suggestions. Business people and industry and
other employers would be involved in persuading the above groups what they needed -
and also they would be covertly doing so by employing those people with the
qualifications and qualities which they required. All the interest groups, not just the
educationalists, would have a say in the curriculum. Now of course they wouldn't
have an equal say - but I have argued above that that is unlikely even in an improved
democracy.
But note another very important factor. Implicit in the writings of those who argue
for political equality is the concern that the disadvantaged have a greater say than they
would have had otherwise in the decision-making process. Political equality in all
extant systems only fulfils this somewhat imperfectly, in that everyone (more or less)
has the vote, but many have considerably greater say than anyone else. But note
crucially, in West's market model- because of the safety-net - the most disadvantaged
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are guaranteed an influence on educational provision. For the most disadvantaged as
much as anyone else have the right of 'exit,35 in the educational market place, and
it is this mechanism that will help to ensure quality provision for those students:
educational establishments that fail to attract enough pupils would be closed, hence
there is always an incentive for such establishments to ensure that they do attract and
keep students. Having the threat of withdrawal is an effective means of
communicating disapproval to a school. It is the same principle that keeps
supermarkets, restaurants and car manufacturers producing high quality goods".
Note how the power the voucher can give the disadvantaged is likely to be greater
than the power the democratic process is likely to give them: Suppose the
disadvantaged are in a small minority. On their own they are not able to significantly
influence policy through voting - they are a minority who are unlikely to be organised
35 Hirschmann's seminal work in this field showed how the management of an
organisation, such as a firm, voluntary association, trade union, political party or
school, can discover that its 'customers' are dissatisfied with its performance in one
of two ways, through 'exit', where the 'customers stop buying the firm's products or
some members leave the organisation'; this leads to a decline in revenue and
'management is impelled to search for ways and means to correct whatever faults have
led to exit.' The second route is through 'voice', where the customers or the
organisation's members 'express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to
some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest
addressed to anyone who cares to listen'. (Hirschmann 1970 p. 4). Democratic control
of education leads to the primacy of the 'voice' option, which is likely to be high-
jacked by the 'politically influential, skilled and adroit' middle classes (Seldon 1990
p. 103). Markets lead to the exit option (as well as voice), which is likely to be
accessible to all.
36 In this context, it is important to note that Forster, the architect of the 1870 Act in
England & Wales, had explicitly stated that fees were essential for parental power to
ensure quality provision, and that these needed to be maintained (West 1970 p. 182).
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and unlikely to be able to enter into coalitions with others. Hence they are not likely
to be able to campaign for improvements to their educational opportunities, and would
have to rely on altruistic others to do this for them. But in our market model, each of
them carries the threat of withdrawing the voucher from any educational institution
which fails to provide them with quality service. Each of them has access to the
market mechanism which, if Hirschmann is correct, can improve quality.
Secondly, consider the justification for democracy which argues that democracy should
have an educative function on its citizens, that, by making themselves better informed
on issues, citizens will develop their full potential as human beings, live in a more
fulfilled way, and so on. Again, I argue that the democratic process will only
imperfectly allow them to do this, and will only give them limited incentives to
become better informed, because of the difficulty of translating their wishes, through
voting, into policy. But what about expressing their choices through markets? If
someone has opportunities to make choices about the purchase of educational
opportunities, as with any other market purchase, this leads to incentives to ensure that
the purchases are appropriate, of good quality, and so on. Choosing educational
experiences for oneself or one's children could be a highly desirable educational
experience, an exercise in personal autonomy, as much as, or more than, making those
kinds of decisions indirectly through the ballot box. Again, crucially, notice that all
people, including the most disadvantaged, are empowered to make these decisions in
West's market model.
It might be thought that perhaps this would be a particularly selfish form of
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deliberation which is not as desirable as the deliberations that could take place in the
democratic process - this may well be implicit in the comments noted about
accountability at the beginning of this chapter. It is not at all clear to me why this
should be the case. For a start, the assumption is that in the democratic process,
individuals are not prompted by selfish motives, but this is not a priori obvious.
Indeed, the public choice theorists have constructed their theory, with many plausible
empirical applications, on precisely the opposite assumption, that individuals are
prompted in the democratic process by exactly the selfish desires that drive them in
the economic sphere (see Mueller 1989 for a review of the literature). Secondly, it is
not a priori obvious either that individuals acting in the 'non-state' sphere of
education will also only be prompted by their selfish interests. They may well decide
to consider what is best for their nation, their community, or their neighbours, some
or all of the time. Or moreover, what is in their selfish interest may well turn out to
be in the public interest - this could be because of the 'cooperative solution' to the
prisoner's dilemma, a consideration which is taken up in chapter 6.
Finally, what about the justification of democracy which maintains that the general
interest can best be promoted through the democratic process? But in a centralized
democracy, the wishes of the majority can override those of minorities, or particularly
organised minorities can override the wishes of the majority (through logrolling and
rent-seeking). One would have to be committed to a definition of the general interest
which allowed for these anomalies to be outcomes. In the market model, however,
neither of these are likely to occur. Minorities who were not politically well-organised
can still get their wishes expressed through their market power. Majorities need never
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kowtow to the wishes of minorities. A diversity of educational experiences would
emerge, which reflected the wishes of all sections of the population. It could be
argued that this much more accurately reflected the general interest than the
democratic option.
The crucial point about this discussion is that there is not such a sharp dichotomy
between markets and democratic control. Both are imperfect systems. But markets
(with safety nets) may well be able to bring about the desirable outcomes which many
seek from democracy. We don't need to go to the cumbersome lengths demanded by
improvements to voting systems. If we are willing to make some compromises - as
it seemed we must if we were seeking to improve democracy - then the market
alternatives are worth investigating seriously too.
In particular, the objections to West's market model do not again appear to be
substantial. Education and democracy are often presented as being intimately
interconnected, and this interconnection would be used by the 'left' in crystallizing
objections to West's market model: For democracy to thrive, citizens must be educated
in particular ways, and the democratic state must ensure that this is satisfactorily
accomplished. And in a thriving democracy, citizens must have democratic control
over education. I have tried to drive a wedge into both of these claims. Education and
democracy are both important in their own spheres, but letting them become too
closely intertwined could be undesirable. Allowing states to be involved in education
for democracy leaves the gate wide open for states to be involved in deciding who is
fit to participate in democracy. Seeking democratic control of education for reasons
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of political equality, or the furtherance of other noble justifications for democracy,
introduces great complexities into voting procedures; moreover, it could be considered
ultimately futile, for these noble aims might not need democracy to bring about their
(approximate) realisation - for West's market model could also accomplish that.
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5.8 Fleshing out West's 'minimum adequate education for all'
The discussion so far brings us to the crucial issue of how we are to resolve the
discussion of West's 'minimum adequate education for all'. For now we are in a
position to argue that (in general) we would be reluctant to centrally-prescribe the
curriculum content, either in terms of the favoured notions of education for democracy
or education for autonomy, or, indeed, any other curriculum aims; nor can we leave
the curriculum content to democratic control to sort it out So we are left with West's
market model requiring that there be a 'minimum adequate education for all', and an
inspectorate to enforce this, but no compulsory core curriculum for them to enforce!
But not only does this mean that we are unable to flesh out the curriculum of the
'minimum adequate education' and give guidelines on this to the inspectorate, it also
means, so the critics would claim, that the curriculum would become a 'hit-and-miss'
affair (O'Hear and White 1991 p. 5), 'chaotic', 'obdurately fragmented',
'unsystematic', 'untidy', and 'a kind of British muddle' (selection from Green 1991).
However, two issues suggest that it is not quite as these critics would claim: The first
concerns the likelihood of a de facto 'national curriculum' arising without compulsion
- that is, of order arising without design. The second concerns the issue of how the
inspectorate will operate. It must be stressed that the following comments are the
beginnings of an argument only, it being beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue
these matters in any depth, as outlined in chapter 1.
Order without design?
Would West's market of the curriculum lead to the chaos noted above? Firstly, we
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do have evidence of some market control of the curriculum, in the private sectors in
the UK, the USA and Japan. In Britain, there is, as yet, no political control of the
curriculum in private schools, but the majority of private schools offer a similar core
of academic subjects, together with some vocational elements. The diversity usually
emerges on the fringes - some schools specialising in drama, dance, and so on, others
in further academic pursuits, or others still focusing on variations in the ethos and
organisation of the schooL There is no compulsion which has made this the case -
order has emerged without design.
Secondly, further support for the plausibility of order arising without design can be
got from the following 'thought experiment': Suppose there is something similar to
West's market model, with the curriculum unregulated, and we wish to set up an
educational setting. It is 1992. What should we include in the curriculum? Are there
any constraints on us? Clearly, there are. If we offered a curriculum of Bingo,
Learning Telephone Pages and Ndebele, we would not get many takers, so would be
forced to close. Even if a few very ignorant or frivolous parents chose our institution,
perhaps because it was nearby, or they liked the glossy brochure, then it is unlikely
that there would be enough of them to make it worthwhile for us to continue. So we
offer what parents and children want - a core of English, maths and science, together
with a smattering of humanities and the arts, vocational subjects and physical
education. We would, however, be able to throw in something extra if we wanted to.
This could be anything that we felt was educationally important, from drama to
slanting the content of the curriculum to a multicultural focus. Or we could offer
something distinctive about the ethos or organisation of the schooL We are definitely
264 Chapter 5
constrained, but within those constraints we can be flexible and innovative.
Now suppose it is 1692. We are setting up an educational establishment for
gentlemen, (probably private tuition). Again, we would be constrained to work within
the cultural context, and offer the appropriate curriculum. Perhaps we would use
Henry Peacham's Compleat Gentleman of 1622 and offer history, cosmography,
geometry, poetry, music, drawing and painting in oil, heraldry, exercises of the body
and fishing (Watson 1909, p. 98). Or we could use any number of other similar texts
as a basis for our curriculum. Again, we might offer certain innovations
corresponding to our pet interests. But nothing too radical, or we wouldn't be offered
employment.
Finally suppose we are setting up an 'educational setting' in 2022, say. What would
we put on the curriculum then? If the current National Curriculum had had a good
innings, I suggest we would offer something rather similar to that - but I doubt very
much if it would be relevant to the society that had evolved by that time. But suppose
there had been a market-led curriculum for some time. Then I refuse to predict what
we would offer. But I suggest that we would very easily pick up what was desired
by our 'customers'. There would be a core curriculum clearly apparent in the
educational establishments around, and it would be to this that we would relate our
curriculum.
These considerations suggest that order in the curriculum can be divorced from design.
There does not have to be chaos without government intervention.
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Guidance for the inspectorate
In West's market model there is likely to emerge, so the comments above suggest,
variations on a similar curriculum in most educational settings, appropriate to the
technology and culture of the society in which it is set. The task of West's inspectors
is to ensure that all children do have access to a 'minimum adequate education'. How
will they do this, without national curriculum guidelines? The answer follows on from
the discussion above: the inspectorate would operate within the educational traditions
within which they fmd themselves. Their traditions will emphasise rules of thumb,
connected with what was generally accepted to be part of a 'minimum adequate
education', and, perhaps most importantly, what would be an inadequate education.
Armed with these rules of thumb, if inspectors found the curriculum of an institution
to be unsatisfactory - and the institution could not demonstrate in what ways it was
satisfactory - then the action taken would be to point out how the institutions could
fit in with what was generally accepted in that environment to be an acceptable
minimum adequate education. This is analogous to the situation after the 1944 Act
in England & Wales when parents decide to educate their children at home: they have
to be able to demonstrate to the Inspectorate that their children are receiving a
minimum adequate 'broad and balanced education', and interpretation of this is up to
the Inspectors, operating within a particular educational climate.
In the context of this thesis there is not space to explore these issues further -
concerned as we are with philosophical objections to markets, rather than a more
thorough theoretical and empirical defence of them. The above comments illustrate the
kind of solution to the problems raised, not a detailed account of this. But one
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powerful objection to all of this discussion remains unchallenged. That is, in both
chapters 3 and 4 we came up against the problem of collective action, or the 'public
goods dilemma'; this problem was also raised in chapter 1, given West's own
discussion of the 'neighbourhood effects', or 'externalities' of education. It is time to
turn to this final objection to markets, and to West's market model. Is education a
'public good'? Does this lead to a major challenge to all the foregoing discussion?
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Chapter 6 Education as a public good
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 6
This chapter has two functions. The first is to take up directly from chapter 1 the
objection to West's market model, that education is a 'public good', hence requiring
of greater state intervention in terms of funding, provision and regulation, than was
allowed for by West. We will use the argument of Grace (1989) as a springboard into
this discussion. But in exploring this, we move easily into the second function of this
chapter, which is to address the unresolved discussion of chapters 3 and 4. For we
found that part of Raz's argument for state intervention in the promotion of autonomy
depended upon discussion of the problem of 'collective action', or the 'public goods
dilemma'. This arose in several places: firstly, where Raz argued against moral
individualism, and suggested that collective goods needed state intervention and hence
state coercion to ensure their provision; secondly, where his arguments against 'the
exclusion of ideals' came to the same conclusion; and thirdly, where his argument for
the authority of states were shown to depend in large part on the prisoner's dilemma
and other problems of collective action: this last issue we put into the context of our
discussion of the efficacy of state involvement in the curriculum, and noted that Raz
was committed to propositions 4 and 5 of chapter 41• Similarly from chapter 3 we
1 Proposition 4: reliance on the altruism and/or self-interest of citizens would not lead
to the desired outcome of the promotion of autonomy for all through education;
Proposition 5: even if individuals were altruistic and/or self-interested enough, they
would be subject to the limitations of collective action problems in coordinating action
for educational opportunities for autonomy without the state; we need the state to
solve these collective action problems for us.
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had the related propositions 4 and 5 concerning collective action and education for
democracy. In this chapter we will explore the connections between these issues.
To this end, we turn firstly to the substantive issue of what exactly a 'public good' is,
whether education is one, and whether this has implications for the role of the state
in educational provision, funding and regulation. Secondly, we then explore whether
the 'public goods' dilemma is as Raz suggested it was, namely that it leads to the
need for state intervention to provide the desirable outcomes of education, i.e. that
there will be 'market failure' in producing these desired ends. The argument of Ruth
Jonathan is precisely on this issue, and raises the question of the applicability of the
prisoner's dilemma to discussion of educational funding, regulation and provision.
Having explored some game theoretic notions, and suggested that there is little reason
for the pessimism of Raz and Jonathan about markets in educational provision and
regulation, we then return to the issue of the curriculum left hanging from chapters
3 and 4. For the conclusions to that are now that there are two strong arguments
against state involvement in the curriculum, both the epistemic argument discussed
there, and now the public goods dilemma, which turns out to be less of a dilemma for
educationalists than was supposed. So we finally turn to the specifics of the suggested
curricula for democracy and autonomy, and suggest ways in which they might arise
without state promotion.
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6.2 Grace on education as a 'public good'
Chapter 6
As has been mentioned several times in this thesis, we are locating plausible
objections to West's market model by exploring actual objections to recent moves by
governments towards introducing market mechanisms in education; we examine
whether these objections apply also to West's market model. One such objections
stresses that market mechanisms are inappropriate for education because it is a 'public
good' . In this chapter I examine one detailed argument along these lines, that of
Gerald Grace (1989)2. Grace, writing in the context of the debate about internal
markets in educational provision in New Zealand, focuses on the arguments of the
New Zealand Treasury; thus he explicitly sets out to challenge arguments based upon
economists' definitions of 'public goods', with the aim of resisting their conclusions
about the role of the state in education. In this chapter, we follow Grace's focus.
Now economists use the notion of a 'public good' to isolate those goods which will
not be provided, or which will be underprovided by markets, so their defmition is
clearly germane to our task here. These 'public goods' are at the opposite end of a
spectrum from 'private goods', or commodities (Mansfield 1980 p. 80). Thus if
education is a public good in this economists' sense, then it would need state
intervention to ensure its provision; if not, then it would not. Note, importantly, that
for the economists, the theory of 'public goods' supports a positive, not a normative
claim. Public goods will be underprovided without state intervention: for the
economists then, this does not say that the state should intervene to ensure their
2 Other authors raise the issue briefly, but do not elaborate on it: for example, Ball
1990a p. 11, Bash and Coulby 1989 p. 28.
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provision, only that if it doesn't, valuable public goods will not be provided", But
note how this positive case fits neatly into the discussion carried over from Raz's
argument in chapter 4. For his moral arguments for the state to be involved in the
promotion of autonomy depended in part on this positive claim that, without such
intervention, goods of value would not be provided, and hence, in combination with
his 'harm principle' and the 'normal justification thesis', the state can use coercion to
override individual liberty in order to ensure these goods are provided. So much of the
power of Raz's argument, we noted, depended upon the validity of the positive claim
about the underprovision of public goods without the state. Thus by narrowly
addressing the economists' argument, we are not only following Grace's argument, but
we are also addressing important foundations to Raz's argument.
At first glance, it is not altogether clear that Grace's argument could be used against
the 'internal market' brought in by the New Zealand government - or likewise the
'internal market' introduced by the British government. For in these 'internal markets'
education is still publicly-funded through taxation, publicly-provided, and publicly-
regulated. However, this prima facie case doesn't actually hold, for, as we shall see,
if education is a public good this could have implications for the particular sort of
regulations, funds and provision required of the state. In any case, in the context of
this chapter, we are concerned with the applicability of the arguments to a more
'genuine' market, West's market model, and hence Grace's objections, if they hold,
3 Conversely, but less relevantly, if goods are not public goods, then this says that
governments don't need to intervene to ensure their provision: but this does not rule
out that a case could be made as to why governments should intervene, even if they
don't have to.
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will here be on very strong grounds indeed. So let us turn to his argument against the
economists.
Now, economists defme a public good as satisfying up to three conditions": (i)
indivisibility, (ii) non-rivalness and (iii) non-excludability'. Indivisibility pertains to
a good, any given unit of which 'can be made available to every member of the
public' (Taylor 1987 p. 5). For example: a bridge over a river, which can be used by
anyone without extra costs being incurred. Non-rivalness is virtually the same as this,
accept that it is the benefits available to every member of the public which are not
reduced, rather than the amount of the good. A good which is indivisible, then, need
not be non-rival, or vice versa. For example, the 'good' of hiking in the Grand
Canyon could be, to a large extent, indivisible, in that many millions of people could
hike there without thereby hindering others from also hiking there. However, if more
than a few people hike there, this will lower the enjoyment of those who wished to
hike in an empty wilderness. Hence in this case, the indivisible good is not non-rival.
Finally, non-excludability pertains when it is not feasible to exclude any individual
members of the group from consuming the good. The classic economic example is
of the lighthouse: 'Each shipping company owner knows that if another shipping
company erects a lighthouse it will effectively serve his ships as well.' (Cowen 1992
p.3).
4 In section 6.3 below we will consider the fundamental objection whether these
conditions do lead to the need for goods to be publicly-provided - this is the 'public
goods dilemma'.
5 The New Zealand Treasury used different terminology, but the same concepts: 'non-
competitive' is the same as 'indivisible'; 'non-positional' is the same as 'non-rival'.
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We will leave aside the economists' own difficulties with deciding which of these
should be the defining features of a public good": for it turns out - as argued by the
New Zealand Treasury - that schooling itself (and the provision of other educational
opportunities) satisfies none of these conditions. Firstly, it is clearly not
nonexcludable. It is very easy to see how a particular child can be excluded from, for
example, a classroom, or refused access to a computer, theatre, cinema or other
educational opportunity. Indeed it seems precisely because education is excludable in
this way that reformers wanted and continue to want the state to be involved in
education!
Similarly for nonrivalness and indivisibility. It is the case that, for example, if some
children have the attention of an excellent teacher, then that teacher has less time for
others, (indivisibility), and others can obtain less benefit from him or her
(nonrivalness). So schooling is not nonrival or indivisible. Again, it seems likely that
it was precisely because of this condition that reformers wanted the state to be
involved in education, to alleviate this inequality of access. In other words, the irony
is that it seems because schooling is not a public good in the economists' sense that
it could be argued that it needs to be publicly provided!
6 All definitions of public goods involve one or more of three conditions, but just
about all permutations of these conditions seem to be exhibited somewhere in the
literature. For example, McLean thinks that a public good should exhibit all three
qualities (McLean 1987 p. 9), as did the New Zealand Treasury. Mueller says it
should only have the first two conditions (Mueller 1989 p. 11); Leuthold agrees
(Leuthold 1987 p. 58). Kiesling argues that it is the last two that defme a public good
(Kiesling 1990 p. 138). Taylor thinks it is the first and last (Taylor 1987 pp. 5-6). See
appendix 8 for a brief discussion of why there might be this disagreement.
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Grace, however, is unhappy with the New Zealand Treasury's conclusion that
education is not a public good. Faced with this, he decides that what is needed is an
alternative definition of a public good'. He says that: 'Public goods are intrinsically
desirable publicly provided services which enhance the quality of life of all citizens
and which facilitate the acquisition by those citizens of moral, intellectual, creative,
economic and political competencies, regardless of the individual ability of those
citizens to pay for services.' (Grace 1989 p. 218).
Now of course Grace, like Humpty Dumpty", is perfectly entitled to defme terms in
whatever ways he wants", But there are difficulties which he has not foreseen in so
doing. Firstly, .his solution is disappointing, for instead of challenging the (New
Zealand Treasury) economists' argument, he simply avoids it. These economists would
be perfectly entitled to dismiss Grace's argument as not addressing the issues with
which they are concerned. We will see below that there were ways of challenging the
economists directly, without sidestepping the issues they raise.
The second problem is deciding what is in the category of Grace's public goods. Does
he want it to include what others often include as public goods, services such as
sewage treatment, rubbish collection, public transport, or fire protection services? If
they are included under the rubric of his definition(s), then it would have to be
7 In fact, curiously, he gives us two, different, definitions (pp. 214-5 and p. 218). We
consider his second definition only.
8 "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just
what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.''' (Gardner (ed) 1970 p. 268).
9 Even in two different ways if he wants, although this seems excessive.
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because they facilitate the individual in obtaining, or overcoming difficulties in
obtaining, aspects of the good life. But then, surely, food, clothing, shelter, parenting,
etc. should also be included as public goods? Using his defmition(s), virtually
everything desirable in a society becomes a public good. Perhaps this is what Grace
would want: but this brings us to the third, and major, problem with his redefmition.
This is what purpose the definition of a 'public good' is supposed to serve. For
economists, the purpose is to delineate goods which need state intervention to ensure
their provision. So, it is argued:
1 If a good is a public good then it is not amenable to market provision; (by
definition)
2 education (in terms of schooling and other educational opportunities) is not a
public good;
3 therefore, education is amenable to market provision.
What Grace attempts is to reconstruct this argument as follows:
2* education (in terms of schooling and other educational opportunities) is a
public good;
3* therefore, education is not amenable to market provision.
However, as he has redefined a public good, he cannot fall back on '1' any more,
because he no longer has the economist's definition to fall back on! So in order to
supplement his argument, he needs an additional clause as to why his definition of a
public good has the implication, as with the economists' defmition, that a public good
is not amenable to market provision. In a moment, we will return to his argument
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to see if he does bring to light this supplementary information as to why these newly
defmed public goods need to be publicly-provided. But before doing that, let us
outline a more satisfactory rebuttal to the New Zealand Treasury economists'
argument, a rebuttal which doesn't sidestep the issues raised.
In fact there are three possible rebuttals. Firstly, it could have been pointed out that
economists generally get into all sorts of difficulties with their defmition, because
there might not be any public goods in their strict sense at all. Consider, for example,
non-excludability. De Jasay doubts whether any good could be said to be intrinsically
non-excludable: 'daylight is excludable by putting coin-operated automatic shutters on
windows, allowing access to daylight to be bought by the hour' (De Jasay 1989 p. 61).
Malkin and Wildavsky concur that nonexclusion 'is always a function of the time and
resources that the supplier is willing to devote to [exclusion]' (Malkin and Wildavsky
1991 p. 362). A skilful shoplifter, trespasser, or burglar will not allow herself to be
excluded from any goods. Even the archetypal 'public good', national defence, (cited
almost universally by economists as a public good), can also be excludable. Citizens
can exclude themselves from some protection, through, for example, nuclear-free
zones; protection can be withdrawn from, or not be extended to, border regions of a
nation - topical examples include Iraq's inability to 'defend' the integrity of its
territory above the 36th and below the 32nd parallels (The Times, 18th January 1993),
and the United Kingdom's inability to defend the Channel Islands from German
occupation during World War II (The Times 2nd December 1992). Finally, it is
conceivable that national defence could be provided by private contractors (or the
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state) only to those regions which were up to date with their premiums (or taxes)".
De Jasay argues: 'What the exercise teaches is that 'excludability' is a variable
property of the universe of goods, being reflected in variable exclusion costs. This
is a good reason to stop talking about the non-excludability of public goods and talk:
instead of the greater or lesser exclusion costs of goods in general.' (De Jasay 1989
p.61).
These considerations suggest that, rather than sidestepping the issue, Grace could have
concluded that, although schooling (and the provision of other educational
opportunities) is not a public good in this sense, neither are many other so-called
public goods. There might not be any pure public goods.
Now the economists could counter this by arguing that their intention is for there to
be a continuum, with pure public goods at one end, and private goods at the other, and
the majority of goods, perhaps even all goods, in between. So their intention is, as
exclusion costs for any good become greater, then that good is more likely to need
state intervention to ensure its provision. Hence a good with large exclusion costs
could be called an 'impure' public good. This solution might help the economists
10 Taylor considers this and says that defence can be decomposed into 'deterrence'
and 'protection from attack'. The first part is non-excludable he says, whereas the
second fits in with the discussion so far, of being more or less excludable, depending
on the form which it takes (Taylor 1987 p. 8). However, it is not clear that if
protection from attack can be withdrawn as noted, that deterrence is also not
excludable. The Germans were not deterred from invading the Channel Islands,
because they suspected the protection from attack would not be forthcoming; the
Americans, British and French aircraft were not deterred from invading Iraqi air space
because they knew that they were inviolable.
277 Chapter 6
preserve their notion of a public good - but it wouldn't help Grace's argument: we see
immediately that schooling (and the provision of other educational opportunities) is
unlikely to be even an 'impure' public good. For schooling is likely to have very
small exclusion costs or the costs could even be negative, that is, there would be
educational benefits from exclusion of certain children".
The second rebuttal of the New Zealand Treasury's argument is influenced by West's
discussion of education. Schooling (or the provision of other educational opportunities)
does not approach being a public good, definitely not, not even an 'impure' one. But
schooling, and education more broadly, is likely to have, as West pointed out,
'neighbourhood-effects' or 'externalities' - defmed by economists as when an activity
undertaken by one party directly effects another party's utility. That is, there are
likely to be benefits to the community or society at large if there are educational
opportunities available, in terms ofequality of opportunity, social cohesion, democratic
benefits, law and order, economic growth, and so on", Crucially, these externalities
are likely to exhibit a large degree of non-exclusion (it is costly to exclude people
from these benefits or costs) and there are usually considerations relating to
nonrivalness or indivisibility - the external benefits or costs are likely to be available
to all with near zero marginal costs. For example, a society lacking in equality of
opportunity could be a society with a dissatisfied populace, becoming lawless, or
11 It could be cheaper to get marginal improvement in an average child if those who
lack the appropriate skills and background are not allowed to retard the progress of
the rest.
12 For further discussion of these externalities - including equality of opportunity - see
Weisbrod 1962 and Krashinsky 1986.
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lacking in social cohesion. I could exclude myself from the problems of such a
society, but only at the expense of burglar alarms, bodyguards, high fences, or by
restricting my movements. It is in this sense that education could be referred to as an
(impure) public good; it is in this sense that we might be able to argue that education
needs state intervention to ensure its provision, in order to obtain these externalities.
Moreover, we can now return to Grace's argument, for he gets close to this
formulation when he asks:
'Might not education be regarded as a public good because one of its fundamental
aims is to facilitate the development of the personality and the artistic, creative and
intellectual abilities ofall citizens regardless of their class, race or gender status and
regardless of their regional location? Might not education be regarded as a public
good because it seeks to develop in all citizens a moral sense, a sense of social and
fraternal responsibility for others, and a disposition to act in rational and cooperative
ways?' (Grace 1989 p. 214 emphasis added).
In other words what Grace seems to be arguing (note the passages emphasised) is that
one reason why the (impure) public good of education should be publicly provided is
that equality of educational opportunity is important, and that if left to the vagaries
of markets, this will not be ensured. Moreover, there seems also to be the implication
that other important 'externalities' of education, such as education for democracy for
all, education for autonomy" for all, and so on, will also be underprovided by
13 Observe his discussion relating to the full development of the individual, the social
and fraternal responsibilities for others, etc.
V9 CMp~r6
markets, and hence these are also reasons why education needs to be publicly
provided.
In other words, by exploring the issue of public goods as raised by Grace, we have
plausibly come full circle to the other fundamental objections to our market model
discussed throughout this thesis, that it would not satisfy equality of opportunity, that
links between education and democracy will be broken, and that it would not satisfy
education for autonomy. Recall that we have discussed equality of opportunity in
chapter 2, and found that it was not a convincing argument against West's market
model, which had the facility of a 'minimum adequate education for all'. Similarly,
the links between education and democracy were examined in chapters 3 and 5 and
not found, in general, to undermine the market modeL But now we arrive at the third
rebuttal of the New Zealand Treasury's argument - a rebuttal which challenges the
supposed implications of the economists' defmition of a public good. Even if their
definition holds, that is, even if a good does exhibit (to a degree) nonexcludability,
nonrivalness and/or indivisibility, why does this imply that it needs to be publicly-
provided in order to ensure its provision? In other words, is it legitimate for the
economists to defme a public good in the way that they do, implying that these
qualities imply the need for state intervention? This is the public goods dilemma,
whether public goods as defined will suffer from the problems of collective action.
This brings us to the concerns of chapters 3 and 4. For recall the principle unresolved
issue from chapter 4 was that, in order for Raz's argument for the state promotion of
autonomy to be satisfactorily translated into an educational context, we would need
280 Chapter 6
to support propositions 1_314• However, we noted that Raz himself might not be able
to accept proposition 3. That is, he might accept that under some circumstances, state
intervention for the promotion of autonomy would not be efficacious, but that he
would argue this on contingent grounds only. However, we suggested that exploration
of the prisoner's dilemma and other problems of collective action could help us to
arrive at a different conclusion - that proposition 3 could be rejected for non-
contingent reasons. We noted that the problems of the prisoner's dilemma would lead
for Raz to propositions 4 and 5, which translated the problem of 'collective action'
into the educational context. We can now further translate this problem into the
language of this chapter, and suggest that what is of concern there is that education
needs to be publicly-provided in order to provide what we could now call the
'externalities' of education, including 'education for autonomy for all'. Similar
considerations arise from chapter 3: there propositions 4 and 5 suggested there would
be problems of collective action in bringing about the externality of an 'education for
democracy for all'. In the next sections we examine the problem of collective action,
the 'public goods dilemma' , in terms of educational provision, to see if we can resolve
the unresolved issues there.
Before moving on, let us sum up the argument so far: the New Zealand Treasury
14 Proposition 1: that some, or all, of the state's citizens need help in promoting their
personal autonomy, over and above that which they or their relatives are able to
provide; Proposition 2: (a) that those who need such help cannot either expect to
receive it through the institutions of civil society, that is through non-state institutions
such as religious organisations, communities, etc; or, (b) that state intervention in this
regard will better promote their autonomy than these other institutions; Proposition
3: that state intervention in this regard is efficacious; i.e. that certain types of state
intervention in education can be expected to have the effect of promoting the
autonomy of citizens better than if the state was not involved.
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argued that education, or at least schooling, was not a public good because it didn't
satisfy their definition of a public good. Grace opposed this, and gave alternative
definitions. We observed that it wasn't very useful to do this, because it avoided the
normal purpose of defining goods as 'public goods' in the first place, namely to
differentiate those goods which should be publicly-provided. When other economists'
definitions of public goods were taken into account, it was observed that still
schooling stubbornly refused to fit into these definitions, but neither did many other
so-called public goods. It was suggested that the economists' definition might help us
usefully decide which goods were more like pure public goods than others, and we
still decided that schooling, and education more broadly, was not likely to fall into this
category. However, while education and schooling are not impure public goods
themselves, they do have externalities, some of which are likely to be non-excludable,
indivisible and/or nonrival, at least to a certain extent. It is these factors which might
lead to the desire to publicly-provide education, and not leave it to the vagaries of
something like West's market model. But we are then left with the issue of whether
the defining feature(s) of the economists' notion of public good do have the
implication that they sought from it, namely that these goods need to be publicly-
provided. This, the unresolved problem of collective action, we tum to now.
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6.3 Education and the 'public goods dilemma'
We have arrived at the position that education could well be an (impure) public good,
in the economists' sense, in that it has 'externalities' which could be, at least to a
certain extent, nonexcludable, nonrival and/or indivisible. The externalities which are
of particular concern to us in this thesis are equality of opportunity, education for
democracy for all, and education for autonomy for all. But we must then ask the
question whether the economists' are correct in arguing that public goods do need to
be publicly-provided. From chapters 3 and 4 we have propositions 4 and 5 which we
seek to challenge - by raising the issue of whether these desired externalities can arise
without state intervention. Later in this chapter we will explore, somewhat
speculatively how state intervention might be unnecessary to ensure the provision of
education for autonomy for all, and education for democracy for all. This discussion,
however, will still only be on a par with Raz's 'contingent objection' of chapter 4: for
it discusses possibilities which might occur without great state intervention. In a
philosophical thesis, it is not possible to undertake the necessary empirical and
historical work to flesh out these suggestions, but what can be undertaken is a more
thorough-going theoretical discussion of these problems of collective action. So in the
following sections (and appendices) I will approach this problem as follows: I will
discuss the problem of collective action in bringing about desirable externalities in
general terms, and assume that education for democracy and for autonomy are two of
these externalities under consideration. I will then return to the specific issues of how
it is likely an education for democracy and for autonomy would arise, and also relate
the issues to West's market model. This approach will enable us to address the
literature on the collective goods problem, and, importantly, to arrive at logical, not
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contingent, difficulties with proposition 3 of chapters 3 and 4. .
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Now, we noted that Raz put the problem of collective action in terms of the prisoner's
dilemma" and other coordination problems. The prisoner's dilemma belongs to
game theory, and we find that the 'public goods dilemma' literature focuses
predominantly on game theoretic notions. This is important to stress: the traditions
in political philosophy and political economy which pursue the problem of the
involvement of the state in public goods provision either explicitly depend upon game
theory (note the early works in political economy of Samuelson 1954), or use
assumptions of human behaviour related to those used in game theory, constructing
theories which can be modelled in game theoretic terms (see, for example, the
discussion of Hobbes and Hume's theories in Taylor 1987 pp. 125-163). So it is for
these reasons that we turn to game theory to make further progress on these issues.
Usefully, we find that Jonathan (1990) has made explicit links between game theory,
educational provision, and market failure, so it is to this work that we turn first.
Jonathan on education and the prisoner's dilemma
In this section we explore Jonathan's argument concerning the prisoner's dilemma and
'market failure'. We discuss whether the prisoner's dilemma is the most appropriate
model to use to describe the problems of educational provision. I then attempt to
sketch alternative models and show that the situation is not necessarily as bleak
regarding educational provision without the state as that made out by Jonathan, or
15 A description of the prisoner's dilemma can be found in appendix 9.
implied by Raz16•
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Now, Jonathan says that the prisoner's dilemma shows that 'market forces are no
substitute for careful, collective deliberation about the ends and means of educational
policy, even if the principal criterion for judging the success of policy were aggregate
increases in wealth generation' (Jonathan 1990 p. 129). Jonathan describes three
facets of the 'market failure' that will occur if the market has an increased role in
educational provision. These are: (1) 'a narrowing of provision ... emphasising those
skills and fields of study thought to be of immediate (socio-) economic benefit',
leading to 'cultural impoverishment'; (2) a waste of 'human capital', because the
'market-competitive education game' will lead to some being losers; and (3) 'ghettoes
of low educational performance' (p. 128).
Now it is well known that 'economic literature on the market is full of explanations
of why the prisoner's dilemma situation is responsible for 'market failure" (p. 129).
Jonathan mentions one example of the sub-optimal use of land between some
hypothetical ranchers and farmers. She then concludes that if the prisoner's dilemma
shows market failure can occur in this, and other, classic examples, 'how much more
apposite is it when we consider a good like education, whose effects are long term and
social as well as immediate and individual' (p. 129). Unfortunately, however,
16 I must stress that what follows is not a treatise in game theory. My aim is not
actually to construct a suitable n-person iterated game of educational provision without
the state - this would be too large a project. All I want to show, is that Jonathan's
(and Raz's) pessimism is unfounded.
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Jonathan makes no attempt to show why the educational case is 'more apposite' an
application. Indeed, one might have expected a question mark at the end of the
sentence quoted, for the crucial question is how applicable the prisoner's dilemma is
to the 'game' of market-led educational provision, funding and regulation.
In order to see whether or not it can be applied, let us translate the economists' classic
example given in appendix 9 into an educational context, and imagine a situation
where the government did not provide, regulate or fund educational opportunities at
all- in other words a situation more extreme even than West's market model. Without
the state will there be 'market failure' which can be modelled using the prisoner's
dilemma? Having seen how it could be applied in this extreme situation, we will then
consider West's market model, to gauge the applicability of the findings there. What
Jonathan is arguing with regards to education is that the prisoner's dilemma shows
that non-cooperative market activity will produce an inferior outcome to govemment-
sponsored cooperative action. It is this argument which would lend support to
propositions 4 and 5 of chapters 3 and 4, concerning the inefficiency of voluntary
action without the state to provide educational opportunities. But let us be clear what
the mathematics of the prisoner's dilemma tells us: ifeducation can be modelled using
the prisoner's dilemma, then the case comes down quite strongly against leaving
educational provision, funding and regulation to markets17•
17 It would still not be a 'knock-down' argument against markets, however, because
of the assumptions behind game theory, which are discussed in appendix z. These
assumptions might make us wary of using game theory to make predictions about
human behaviour. But note that it is Jonathan and Raz, and others, who have taken
the argument onto that territory: they argue against markets using those assumptions;
we aim to show that their arguments against markets, using the same assumptions, are
not valid.
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So let us start to build up a model to see if Jonathan is correct in arguing that the
prisoner's dilemma is the appropriate model to use. We begin with the simplest of
models, a two-player" game, and build up a more realistic model in the next few
sections. These two-player games are useful as a heuristic device, and are not meant
to be more realistic than that.
fIrst model: two-player game, external benefIts, individual players purchasing own
education
First we consider the case where the player is choosing to purchase education. The
purchase of any good will depend on the utility of that good to the person. Let us
first base the utilities on the externalities, or public benefits, to be derived from
education, as Jonathan wishes us to do. In the classic economist's example in
appendix 9, the externalities were clean or polluted air. In terms of education,
Jonathan hints at some externalities of education in her examples of potential market
failure given above. The second and third of these can be subsumed under an
externality of equality of opportunity, which we have already examined in chapter 219
- but about which further interesting observations can be made in this context. The
other externalities of education of concern to us here include education for democracy
for all, and education for autonomy for alL For the purpose of this argument, we
lump together all of these externalities and attach some utility value to them. The
18 Think of each player as being a family, or a parent, or a child, concerned with
purchasing educational opportunities. A 'community' is two families, or two children
or two parents.
19 There it was suggested that West's minimum adequate education would satisfy what
is meant by equality of educational opportunity.
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assumption of complete knowledge comes in here: in a more sophisticated model than
we have scope for here, we could bring in probabilities about the players' awareness
of these externalities, and their value to them. But note that their potential ignorance
does bite both ways: it might be that the players thought education was of far greater
value in promoting law and order, or economic growth, say, than it actually was".
The easiest and usual way of representing the utility value is to give some monetary
value - but this does not imply that we are considering this as the only form of utility.
It is just a useful way of showing the model. If we could show that, without state
intervention, these externalities would not be provided, then the prisoner's dilemma
may be applicable and Jonathan's application would stand.
We can find, with a little juggling of numbers, many situations which will make
Jonathan's application true. For example, the cost of a child's education, from
schooling and other sources such as television, newspapers, families, religious bodies,
etc. is £1000 per annum. The external benefits that accrue to each parent are worth
£700 for each child educated - these external benefits would be in terms of the value
to the parent of economic growth, equality of opportunity, education for democracy,
law and order, education for autonomy, etc. Then the matrix of payoffs, in a
simplified two-person world, would look like:
20 See Lou (1987) for a discussion of the failures of schooling to promote these ends.
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person 2
educate don't educate
educate 400,400 -300,700
person 1
don't educate 700, -300 0,0
If both parents educate their children, then they have net benefits of £400 each,
(2x£700 - £1000). But if I educate my child, and you don't, then you still get £700
utility for zero expense, whereas I payout £1000 and only get £700 in return, hence
a net loss of £300. Thus although both parents would prefer the returns from
educating their children, it would be rational to choose the less than optimal state of
declining to do S021. SO, in this our simplest model we have shown that, under
certain assumptions, Jonathan could make a case out for there being a genuine
prisoner's dilemma.
second model: two-person game, external benefits, school requiring collective
provision
Now in the above model, I assumed that each player could provide educational
opportunities by him or herself. I mentioned one of the possible educational
opportunities to be schooling, but in the two-person game, it doesn't seem very natural
to call this 'schooling' - for there might be a school with only one pupil in it. In any
21 Of course, the utilities could be given other values which would not make a
prisoner's dilemma. For example, if the benefits from externalities were £500 each and
the cost £1000, then the prisoner's dilemma would disappear. For the general result
see appendix 11 section 1.
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case, it is more realistic to suppose that the costs of the school would be related to the
numbers of pupils in the school, which would affect the outcomes above. Perhaps in
the above model, it is easiest to think: of the parent purchasing a home tutor, or a
home computer and appropriate software, etc22• We now modify the model to the
case where it is a school that is being financed, with fees proportional to the number
of children in the schooL This is, after all, the territory on which many philosophers
argue, and it may be thought to be avoiding their challenge if we concentrate on
educational experiences always defined more broadly than schooling.
To add flesh to the model, suppose a two-family community, with one school-age
child in each family. Suppose there is a teacher who is willing to provide a school
for this community, providing that if he or she opens the school, both children can
attend (it is not worth her while to teach one child, perhaps, or she has a sense of
social justice which says that he or she can't exclude anyone from a community). The
teacher charges a flat rate for his or her services. In this case there could be two
possibilities.
The first possibility is where one person alone could finance the schooL In this case,
if one family contributes, then that family bears all of the cost, but both can send their
children to the schooL Assuming self-interested persons, then family' I' would prefer
family '2' to pay for the school, but neither family would want for there to be no
schooL Let us have the fees and benefits to be the same as in our first example above.
Then we have the following payoff matrix:
22 In the many-person case the description would be more natural -see appendix 12.
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school fees £1000 (total, to be shared if both contribute);
public benefits per child educated £700;
person 2
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pay
person 1
don't pay
pay
900, 900
1400, 400
don't pay
400, 1400
0,0
The calculations are: if both pay, then the costs are halved, and the maximum positive
public benefits 'are reaped, so we have £1400 - £1000/2 = £900. If one pays and the
other doesn't, then still there are maximum positive benefits, because both can send
their children to school, but the person who doesn't pay reaps these with no costs,
whereas the other has to pay £1000 for the privilege. Finally, if neither contribute,
then there are no benefits to society.
Given these particular values, this game is no longer a prisoner's dilemma",
Instead, it is known to game theorists as the game of 'chicken': both players prefer
that the school is provided, but each prefers that the other will provide it all by him
or herself; however, if it is known that the other player will not provide, then that
person will provide the good rather than run the risk of nothing being provided".
23 Notice that now, using the standard terminology, T>R>S>P, as opposed to the
prisoner's dilemma where T>R>P>S - see appendix 9.
24 The general result for this is found in appendix 11 section 2.
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Another example of this sort could be where we have two employers in a small town.
Each of the employers can fund schooling in one neighbourhood. It is considered by
the employers that the town only needs one neighbourhood to be educated, for
example to provide a literate workforce, or to prevent too much crime. That is the
town can absorb one neighbourhood of children who are uneducated, but not two. If
I know that the other employer will not fund education in her neighbourhood, then I
will fund education in mine. This again is likely to have the format of. a game of
chicken.
Returning to the two-family community, the second possibility is that neither family
can afford the school fees by themselves. In this case, unless they both contribute, no
school will be provided. Here we have another type of game, known to game
theorists as the 'assurance game'. Both families prefer there to be a school, but each
family will not contribute if it knows that the other will not contribute. Each family
would prefer to contribute if the other contributes too. The game is called the
'assurance' game, because its solution lies in finding ways of assuring each players
that the other will cooperate.
Given the utilities as in the example above, we have two possible situations, either
where the teacher returns the money if the school isn't funded, or where he or she
takes it with him or her if it isn't funded. The former situation, taking the funds
required to build the school as £1000 (£500 each), and the public benefits per child
educated as £700, is as follows:
pay
person 1
don't pay
pay
900,900
0,0
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person 2
don't pay
0,0
0,0
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Clearly in this situation, both players would rather pay than not pay school fees - for
that is the way benefits are maximised".
Now, it is crucial to recognise that neither the chicken nor the assurance game has the
dominant strategy of 'mutual defection' which characterises the prisoner's dilemma.
In fact, both games have two equilibria". In the assurance games the two equilibria
are for both to payor for neither to pay. Since both players prefer the mutual
cooperation outcome to the mutual defection, then neither will expect the latter to be
the outcome, so the preferred outcome of both cooperating is likely to result.
In the game of chicken, the two equilibria are the situations where one player
25 In general, this will be an assurance game provided that twice the benefits is greater
than half the fees.
26 An equilibrium is defined as the position when one player cannot unilaterally
improve his or her position if the other person's strategy doesn't change. Or more
formally: 'Given an outcome, [a simultaneous choice of strategies by players] a player
is said to be motivated to shift (to choose another strategy) if by doing so he can get
a larger payoff provided the other player does not shift. ... If neither player is
motivated to shift, the outcome is called an equilibrium.' (Rapoport 1992 p. 77).
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cooperates, by paying for the teacher, and the other defects". It will, therefore, be
in each player's interest to attempt to bind her or himself irrevocably to non-
cooperation, providing that she or he is the first to do it. This pre-commitment will
then force the other player to cooperate. But if each player is free to bind her or
himself in this way, and realize the dangers of simultaneous binding, then they may
forgo this for the cooperative solution. The solution of this is unstable - but it is not
the determinate non-cooperation of the prisoner's dilemma. So although our first
model could have supported Jonathan's claim that educational provision without the
state will result in the prisoner's dilemma, in our second model we already see an
undermining of that claim.
third model: two-person game; private and external benefIts
In both of the models so far, we have assumed that schooling has public benefits,
externalities only. However, schooling also has private benefits. Parents are concerned
for their children to receive an education because they want private benefits for their
children - the economic benefits of literacy, schooling, etc. in terms of employment
prospects, the benefits of literacy and education in terms of leisure enjoyment and
personal development, political benefits of being able to participate in society, social
benefits of being a member of a literate and educated society, and so on. Parents will
also seek private benefits of schooling for themselves, such as the satisfaction that
comes from seeing their children earn a living and support a family themselves, and
financial security in old age.
Z7 The other situations, where both defect or both cooperate are not equilibria, because
one player can unilaterally improve his or her position if the other person's strategy
doesn't change.
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As soon as these private benefits are introduced, then this changes the situation
completely. Education simultaneously produces both private and public benefits. We
modelled the first prisoner's dilemma model above on the catalytic converter example
found in appendix 9, but now see that the analogy doesn't quite hold. To maintain
the analogy with education, the motoring example would require that the converter
was not a costly inconvenience but produced significant private benefits also. For
example, it could increase performance, or reduce petrol consumption. If the cost of
fitting the converter was less than these private benefits alone, the prisoner's dilemma
would disappear. The externality of reduced air pollution would follow, but as a
result of the self-interested behaviour of the motorists, not as a consequence of their
environmental awareness.
To show this new situation, we could have the same situation as in the first model,
with in addition, private benefits of say £400. The matrix of payoffs would then look
like this:
educate
person 1
don't educate
person 2
educate
800, 800
700,100
don't educate
100, 700
0,0
(The £800 is made up of the two external benefits of £700 each, plus the £400 private
benefits, minus the £1000 costs of the schooling, and so on).
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In this particular example, crucially, the situation is no longer a prisoner's dilemma -
the 'dominant strategy' is to educate one's child, whatever the other person does.
That is, there is only one equilibrium, for both parents to educate".
Taking into account private benefits in our second model above, we fmd neither
possibility changes too drastically. In the first possibility, where one family alone
could finance the teacher, again, in some situations there could be a prisoner's
dilemmas, in others, a game of chicken". However, we can say that it is less likely
that the game will be a prisoner's dilemma, and more likely for it to be a game of
Secondly, in the situation where neither player can afford to pay for the school alone,
and both can be admitted when the school is opened, the situation is even more likely
to be an assurance game".
fourth model: two-player game; one or more players too poor to fund schooling
In all of the models so far, we have assumed that each player could afford to fund
schooling, although in some cases they were unwilling to do so. But a plausible
scenario is where some players are too poor to pay for schooling at all. Taking this
28 In general the situation is a prisoner's dilemma whenever the school fees are greater
than the sum of the private benefits and the public benefits, but less than the sum of
twice the public benefits and the private benefits. See appendix 11 section 3.
29 See appendix 11 section 4.
30 See appendix 11 section 5.
31 See appendix 11 section 6.
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into account brings an unexpected and important result.
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Again, we can model this situation using a two-dimensional matrix. Still assuming
our two-player community as before, with the teacher offering to provide a school for
use by the whole community (for example, by both school-age children). For this
model, let us decide that the teacher will provide schooling however many children
attend, but that he or she, again, would want to open the school to the whole
community once his or her funds are met. Clearly if neither family is rich enough to
pay the fees by itself, then no schooling will take place. But if one family can provide
all of the funds, or is willing to pay more than the other, then things need not be so
bleak.
Let us assume that it is player? 2 who can't afford to pay anything. If the school
is funded, then there is the option of sending or not sending their child to schooL
Suppose too, private as well as public benefits, with the school fees at £1000, private
benefits of £400 and public benefits of £700 per child educated, as before. Then the
situation can be modelled as:
player 2
pay
player 1
don't pay
attends
800, 1800
[n/a]
dosen't attend
100, 700
0,0
32 Each player recall is a family, parent or child.
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Here, surprisingly, the equilibrium is for player 1 to pay all the costs, and for player
2 to attend free of charge. That is, it is still in family 1's interest to pay for the
schooling unilaterally. Also note that for player 2 not to attend while person 1 pays
is not an equilibrium (for player 2 can unilaterally improve his or her position by
attending)".
Above we assumed that player 1 could afford to pay for all the school fees. Clearly,
if player 2 is able to contribute some proportion of the school fees, then the situation
improves, because we need only have the less strong condition that player 1 can afford
to pay for that part of the fees which player 2 cannot pay. With player 2 contributing
some proportion of the fees, the same conditions on the equilibria still apply as above,
however".
One assumption here is that it is possible to easily decide whether or not player 2 can
afford to pay for schooling. In a two-player community, this is likely to be quite
tenable. If it is not obvious, or if there is room for deceit, or if one or both of the
players is on the border-line of being able to afford to pay, then this game is likely
to deteriorate into the game of chicken. It will be in the interests of both players to
pre-commit themselves to the statement that they are too poor to pay for schooling,
in the hope that the other player will pick up the bill for them. Or it will be in the
interests of both players to pre-commit themselves before the other by spending
33 For the general result see appendix 11 section 7.
34 See appendix 11 section 8.
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money on luxury goods, say, so that they really are too poor to provide schooling, in
the hope that the other player will pay. But, as was noted above, this strategy in the
game of chicken is a risky business, because it might mean that no schooling is
provided at alL Hence, this will be some disincentive to deceiving the player this
way. Note that, the game of chicken in this and in the previous case, might not be
as risky as the standard game, because we do have an 'outside authority'; we have a
teacher or school who him or herself could impose some sort of means-test on the
players to decide if there are genuine cases of poverty. In this case, this could help
alleviate the problem.
Moving away from two-player models
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The purpose of these four models was to show that there are a variety of possible
games which represent markets in educational provision in the two-person game.
Hence we have shown that both Jonathan and Raz were far too pessimistic in their
suggestion that the games would always become prisoner's dilemmas. Sometimes they
might, but often they won't. Crucially, if the games are assurance games, games of
chicken, or hybrids of these, then there is not the dominant strategy of the prisoner's
dilemma: there are likely to be cooperative solutions possible without any outside
interference. That is, there will not be the market failure to provide the externalities
of education, as predicted by Jonathan". This was shown using simplified two-
person models: 'can these be generalised to show the same in more realistic many-
person games? In appendix 12 we show that they can. In each of the generalisations,
we find that moving to the many-person game extends the results of the two-person
games. Again we fmd that some are likely to be prisoner's dilemma, but the most
plausible situations will be games of chicken or assurance games, or hybrids of these.
So again we fmd that Jonathan's and Raz's pessimism seems unfounded.
Iterated games
The final move we must make in exploring possible game theoretical models of
educational provision is to note one major inadequacy exhibited by all of the models
discussed so far. They all assume that the players meet only once, play the game and
then have no further interaction with each other. However, this is clearly unlike in
35 In a moment we will consider the particular externalities of education for democracy
and education for autonomy to see how they could be provided in this way.
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many social situations. For example, if the families in our community are paying fees
for a school, then the 'game' when they make their payments is likely to occur every
term. Or providing funding for schooling could be one of several 'public goods'
projects being canvassed in the community; others could include perhaps funding a
clinic, or a footbridge, or a community centre. Finally, the people in the community
are likely to meet on many different levels, and this other interaction would also be
relevant to our games. The people who 'play the game' of raising funds for the
school could also meet as customer and seller in the local market, or as friends in the
local pub. All of these interactions would also influence their interactions when they
came to 'play the game' of educational provision.
In fact we can extend the 'one-shot' games that we have used so far, to take into
account this interaction of players over a period of time. That is, we can model the
games to be played iteratively. In 'supergames', as these are called in the literature,
some new considerations need to be brought to bear. Firstly, future payoffs are
discounted. In the early literature, it was assumed that there should be the assumption
of 'perfect information'. That is, after each sub-game is played, each player knows
of the strategies played by all other players up to that point. However, recent
literature has shown that a probabilistic model can be used to model imperfect
information as a game with complete information (Tullock 1992 p. 56). Again, the
considerations about probabilistic models raised earlier are relevant here". Another
assumption in the early literature was that there must be indefmite length of games,
for with finite length games, by an inductive proof, it was thought that the dominant
36 For discussion of perfect knowledge, see Appendix 10.
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strategy would always be to defect. However, this result no longer holds if a small
amount of uncertainty is introduced into the game - 'If players are not quite certain
about each other's motivations, options or payoffs, the backwards induction argument
cannot be applied.' (fn3 p. 190 - see also Kreps et al 1982). Hence, these two
restrictive assumptions on the supergames do not have to be applied, provided that
some element of uncertainty in the result is tolerated.
In appendix 12 it is outlined how educational provision could be modelled in the
many-person games, to produce results that were either prisoner's dilemmas, games
of chicken, or assurance games, or hybrids of these. With this work undertaken, we
can now 'plug into' the extensive mathematical work that has been done on each of
these games, and show what happens in the supergame. The results are interesting.
For in the worst-case scenario, when the game was a prisoner's dilemma in the 'one-
shot' game, in the supergame there is a cooperative solution. The solution is known
as the 'tit-for-tat' strategy. Originally discovered in the iterated two-person game, this
is when one player adopts a 'conditional' strategy, of starting the supergame by
cooperating (in our models, by paying for schooling), and then cooperates in the next
game if the other player cooperated in the previous game; if not, the player defects,
but then immediately tries to cooperate in the next game (Axelrod 1984 p. 13)37.
Axelrod's insight was that, if it is known that the players are likely to meet again, the
moves each player makes now are likely to influence the moves made by players later:
37 Axelrod considers the two-person game only, extending it to more than two persons
by assuming that each player interacts with each person one at a time - this limitation
was overcome by Taylor (1987), as we shall see in a moment.
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'The future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the present and thereby affect the
current strategic situation.' (Axelrod 1984 p. 12). It is this crucial fact that leads to
the possibility of cooperation emerging. Axelrod's most notable result was using a
computer tournament, which now provides the basis for a vast literature on game
theory. Participants submitted entries to play an iterated prisoner's dilemma game for
an unknown length of moves, where each participant was aware of strategies that had
been successful in a previous competition, together with an analysis of what seemed
to have made the strategies successful. The strategy that won the competition, (that
is, by scoring on average the highest number of points when played against every
other participant, including itself and a random programme) was named 'TIT FOR
TAT'. TIT FOR TAT also won a simulated 'ecological' process, whereby
unsuccessful programmes were gradually eliminated, and replaced in growing
proportions by successful ones. The features that seem to make TIT FOR TAT a
successful strategy are that: it is 'nice' (it is never the first to defect); it is retaliatory
(it will always punish a defection with a defection of its own); it is forgiving, (it will
always try to restore mutual cooperation once it has retaliated); and it is clear, (it is
easily intelligible to the other player) (p. 54).
Moreover, TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable, that is a population of people using
this strategy can't be invaded and taken over by intruders using any other strategy,
provided that the discount parameter is large enough (p. 59). Conversely, a world of
'meanies', that is, of people who never cooperate, can be 'invaded' by a cluster of
people using TIT FOR TAT, and the cluster would only have to be large enough so
that players using TIT FOR TAT need interact with other TIT FOR TAT players
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about 5% of the time. That is, the TIT FOR TAT people would be consistently more
successful than the 'meanies', even with these limited interactions with each other.
Hence, if the 'meanies' wanted to raise their utility, they would see that it would pay
to behave cooperatively, rather than uncooperatively.
Taylor extends these results to model the many-person prisoner's dilemma supergame,
and arrives at the following conclusions: Cooperation can arise if, firstly, every player
plays the tit-for-tat strategy, and their discount rate is not to high. That is, when every
player uses this strategy, there is an equilibrium (Taylor 1987 p. 104). It is not the
only equilibrium however - see footnote 39 below. Secondly, even when some of the
players unconditionally defect throughout the supergame, (in our terms, when they
refuse to pay for schooling), then cooperation may still be rational for the rest,
provided that there is a subgroup of players who cooperate, either by playing the tit-
for-tat strategy, or by cooperating unconditionally, and again provided that their
discount rates are not too high (p. 104)38. But in this case, as the 'public good' is
going to be provided by a subgroup, each player has the usual incentive not to be in
that subgroup (p. 93). So every player has an incentive to pre-commitment to non-
cooperation, in other words, this game gives rise to the game of chicken. Again, the
comments about risk-aversion are applicable here: 'a subgroup of conditional
Cooperators might emerge if enough players are sufficiently risk averse' (p. 93).
So we have the condition that the supergame solves the prisoner's dilemma under
38 This is similar to Axelrod's finding that a cooperative subgroup are able to 'invade'
a population of 'meanies'.
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certain specified conditions. Let us be clear what this means in terms of our
educational models. In some of those models it was pointed out that the situation
could arise as Jonathan predicted, as a prisoner's dilemma. In those situations,
educational opportunities would be underprovided because it would be in both players'
interest not to cooperate with each other. But in those cases, we assumed that the
players only met once, and then never played together again. We now can consider
cases where the players interact several times, through various community interactions,
or simply by virtue of paying school fees at regular intervals. What the discussion of
the iterated game shows is that the prisoner's dilemma outcome now in general does
not hold: it is now in the players' interests to cooperate. That is, it is mutually
advantageous fOT both players to provide educational opportunities for themselves or
their children, and only to 'defect', i.e. not to cooperate, if other players refuse to
provide such opportunities. But even if there are other players who refuse to provide
such opportunities, then it is still likely to be advantageous to the subgroup that wants
to cooperate to continue to provide educational opportunities for themselves, and this
subgroup may well be able to influence the remainder of the group 'by example' as
it were (a cooperative subgroup is able to 'invade' a population of 'meanies').
In other words, we have shown that, even in those worst-case situations in which
Jonathan was correct in suggesting that a prisoner's dilemma is likely to arise under
markets in educational provision, then this still doesn't necessarily bring about her
pessimistic conclusion of market failure. Even the prisoner's dilemma -the worst-case
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scenario - can bring about cooperative behaviour in the long run". Similar
comments apply to Raz's pessimism: it was not legitimate for him to simply assume,
as he did, that .the problems of collective action, exemplified as he saw it by the
prisoner's dilemma, would need the state to intervene to solve them.
39 Two general comments: Firstly, as we have said, these cooperative outcomes are not
the only equilibria. How do we know which equilibrium is likely to be the outcome
of a game? The answer is that we don't. As far as our work is concerned here, this
is not too distressing, because we are only trying to show that the determinate
outcome predicted by Jonathan and Raz is not the only possible outcome. However,
Friedman suggests, in any case, that the problem is not too significant. For in
economics, 'uniqueness is the exception rather than the rule for general models. '" We
must look to other information, beyond that embodied in formal mathematical models,
to help us select among equilibria.' (Friedman 1992 p. 43). Myerson notes that
'anything that focuses the players' attention on one equilibrium may make them
expect it and hence fulfil it as a self-fulfilling prophecy' (Myerson 1992 p. 68). Raub
et al suggest that other factors will help focus players attention on the cooperative
solution, including 'conditions like opportunities for direct communication, the
availability of charismatic leaders which (sic) have the status of central brokers
providing unambiguous rules without being endowed with direct sanctioning power,
and a common history of the actors or tradition' (Raub et al 1992 p. 98). Each of
these could influence the outcome of the prisoner's dilemma supergame favourably
in terms of successful educational provision without the state.
Secondly, we need to ask, are the conditions which taylor found for the cooperative
solution likely to be met in practice? Taylor suggests that cooperation is less likely
to occur the larger the number of players. The main reason for this 'size' effect is that:
'Cooperation can be sustained only if conditional Cooperators are present and
conditional Cooperators must be able to monitor the behaviour of others.' (Taylor
1987 p. 105). This monitoring is clearly more costly the larger the number of players.
However, this is assuming perfect information. If we move away from this, as we
noted was possible above, then things change in favour of a cooperative solution..
Rasmusen notes that: 'Uncertainty over the player's payoffs can make cooperation
more likely, not less.' (Rasmusen 1992 p. 91). Raub et al concur: 'incomplete
information, far from fundamentally undermining game-theoretic analyses ofcollective
action problems, may be a crucial mechanism of cooperation in a game-theoretic
framework.' (Raub et al 1992 p. 99).
These issues cannot be explored further in the context of this thesis. The conclusion
must be, however, that Jonathan's suggestion that educational provision without the
state would suffer from a prisoner's dilemma cannot be sustained.
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This is as far as we can go with the theoretical discussion here. We have shown that,
in general terms, the externalities of education are likely to be provided without the
authority of states, that there is likely to be cooperation as regards education, that
provision, funding and regulation of this could occur by individuals acting even within
their own self-interest. Moreover, as soon as altruism was allowed to enter into the
picture - altering in game theoretic terms the payoffs of the players - then this
cooperation is even more likely to emerge. But we still haven't tackled the
practicalities of how the particular externalities desired by Raz, White, Grace and,
generally the 'political left' - namely, education for democracy for all, and education
for autonomy for all - are likely to arise without state intervention. As remarked
above, it is not possible in a philosophical treatise to do more than make some brief
remarks about the kinds of mechanisms which could bring these about: some
speculative comments to this effect follow.
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6.4 West's market model, his 'minimum adequate education', and externalities
Propositions 4 and 5 of chapter 4 suggested that education for autonomy would be
subject to the collective action problem, and that it couldn't arise by people pursuing
their own selfish, or even altruistic, goals. Similarly for education for democracy from
chapter 3. We have now seen that, in general, externalities of education can be
provided by players pursuing their own self-interest without outside intervention - and
as these 'game theoretic' models were the ones either implicitly or explicitly used by
those who argue for state intervention for the provision of 'public goods', we can say
that there is likelihood that externalities of education in general could be provided
without state intervention. But how could the specific externalities of concern here be
provided? Let us pursue this question by putting it into the context of West's market
model, as we left the discussion at the end of chapter 5.
Education for autonomy for all
The first thing that is interesting about White's and O'Hear's list of the qualities
needed in the autonomous person, is that many of the qualities and skills are those
which parents are highly likely to seek for their children, or which children are highly
likely to seek for themselves, for 'instrumental?" or self-interested reasons. For
example, a brief analysis of O'Hear and White's list of qualities and skills of the
autonomous person (O'Hear and White 1991 pp. 12-16) suggests that the following
40 By 'instrumental' I mean those reasons connected with improving employment or
wealth-creating prospects, and reasons enabling individuals to fit in with society, to
obey the law, respect the needs of the family, and so on. (This could be contrasted
with those qualities which people would seek for 'intrinsic' reasons, because of the
delight in learning for its own sake, for self-fulfilment, and so on).
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are likely to fit into this 'instrumental' or 'self-interested' category":
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Personal Qualities
Personal Concerns
attentiveness to basic needs such as health, wealth, and law and order
qualities of character such as courage, self-control, patience, practical judgement, etc.;
commitment to pursuing and persevering with personal projects; enjoyment of physical
pleasures;
Social Involvement and concern for others
working with others for shared goals
enjoying others' company
promoting and protecting the well-being of those close to one
refraining from harming other people
Critical and reflective awareness
reflectiveness about priorities among one's values, enabling one to cope with value
conflict;
possessing the intellectual virtues necessary to sustain one's practical judgment
Knowledge and understanding
Scientific Knowledge and Understanding?
Personal Knowledge and Understanding?
Social Knowledge and Understanding?
experience of the arts
vocational aspects of arts
personal enjoyment aspects
personal competencies
communication and numeracy
planning and organisation
social interaction
Conversely, a similar analysis suggests that the following skills and qualities are not
likely to be sought for these instrumental or self-interested reasons:
41 A question mark indicates doubt about inclusion.
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Personal Qualities
Personal Concerns
none
Social Involvement and concern for others
a more general beneficence
being impartial
Chapter 6
Critical and reflective awareness
critical awareness of obstacles to self-determination (including overcoming
authoritarian creeds, manipulation, etc.)
openness towards one's value system
contemplative reflectiveness on human nature and existence.
Knowledge and understanding
Scientific Knowledge and Understanding?
Personal Knowledge and Understanding?
Social Knowledge and Understanding?
experience of the arts
Rich experience of a variety of arts
personal competencies
none?
What can we say about this analysis? If there are qualities which are in the self-
interest of those who need to acquire them, and moreover, if those individuals are
aware of both the need and the way in which it serves their self-interest", then it
seems highly likely that they will seek to acquire these qualities and skills. Of course,
we can only say that this is 'highly likely' - but then we would not be able to
guarantee more under a compulsory curriculum for autonomy, for reasons given in
chapter 3 (3.4) when we discussed these issues in that context".
42 Perhaps because they are clearly the qualities which would interest employers, or
which would enable someone to find a partner and raise a family, etc.
43 Note too that children need to be motivated in order to take in a compulsory
curriculum, and a strong motivator, perhaps explicitly used as such by teachers, is
likely to be this notion of self-interest or instrumental value.
310 Chapter 6
White, I suggest, would have two problems with this: Firstly, he could point out that,
although that it is likely that many of these qualities could arise 'spontaneously' by
families pursuing their own ends (that is, in the language of this chapter, these
externalities will be produced without state intervention), the crucial factor will be that
not all families will be pursuing these ends: some families will not do what is in their
own self-interest to do. Secondly, he could point out that I have conceded that there
are some parts of his curriculum for autonomy not likely to be being met in any
family pursuing these instrumental or self-interested goals. He could of course agree
that there would be some additional families who would be pursuing these other
qualities and skills for 'intrinsic reasons' - but still there would remain the problem
of those families not doing so.
In the case of the first problem, what we are saying in effect is that there are some
families who are not concerned with, or knowledgeable about, their own welfare, and
are consequently not pursuing their own self-interest. White's solution to this would
be to impose a compulsory curriculum for autonomy on them. This might not be
effective, for all the reasons already given in chapters 3 and 4. But would it indeed
be necessary? Firstly, it could well be that in West's market model, the inspectorate's
'rules of thumb' would include considerations relating to people pursuing their own
welfare. Moreover, our discussion of game theory points us to the possibility that
through the example and concern of others in the community, these families could
come to develop those qualities and skills too".
44 The population of 'meanies' could be 'invaded' by the cooperators, to put it into the
language of game theory.
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As far as the second problem is concerned, again White's solution would be to impose
these missing qualities and skills through a national curriculum. Again, there are many
difficulties with this, as already discussed. But again, would it be necessary to do so?
There would be a multitude of ways in which educational reformers concerned with
these issues could avoid this implication. They could campaign to promote these ideas
to educators, to parents, to the inspectorate, or to the media". Or they might promote
local action, local initiatives, local experimentation, and hope that programmes arise
which can be imitated or adapted to other areas.
But supposing these ideas consistently failed to interest those people who didn't seek
to promote these values and skills for themselves or their families. Suppose, for
example, that families just weren't interested in promoting the value of 'openness
towards one's value system'. What would the educational reformers do then? They
would have to concede defeat, or try again at another time. But this exactly parallels
the situation of imposing these values through an improved democracy, for example,
one that was more responsive to political equality, which as we have seen, in chapter
5, White seeks. In a more responsive democracy, the educational reformers' ideas
would have to convince the public, and would fail to be implemented if there was not
enough public support. Only when people were willing to take them on would they
be implemented through the democratic system. In the case of bringing them about
45 For example, Medved notes how the boycott weapon has been used by advertisers
to promote certain values: the Burger King Corporation refused to use their advertising
in any programs which were undermining 'traditional American values' including 'the
importance of the family' (Medved 1992 p. 330).
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without the state, the same conclusion arises".
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To summarise, the argument is that it is possible for the externality of 'education for
autonomy for all', as stipulated by White (and Q'Hear) to arise without state
intervention at all, through, firstly, people pursuing their own self-interest, and
secondly, through the campaigns of educational reformers. This is not to say that it
will arise, but then we have already seen difficulties with it arising with state
intervention.
Education for democracy for all
Similar considerations to those discussed under education for autonomy apply here.
Some parts of the curriculum for democracy are likely to be in the self-interest or of
instrumental value to parents or children - for example, knowing how to vote or how
to lobby political representatives, and so on. But there are likely to be parts of the
curriculum which, although they would be in the peoples' self-interest to know of, are
likely to be difficult to discover. In these cases, however, another important factor,
as noted in West's discussion in chapter 3, also arises here, for it is in the interests of
political parties and lobbying groups to foster interest in their policies and the
shortcomings of the opposition, etc. Also it is in the interests of the media -
particulary newspapers and documentary film-makers - to ensure that there is much
public debate and interest around political matters. We see this clearly in our system
how independent television producers and newspaper editors constantly seek out
46 To put it into the language of game theory, White and Raz, for example, could see
themselves as part of that vanguard, the cooperative subgroup, invading the population
of 'meanies'.
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exposes of government or opposition scandals or inadequacies. So much of value of
an education for democracy can be provided without the state, by individuals pursuing
their own interest. Again, those seeking state-promoted curriculum would be worried
that not all would receive this curriculum if it was left to the whims of these
independent agencies. We have already discussed this important issue in chapter 3
(3.6). Again, we can conclude that the externality of education for democracy for all
could arise without state intervention, that mechanisms of self-interest exist which
would ensure this.
Conclusions: West's market model and the public goods dilemma
Where does this leave our discussion of objections to West's market model? The
argument against the model was that because education is a public good, that it is
inappropriate for its allocation to be left to markets. Our provisional conclusion is that
it is possible that education is an 'impure' public good, (in the sense that it has
externalities which are likely to be highly non-excludable, indivisible, and/or nonrival).
But this then raised the crucial issue of whether the economists were correct in
suggesting that the qualities of nonexcludability, nonrivalness and/or indivisibility
really did imply that the goods in question would not be provided, or be
underprovided, by markets; this we pointed out was the 'public goods dilemma'. When
applied to educational provision, the questioned raised was whether, without state
intervention, the market would underprovide, or fail to provide, the externalities
desired from education. In particular, in terms of education for democracy and
education for autonomy, this questioned propositions 4 and 5 of chapters 3 and 4.
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We examined one argument that there would be this 'market failure', that of Ruth
Jonathan, under the spotlight of the literature concerned with this public goods
dilemma. We showed that she was not, in general, correct in her assumption, that the
prisoner's dilemma showed that there would be market failure as regards educational
provision, funding and regulation without the state. This was true even when we
considered the simplest two-person one-off game; it became much harder to sustain
as we looked at more complicated many-person iterated games. Similarly we can say
that Raz was incorrect in his strong assumptions raised in chapter 4 about the public
goods dilemma; again we have another strong challenge to his 'contingent objection',
a suggestion that in order to provide the desirable outcomes of education, it might not
be necessary to have the state intervene. In terms of the desired education for
autonomy, and education for democracy, it was suggested that these could emerge
without state intervention. But crucially, although the argument as to how they might
emerge was necessarily rather loose and speculative, we challenged the argument
which purported to show that they couldn't so emerge on stronger, logical grounds.
Both the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods dilemma have a deceptive appeal.
They seem as if they can, simply and logically, justify the need for state intervention
in our lives, to secure valuable aims. But once the dilemmas are put under close
scrutiny, this initial appeal often fails: we have shown this to be the case as regards
education. We have taken the logical argument as far as it can go - and shown that
there is no foundation to the defeatism which would suggest we need state
intervention to provide desired externalities of education. There is a need for historical
work to take this discussion further. Possible such work could build on the comments
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made in appendix 1 and show that the voluntary decisions of ordinary individuals in
the nineteenth century laid the foundations for approximations to education for
autonomy, education for citizenship, and also, intriguingly, equality of educational
opportunity: all before the state got involved. However, such work is definitely beyond
the scope of this thesis: It is time to draw all these threads together; the final chapter
will assess the case against West's market model in educational provision and draw
out the minimal implications of this for state intervention in education.
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Chapter 7
In the newspaper this morning (Daily Telegraph January 8th 1994) are two stories.
One concerns the raging debate about in vitro fertilisation, specifically the removal of
eggs from aborted foetuses. The voices raised against this uniformly believe that the
regulatory body, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), should
use its statutory powers and ban it. The second story concerns the urgent need for
child-care facilities, to prevent young children from being left on their own while both
parents are at work. Here the appeal is for governments to step in and provide these.
Both stories illustrate a widespread 'mindset' about the role of government. If it is
bad, ban it; if it is good, governments should provide it. But there is an alternative
position: that if something is bad, certainly campaign against it, invoke moral outrage,
and so on, but don't involve government; similarly if something is good, campaign for
it, organise and lobby for it from voluntary and private interests, but again don't
involve government'.
It is this 'mindset' that this thesis has addressed, concerning state intervention in
education: There are many desirable intrinsic and extrinsic benefits sought from
education; we seek, for example, that children should grow up to develop and thrive,
to become autonomous, to become good citizens of a democracy, and so on; therefore
1 A converse trap which libertarians often fall into is to think that just because
something shouldn't be banned, that therefore it must be good: so libertarians often
think it is de rigueur to praise pornography. An alternative position is to agree that
pornography shouldn't be banned, but still to argue against it.
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governments must step in to provide these things. This is the position which has been
challenged, using the seminal work of E.G West.
We set out West's 'market model' of education in chapter 1. This began with four
assumptions about an imaginary society: firstly, that the 'protection of minors
principle' prevailed, conceding that the state could intervene in those cases where it
was discovered that any child was being deprived by its family of an 'adequate
minimum education'. Secondly, that there was as yet no state involvement in that
society, hence that we were in an 'original position', able to decide what state
intervention would be desirable and justified. Thirdly, that in this low tax society, most
parents were able to afford to provide educational opportunities for their children:
indeed, fourthly, the great majority of parents were doing that. From these four
assumptions, West arrived at conclusions about the justified minimum state
intervention: these were that the state was justified in ensuring that every child had
access to a 'minimum adequate education'; that an inspectorate should be set up to
enforce this; that funding should be arranged so that those too poor to provide these
opportunities could do so; and finally, that selective compulsion should similarly
ensure that the irresponsible also provided access to these opportunities for their
children. We then set out to examine some philosophical issues raised by this
discussion.
In chapter 2, we showed that, very plausibly, West's 'minimum adequate education
for all' could satisfy those concerned with 'equality of educational opportunity'. This
was argued by following the arguments of three prominent philosophers, Bernard
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Williams, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin - philosophers, moreover, likely to be
used by the political left to support their anti-market stance. This discussion was all
very abstract in that it assumed that we would know what the curriculum for West's
'minimum adequate education' would be. We turned to this 'fleshing out' in chapters
3 and 4.
Chapter 3 showed that there were difficulties in defining the curriculum in terms of
'education for democracy'. These were logical difficulties, and involved showing that
those committed to states being involved in the curriculum for democracy would also
need to be committed to a 'fitness test' for participation in democracy. Most, it was
suggested, would then reject this position. Similarly, chapter 4 showed that there were
problems with using an 'education for autonomy' to similarly flesh out West's
'minimum adequate education'. This was in particular because, not only could we find
no positive justification for the state to be involved in the promotion of autonomy -
in particular by examining Joseph Raz's arguments - but also because the 'epistemic
argument' seemed to undermine the justification for any centrally-planned compulsory
curriculum.
Not being able to use the two most promising curricula possibilities to 'flesh out'
West's 'minimum adequate education', we turned to examine the possibility that what
was desirable instead was that the democracy should decide on this curriculum
content. Thus in chapter 5 we explored an argument for democratic control of the
curriculum - with wider implications for education more generally. We found this
argument floundering on logical constraints to improvements to democracy. It was
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suggested that some compromise might be found by those supporting democratic
control, in that some voting systems might be better than others, and not fall foul of
all the difficulties mentioned. But this then raised the issue of whether it was all worth
the effort, whether in fact the justifications for democracy could indeed be met within,
for example, West's market model. The suggestion was, indeed, that they could.
This brought us to consider, again, the curriculum for West's 'minimum adequate
education'. The suggestion was that the curriculum content itself could be left to the
market. As far as the inspectorate went, it was suggested that they would use 'rules
of thumb' evolved in their own traditions to decide which educational opportunities
were inadequate. Hence West's minimum adequate education could be ensured without
the state being involved in promoting a particular curriculum.
There was one strand of the argument which had been revealed several times in
chapters 3 and 4, and also which pervaded West's own writing, and that concerned
whether or not education was a public good, and whether its 'externalities' fell foul
of the 'public goods dilemma'. These issues were taken up in chapter 6. Here it was
argued that education could well be a public good of some description. However,
when the public goods dilemma was explored in detail - and shown to be dependent
upon game theoretic ideas - we discovered that there was not a strong argument for
assuming that the state needed to be involved in the promotion, regulation or funding
of education, over and above the involvement laid out in West's thesis.
We can return now to West's conclusions in chapter 1, to see how they fare against
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this discussion. Recall that several of the issues were empirical ones, which we are no
closer to resolving now - so, for example, we still wouldn't know how many families
would fit into each of West's groups 1-4 (including the revised Ia-Ie). But one
comment worth recalling was that, if the curriculum for the 'minimum adequate
education' was very demanding, this might lead to more families not meeting these
requirements, hence require a larger role for the state. We still can't answer this issue
- but at least we have ruled out, for many readers, what seemed to be the very
demanding curricula of education for democracy, and education for autonomy, and
hence provided some support for West's optimism about the numbers of families who
would be able to provide an adequate education for their children.
If we return to the possible positions compatible with West's argument, outlined in
chapter 1, (1.7), can we adjudicate between them as we suggested? Probably not. It
is clear that some could have come with me all the way in the thesis and still argue
that the assumptions of West's market model would lead to a national curriculum (for
those who felt that the discussion of education for democracy didn't rule this out - that
is, for example, for those who wouldn't mind the commitment to fitness tests for
democracy, who saw no contradiction between propositions 3 and 3* of chapter 3; or
for those who floundered on the need for inspections to utilise 'rules of thumb') that
it could lead to universal compulsion, funding and provision (because we haven't been
able to address 'the empirical issues of invasiveness, means-testing, and the expense
of administering vouchers); moreover, some could still be unpersuaded by the
discussion of chapter 5 and argue that what is required is democratic control of the
curriculum, or of education more generally, and that this can be achieved in an
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improved democracy - albeit one with very complicated voting procedures.
However, if the weight of the arguments of this thesis are accepted, then several
issues, it is hoped, will be less indeterminate than they appeared in chapter 1. The
issue of equality of opportunity will have been shown not to be a valid objection
against West's market model, in terms of provision, funding or regulation. But it is
also hoped that the idea of a national curriculum, in particular the proposed national
curricula reviewed here, will be found to be strongly opposed. Hence, it could be
argued that West's neglect of discussion of the curriculum was vindicated, because the
discussion here has argued against states being involved in this area. It is also hoped
that the discussion on democratic control of education will have persuaded some that
even allowing democratic states into the areas of funding and provision, as well as the
curriculum, was not desirable, and not necessary to ensure its desired ends. Finally,
as far as the discussion of the empirical issues noted in chapter 1 is concerned, chapter
6 is likely to have application there: for the arguments there will provide a powerful
counter to those economists and educationalists who will seek to supplement empirical
claims with theoretical discussion based on the notion that education is a public good.
The 'public goods' discussion brings us to another interesting observation on West's
thesis: for West allowed that there was a role for the state in ensuring a minimum
adequate education for all, in other words, in ensuring that 'equality of educational
opportunity' prevailed. But is even that state involvement necessary? For, in the game
theoretic discussion of chapter 6 (6.3, fourth model) it was suggested that it might be
in the self-interest of members of the community to fund those who couldn't afford
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educational opportunities for themselves. Perhaps then, it could be the case that this
externality could also be provided without state intervention? What sort of
mechanisms might there be which could help to bring this about? There could be
businesses fmancing the education of the poorer people in their area (to ensure capable
employees, or to raise their public-relations profile); families could be sponsoring
poorer people out of altruism; schools could provide for poorer members of the
society by doing 'education with production', making goods and selling them, or
providing services at a profit, and using these services to fund the poorer children;
entrepreneurs could link the provision of schooling in a community to the purchase
of a private good: some could set up schools that are free or subsidised at the point
of delivery, but where children purchase food, books, writing and sports equipment
on the premises'; fmally, an educational service could be provided as a 'public good'
through privately-fmanced radio, television and computer networks".
The point being made in these examples is that, if the state safety-net was withdrawn,
it does not necessarily follow that the externality of 'equality of educational
opportunity', West's 'minimum adequate education', would also simply disappear. If
the safety-net was not there, it could be that people themselves would be freed to
2 The producers of these private goods would find it is in their economic interests to
subsidise the schooling in order to raise revenue - in much the same way that shops
in a shopping mall contribute to the 'public good' of the street lighting and cleaning
etc. see Cowen 1992 p. 10.
3 This would benefit two sets of producers who would be able to tie-in their private
goods with this public goods provision, and hence be willing to subsidy this: these are,
firstly, advertisers, who would be keen to fund part of the cost of the service to get
their message across to all young people; secondly, the producers of the radio,
television and computer hardware and software, who would be keen to subsidise the
educational network so that more children and parents will buy their equipment.
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think up many ways of providing for educational opportunities for those unwilling or
unable to provide for them - out of both self-interest, and through altruism.
This kind of discussion is speculative, and is beyond the scope of the thesis to
explore. However, it does point to areas of future research which might be profitable
to pursue, seeking to ascertain the viability of a more 'libertarian' position than West
was willing to adopt, at least in West (1970). Another profitable area for future
research would be to take the 'epistemic argument' further, and provide a thorough
philosophical defence of markets in education (for this thesis has been more narrowly
concerned with considering some objections to markets, rather than making a full
defence). Such a defence would require exploration of the work of, inter alia, Hayek
(1960, 1978, 1982). And of course, further work in defence of markets would need to
go beyond a philosophical perspective, and examine historical and empirical evidence:
such work could build on the arguments of West elsewhere (West 1975b, 1975c, 1981,
1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991).
Finally, we can make some suggestions about how this discussion fits into the debate
about current reforms in England & Wales, particularly those ushered in with the 1988
Education Reform Act Because this thesis is concerned with 'markets' in education,
and the current reforms are often proclaimed, by supporters and detractors alike", as
being concerned with markets, does this mean that the positive conclusions here could
also be modified to be positive arguments for current reforms? Or similarly, could, as
4 Ranson, for example, has recently noted that the 'Conservative Government in the
UK has over time introduced complex administrative regulations designed to create
a highly structured market of educational choice' (Ranson 1993 p. 334).
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argued by Ranson (1993), negative practical outcomes of current reforms be used as
valid objections to markets in education in general, and hence undermine the
theoretical discussion of West's market model? The crucial question is: are what is
being promoted through current reforms in England & Wales really 'markets'? At its
most basic level, a 'market' is a mechanism for the registering of preferences and
apportioning of resources in a society, and can be contrasted with government
planning procedures for achieving the same ends. So on one level, because under
current reforms government funds schooling through taxation, which is provided 'free'
at the point of delivery, it could be argued that this situation bears very little
resemblance to a market of any description. In real markets decisions about funding
would be in the 'hands of those seeking the educational opportunities. (This is the case
in West's market model, where all except the poor and irresponsible make decisions
about education and fund these according to their own wishes). However, as the term
is commonly used, it is possible also to have market mechanisms within government
funded and/or government supplied institutions. In these cases, commonly called
'internal markets', the resources to be apportioned are those funded and/or supplied
by the government. So, with this caveat, can the current situation be described as an
'internal market'? Now, there are two aspects to any market - the supply side and the
demand side. Through the demand side, individual's preferences are expressed, and
the supply side then apportions the resources. Certainly, the demand side - with
'money follow students' through per capita funding and less control over enrolment -
has been opened up to a certain extent under current reforms. But crucially, the
supply side has not been liberated: it is very difficult to set up a school, there is unfair
competition between schools - for state schools are subsidised, private schools not;
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moreover, although there are moves afoot to allow schools to 'opt-in' to the state
system and receive funding on the same basis as state schools, the rules only allow
this to happen if there are no 'surplus places' in the local area, something which is
unlikely to occur very often. Finally, and very importantly, although it is unrealistic
to expect a market not to be regulated, the regulation of the National Curriculum is
precisely that which undermines the possibility of a liberated supply-side, for it
imposes heavy restrictions on the degree of diversity tolerated.
So what we see as a result of the current reforms could not really be referred to as a
'market', not even an 'internal market'. Thus on one level the considerations of this
thesis cannot be used to support the current reforms, nor can practical criticism of
these reforms be used to undermine the discussion here. However, what the arguments
here can do is, firstly, to point out the inconsistencies between elements of current
reforms - for example, by suggesting that, if it is market mechanism which are sought,
then it is not much good allowing demand to express itself through per capita funding,
if the supply-side is also not opened up. Secondly, the arguments here can be used to
support certain possible future developments which do fall in line with genuine market
or 'internal market' reforms. For example, if the debate about vouchers begins again,
or if schools seek more to diversify, or schools are allowed to opt-in to the state
system. For likely objections to such moves from the 'political left' would be in terms
of the failure to satisfy equality of opportunity, or the need to strengthen the links
between democracy and education, or apprehensions about the 'public good' of
education. The discussion of this thesis could then be adapted to counter such
criticisms.
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One final comment about the conclusions of this thesis. The arguments throughout,
but particularly in the last chapter, could be seen to be aimed at those who would like
to do something to help ameliorate educational disadvantage and injustice, but feel that
the only way to approach this is through collective political action. My thesis
suggests that there is an alternative approach, that voluntary activity can be very
important and worthwhile. People of goodwill and social concern could, it is
suggested, put less of an effort, and less funds, into politics, and more into grassroots
projects in their neighbourhoods. Crucially, they need not feel that this activity would
be futile or second-best.
327
APPENDICES
Appendices
328 Appendices
Appendix 1 (Chapter 1)
Historical evidence from nineteenth-century England & Wales
E.G. West's 4th assumption of near-universal educational provision was inspired by his reading of the
historical evidence of educational provision in Victorian England & Wales. In this appendix I review
his arguments, and those of some of his critics.
Quantitative issues
West's major insight, widely accepted now by historians of the political 'left' and 'right', was that
before the state intervened in 1870 (and its intervention before that had little impact) there was
widespread provision of schooling in England & Wales. From the political 'left', for example, Johnson
notes that 'One of the most interesting developments in working-class history has been the rediscovery
of popular educational traditions, the springs of action of which owed little to philanthropic,
ecclesiastical or state provision.' (Johnson 1979 p. 75). He cites West as one of the sources of this
revisionism.
West's argument is that, prior to the major state involvement in education through the 1870 Act, school
attendance rates and literacy rates were high. As regards literacy, West first notes the substantial
circumstantial evidence, that until 1833, the action of the state was one of deliberate hindrance of
individual efforts towards literacy (West 1970 p. 127). For example, there were fiscal and legal actions
against the spread of newspapers. Steam printing was introduced in the 1830s and caused reductions
in the price of newspapers, which began to increase their sales, despite restrictive taxes: 'That a mass
newspaper-reading public was already in existence well before 1870 is now firmly acknowledged by
specialist writers' (p. 128). Secondly, he reviews statistical evidence including records of educational
qualifications of criminals, records of workhouse children, workplace literacy returns, and numbers of
people signing the marriage register. From these various sources, he concludes that '93% of school
leavers were already literate when the 1870 board schools first began to operate' (p. 137).
As regards schooling, West uses a variety of widely available statistics, including the report of the
Newcastle Commission on Popular Education, published in 1861. Its results showed that 95.5% of
children were in school for up to 6 years. The remaining 4.5% could be accounted for by sick children,
children educated at home, and also perhaps an error in estimation (p. 142).
When Forster introduced his Education Bill of 1870 into parliament, he made no reference to the
Newcastle Commission's findings, but relied on evidence from a small scale survey conducted by two
inspectors in 1869 over a period of a few months in four industrial towns, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds
and Birmingham (p. 144). In Liverpool, for example, he argued that, out of an estimated 80 000
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children of school age, '20000 of them attend no school whatever, while at least another 20 000 attend
schools where they get an education not worth having' (quoted p. 144). Is this discrepancy between
Forster's and the Newcastle Commission's results significant? West notes that it arises because of the
definition of 'school age'. The Newcastle Commission had discovered that a typical child was at school
for 5.7 years. Forster had assumed that the school age population was of children between the ages of
5 and 13, i.e. an 8 year schooling period. Even if we assume that the school age period had increased
from 5.7 to 6 years by the time of Forster's survey, then instead of his estimated 80 000 children of
school age, we are likely to find a reduced figure of 60 000, (ie 3/4 of 80 000). This was exactly the
figure that Forster's survey found in school!'.
We must be clear exactly what level of government funding we are concerned with before 1870. There
was some state subsidy to schooling from 1833. However, when presenting his evidence for his 1870
Bill, Forster noted that two-thirds of funding carne from non-state sources, (parents fees and Church
and philanthropic funds) and this was evidence regarding schools in receipt of public subsidies: in other
schools, of course, state support would be zero (West 1983 p. 427). Also note that the biggest part of
the school fees were provided by parents (p. 427i.
Now, although West's insight that there was substantial non-state educational provision, his precise
figures are disputed. One argument comes from Green, who states that West 'has attempted to
rehabilitate the reputation of English educationallaissez1aire, arguing that reformers ... exaggerated
English deficiencies. However, comparative data, which West largely ignores, vindicates the deficiency
verdict, at least in terms of the relative position of English education' (Green 1990 p. 11, emphasis
added).
That is, Green suggests that the main thrust against the English system is that it was failing to achieve
the same levels of enrolment and literacy as the heavily interventionist European states. However, when
he actually gets around to reviewing this evidence, it transpires that even according to him, England's
relative position in the mid nineteenth-century was better than France's as regards the percentage of
the population receiving schooling, (p. 15) and with regard to adult literacy (p. 25). Green neither
disputes that there was a widespread 'national network' of schools in Victorian England & Wales
without the state (p. 8), nor does he dispute that this was more effective than the French centralised
1 The fallacy that Forster committed would be rather like defining the proper school leaving age in
England today as 20 years, working out the number of children in school, and then claiming that a great
number of 'school-age' children were not in school at all. The Report of the Statistical Society of
Bristol, in the Journal of the Statistical Society ofLondon, iv (1841) 252-3, first pointed out Forster's
error (West 1983 fn6 pp. 80-1).
2 Note Kiesling's (1983) misunderstanding of this point
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state educational system. It doesn't seem that his challenge to West is as substantial as he suggests.
Other historians concur: Stephens notes that in the period 1850-90, 'the proportion of literate persons
in England' was higher than in France, although less than in Germany (Stephens 1987 p. 16).
A second criticism comes from Stephens. He thinks that West has taken the Newcastle Commission's
conclusions too literally. He says that their estimate of time spent in school of 'five to seven years'
(Stephens 1987 p. 52)3 was probably on the optimistic side: 'At all events this time probably included
years spent as toddlers from three years of age upwards, and anyway. being an average, varied greatly
from place to place, and was in practice reduced by irregular attendance.' (p. 52). Now, even if
Stephens is correct in this observation, then it is clear that he is not undermining the basic claim of
West - only that he is arguing over the specific details of what exactly the percentages were of children
who were in schooling or adults who were literate. He is not disputing West's fundamental claim that
without the state (or with very minimal state interference), there were very high literacy and schooling
It is undisputed that the majority of children were literate and attending school to some degree.
It is crucial to recall that this was in an age of great poverty. Perhaps the crucial question for our
purposes, trying to extrapolate from this evidence conclusions about education without the state more
generally, is to what extent any shortcomings in schooling provision were the result of such economic
factors. We shall turn to this question below.
Now John Stuart Mill writing in 1834 would have concurred with this conclusion: 'As far, therefore,
as quantity of teaching is concerned, the education of our people is, or will speedily be, amply provided
for.' However, he continues: 'It is the quality which so grievously demands the amending hand of
government. And this is the demand which is principally in danger of being obstructed by popular
apathy and ignorance.'(quoted in Garforth 1980 p. 114t. This is crucial. Even if it is conceded that
there was schooling of this sort, this is still a long shot from saying that the schooling was of an
'adequate' quality without the state. What can we say about the quality of schooling in nineteenth-
century England & Wales?
Quality of schooling
It is clearly very difficult to make an assessment of the quality of schooling received by children in the
nineteenth century. Even if it was unremittingly bad, this would not necessarily have any bearing when
3 I think he means 5.7 years here.
4 Note that Mill's objections might be the objections of a perfectionist he also objected to the quality
of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, to which he 'directed his most scathing criticism'
(Garforth 1980 p. 113).
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we come to extrapolate from the evidence - for not only have educational ideas changed, but also we
would want to consider what effect poverty would have had on the quality of schooling. Moreover, as
far as the educational experiences of children more generally are concerned, schooling may not have
been the most significant component in any case - we will return to this below. It is difficult to make
the assessment, but many writers have done so and so it is important to at least examine some of the
evidence.
Two of the factors often cited as leading to a poor quality of schooling were very likely to be the
effects of poverty, namely poor school attendance, and an early school-leaving age. As far as school
attendance is concerned, West notes: 'It is now a recognised world-wide phenomenon that absenteeism
from schools is more common in agricultural areas, whether their education is compulsory or not, and
whether they have state schooling or private schooling' (West 1970 p. 161). Periodic absence from
school was thus not necessarily a sign of parental negligence, but of 'judicious weighing of the expected
sacrifice in family income against the expected educational benefits' (p. 162). Similarly for the school
leaving age, parents were often too poor to send their children to school above a certain age, whether
they wanted to or not (p. 163). (We will discuss parental attitudes further below).
What of the quality of the curriculum and teaching? It is worth remarking that with state involvement,
the quality issue does not necessarily get solved. For example, Green, whom we noted is highly critical
of West's position, himself points out that just because a state was heavily involved in education, 'this
does not mean that what [was] taught was necessarily desirable from all points of view, and indeed, the
kinds of knowledge and attitudes that were transmitted by the most efficient systems, notably in Prussia,
often reflected most illiberal and doctrinaire purposes on the part of the state, and consequently
engendered great suspicion amongst those with more democratic leanings.' (Green 1990 p. 8).
Similarly, there is Mill's well-known waming that a 'general State education is a mere contrivance for
moulding people to be exactly like one another.... in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it
establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.' (Mill [1859],
1972 p. 175).
So with the state controlling curriculum and teaching, there may still be problems. But what about
without? The educational reformers of the nineteenth century were adamant that the quality of schooling
needed to be improved, and could be improved only with state action. Recent historians have concurred
with this. For example, Stephens notes: 'With the advent of government funding and inspection,
followed by the introduction into public schools of pupil teachers, increasing numbers of trained
teachers, better buildings and equipment, more generous provision of books and so on, the benefit of
a sound curriculum and teaching methods, and the pressure for regular attendance, standards in
inspected public schools, particularly from the 1850s, must certainly have outstripped those of schools
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reliant on local funding and school pence and under less external pressure.' (Stephens 1987 p. 25,
emphasis added).
That is, the intervention of government had the effect of improving the quality of schooling, which
would not otherwise have occurred. Two comments about this. Firstly, it is not true that these
'improvements' could have come about only through state intervention. Some of them were simply the
result of more funds (buildings, equipment, books), and more funds could have come from other sources
besides the state - from voluntary contributions, charities, or simply improved wealth over time of the
people buying schooling. Moreover, Stephens can't mean that 'the pressure for regular attendance' was
state-induced, because schooling didn't become compulsory for some years after the period he is
surveying. So this must have been something that happened irrespective of state involvement',
Secondly, how can we be so sure that the 'improvements' he is describing did lead to higher standards?
It is a common assumption today that better buildings, resources, trained teachers, etc., do lead to higher
quality - but in recent years, researchers have tried to look for correlations between these things and
found none (see for example Chubb and Moe 1990). As far as the situation in the nineteenth-century
is concerned, there may be other factors which mitigate against Stephens' conclusions. Concerning
trained teachers, West points out that the teacher training at the time consisted overwhelmingly of
rote-learning and that 'seems at least arguable that the communication of adults from varied occupations
might, on average, have been more useful and inspiring to children in school rooms than [trained
teachers] parroting of English Literature [from] young school teachers who, in their own lives, had had
little time to do anything else' (West 1970 p. 168). Johnson notes the preponderance of politically
radical teachers in the uninspected schools: 'Teaching was indeed an obvious resource for an intelligent,
self-educated man or woman especially if he or she had already fallen foul of employers or other
authorities.' (Johnson 1979 p. 81). So it might not have been the case that trained teachers led to a
higher quality of schooling.
Doubts must be cast on Stephens' suggestion that government inspection also led to higher quality of
education: it must be noted that the inspectors' early official concept of educational efficiency meant
'a schooling which scored high marks in divinity and morality' (West 1970b p. 90). Indeed, some
schools were deemed worthless precisely because of failure in moral and religious training. But it is
likely that many parents felt that these aspects of education were being largely catered for in the family
5 Also note that the type of state intervention he is referring to is pretty minimal. These 'public
schools' he is describing are simply publicly-inspected schools, with some small government subsidy.
They are not what we would term 'publicly provided' today. (In fact they are more akin to schools
within West's market model!) So even if Stephens is correct, and these were of much higher quality
than the non-inspected schools, then this would be an argument only for inspection and very small
subsidy - it is not an argument for state provision or funding in general.
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and in the Sunday Schools - 'on week-days families were demanding education in more "practical"
matters', (p. 91), such as reading, writing and arithmetic. Moreover, it must be noted that inspectors
making these criticisms are known to have had particular biases. For example, H.S Tremenheere in the
early l850s noted that the people's education enabled them to read 'seditious literature without having
the moral or intellectual strength to discern its falseness' (Stephens 1987 p. 133). This was literature
which was 'exaggerating the principle of equality before God and the law', and encouraging workers
to be antagonistic towards their employers (p. 133). With prejudices like these, it may well be that the
inspector's reports were not as valuable as Stephens suggests, nor as likely to lead to improved quality
of educational experiences.
Again, the assumption that better buildings were likely to have led to educational improvements may
also be far-fetched. It too may have had no impact at all on children - indeed, as Gardner noted, it may
well have meant schooling in large, cold, regimented factory-like surroundings, rather than the cosy
schoolroom of the dame school, and may in fact have been detrimental to education",
Green also argues 'that the quality of schooling in nineteenth-century England & Wales was very poor.
He argues that even the quality of post-elementary schooling for the middle-classes was inferior to that
found in continental Europe. He arrives at this conclusion by noting that there were only 100 secondary
schools in England & Wales that even aspired to the standards of the German Gymnasien; 'and one may
doubt whether any of these matched the latter's academic standards'. (Green 1990 p. 17). But even if
this figure of 100 is correct, then this is to be compared with 139 Gymnasien (p. 16) which is a greater
number, true, but not that much more. Moreover, in France, there were only 77 lycees. But how is
6 Stephens does give us some evidence to support his statement, but none of it seems very substantial.
One statistic he gives us that by 1851, 'about 89 per cent of boys and girls in the voluntary schools
were learning reading as opposed to 84 per cent of boys and 87 per cent of girls in private schools.'
(Stephens 1987 pp. 25-6). These are very minor differences, perhaps not statistically significant
Writing was also less commonly taught in the private schools than in the public schools, but he says
that this 'reflects the greater concentration of the very young in the dame schools, many of which did
not teach writing' (p. 26). He also tells us that the uninspected schools were 'certainly less efficient that
the inspected schools. It was reckoned that in the uninspected schools of Birmingham less than a quarter
of pupils would have passed the appropriate examination under the Revised Code.' (p. 149). How many
would have passed in the inspected schools? How was the previous figure obtained, if the schools were
not inspected? Were the inspected schools better because of the better training of teachers, etc., or was
there some other reason? We are left in the dark with the information given. Some schools were run
'cheaply with uncertified teachers and poor equipment; they were thus unable to obtain government
grants and a bad situation was compounded.' (p. 204). But why does this tell us that the quality of
schooling was low? We simply do not know whether certified teachers were really any better. He tells
us that the inspectorate were dismayed by the 'number of poorly staffed, ill equipped schools.' (p. 262).
He notes that one report showed that 'educational progress since 1853' in Monmouthshire was very
marked, yet points out that this can't have been the case, because of the low number of certified
teachers and schools in positions of grants. His assumption is that these are related to educational
quality: but it is an assumption not borne out by this particular evidence.
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his figure of 100 obtained? He notes that there were in total, according to the Taunton Commission
of 1868, 9 public schools, 46 boarding schools and 209 endowed grammar schools, plus a 'dense
outgrowth of "lesser" private schools' (p. 17). As the Commissioners found most of the lesser private
schools 'unspeakably bad', and the endowed grammar schools generally 'very unsatisfactory' and
'chaotic' (p. 17), Green wants to ignore most of these from his calculations. However, he admits that
70 of the grammar schools sent children to university, which suggests that these at least can't have been
that bad. So even taking these 70, and adding them to the 46 and 9 upper class elitist schools, then we
actually have not 100 but 125 schools - which is much closer to the German figure, and nearly twice
as high as that in France. But note that, while he has doubted the quality of the English schools, he
has assumed that all of the continental schools were of a high standard. How does he make this
assumption? Perhaps if there had been similar Commissions set up in Prussia and France, they too
would have found some at least of those schools below standard? It seems that Green's evidence does
not lead us to conclude that the quality of education without the state in England & Wales was
necessarily so bad after all.
We conclude that, given the poverty of the period, the quality of education without the state may not
have been as bad as was suggested by contemporary observers, and reinforced by modem historians.
It is important to stress the poverty aspect, for we are considering whether there could have been
improvements without the state, given an increase in the wealth of the nation. It seems plausible that
the improvements noted by historians as being a product of state intervention could either have occurred
without the state, but with an improvement in the wealth of the society, or it is questionable whether
they were improvements in the quality of schooling at all'.
Remember too that we are talking about the quality of schooling, and not 'education' more generally.
The education that was going on elsewhere in children's lives is not taken into account in any of the
above. In homes, communities, churches, etc, there may well have been extensive educational
opportunities, which may well have been vastly superior to those received by children in schools this
century. (Moreover, what might be termed negative educational experiences, such as 'pulp' television
viewing, were not rife then). For example, Johnson comments on one undervalued 'popular educational
resource: the working-class family itself (Johnson 1979 p. 75), where families must be understood in
the extended sense of fathers, mothers, uncles and grandparents (pp. 80ft). He notes that part of the
tradition of working class 'radical education' was a critique of all forms of provided education,
including opposition to a centralized state system (p. 76), and an emphasis on 'men and women as
7 One other complaint of the nineteenth century reformers must be noted: in the 1830s the Manchester
Statistical Society complained that pupil-teacher ratios were too high. The figure they found was 26.8
pupils per teacher. In 1967 there were 29.7 pupils per teacher in English primary schools! (West
(1970b) p. 90).
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educators of their own children' (p. 77). In addition, he notes the educational resources of
'neighbourhood and even place of work, whether within the household or outside it, the acquisition of
literacy from mothers or fathers, the use of the knowledgeable friend or neighbour, or the 'scholar' in
neighbouring town or village, the work-place discussion and formal and informal apprenticeships, the
extensive networks of private schools and, in many cases, the local Sunday schools, most un-school-like
of the new devices, excellently adapted to working-class needs .... communal reading and discussion
groups, the facilities for newspapers in pub, coffee house or reading room, the broader cultural politics
of Chartist or Owenite branch-life, the institution of the travelling lecturer who, often indistinguishable
from "missionary" or demagogue, toured the radical centres, and, above all, the radical press, the most
successful radical invention and an extremely flexible (and therefore ubiquitous) educational form ....
best thought of as a series of educational networks.' (p. 80). William Cobbett - the 'original de-
schooler' - wrote 'What need had we of schools? What need of teachers? What need of scolding or
force, to induce children to read and write and love books.' (quoted p. 78).
Schooling is not contiguous with education, and even the quality of schooling was bad, this does not
necessarily imply that the total educational experiences of children were bad too.
Thus far in this historical survey, we can conclude that it is likely that the problems of quality and
quantity could have been solved by increases of wealth, and did not need the state to intervene to solve
them. The problem was low income, not a low importance attached to schooling or education more
generally. One major objection to this is that, irrespective of parents' income, their attitudes were often
set against schooling, and that this was a major cause of educational inadequacy, needing compulsion
by the state to rectify. It is to this that we turn next.
Attitudes of parents towards schooling
It is commonly held that not only did the state have to get involved in the funding of schooling from
1870, but that an essential part of its later intervention was also to make schooling compulsory. Only
in this way could adequate educational opportunities be provided for all. Stephens notes that 'despite
what has been said of the growth of working-class demand", all the evidence suggests that only some
form of compulsion combined with state assistance could bring what was generally considered as
adequate schooling' to the poorest children (Stephens 1987 p. 52 emphasis added)",
S 'Since schooling generally was not free and did not begin to become compulsory until the 1870s, the
rising school attendance figures over the two generations before that must reflect a growing demand
from working-class parents for formal schooling, however minimal.' (Stephens 1987 pp. 48-9).
9 He does equivocate slightly about this: surveying the evidence for Northern and Eastern England (p.
85), he notes that '[tlhere is little evidence to suggest that by 1870 adequate schooling for all children
could have been made a possibility without compulsion and increased public assistance.' (p. 85
emphasis added). This qualification - that by 1870 things could not have been significantly improved
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If compulsion is required, then this must be because of negative parental or child attitudes towards
schooling. In fact, when Stephens' evidence is surveyed. it is not clear how he is able to arrive at this
conclusion regarding the necessity of compulsion. Firstly, he is able to offer many positive findings
for parental attitudes to schooling. He notes that not only were there economic benefits to schooling,
but there were also political and social ones. He attempts to explain the parental demand in terms of:
religious motives; 'aspirations to the respectability of local clergy and others' (p. 49); the attractions
of 'reading for pleasure and the ability to communicate with relations living at a distance'; political
advantages; economic advantages, both real and hoped-for, of literacy, and of schooling. Moreover,
'as schooling became the norm the completely unschooled became increasingly untypical, a situation
which must have brought its own pressure to conform' (p. 50): 'From 1840 schooling appears
increasingly desirable socially and also functionally advantageous in an increasing number of jobs.' (p.
51); 'Moreover, the vast expansion from the 1830s of didactic evangelical and utilitarian publications,
of political and commercial literature, and of newspapers, radical and otherwise, attest to a working-
class society in which the ability to read must have added to the economic advantages political and
social ones.' (p. 51).
This trend in schooling norms would have a considerable bearing on the thesis that compulsion would
be necessary to ensure an adequate education for all. If there were social and political, as well as
economic, advantages in sending children to school, and if there were norms that made it more
favourable to send children to school, then it is likely the rate of schooling would continue to increase.
However, let us ignore this (substantial) part of Stephens' evidence, and concentrate on the negative
attitudes of parents that he says would need state compulsion to overcome. It is not enough to say that
the parental attitudes were negative: we need to question whether there were reasons for these attitudes.
Reviewing his evidence, there seem to be four main reasons given. Three of these concern economic
factors which may have influenced parental choice about sending children to school. The first would
be the actual fees for schooling; the second would be the opportunity costs of sending children to
school. That is, the benefits foregone of children's income and assistance around the house that could
be had if children didn't go to school. This is likely to have been quite a considerable deterrent to many
poor parents. Stephens notes: 'Certainly not all families were able to view the loss of children's
earnings with equanimity.' (p. 52). Moreover, he notes the remarks of Revd J.P. Norris (HM!, 1850s)
who suggests that school fees were far less important than this factor: parents 'cannot afford to give up
the value of their child's time... the school fee is a mere trifle.' (quoted p. 128). These first two factors
without compulsion - might be accepted without agreeing with his earlier remark, for things might have
improved by a later date. However, elsewhere he does reinforce the notion that he has in mind that
even later than 1870 compulsion would have been necessary (p. 268).
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would be influenced by poverty: and Stephens points out that '[p]overty was, indeed, the main reason
given' by working class parents for not sending children to school (p. 25).
Thirdly, another economic factor would relate to the economic benefits that were considered to be
obtained from schooling. It may well be that many parents could see no economic benefit to be derived
from schooling for their children, and so were not prepared to make the necessary sacrifices for no
economic return. Stephens notes that for some parents, their relative prosperity didn't depend on
schooling, and they didn't see why it would for their children either. It was important for some children
to learn manual dexterity early on, and 'in the iron and coal districts there were many prosperous
employers who had risen from the lowest occupations in the pit, the furnace or the forge, and even the
nailers' shop without ever acquiring the rudiments of reading or writing.' (p. 123). A common saying,
he notes, was: 'The father went down the pit and he made a fortune, his son went to school and lost
it'. (p. 123). This attitude was reinforced by some employers: 'even employers active in promoting
schooling admitted that their most skilful and best paid workmen were not necessarily those who were
literate.' (p. 124). Moreover, when parents preferred to send their children to vocational schools, again
this could have been for sound economic factors: 'The lace and plait schools, so disliked by
contemporary educationalists and philanthropists, could be regarded less as evidence of parental
exploitation than indicative of parental responsibility in securing for their children the practical
education of the apprentice in crafts where skills had necessarily to be mastered at an early age.' (p.
175).
Each of these three reasons depend upon economic factors. Our interest is concerned with whether or
not these factors would have continued to be of importance towards the end of the nineteenth and in
the twentieth century. Clearly, if the wealth of the nation had continued to increase, the importance of
the first two of these factors is likely to have rapidly diminished. The third factor is clearly influenced
by the demands of employment, and Stephens observes that as industrialisation increased, the demands
of employers for a schooled, skilled workforce likewise increased. A survey in the 1840s found that
employers in Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Birmingham unanimously agreed that
education led to workers who were 'more trustworthy, more respectful ... more accessible to reason in
disputes over wages or changes in routine, better conducted in their social duties, and more refmed in
their tastes and use of language.' (p. 136, quoting Parliamentary Papers of 1843). So again there seem
to be very strong pressures from industry for educated workers, pressures that would have found their
way down to parents and children, ('the company ... [let] it be known that preference in employment
would be given to educated youths and workmen who schooled their children and offer[ed] fmancial
assistance to large families.' (p. 137)) Similar views were expressed in other parts of the country and
at later times. There were also technical advantages of a better educated workforce, in metal. pottery
and textile trades, although not in the coal and iron industries (p. 137). Uneducated workforces lead to
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'the loss of immense sums of money' (p. 137, citing Parliamentary Papers of 1850).
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Indeed, we can put all of this evidence into the broader discussion of modernisation theory. Osterfield
notes a commonly-observed phenomenon of modernisation: 'In a preindustrial society children support
their parents; in an industrial society parents support their children.' (Osterfield 1992 p. 117). Children
cease to be the 'economic assets they were in preindustrial society', instead becoming economic
liabilities. In preindustrial societies, 'the cost of rearing children is minimal and by the time they are
5 or 6 years old they are working in the fields or doing other odd jobs and more than "paying their
way'" (p. 113). More children means an increased supply of food, and the only support for parents in
old age. However, in an modem industrialized society, skills for work often require years of formal
training, and the incentives go the other way - wages are higher, it is possible to support families with
only one or two wages, and necessary for children to be dependent for longer if they are to have the
skills necessary to obtain highly-paid employment So the flow of wealth goes from parents to children.
The fourth factor influencing parental attitudes towards education which Stephens notes is ofa different
type. He observes that the middle-classes tended to overlook the three economic factors, instead
criticising the working classes for parental greed and laziness. Some parents, it was reported, did live
off their children's wages (Stephens 1987 p. 126) - but these were a small minority of reported cases.
There were also savage indictments of working class drunkenness, with parents spending money on
drink rather than education of children", Now clearly, in these cases, it would seem that compulsion
would have been necessary in order to ensure that these children received an adequate education. But
let us be clear that Stephens' evidence suggests they are likely to have been a very small minority of
cases. Moreover, given the discussion above about the process of modernisation, it is plausible that
these few families exhibit, even though they themselves were in early industrial society, the norms of
peasant farmers. So it is possible that such attitudes would not last very long in the society as it
became more industrialized.
What do these four factors and Stephens' evidence suggest about the need for compulsion after 1870?
The first three factors were the most significant, and it is highly likely that they would have become
less significant as the society grew in wealth and modernisation. The fourth reason may also have
become less significant as modernisation progressed. However, even if there were some parents who
would not themselves be interested in sending children to schools, these are likely to have remained in
10 Stephens notes: 'Such indictments have a ring of truth, though the disapproval is underlaid with fear,
for Monmouthshire had been the seat of a Chartist rising in 1839. For more docile Cornwall, a mining
area of a different kind, accusations of parental debauchery, barbarity and indolence were absent.' (p.
225). And the Cornish were seen as a race of people who were willing to send children to schools.
339 Appendices
a small minority. At most, Stephens' evidence warrants the conclusion that very selective compulsion
of a few parents would have been necessary as the wealth of the people grew, not wholesale universal
compulsion as he suggests.
This brief survey of evidence surrounding the situation in England & Wales in the nineteenth century
suggests that without the state, very great educational opportunities were provided. A very substantial
piece of evidence in support of this, not all ready considered, is that Forster introduced his 1870 Bill
explicitly as a measure to 'mop up' those children who were not being provided by existing voluntary
measures. It was explicitly not designed to cater universally for all children. Moreover, under the Act,
the country was divided into school districts, a survey of the educational needs of each district
conducted, and non-state sources given six months to rectify the deficiencies (Reid ([1888], 1970) pp.
479, 506). Clearly Forster was aware that voluntary provision was a very valuable resource in
educational provision, and simply needed to be supplemented where appropriate.
There is similar evidence from America (High and Ellig 1992). The evidence too from Scotland is also
not as is suggested by many: for example, Kiesling castigates West: 'The Scottish educational system,
with well-paid schoolmasters in parish schools funded by taxes on large landowners was quite different
from the situation in England and Wales.' (Kiesling 1983 p. 425). However, as West points out, by
the end of the 19th century, the Scottish system had been rendered insufficient by the population
growth. In 1818 private unendowed schools were taking two-thirds of all pupils, the parish schools only
a third",
11 The actual figures were: 106,627 pupils in 2,222 private unendowed schools; 54,161 pupils in 942
parochial schools. (West 1970 p. 74, from the 1818 Digest). These figures exclude Sunday schools,
Dame schools, and schools for the rich. Very little of any of this education was free, whether in the
private or parochial schools.
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Appendix 2 (Chapter 3)
Reiner's argument against education for democracy
Beiner's work on political judgement offers the suggestion that political judgement is something that
all can exercise, irrespective of their levels of education, without undermining the seriousness with
which participation (including voting) should be taken. He bemoans that:
'The monopoly of political intelligence is handed over to experts...who coordinate the rules of
administration and decision-making that accord with the reigning canons of method, rational procedure,
and expertise. This monopoly goes unquestioned because the exercise of political rationality is assumed
to be beyond the competence of the ordinary individual... ' (Beiner 1983 p. 1)
He insists that would-be citizens should not withdraw into their own private domains feeling that they
aren't qualified to participate. Instead, they should realise that political judgement:
' ...is a form of mental activity that is not bound to rules, is not subject to explicit specification
of its mode of operation (unlike methodological rationality) and comes into play beyond the confmes
of rule-governed intelligence.' (p. 2)
Beiner's method of showing this is to forge a middle way between Kant's and Aristotle's notions of
judgement. It is interesting for our purposes that what he takes from Aristotle is certain aspects of his
concept of prudence. In particular, Beiner is concerned to show that a political judgement is 'the
decision arising from a process of deliberation. Such a process of deliberation is governed by insight
into the effect of one's contribution to the deliberation. In short, he who deliberates well must have
insight into rhetoric.' (p. 83).
Now, rhetoric for Aristotle is 'the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of
persuasion' (p. 86), and is not a science but a 'practical faculty'. Because most of the political
judgements we have to make do not present us with only one 'necessary' decision, but with conflicting,
but not illogical alternatives, this implies that political judgements can only be made after deliberation,
and weighing up of probabilities. Thus far so good. However, what are the elements of which the ability
to enter into rhetoric and to persuade and be persuaded consist? Beiner lists: 'character (of the speaker);
emotion (of the audience); and rationality (of the arguments of the speech itself).' (p. 87). It is the last
consideration that should clearly present problems for Beiner. If the ability to make a judgement rests
on the ability to assess, inter alia, the rationality of the arguments put forward, then have we moved
away from the position which he hopes to refute, that some people will be more qualified to make these
judgements than others, and that, in terms of our argument, and education for democracy is needed?
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Aristotle's solution to this problem is to suggest that, although individuals themselves may not be able
to make judgements of very good quality, 'when they all come together it is possible that they may
surpass - collectively and as a body, although not individually - the quality of the few best.' (quoted
pp. 90-1). Moreover, Aristotle agrees that while there may be 'political experts' in 'the sense of those
who are qualified to decide political questions, 'each individual may indeed be a worse judge than the
experts; but all, when they meet together are either better than experts or at any rate no worse. ' (quoted
p.91).
Actually, Aristotle is too optimistic here, as later mathematics has shown - for Aristotle's notion was
explored by Condorcet as his famous 'jury problem'. Clearly Aristotle is correct that it is possible for
the judgement of the collective to be better than that of the few best, but the likelihood of this
happening depends on people, on average, being more often right than wrong; however if the people
are more likely on average to be wrong than right, then the outcome of the collective vote is likely to
compound their poor decision (for recent discussion of this complicated mathematical problem see
Ladha and Miller 1993). So Aristotle's solution is not acceptable, for he assumes the competence of
people on political matters, which is assuming what we are trying to prove.
Does Beiner accept Aristotle's solution as part of his synthesis of Aristotle and Kant? It seems he has
to. At any rate, there do not seem to be alternative arguments offered. He moves forward with a
'comprehensive' theory of judgement, incorporating what is best from Kant and Aristotle. But it is
interesting that what he takes from Kant seems to be the formal requirement of autonomy, that 'any
rational agent has a right to autonomy' of judgement (Beiner 1983 p. 103). This formal side of
judgement brings with it a requirement of distance and detachment from human events. The Aristotelian
'substantive' side brings with it the requirement of experience. Beiner's synthesis will then involve
judgement as operating 'with sympathy and detachment'. This type of judgement cannot then be 'a
matter of spontaneous, immediate intuition' (p. 105), but is 'essentially mediated - by reflection, by
imagination, by spatial and temporal distance, by detachment, by practical and historical experience, by
prudential knowledge, by the positing of alternative judgements' (p. 106). This seems quite an
impressive list of qualities that the judging person must bring to the judgement Are these qualities
assumed to be found in every individual, regardless of educational achievement? We might agree that
this faculty of judgement could be 'intrinsic to man as a political being' (p. 129), that is that we might
not fmd it in non-humans, but still the question remains, does every actual human individual have this
ability? For surely that is what we need in order to reclaim as individuals 'our capacity of judgement
from those who presume to exercise it on our behalf' (p. 153)?
Matters get worse, as Beiner moves 'towards a theory of political judgement.' (chapter 7). Here he
posits an hierarchy of judgements, from judgements about 'practices', to 'character judgements', and
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finally to 'political judgements' themselves. The latter - the most complex of all - 'are characterized
by implicit judgements about the form of collective life that it is appropriate for a community to pursue'
(p. 139). The example he gives to illuminate his point amply serves to illustrate all the difficulties with
his approach. He considers the political judgement of 'I support Zionism' versus 'I oppose Zionism'.
He then spends over a full page outlining the issues that must be raised before such a judgement can
be made. Some of these are factual questions, (eg 'When were the Jewish people constituted into a
nation?'), others require interpretation and value judgement (eg 'What is the historical timespan over
which a people retains its claim to an ancestral homeland?').
His point in enumerating these questions is to show that there must be 'commensurability' between
judging subjects. However for our purposes the interesting question raised is: if someone is making the
judgement about whether to support Zionism or not, can we take their judgement seriously if they have
not considered all those complex issues raised? If so, then surely we would want some way of
ascertaining that they have considered the relevant factors. Or to put the question in a more parochial
setting: If someone is ' ...deciding whether the monetarist policies of Mrs. Thatcher's government are
leading to the salvation or the ruin of British society' (p. 8), (by voting Labour, say), shouldn't they
too have taken into account a whole range of considerations, (a page full?), and shouldn't we wish them
to demonstrate that they had done this before we take their vote seriously? It does not seem as if
Beiner's synthesis has obviated the need for this sort of question at all.
In his concluding remarks, Beiner virtually admits as much, when he writes 'we can judge only on the
basis of a great deal of antecedent knowledge' (p. 163). If that is true, then Beiner's argument has not
convinced us that an education for democracy is not required in order to make these judgements
appropriately. Beiner's way out of the need for an education for participation in democracy fails.
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Appendix 3 (Chapter 4)
Raz against the Exclusion ofIdeals
Raz's argument against Nozick's anti-perfectionism is that Nozick's 'side constraints' are 'agent-relative
action reasons of absolute or near absolute weight' (Raz 1986 p. 146). Several terms need to be defmed
here: 'Action reasons' are reasons for action 'based on the value of a particular (class of) agent(s)
performing a certain action (including the bringing about by those agents of a certain outcome).' (pp.
145-6) This is in contradistinction to 'outcome reasons', which are 'reasons for action based on the
value of the outcome of those actions.' (p. 145) So parents have both of these types of reasons for
looking after their children - the outcome reason would be satisfied by employing childminders, or other
educationalists. The action reason is only satisfied if they are personally involved in the upbringing of
their children. By 'agent-relative' reasons, Raz wishes to stipulate those reasons which 'are reasons for
some people and not others' (p. 146), that is opposed to 'agent-neutral' reasons which are reasons for
all. 'A person who made a promise has an agent-relative reason to keep it, even though it may derive
from an agent-neutral reason to keep it.' (p. 146). Outcome and action reasons can be of either sort
Now Raz argues th,e Kantian imperative involves action reasons. It is not that we should simply ensure
that people have the benefits of being treated as ends, but that we personally should treat people as
ends. (p. 146). Raz suggests that there is an agent-neutral interpretation of Kant's imperative open to
us, but rejected by Nozick. Raz argues that '[e]ach person may be thought to have reason to help, or
even make, others treat people as ends.' (p. 146). So he suggests that the Kantian imperative will not
adjudicate in certain cases, such as the decision whether to coerce a person not to coerce another. Here
the choice is between treating the person as an end oneself (and not coercing them), or of treating them
as a means, where so doing will ensure that they treat the other as an end. As Raz points out, Nozick
rejects this interpretation: 'Had Kant held this view, he would have given the second formula of the
categorical imperative as, 'So act as to minimize the use of humanity simply as a means,' rather than
the one he actually used: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."
(Nozick 1974 p. 32).
Nozick regards the Kantian imperative as imposing side constraints on people, which express their
inviolability. He counters the notion that some people could be expected to bearsome costs that benefit
others more, for the sake of the overall social good, by arguing 'there is no social entity with a good
that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.. There are only individual people, different individual
people, with their own individual lives.... To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and
take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get
some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him' (pp. 32-3).
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Now Raz notes several exceptions that Nozick is apparently willing to make to this principle, such as
imposing sacrifices on people in the case of self-defence, and compensation (Raz 1986 p. 147).
Moreover, 'on occasion Nozick seems to suggest that imposing a sacrifice on a person does not offend
against ... the Kantian principle so long as he is compensated by receiving a counterbalancing good.'
(p. 147) Hence Raz's conclusion that there are gaps in Nozick's theory.
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Appendix 4 (Chapter 5)
Justifications for Democracy and the need for democratic control
This appendix examines three justifications for democracy, and shows how it is unlikely that they would
be powerful catalysts for democratic control of education in current democracies, i.e. that if these
justifications are held, improvements to democracy, and in particular, improvements to voting systems
will be sought.
Democratic control of education: the argument from the educative function of democracy
Given the outline in chapter 5 of how our 'democratic' process actually currently works, I think it again
uncontroversial that the argument for democratic control of education based upon the justification of
the importance of the educative function of democracy would not hold much force in our current
democracy. As Nathan (1971) points out, the force of this justification for democracy depends upon
how many 'constraining groups'P there are, upon the composition of these, upon how many important
issues these constraining groups vote (particularly as a proportion of the total number of issues decided
by the executive), and fmally on the extent to which the constraining group's decision controls the
executive (Nathan 1971 pp. 111-2). So in a democracy with only one constraining group consisting
entirely of symbolic representatives of the people, 'which voted only on a few relatively unimportant
issues, and were constituted so that a simple majority in the constraining group licensed the executive
to act on these issues' (p. 112), the importance of the educative function would not be so great. In this
case, and he clearly has in mind something similar to the British system, he notes that even for the
members of the constraining group itself, (the MPs), 'expression of political preferences known would
be no weighty exercise of moral responsibility, and there would be no great incentive to self-education
by means of a scrupulous investigation of what could be said for and against each alternative. And the
people at large, with even less power, would have even less responsibility and incentive.' (p. 112).
Indeed, he suggests that the argument could be turned back on itself, to show that there is 'something
morally and intellectually corrupting about a regular invitation to register one's preferences between
alternatives whose merits and demerits one has neither time nor competence to investigate, and which,
in a party system, are as likely as not obscurely stated, nonexclusive and nonexhaustive' (p. 112).
Put into the framework of the way decisions were made about, for example, the curriculum, we can see
that individuals being invited to cast their vote without the potential for making an informed decision
about the curriculum itself (as opposed to making a decision about a party package being offered to
them), and given only meagre information about the curriculum proposals, could not be justified for its
educative effect on the voter. Indeed it could have the opposite, demeaning effect on the individual,
12 Nathan defmes a vote-constrained system of government as one in which 'voting among one or more
groups of persons conventionally limits the executive's freedom of action.' (Nathan 1971 p. 90). A
constraining group is then any group which limits an executive's freedom of action.
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that they would recognize that their informed opinion about the matter was not really being sought
So this argument couldn't be a particularly useful justification for democratic control in our current
democracy. Again, however, we could say that it is likely to be an argument which would carry greater
force in an improved democracy. What sort of improvements would we be seeking to realise this
justification of democracy? Clearly, there would be a need for increased participation in decision-
making. For example, voting would be conducted on a variety of discrete issues, not simply party
platforms; moreover, it would also be the case that the executive, if it existed, would have to be more
accountable, and perhaps directly controlled, by the outcomes of these voting procedures. Moreover,
voters would need to be reassured that, when votes were aggregated, the outcome could be described
as reflecting what the voters actually wanted, rather than some arbitrary outcome - for otherwise there
would be much less incentive to participate in an informed manner, and the 'feedback' from
participation would be distorted by these anomalous results. Again, it is the case that other forms of
participation besides voting would also be involved here, but that improvements to voting procedures
remain a crucial necessary improvement.
Democratic control of education: the argument from the promotion of interests
How strong is the individuals' interests argument in terms of the need for democratic control of
education? I suggest that it is unlikely to be used as a justification for democratic control of education
under current circumstances. Firstly, given the realities that the Government is currently involved in
educational provision, fmance and regulation, then this interests argument could be used as an expedient
to allow individuals some input into the decision-making process. But given the inadequacies of the
ways in which that input can achieve expression, this is not likely to be a particularly useful buffer
against the decisions made by the Executive. Moreover, and most importantly, if it is true that the
individual best knows of his or her interests in terms of education, then it is likely that what they would
be seeking is not increased centralized control of education, but moves towards, at least, internal
markets in education. For then they would be able to influence educational provision more directly.
So an 'interests' argument for democratic control of education would presuppose governmental
involvement in education, which is itself what we are questioning here. Secondly, even moving towards
possible improved democracies, of whatever sort mentioned so far, the interests argument would not
carry any weight as far as democratic control of education was concerned. For still it would be observed
that it would only be a second best option that educational matters would be decided upon
democratically. The best option would be for individuals to be able to make their own education-related
decisions, which would mean taking education out of the political decision-making sphere.
What of the second argument concerning interests, that democracy best promotes the general interest?
In terms of democratic control of education, the argument would be that democratic control will (better)
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ensure that the general interest will be realised, because voters will vote for what they perceive to be
in the general interest; this compares with in markets, for example, where individuals will pursue their
own selfish interests, not taking into account the general interest Those in favour of (a) would then
need to show how the general interest on education could get represented through the voting system.
Given its imperfections, I think again it would be fairly uncontroversial that it would not be expected
that this general interest could be expressed through our current democratic system. So again, it would
be in a system with improvements in voting in particular, that the general interest could be pursued.
For it would be no good if the voting procedures were such that voters were not permitted to consider
discrete issues, but had to vote on party packages (for their might be no party package which
represented what they felt to be in the general interest); and it would be no good if, when votes were
aggregated, the outcome was such that it didn't reflect what the voters actually wanted. So the
improvements to democracy needed for this would be very similar to those improvements noted above
under the improvements needed for an educative democracy.
Democratic control of education: the argument from the promotion of liberty
The positive view of liberty requires that certain material conditions are necessary for a person to have
freedom to follow his or her chosen projects. But, 'generally speaking, the provision of these means
of life is a relatively complicated business in our society, calling on the effort and co-operation of large
numbers of people.' (Graham, K. 1987 p. 49). So for freedom, in this view, a person needs the
organisation of society to be such as to provide him or her with the material basis of freedom. Put in
terms of education, a person will need society to provide everyone with, at least, a curriculum for
autonomy, to enable all to choose projects and follow them through to fruition (see Raz 1986, White
1990). Now: can this view of liberty as a justification for democracy be used as a justification for
democratic control of education, and in particular, of the curriculum? The problem with this is that
democratic control of the curriculum could lead to any curriculum whatsoever. We cannot say, a priori,
that it would lead to a curriculum for the promotion of autonomy, for example, similar to the one
proposed by O'Hear and White in chapter 4. This is for two reasons: Firstly, the difficulty is that, as
O'Hear and White would argue that the majority of people have not gone through their education for
autonomy, how is it that the uneducated (in this sense) could be able to decide upon what is needed for
a genuine education? Secondly, it is precisely one of the fears of the Left about markets in educational
provision that people (presumably the uneducated in this sense) would choose a curriculum which was
not geared towards rational autonomy. So they would need to offer us some assurance that these same
people would choose differently when voting than they would when choosing in the market This could
be satisfied if there were improvements to democracy as mentioned above, together with improvements
to voters' intellectual and dispositional qualities. So my suggestions are that, firstly, this argument is
unlikely to be used by to argue for democratic control of the curriculum (which is perhaps why White
uses the political equality argument instead), since democratic control, particularly of the curriculum,
348 Appendices
would be no safeguard that the curriculum would be of the type that promoted autonomy. If this is so
important, then it would be far safer to take this decision out of the democratic sphere, and enshrine
it, for example, in a 'constitution of liberty'.
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Appendix 5 (Chapter 5)
Genuine Political Examples of the 'Paradox ofVoting'
Appendices
Perestroikan Paradoxes - the beginning of the end of Gorbachev
The election of Boris Yeltsin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 1990 had important
repercussions for Russia, and plausibly led to the breakup of the Soviet Union, the deposing of
Gorbachev, the civil war in Yugoslavia, etc. I argue that the election result could have happened
because of the vagaries of the voting system used, and not because it was necessarily what the electors
wanted.
There were three main candidates for the presidency, the radical Yeltsin, the centrist, Alexandr Vlasov,
and the conservative Ivan Polozkov. The voting system allowed voters to choose between Yeltsin and
Vlasov, and between Yeltsin and Polozkov, but not between Vlasov and Polozkov. So we don't know
for sure what their preferences would have been. But we can make educated guesses, as below.
The voting took place over three rounds, and the results were as follows:
Voting in Round 1
Candidate
Yeltsin
Polozkov
Morokin
Voting in Round 2
Candidate
Yeltsin
Polozkov
Voting in Round 3
Candidate
Yeltsin
Vlasov
Tsoi
Votes Cast
497
473
30
Votes Cast
503
458
Votes Cast
535
467
11
Looking at these figures, the uninitiated might think that they show Yeltsin as the clear winner; he did
after all score more than anyone else in each round. However, things are not that straightforward. What
I want to do is try to find out what plausible preferences of the voters were between all three of the
main candidates.
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Yeltsin obtained 38 more votes in the third round vote against Vlasov than he did against Polozkov in
the first round. This suggests that 38 voters preferred Polozkov to Yeltsin, but Yeltsin to Vlasov. That
is, these 38 prefer the conservative status quo, but the radical solution is better than the current
haphazard pace of reform.
Of the remaining, it seems very likely that all 497 who voted for Yeltsin in the first round aligned
themselves on the standard 'radical-centre-conservative' political spectrum. That is, that they preferred
Yeltsin to Vlasov and Vlasov to Polozkov. Then the remainder of the Round One voters, 465 of them,
were happy with the current rate of reform, but if faced with more drastic change would opt for a return
to conservative past values, rather than the market vision of the radicals. That is, these preferred Vlasov
to Polozkov, but Polozkov to Yeltsin.
Given these plausible assumptions, we then can hypothesise the order of preference of the voters:
Order of Preference
first-second-third
Number of Voters
Yeltsin-Vlasov-Polozkov 497
Polozkov-Yeltsin-Vlasov 38
Vlasov-Polozkov-Yeltsin 465
These numbers then quite plausibly explain the actual votes cast in all three rounds", In the first
round, all 497 of those who preferred Yeltsin to Polozkov voted, sensibly enough, for Yeltsin. Those
who preferred Vlasov were in a quandary. 435 of them voted tactically for Polozkov, as a vote against
Yeltsin, perhaps hoping to produce an inconclusive result that would lead to a second round vote, this
time when they could directly vote for Vlasov. Together with the 38 who preferred Polozkov to
Yeltsin, this gave Polozkov's total of 473. However, the remaining 30 who preferred Vlasov sincerely
followed their 'centrist' convictions, and voted for the outsider, but centrist, Morokin.
In the second round, Yeltsin picked up 6 more of the votes outside of the 1000 that we have tabs on,
13 The situation is slightly more complicated because there were different numbers of non-abstaining
voters in each round: 1000 in the first, 951 in the second, and 1013 in the third. I assume in what
follows that I can keep tabs on the 1000 who voted in the first round in each successive round: this
simplifies the discussion.
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while more of the Vlasov supporters abstained - clearly afraid that, if they voted tactically, Polozkov
might get a clear victory, rather than provoke a third round.
In the third round, all those 465 who preferred Vlasov to Yeltsin voted, again sensibly, for Vlasov. (He
also picked up 2 of the 'outside' votes). The 38 Polozkov supporters, who definitely preferred Yeltsin
to Vlasov, joined with the 497 Yeltsin supporters to give him his required majority of 535.
So what is wrong with all this? Yeltsin did win the required majority. He stood against his main rivals
Vlasov and Polozkov, and beat them both. Yes, but what about the voters' preferences between all
three main candidates? Did the outcome reflect that?
Consider the preferences noted for the 1000 delegates above, and assume that the others won't alter the
figures significantly. Let us take the candidates in pairs and work out their popularity in pairwise
elections. Consider first Yeltsin versus Vlasov. How many voters rank Yeltsin higher than Vlasov, and
vice versa? Yeltsin has the 497 of his own supporters, and also the 38 whose first choice was
Polozkov, making a total of 535. Vlasov has only his 465 supporters. So we have (not surprisingly)
more or less the result of the third round. Yeltsin is preferred to Vlasov by 535 votes to 465.
Next consider Vlasov versus Polozkov. The 497 whose first choice was Yeltsin prefer Vlasov to
Polozkov, as do the 465 (of course) whose first choice was Vlasov, ie 962 votes. Polozkov only has
the remaining 38 in this play-off, so Vlasov is clearly preferred to Polozkov.
Now, Yeltsin is preferred to Vlasov, and Vlasov is preferred to Polozkov, So the assumption - to the
uninitiated - is that Yeltsin is preferred to Polozkov. Not so! Yeltsin has all 497 of his first-choice
supporters, while Polozkov only has 38 of his. But all 465 of Vlasov's first-choice supporters prefer
Polozkov to Yeltsin. So Polozkov is preferred to Yeltsin by 503 to 497. Note that this is not
contradicted by the actual result obtained in the second and third rounds. At the risk of repeating
myself, voters were there forced to make an artificial choice between two of the main candidates and
were not allowed to express their genuine preferences.
This has given us a paradox: Yeltsin is preferred to Vlasov, who is preferred to Polozkov, who is in
turn preferred to Yeltsin. That is, there is no winner. Choose any candidate, and he is beaten by
another. Yeltsin could be chosen, but equally so could Vlasov or Polozkov.
Note that I stress I am not saying this!§. what happened, merely that it is very plausible. Any of my
assumptions could be challenged. However, there are other plausible scenarios that can give the same
result, and one, slightly less plausible, that would give Polozkov - the die-hard conservative - as the
winner.
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Elections have profound consequences. This one, I suggest, did not give an outcome which reflected
what the representatives really wanted.
What of the point mentioned earlier about the presence of cycles leading to the incentive for
misrepresentation of preferences? Here clearly in the second round, had the Vlasov supporters been
organised and sophisticated enough, they could have ensured that a sufficient number, but not too many,
voted for Polozkov, to eliminate Yeltsin, knowing that in the third round, Vlasov could easily beat
Polozkov.
Eastbourne Ending - the beginning of the end of Thatcher
The Eastbourne by-election of October 1990 in the UK, which plausibly led to the downfall of another
powerful leader, Margaret Thatcher, again shows, using feasible assumptions about real voters'
preferences, how cycles of preferences could occur in practice:
Suppose voters' preferences when they actually went to vote were as follows:
1st 2nd 3rd % of voters
Lib Con Lab 40
Lib Lab Con 1
Lab Lib Con 10 *
Lab Con Lib 5
Con Lab Lib 39
Con Lib Lab 2
(Lib: Liberal Democrats, Lab: Labour, Con: Conservative).
This profile of preferences is consistent with the outcome, with the Labour supporters who preferred
the Liberal Democrats second (*) tactically voting to give the Liberal Democrats the seat with 51% of
the vote. It is also consistent with opinion polls published before the election.
In British elections, voters are not allowed to reveal their order of preferences, but vote only once. Even
though there was a clear winner, it is worth seeing what would have happened (given this feasible
profile) had voters' preferences been taken into account. This can be done by looking at the candidates
in 'pairwise' comparisons:
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The Liberal Democrats beat the Conservatives by 51% against 46%. Likewise pitting the Conservatives
against Labour gives the Conservatives winning by 81% against 16%. The Liberal Democrats are
preferred to the Conservatives, and the Conservatives to Labour, so our feeling is that the Liberal
Democrats will be preferred to Labour. Not so! Given the figures above, Labour is preferred to the
Liberal Democrats, by 54% to 43%! So we have a cycle of preferences again. The Liberals were
chosen, but it could equally have been any of the other candidates.
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Appendix 6: (Chapter 5)
Example illustrating the need for the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives'
Condition of Arrow's Theorem:
'Night Out'
Seven democratic friends arrange a night out. They discover they have four alternatives open to them,
and each is aware of his or her own preferences between these options as follows:
Keith, Dave, John:
Susan, Ann:
Bob, Ruth:
theatre, cinema, concert, pub
cinema, concert, pub, theatre
concert, pub, theatre, cinema
They decide to use a voting method which is a favourite for committees reaching a decision, namely
the Borda count method, or point scoring. For first choice, they award 3 points, second place, 2 points,
and so on, down to 0 points for last place. They tot up their scores as follows:
theatre:
cinema:
concert:
pub:
9+0+2=11
6 + 6 + 0 =12
3+4+6=13
0+2+4= 6
So the concert is decided upon. Then Keith remembers that he saw their favourite pub was closed for
refurbishment. As it was their least favoured option, they decide that it won't make any difference to
the outcome. They go to the concert. But let's be more careful than them, and see what would have
happened. Their revised preferences, now that the pub is not available, are as follows:
Keith, Dave, John:
Susan, Ann:
Bob, Ruth:
theatre cinema concert
cinema concert theatre
concert theatre cinema
The Borda count method now awards points as follows: (for three options, 2 points to first place, 1 to
second, and 0 to last)
theatre:
cinema:
concert:
6+0+2=8
3+4+0=7
0+2+4=6
We now have a complete reversal of results! The concert is in fact the least favourite now, although
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there was no change in the preferences of the voters!
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Put this example into a less contrived setting, and we have something quite remarkable happening.
Suppose, for example, that a committee of seven people has interviewed four candidates for a position,
and moves to the vote. If their preferences are:
VI-3 abc d
V4-5 b c d a
V6-7 cdab
Then, a Borda count, assigning 3 points to the first place choice, 2 to the second, 1 to the third, and
oto the last, gives c as the winner with 13 points, followed by b (12), a (11) and d with only 6.
Ii for whatever reason d withdraws, the voters' preferences are now:
VI-3 abc
V4-5 b c a
V6-7 cab
The Borda count produces a as winner, with 8 points, followed by b, and c, the previous winner, in last
place!
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Appendix 7: (Chapter 5)
The Arrovian dictator: has the emperor no clothes?
In this appendix, I challenge the non-dictatorship condition. This challenge is not, trivially, that we
might argue that 'there is nothing particularly irrational about selecting one individual and allowing him
to make all decisions for the community' (Mueller 1989 p. 388). Such a way to avoid the impact of
the theorem is not relevant to our discussion about the Left's concern with democracy. The criticism
will elaborate on that raised by Little (1952), and subsequently apparently dismissed by writers on social
choice theory.
Little's objections to the non-dictatorship condition
For our purposes, two passages stand out in Little (1952). Firstly: 'As put by Arrow, condition 4
('non-dictatorship') appears eminently acceptable. In his formulation, Tom is a dictator if, for all x and
y and 'regardless' of the orderings of others, 'Tom prefers x to y' implies 'x is higher in the
master-order.' What Arrow evidently has in mind is that if no change in the orders of others can upset
the coincidence of Tom's and the master order, then it would seem reasonable to call Tom a dictator.
Here I should agree. But, when we discover that this condition, if combined with the others, produces
the consequence that no more be known to dub a man 'dictator' than that his ordering of any pair of
alternatives has prevailed against the reverse ordering on the part of everyone else, we may well begin
to feel uncomfortable.' (Little 1952 pp. 425-6).
Secondly: 'Thus it may be said that, although one values x above y, one might prefer to accept a
procedure which would yield y, if the only way to get x were to impose one's will on society. This
is true; but it is not a sufficient reason for accepting Arrow's condition of 'non-dictatorship' which
barring the name, contains nothing about power or force. .... causal and power relations are not logical
relations. Thus since 'dictatorship' in the ordinary sense, involves ideas of causation, it cannot be
adequately described in terms of implication.' (p.431).
Little does attempt to illustrate what he means in the first quoted passage. The example he gives is
rather weak: Tom Dick and Harry have the following preferences:
Tom: xy
Dick: yx
Harry: yx.
Now, suppose x and y turn out to be certain social states defined as:
y: Tom has 1 piece of manna and Dick and Harry have 99 pieces of manna each;
x: Tom has 3 pieces of manna and Dick and Harry have 98 pieces of manna each;
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Given these states, it might be very reasonable for society, says Little, to choose xy, even though this
would make Tom a dictator, (says Little). But the question this begs (but not for Little) is how the
social choice process would come to choose xy over yx. For example, the obvious way it might have
done this was if Tom, Dick and Harry were only three of many voters, and a majority of the others
preferred x over y. In which case, the example clearly doesn't have anything to do with 'dictatorship',
as Tom is in agreement with other members of society.
Alternatively, as later remarks suggest, perhaps Little wants us to believe that there are only these three
individuals in the society. But then two possibilities occur: if majority voting is used, then society
wouldn't have chosen x over y, if the preferences given above are genuinely held. This is not to rule
out that Dick and Harry might, being altruistic, prefer Tom to have more at their slight expense: but
then their preferences would, on their reflection, be changed to xy. Thus their preferences would be
the same as Tom's and the unanimity condition would simply be invoked to bring about x as the social
choice over y. No problems of dictators in this case. Secondly, if some other voting system was used,
and the outcome was x over y, why does this make Tom a 'dictator' 'because it happens to be the case
that society agrees with him'? (Little 1952 p. 426). This is the crucial point to which we return in a
moment.
Now Little apologises for the example as being 'absurdly limited', and then goes on to draw the
conclusion that 'it is foolish to accept or reject a set of ethical axioms one at a time' (p.426). It is this
pithy maxim that has received attention, (eg by Barry and Hardin 1982 p. 266, Pollak 1979 p. 86),
rather than the example itself, or, more significantly, the comments the example was supposed to
illuminate. This is disappointing. Moreover, Little's article has been frequently cited". Without
exception the writers either focus on Little's use of the non-dictatorship condition to suggest that
Arrow's social welfare function is only sensibly interpreted as a decision making process (Little 1952
p. 427), or mention in passing that he had attempted the absurd questioning of the non-dictatorship
condition, presumably without success. For example, Sen examines Little's assertion that 'Arrow's
work has no relevance to the traditional theory of welfare economics' (Sen 1977 p. 1562). Nath
similarly looks at the contention of Little's that'Arrow confuses a social decision making process with
a value judgement or a social welfare function' (Nath 1964 p. 563). Neither of these consider the
passages quoted above. Riker (1961) initially seems more promising: he mentions that Little has been
'arguing the unreasonableness of the non-dictatorship condition', but then confines himself to discussing
Little's remarks about vote-counting machines always being dictatorial, siding with Vickrey that this
14 I found 27 citations in the Social Science Citation Index from 1956 to 1990.
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'is a rather far-fetched inference' (Riker 1961 p. 905Ys.
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In this way, the derivative literature is following both Arrow and Little: Arrow addresses Little's 1952
criticisms, (Arrow 1963 pp. 103ft), but explicitly states that 'the area of fundamental disagreement thus
narrows down to this one assumption [the independence of Irrelevant alternatives], and ...
Nondictatorship, hardly raises any fundamental questions' (p. 105); Meanwhile, Little, in the very next
paragraph to the second of his quoted above, concludes that: 'one may say that expediency might, in
most situations, counsel one to accept condition 4 [non-dictatorship] as applied to procedure. It may
also be widely accepted on moral grounds. Indeed conditions 3 and 4 [nonimposition and
non-dictatorship] might be said to contain the bare essentials of democratic procedures' (Little 1952 p.
431).
So, is it right to accept the non-dictatorship condition? I will argue here that it is not, that the two
passages of Little's quoted above contain in embryo a powerful critique of the non-dictatorship
condition which needs to be taken more seriously. That is, they need to be taken more seriously if
Arrow's theorem is to be used for looking at voting systems, as Riker wants to do. In order to see the
full force of these criticisms, it might be useful to see how the nondictatorship condition is used in the
formal proof of Arrow's theorem.
Non-dictatorship and the proof ofArrow's theorem
For convenience, we will follow the elegant and succinct proof of the theorem given by Vickrey (1960),
outlining the places where the non-dictatorship condition is invoked. (In the relevant steps, each proof
agrees, so nothing is lost by focusing on this particular proof).
Vickrey's proof is in two parts. Part 1 shows that if a set D is 'decisive' for one pair of options x and
y, then it is decisive for all decisions covered by the universal domain condition, where decisiveness
is defined as follows:
'a set of individuals D is decisive for alternative x against alternative y in the context of a given social
welfare function, if the function is such that whenever all individuals in D express a preference for x
over y and all other individuals express the contrary preference, then the social welfare function yields
a social preference for x over y' (Vickrey 1960 p. 345).
One of the most cunning moves of the proof is to show that there is such a 'decisive' set, namely the
set S, the whole of society, by default as it were. We can see, upon substituting S instead of D in the
IS Interestingly, in his very comprehensive Liberalism against Populism (1982), although he explores
criticisms of other of Arrow's conditions, he does not even mention this criticism by Little, nor is this
article listed in his extensive bibliography.
359 Appendices
first stage of Vickrey's proof that this special decisive set does indeed satisfy each step of the proof,
although each step is of course by default, which intuitively feels a bit of a cheat, but is logically
impeccable.
The second stage then takes a decisive set D, confident in the knowledge that there is one such set, and
by an iterative application of the paradox of voting, arrives at a decisive set of only one individual,
called the dictator. How does it do this? Using the Unrestricted Domain condition, the set D can be
split into two non-empty subsets with the members of each subset having the following profile of
preferences:
A: xyu
B: yux
In the case of this decisive set being S, the whole of society, (the only decisive set that we know exists
at the moment), then we know that A and B exhaust the whole population. However, later on this will
not be the case, so we also add that anyone not in A or B is in a set C, with the following profile of
preferences:
C: uxy
Since the individuals in A and B all 'prefer' y to u, and together form a decisive set, then the social
ranking must put y above u. Now comes the crucial part of the proof for the argument of the paper
here. I quote Vickrey to be perfectly clear about the implications:
'If in addition the social welfare function is made to put x below y, in this case, .... B would be decisive
for y against x. On the other hand, if the social welfare function does not put x below y, it must by
transitivity place x above u, making A decisive for x against u.' (p. 346).
Note the qualifications: 'if' the function does such and such, then B forms the decisive set. 'On the
other hand, if it does the opposite, then A makes up the decisive lot In other words, the members of
the decisive set become 'decisive' as a result of the vagaries of the social welfare function, by chance
as it were.
The proof continues in this vein. In either case, it is true, we have a smaller decisive set than S, and
hence we can reiterate the whole process, this time using subsets A and B of this new set, and hence
a non-empty set C. Eventually, with decreasing probability that we can find such a set, we arrive at
a decisive set which contains only one member, ie we have a 'dictator'. Again we need to stress how
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this 'dictator' is arrived at The preferences of this member happened to coincide with the profile of
preferences chosen by the social welfare function.
Now, does any of this have implications when we attempt to translate Arrow's formal system into
discussion of voting situations? What it seems to show is that it is at least perfectly compatible with
Arrow's theorem that the term 'dictator' is somewhat misleading. As Little had pointed out, there
seems to be no question that this individual has imposed his or her will, or exerted any force or power.
Indeed, even Little's characterisation that this person's will 'has prevailed' (Little 1952 p. 426) seems
too strong, because to prevail can have the sense of 'gaining mastery over others' (Oxford English
Dictionary). A more appropriate expression would seem to be to say that this person's profile of
preferences has coincided with those chosen by society. To make this perfectly clear, consider again
the example of pairwise majority voting in the context of the paradox of voting given earlier. There we
have a cycle of preferences, with S wining over C winning over L winning over S.
Now if a choice has to be made, then built into the mechanism for aggregation there would be some
device for producing an outcome in these circumstances. (Note that I am not suggesting here a
particular device for doing this: merely suggesting that one can be found, and moreover a device that
does not make the social welfare function violate either of the other four conditions. Arrow's theorem
proves only that a social welfare function cannot simultaneously satisfy all five conditions. In this
example, I am sacrificing the nondictatorship condition, hence assuming that there is a social welfare
function that satisfies the other four conditions). Suppose the device chooses the preference profile
CLS. Then VI becomes the 'dictator'. One moment VI was an ordinary voter. The next, he (say) is
elevated to the status of dictator. But does this make any difference to his behaviour? Is there any
sense in which he has exerted power, used force, or any of the other things that we normally understand
by being a dictator? Not a bit of it. All he has done is held certain preferences, sincerely and honestly,
and by processes beyond his control, discovered that his preferences were the ones 'drawn out of the
hat' (as it were) as the social choice. He might feel very pleased about this outcome, but it is unlikely
that he would feel dictatorial.
To further illuminate the point, suppose that V2, understandably disappointed by this result, goes against
the decision, and stages a coup, and asserts that her (say) preferences must be followed. Now, I
contend that normally we would feel happy (if that's the right expression) in calling her a dictator. But
if we use Arrow's Theorem in the way suggested by Riker, and others, then we seem to be committed
to saying that there is no moral difference between the behaviour of V2 and VI! Both deserve the
name of 'dictator' in Arrow's eyes. This is surely not right. VI's preferences were chosen by the
social choice procedure; V2' s were imposed by force.
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It is interesting to ask why Arrow chose to call this individual a 'dictator' when this does not seem to
fit in with what we normally understand by the term. Of course he was perfectly entitled to choose any
term, because the formalism of his proof had to be interpreted into English terms. However, given, as
already hasbeen noted, the normative purpose which Arrow wished his conditions to serve, the question
is whether the term he chose is the most suitable because it carries with it certain connotations which
we have shown are not part of the way the condition is used. The question is whether calling the
person a 'dictator' is misleading.
Arrow himself wrote that 'it cannot be claimed that Defmition 6 [dictatorship] is a true model of actual
dictatorship' (Arrow 1963 p. 30), but his reasons were that people might have a liking for a dictator
in a Frommian 'fear of freedom' sort of way. Perhaps Arrow had a different understanding of the term
'dictator', and this is why he felt it appropriate to interpret the formalism of his theorem in this way?
On inspection, however, this doesn't seem to be the case. He contrasts dictatorship with democracy and
the market (pp. 1-2); dictators are dangerous, he notes, approvingly quoting Lord Acton's dictum that
'power always corrupts; and absolute power corrupts absolutely' (p. 86). All this seems to fit in with
a standard conception of the dictator as an 'absolute ruler... one who suppresses or succeeds a
democratic government.. person with absolute authority in any sphere' (Oxford English Dictionary).
So the question still persists: why did Arrow call his 'accidentally decisive' individual by that term?
One reason could perhaps be found in the way Arrow originally thought of his social welfare functions.
These were defmed originally as having as their domain 'social states'. These are defined, as noted
above, as 'a complete description of the amount of each type- of commodity in the hands of each
individual, the amount of labor to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each productive
resource invested in each type of productive activity, and the amounts of various types of collective
activity such as municipal services, diplomacy and its continuation by other means, and the erection of
statues to famous men.' (p. 17).
Now, there may be some excuse (although still not a very strong one) for describing an individual as
a dictator, whose own preferences profile of these all-encompassing social states coincides with that
chosen by society, because this dictator by definition is decisive over everything in social life.
Moreover, it is accepted that in Arrow's abstract formulation, this individual is decisive for everything
for all time: 'The society prefer one possibility to another whenever that individual does' (p. 52); 'It
is impossible that the preferences of society be always in agreement with those of a single individual'
(emphasis added p. 56).
While still there is no suggestion that power or force has been exerted, there may well be a slight sense
in which this makes one uncomfortable. (But note that even here, there could still be an alternative real
dictator, a person who sees that his or her preferences are not to be realised, and hence seizes power
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away from the democratically chosen options. As noted above, Arrow seems committed to saying that
both sorts of 'dictator' are equally as unacceptable). However, when one leaves this high level of
generality and comes down to earth with an example of a plausible social welfare function, namely
voting, then this weak excuse disappears altogether. With voting the 'social states' that people are
required to order become candidates in an election, or proposals in a referendum or committee vote.
It does not seem nearly so bad that our putative dictator has a preference profile which merely coincides
with the options chosen in a particular local or national election;or a vote on a committee. Moreover,
unlike in the social states case, voters will have many other chances to order these and other options,
for example in national elections, every four or five years, local elections more frequently, and in
elections in committees and parliaments more frequently still. Hence there are many opportunities to
vote, and crucially, there are then many opportunities for all to share in being an Arrovian 'dictator'.
Even allowing that cycles occur as frequently as Riker suggests, then say with 5 candidates and a large
number of voters, a cycle, and hence a 'dictator', might be revealed in a quarter of the elections (Riker
1982 p. 122). However, there is no suggestion that the same person would be 'dictator' more than
once, except by chance.
Perhaps there is one last way in which we can save the term 'dictator' to describe the 'accidentally
decisive' individual, and that is if the individual were to know beforehand that he or she would be the
dictator. Perhaps then there could be some semblance of the illegitimate force of a real dictator
restored? An individual, for example, might be able to do a straw poll of everyone else's preferences,
compute the outcome using the known aggregation process, and either establish that he or she would
become the 'dictator' or adapt his or her preferences accordingly; Putting it in this way shows that this
is not a way out In the former case, the person has genuine preferences and comes to realise before
the vote takes place that his or her preferences will be realised through the vote. This knowledge in
fact would produce the antithesis of dictatorship: he or she could simply sit back and enjoy the spectacle
of the voting system unravelling his or her own preferences: there would be absolutely no need to exert
force at all! In the second case, the defmition of preferences rules out the deliberate adjusting of one's
preferences to ensure they were in line with the voting outcome. By definition, these would no longer
be one's preferences at all. Finally, if the voting system being used satisfied the other four of Arrow's
conditions, (as is possible, by Arrow's theorem itself), then, because it satisfies the Independence from
Irrelevant alternatives condition, the system would not to be open to strategic manipulation: as we have
said, Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorems show that satisfying the Independence condition is logically
equivalent to being immune from strategic manipulation.
What's in a name?
The discussion above has suggested that when Little questioned Arrow's non-dictatorship condition, he
raised some important criticisms of it These criticisms have been ignored by Arrow, and by all those
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writing on social choice and its implications. Even Little himself did not acknowledge the force of his
own criticism. However, when the proof of Arrow's theorem is closely followed, and put into the
context of voting, then it seems highly inappropriate to use the term 'dictator' for the 'decisive
individual', and hence to call the relevant condition 'non-dictatorship'. But why does any of this
matter? It matters because the conditions have been used to embody value-judgements about voting
systems, and although 'a rose by any other name would smell as sweet', the suggestion here is that
'non-dictatorship' by many other names would become far less pungent.
For example, above in a couple of places we have used, instead of 'dictator', the term 'accidentally
decisive individual'. Now even this is obscuring too much about the real way this person is revealed
in the proof of the theorem. So let us use the more precise formulation of a 'preferences accidentally
coinciding with those chosen by the social choice process' -individual. Then the 'non-dictatorship'
condition would be called something like the 'outlawing of a "preferences accidentally coinciding with
those chosen by the social choice process" individual' condition. Or if this seems too cumbersome, we
might simply call it the 'Little' condition. Given this new terminology, would anyone now be able to
get away with statements such as the following without giving further explanation?
'Finally, we enunciate probably the least controversial of all the conditions, the "outlawing of a
preferences accidentally coinciding with those chosen by the social choice process individual" condition"
(paraphrasing Arrow 1983 p. 71).
I suggest that we wouldn't, because the new name is not self-evidently a criterion of fairness, and any
reader of such a statement would insist that an explanation is offered as to why it should be a condition
of fairness. Similarly, when we read of the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives' condition, we
don't automatically recoil in horror, thinking this isn't what democracy should be about. but calmly and
intelligently ask for an explanation of why it should be a condition of fairness, and calmly and rationally
weigh up whether the arguments are sound. The point is that, using the emotive phrase
'non-dictatorship' means that this has seldom (perhaps only once) been done concerning the efficacy
of that condition.
The suggestion here is that when this is done, then we may well decide that this condition is not needed
for a social welfare function to be fair. Hence, Arrow's theorem can be transformed it into a genuine
'possibility theorem'. For it shows that there are criteria for fairness of any social welfare function, in
particular a voting system, namely the conditions of independence of irrelevant alternatives, unanimity,
unrestricted domain and logicality, that is 4 out of 5 of Arrow's original conditions. Given these 4
conditions of fairness, there is a Social Welfare Function that satisfies them. On occasion, this Social
Welfare Function throws out a person who unwittingly has his or her preferences coincide with those
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of society, but no-one need object to this. It could happen to anyone, no-one abuses their position when
it does happen to them, and they won't find themselves in this position for very long.
In one revealing passage, Arrow seems to come very close to this position. He considers the case when
there is complete unanimity of preferences amongst all individuals in a society, and concludes that in
this case the obvious thing to do is to pick an individual at random and use his or her preference's as
the social choice. However, 'this satisfies all the conditions ... except the condition that the social
welfare function not be dictatorial...since it makes no difference who is dictator, the condition of
nondictatorship loses its intrinsic desirability' (Arrow 1963 p. 74 emphasis added).
My contention here is that whenever the nondictatorship condition is invoked it is analogous to this in
an important way, for the example reveals the passivity of the Arrovian dictator. It is the social welfare
function that chooses him or her, rather than the outcome of the social choice process being actively
overruled. This happens whenever a 'dictator' emerges. With this noted, then the condition of
non-dictatorship loses its 'intrinsic desirability' in any situation.
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Appendix 8: (Chapter 6)
Economists' definitions ofpublic goods
Why should some economists think that excludability is the important defining feature of a public good,
others non-rivalness or indivisibility? It seems to be because of the function of the concept of public
goods. Public goods are important and without government provision these goods will be underprovided
or not provided at all, because in part, the 'free rider' - someone who wants to consume the good but
who is unwilling to pay for it - will lead to inefficiencies. That is, people fail to contribute to public
goods either through fear of being taken advantage of by free riders, or because they want to adopt that
role themselves. Nonexcludability clearly could lead to the problem of the free rider - because if a
community were to fund a good from which no member could be excluded, then there is an incentive
for some to free ride, because no-one can exclude them from doing so. So it is easy to see why some
economists want nonexcludability in their definition of a public good. But, if a good is indivisible or
nonrival, then this is likely to imply nonexcludability. The important point about both non-rivalness and
indivisibility is that the marginal cost of serving additional persons is zero. But if it is costless to serve
an additional person, then it wouldn't make any sense to exclude him or her. We can conclude that
nonexcludability and indivisibility (or nonrivalness) seem to be related: indivisibility (or nonrivalness)
implies nonexcludability. This may help explain why economists are not unanimous about which
concept is the more fundamental to the defmition of public good. If nonexcludability is implied by
indivisibility (or nonrivalness), then economists might not feel the need to include it in their definitions.
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Appendix 9: (Chapter 6)
What is the prisoner's dilemma?
The prisoner's dilemma belongs to game theory, a branch of mathematics. The parable used to give
it flesh is as follows: Two criminals are held in separate prison cells awaiting trial. The evidence is
sufficient to convict them both on minor crimes, but they are also thought to be jointly guilty of a
serious crime; however, the evidence is not sufficient to convict them of this. The serious crime would
normally carry a maximum of 10 years imprisonment, the lesser crimes a maximum of 2 years. The
district attorney tells the prisoners individually that if both confess to the serious crime, then he will
recommend a reduced sentence of 6 years. If neither confess, then they will both be convicted for the
minor crimes for 2 years. If one confesses, and the other does not, then he will recommend that the
confessor get a token sentence of 1 year, and the non-confessor the full 10 years. The options for the
prisoners can be shown in the matrix diagram below where the first number of each pair shows the
number of years in prison for prisoner 1, the second for prisoner 2:
don't confess
prisoner 1
confess
prisoner 2
don't confess
2,2
1,10
confess
10,1
6,6
The significance of the game is, given certain assumptions about the players' behaviour, there is
'dominant strategy' for each player. The assumptions are that the players are 'rational' in the
economist's sense of seeking to maximise their own utility, (measured in this example by length of time
out of prison); they are ignorant of what the other person will choose; and they have 'complete
knowledge' of the outcomes - in the prisoners example this means they have faith in the attorney, and
assume the judge accepts his recommendations. Given these assumptions, the 'dominant strategy' is
to confess, whatever the other prisoner does. For if prisoner 1 confesses then he or she will either get
the token 1 year (if prisoner 2 doesn't confess) or 6 years (if prisoner 2 does confess). In both cases
this sentence is less than if prisoner 1 had instead not confessed: 1 year compared with 2 if prisoner
2 doesn't confess, 6 years compared with 10 if prisoner 2 does confess. This is, in a loose sense, a
'dilemma': for both to confess gives an inferior outcome to neither confessing.
Now, the dilemma arises because of particular relationships between the four potential outcomes. In the
prisoners example, using the customary terminology, the 'temptation' (T) to 'defect', at 1 year, is less
than the 'reward' (R) to 'cooperate', at 2 years. This is tum is less than the 'punishment' (P) for mutual
defection, 6 years, which is itself less than the 'sucker's payoff, (S) at 10 years.
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The example on which the prisoner's dilemma is based looks at years in prison, hence at punishment
rather than reward. This means that the relationships between T, R, P and S are reversed when we
come to look at examples which involve the rewards on offer to people, as is usually the case. Hence
in most cases, we will fmd that the relationship T>R>P>S, must hold if the game is to be a prisoner's
dilemma.
A classic economic example of market failure to provide public goods using the prisoner's dilemma
concerns the issue of whether to fit vehicle catalytic converters to reduce air pollution. Should these
be made compulsory or can motorists be trusted to fit one voluntarily?" The game theorist might
first, for simplicity, consider a two-person society. The standard assumptions in game theory would
then be attached to the individual players; that is, they have perfect knowledge of their own utility
functions concerning the outcomes, they are self-interested and interested in maximising their own
outcomes. We could then show their preferences on a two-dimensional matrix. Let us put some flesh
on to the example by introducing numbers. Suppose that a device costs £10 to fit, and that every such
device contributes to reducing air pollution, but the value to each individual of one device fitted is, say
£7 (in clean air benefits)". This benefit accrues to each individual whether or not they have a
catalytic converter fitted. It is a public good in the economists' sense. Then the game can be illustrated
in the following matrix:
person 2
install don't install
install
person 1
don't install
£4, £4
£7, -£3
-£3, +£7
0,0
That is, if both motorists install the device, they each pay £10, but receive £14 worth of clean air
benefits, (because there are two catalytic converters fitted). However, if one installs, and the other
doesn't, then the person installing pays out £10 and receives £7 benefit, i.e. a net loss of £3, whereas
the person who doesn't install simply receives the £7 without any cost. Thus again there is a 'dominant
strategy': it is rational for each, whatever the other does, not to install a catalytic converter. It is rational
for both to attempt to 'free ride' on the other doing so. But again they would both be much better off
if both had installed. The prisoner's dilemma therefore seems to suggest the need for some form of
government action to arrive at this optimal position.
16 Example from Ordeshook 1986 pp. 207ff.
17 Note that the assumption of 'complete knowledge' means each player is able to translate the clean
air benefits into this value of £7.
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Appendix 10: (Chapter 6)
Assumptions of game theory
Game theory is usually taken to assume that the players have complete information - that is that 'players
are endowed with information about all the strategies and payoffs available to all other players' (Hechter
1992 p. 34) - and are self-interested and aiming only to maximise their own utility. These assumptions
might seem objectionable to some, and so it might be worth suggesting why I think it is worth exploring
game theory in a little detail. Let us be quite clear, then, that the reason why I am looking at game
theory is because Jonathan (with respect to philosophy and educational provision), Raz (with respect
to moral and political philosophy), and the public goods theorists in general (with respect to political
philosophy and political economy), have all used the prisoner's dilemma and other games to show the
impossibility of collective action without the state. They started the argument on this territory, and so
it is necessary to respond to them on that same territory. Had they not used game theory in this way,
it is possible that those opposing them might not have chosen it either as a useful vehicle for exploring
these issues. But if they are happy with drawing conclusions from the strict assumptions mentioned,
then it is legitimate that I try to do so too.
In any case, the assumptions are not quite as negative for my task as they might first seem. Firstly,
consider the assumption about self-interest What the public goods theorists have done is posit an
extremely dismal notion of a person, interested in maximising his or her own utility, a Hobbesian
person. But if we are able to take the same gloomy notion and show that, even then, cooperative
solutions are possible, then it might be felt that, when we move closer to the real world of human
interaction, cooperative solutions might become more likely. As De Jasay points out, game theory
avoids founding its argument on 'the decency, far-sightedness, and considerateness of human nature'
(De Jasay 1989 p. 126). But: 'It may well be that man's better self is more robust than he is given
credit for in the bleak theory of public goods. In particular, it may be the case that his better self
becomes the more assertive, and his ability to sustain good co-operative solutions the more reliable, the
more often it is appealed to by prevailing social arrangements' (p. 126). But public goods theorists
must be challenged on the pitch they set: so any challenge must take as bleak a view of human nature,
'eschewing all reliance on our better selves lest it be open to the wholly proper objection that no
solution to a vital problem is much good that does not withstand 'selfishness' in motivation and single-
mindedness in its pursuit.' (p. 127).
What of the second assumption, about complete information? In the simple games shown in chapter 6,
complete information is assumed, as it was in early game theory. However, more sophisticated game
theory does construct games based on the more realistic assumption of incomplete information, using
a probabilistic model to reflect players uncertainties about the parameters of the game (Harsanyi 1992
p. 52; see Kreps 1990 for a discussion of the extensive literature on this). Introducing a probabilistic
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model clearly makes the outcome of the games uncertain - but then this caveat cuts both ways, affecting
anyone who wishes to use game theory to reach any conclusion. It would affect the supporters of state
intervention as well as those opposing it. So neither of these assumptions of game theory is detrimental
to the case being set out here.
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Appendix 11: (Chapter 6)
Models of Educational Provision - Additional Mathematics
N.B. In all the models it is assumed that b, f, and p, (the benefits, fees, and private benefits
respectively) are non-zero.
First model
Section 1
In general, it can been shown that this situation is a prisoner's dilemma whenever 2b>f>b, where b is
the external benefits per child educated, and f the fees per child. Using the standard terminology, T
= b, R = 2b-f, S = b-f, and P = O. For a prisoner's dilemma, T>R>P>S. That is, b>2b-f>0>b-f. This
is true whenever 2b>f>b. Note too that this situation can never be a game of chicken. For then,
T>R>S>P, which brings b>2b-f>b-f>O. This gives the contradiction of f>b and b>f!
Second model
Section 2
Generalising from this example, we find that whenever the fees are less than twice the benefits, 2b>f,
this game will be a game of chicken. However, it will be a prisoner's dilemma if the fees are greater
than twice, but less than four times, the benefits, 4b>f>2b. As before, school fees are f, benefits per
child are b. Then T=2b, R=2b-f/2, S=2b-f, and P=O. For chicken, T>R>S>P, i.e. 2b>2b-f/2>2b-f>O,
which is true when 2b>f. For prisoner's dilemma, the last pair of inequalities is reversed, which gives
4b>f>2b.
Third model: private and public benefits to education
Section 3
To be a prisoner's dilemma, we need, as usual, T>R>P>S, where T=b, R=2b+p-f, S=b+p-f, P=O. These
inequalities give: 2b+p>f>b+p.
Note that this situation can never be a game of chicken, for then we would have: T>R>S>P. This gives
b>2b+p-f>b+p-f>O. The outside and the inside inequalities give f>b+p and b-pc-f, a contradiction!
Section 4
We have R=2b+p-f/2; T=2b+p; S=2b+p-f; P=O. To be a prisoner's dilemma, this would need T>R>P>S.
That is, 2b+p>2b+p-f/2>O>2b+p-f. This is true if f>2b+p>f/2. To be a game of chicken, this would
need T>R>S>P, ie 2b+p>2b+p-f/2>2b+p-f>0. This is true if 2b+p>f.
Section 5
To be a game of chicken, previously we needed 2b>f. Now we need 2b+p>f, which is more likely to
be fulfIlled.
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Section 6
If funds are returned if enough money isn't raised, we have: R=2b+p-f/2; T=O; S=O; P=O. This is still
an assurance game provided that 2b+p>f/2, which is more likely to be true than in the previous case,
where the condition was only 2b>f/2.
Fourth Model
Section 7
In general there will be this single equilibrium if b+p>f: for the benefit of player 1 being an 'altruist',
i.e. in paying player 2's fees, is 2b+p-f; ifplayer 1 is not 'altruistic', then the benefits are b+p-f. Hence
it is in player l's interest to pay the fees if 2b+p-f>b+p-f>O.For player 2 to accept player 1's help, we
need 2b+p>b>O, or b-pe-O, which is always true, not surprisingly. However, if b-psf, then there are
two equilibria, one the same as before, the second for player 1 not to pay, and hence player 2 not to
attend. The comments about multiple equilibria in footnote 41 suggest that the former is again likely
to be the solution.
Section 8
Let the fraction of fees to be paid for by player 2 be k, (0<1c<1). Then we will have, analogously to
above, that player 1 will pay the remaining fraction (1-t) of the fees if the following inequality is
satisfied: 2b+p-(1-k)f>b+p-i>O. Similarly, it is in player 2's interest to pay proportion k of the fees if
2b+p-kf>b>O. For player 1, then, we have b-(l-k)f>-f, that is b>-kf, which is always true, as b,k,f are
all positive by assumption; we also get from the first inequality, b+p>f, as before. For player 2, the
second condition gives 2b+p-kf>b, i.e. b+p>kf. Clearly, the smaller k is, the more likely this condition
is to hold.
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Appendix 12: (Chapter 6)
many-person games
The intention here is simply to show that education can be modelled in the many-person games, that
the two person games can be extended as desired. This is so that we can use the results already derived
from game theory to show the kinds of solutions already derived: the intention again is not to move
forward the frontiers of game theory.
The first model we considered in chapter 6 above was the case where a person is choosing to purchase
schooling for his or her own child and is aware of external benefits but not private benefits. This type
of game can be extended to a many-person prisoner's dilemma game to model the interactions in a
more realistic society. Suppose we have (n+1) people deciding whether or not to spend money on
schooling. To show adequately the options we would really need an (n+lj-dimension matrix; failing that
we can represent the options of the people in a slightly more complex normal form. Below is an extract
from such a table, based on the figures used earlier, with £700 external benefits per child educated, and
school fees of £1000. The table shows the payoffs to the ith person, (all units f):
all other persons
pay
ith person
don't pay
opay
n don't
700-1000
o
j pay
n-j don't
7000+1)-1000
700j
n pay
odon't
700(11+1)-UXX)
700n
Again it can be seen that, by looking at the payoffs in each of these columns, that, regardless of what
anyone else does, 'don't pay' is a dominant strategy for the ith person. That is, £0 is greater than -
£300, i.e. £700-£1000; £700j is greater than £7000+1)-£1000, and so on. By symmetry, this is also the
dominant strategy for all individuals. But with everybody choosing not to pay, then their payoffs will
be zero each, as in the first column. However, if everyone had sent the child to school, then the
payoffs could have been the large sum of £700(n+1)-£1000.
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So the first model - a prisoner's dilemma under some circumstances in the two-person case - can
translate into a prisoner's dilemma in the many-person case. That is, universal defection will be the
result after one game.
The second model we considered was when one person (or family) could provide the funds for
schooling for all. This can be more realistically generalised by saying that there is a percentage of the
persons (or families) who could fund the schooling for the community, but each person (or family)
would prefer to be in the proportion that didn't pay. However, no-one would want for there to be no
school. Again we can generalize this model, although with slightly more difficulty. Taylor notes that
the central feature of the two-person game that should be maintained in the many-person game is that
each player is able to bind himself irrevocably, in this case, to non-payment for schooling. This is so
that others will be convinced that he won't cooperate, and hence choose to cooperate themselves (Taylor
1987 p. 41). Again, it is assumed that each person prefers the situation when all players do cooperate,
over that when no players cooperate. The best course of action for each player is for all others to
cooperate while he or she chooses not to. In fact, the natural extension of the two-person game, as
Taylor notes, is for each player to prefer 'to Defect if "enough" others Cooperate, and to Cooperate if
"too many" others Defect.' (p.41). In the many-person game of chicken, Taylor has shown that rational
individual action could lead to the undesired outcome of not enough people cooperating: 'For in the
rush to be among the first to make a commitment to non-Cooperation (and thereby secure a free ride
on the Cooperation of others), the number so binding themselves may exceed the maximum number of
players able to commit themselves without inducing non-provision of the public good.' (p.43). It must
be stressed that the cause of the inferior outcome is pre-commitment. Taylor suggests that this would
be a risky decision - because of the possibility of, in our case, not enough funds being raised, and the
teacher going elsewhere. Hence he concludes that some will be put off by this risk, and not go for pre-
commitment. That is, cooperation is more likely in the (one-oft) game of chicken than in the (one-oft)
prisoner's dilemma (p. 58).
Thirdly, we had the situation where an individual's contribution by itself was insufficient to provide a
school, which led in the two-person case to the assurance game. The generalization of this to the many-
person case would be similar to the above case, the game of chicken, except that now, the school could
only be funded if all members of the community contributed. This is now a less realistic situation than
that outlined above", One way in which the game might be an assurance game is if the educational
entrepreneur for reasons, perhaps, of community spirit stipulated that he or she would only go ahead
with building and staffing a school if all members of the community did contribute. If there was a
single defector, then the school would not be built. In this case, the many-person game of this would
18 Note that if it was agreed that some proportion less than the whole community could fund the school,
then the game would deteriorate into the game of chicken above.
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also be an assurance game. That is, (i) all paying for schooling is preferred by each player to universal
non-payment, and (ii) an individual will prefer to pay for schooling if at least a certain number of other
players do the same, but otherwise will prefer not to pay, so that the only equilibria are when all pay,
or when all do not". The likely outcome will then be the more advantageous universal cooperation.
Our fourth model included private as well as public benefits. This would alter the many-person games
by providing additional incentives for individuals to contribute to schooling, making the prisoner's
dilemma game less likely, and the chicken game and the assurance game more likely to arrive at the
cooperative solution.
Finally, our fifth model investigated the problem of poor citizens not being able to pay for education
at all. We could generalize this as a situation where a percentage of the population were not able to
pay for schooling. As the two-person case looked at the situation when 50% of the population (i.e. one
family) was not able to pay for schooling, we fmd that if a proportion greater than this is able to pay,
it becomes even more likely that it will be in their interests to pay for the schooling of the minority.
Again, however, as soon as this situation is opened up in this way, there becomes an incentive for
families to lie about their relative poverty, and to pre-commit themselves to not paying. In other words,
the game could deteriorate into a game of chicken. The earlier comments about the risk involved
pertain here. Also the earlier comments about there being an external body which is not the state which
is able to impose some means-test on the community is alsorelevant. The educational entrepreneur can
easily ask for some way of verifying that families asking for bursaries are really too poor to pay.
In all of these cases, then, moving to the many-person game extends the results of the previous two-
person games. Some are likely to be prisoner's dilemma, but many plausible situations will be games
of chicken or assurance games, or hybrids of these.
19 An 'intermediate' situation (in which some players pay and some do not) will not be an equilibrium
because it will be in each player's interests to unilaterally change his or her strategy.
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